Technologies of the natural: ‘Male enhancement’, gender conﬁrmation surgery, and the ‘monster cock’ by Thomas, Jennifer
Technologies of the Natural: ‘Male
Enhancement’, Gender Confirmation
Surgery, and the ‘Monster Cock’
by
Jennifer N.H. Thomas
B.A., (Sociology), Pacific University, 2010
B.A., (Spanish), Pacific University, 2010
Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
c© Jennifer N.H. Thomas 2020
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
Fall 2020
Copyright in this work rests with the author. Please ensure that any reproduction
or re-use is done in accordance with the relevant national copyright legislation.
Declaration of Committee
Name: Jennifer N.H. Thomas
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy
Thesis title: Technologies of the Natural: ‘Male Enhancement’,
Gender Confirmation Surgery, and the ‘Monster
Cock’























Responding to Susan Stryker’s (2006) call to identify the “seams and sutures” of the
‘natural body’, this dissertation analyzes the social incarnation of the ‘natural male body’
through ‘male enhancement’ discourse in Canada and the United States (247). As one of
the few sociological investigations into the medical practice of male enhancement, this
research reorients our analytical gaze away from the somatic transformations of
historically-oppressed people’s sexed bodies, towards bringing the male body, cis
masculinity, and whiteness into the spotlight of critique. This investigation is grounded in
fifty hours of online observations of a male enhancement forum for cis men interested in
augmenting their genitals; and twenty in-depth, qualitative interviews with medical
practitioners who specialize in male enhancement procedures. Drawing on the theoretical
and analytical tradition of somatechnics, I juxtapose bodies and somatic transformations
in relation to each other to reveal the underlying assumptions, justifications, and
prohibitions for particular forms of bodily being. I first compare how male enhancement
for cis men and gender confirming genital procedures for trans people are discursively
produced in contrasting ways, despite how both sets of these procedures use overlapping
medical knowledges to intervene on genitals, aiming to produce similar aesthetic results
and to reduce patient suffering. Yet male enhancement is discursively framed as
‘restorative’ or ‘augmentative’ of the natural male body, whereas gender confirmation
surgeries are rendered ‘constructive’ of an unnatural body. In the second half of my
analysis, I demonstrate how male enhancements that result in ‘monster cocks’, by
definition, make penetrative sexual practices impossible or cause sexual partners pain,
thereby creating a tension between sexual practices that male the body, and dominance
practices that accomplish masculinity. Reading the monster cock in relation to discourses
about the ‘female reproductive body’, dyspareunia, and racialized bodies, I trace how
male enhancement discourse works to shore up the contours of whiteness, cis masculinity,
and the male body. This project aims to disrupt the naturalized white male body against
which all others are measured, and attempts to make an intervention into how bodies
come to matter.
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Chapter 1
Identifying the Seams and Sutures
of the ‘Male’ Body
Hearken unto me, fellow creatures. I who have dwelt in a form unmatched with
my desire, I whose flesh has become an assemblage of incongruous anatomical
parts, I who achieve the similitude of a natural body through an unnatural
process, I offer you this warning: the Nature you bedevil me with is a lie. Do not
trust it to protect you from what I represent, for it is a fabrication that cloaks the
groundlessness of the privilege you seek to maintain for yourself at my expense.
You are as constructed as me; the same anarchic Womb has birthed us both. I
call upon you to investigate your nature as I have been compelled to confront
mine. I challenge you to risk abjection and flourish as well as have I. Heed my
words, and you may well discover the seams and sutures in yourself.
—Susan Stryker
My Words to Victor Frankenstein above the Village of Chamounix: Performing
Transgender Rage
Sociologists and feminists have given a great deal of attention to the bodies of
people who have historically faced oppression and who engage in somatic transformation
of their genitals, identifying their bodies as socially constructed sites of gender and sex.
Feminists have a lot to say about how ‘designer vaginas’ and other ‘female genital cosmetic
surgeries’, for example, produce ‘female bodies’1 according to logics of binary gender and
1I acknowledge that ‘female’ and ‘male’ are not a reflection of the ‘nature’ of bodies, and employ these terms
consistently throughout this manuscript as socially (re)produced divisions of materiality. For the purpose
1
heteronormativity (Pentney 2012; Braun 2009, 2005; Green 2005).2 Investigations into
surgical procedures for trans (Hausman 1995; Billings and Urban 1982) and intersex
people (Fausto-Sterling 2000; Dreger 1998; Kessler 1990) for the purpose of demonstrating
that sex is socially, medically, and technologically constructed number too many to list
here. Repurposing the common feminist quip ‘but what about the men?’ into a gesture
towards deconstruction I ask, ‘how does male enhancement constitute cis men’s bodies?’
It is not as though the importance of ‘male’ genitals to the intelligibility of
masculinity and the male body is lost on social scientists. There is an abundance of
academic interest from social theorists in investigating penile aesthetics (Brennan 2017;
Flowers et al. 2013; Castro-Vázquez 2013); the gender, sexual, and racial meanings of
penis size (M. Hall 2015; Del Rosso 2011; Lever, Frederick, and Peplau 2006;
Poulson-Bryant 2006; Bogaert and Hershberger 1999); the medicalization of erectile
performance (Gurevich et al. 2018; Maddison 2009; Potts 2005; Bordo 1998); the changing
social and historical meanings of (de)circumcision (Kennedy 2015; Fox and Thomson
2009b, 2009a; Gilman 1997); the (often forgotten) importance of the testicles to men’s
construction of masculinity and the ‘male’ body (Karioris and Allan 2017); among other
topics related to ‘male’ genitals (Hayes and Dragiewicz 2018; Owen and Campbell 2018;
Inhorn 2007; Stephens 2007; Cameron 1992). And while there is also a growing body of
research examining cis men’s participation in aesthetic practices (Atkinson 2008; Holliday
and Cairnie 2007; Weber 2006), I echo sociologist Jared Del Rosso’s (2011) surprise that
so few social scientists have investigated ‘male enhancement’ in general, much less as a
of improving the style and clarity of this dissertation, however, I chose to strategically limit the moments
when I use scare quotes around these (and other) concepts.
2Heteronormativity is the commonsense idea spread throughout the globe through colonialism that
heterosexual coupling is the elemental form of human association (see Warner 1993). It promotes and
naturalizes monogamy as the cornerstone of the family and of human civilization, as well as the alignment
of primary and secondary ‘sex characteristics’ with one’s gender and sexuality. Heteronormativity suggests
that females are naturally feminine women who are attracted to and form sexual and romantic relationships
with males who are naturally masculine men.
2
rich site for understanding how power operates—particularly through medical
discourse—to materialize the body as ‘naturally male’.3
This analysis reorients our analytical gaze away from focusing on the construction
of historically-oppressed people’s bodies and identities, and towards bringing masculinity
and the ‘male’ body into the spotlight of critique. Attempting to respond to Susan
Stryker’s (2006) challenge to “discover the seams and sutures” of the ‘natural body’, this
dissertation analyzes the social incarnation of the ‘natural male body’ through ‘male
enhancement’ discourse in Canada and the United States (247). Within the analytical
chapters of this dissertation, I explore how the male body comes to matter: a play on
words that expresses how bodies become material, take on meaning, and gain legitimacy.4
Anchoring my analysis is a comparative somatechnic method that enables me to juxtapose
bodies and somatic transformations in relation to each other to underscore how they are
discursively framed in contrasting ways, revealing the underlying assumptions,
justifications, and prohibitions for particular forms of bodily being. This manuscript offers
an examination of how medical discourse creates, maintains, rearticulates, and contests
categories of human difference rooted in the ‘natural body’ and upon which socio-political
violence is so often justified in Canada and the United States.
This investigation is grounded in roughly fifty hours of online observations of a male
enhancement forum for cis men interested in augmenting their genitals; and twenty in-depth,
qualitative interviews with Canadian and US plastic and cosmetic surgeons, urologists, and
other medical practitioners who specialize in male enhancement procedures. Of the twenty
physicians in my sample, six also specialized in gender confirmation procedures for trans
3I use ‘male enhancement’, among other variations of the term, to refer to penile length and girth
augmentations and scrotal enhancements. Physicians from my sample often used the terminology
‘augmentation phalloplasty’ to name medical interventions that aim to increase the length and/or girth of
the penis. While I occasionally use this language in this dissertation, I noticed that it caused more confusion
than elucidation during interviews with doctors. This is in part because some trans folks also undergo
phalloplasty procedures, making it difficult to distinguish between the set of patients and procedures I
was discussing. I also selected this term because medicalized language was not accessible to friends and
colleagues, but they immediately understood the meaning of ‘male enhancement’. I acknowledge that this
terminology is politically imbued and contentions; in this manuscript, I work to demonstrate how even the
term ‘male enhancement’ discursively functions to naturalize the male body.
4See feminist philosopher Judith Butler’s (1993) Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of “sex”.
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people.5 By examining this data through a feminist poststructuralist lens, I demonstrate
how various discourses operate to naturalize the particularly white male body both before
and after going under the proverbial knife.
I understand this project as entering into an ongoing conversation about the
‘nature’ of bodies and subjectivities. This research builds on previous scholarship—most of
which I outline in Chapter 2—but here I detail the historical accounts of male
enhancement, theoretical insights from men and masculinities studies, and comparative
analytical approaches from somatechnicians working to deconstruct masculinity and the
male body. I provide an outline of this research in the sections that follow, beginning with
an overview of the history of male enhancement within my research context.
A Brief History of Male Enhancement
Genital practices of penis stretching, elongation, and stone and bead implants have been
recorded throughout the world, from the Middle East (Wylie and Eardley 2007) to South
America (Talalaj and Talalaj 1994, cited in Wylie and Eardley 2007), and from Africa
(Lemperle and Elist 2015) to Asia (Oktavian, Diarsvitri, and Dwisetyani Utomo 2011;
Fischer et al. 2010; Hull and Budiharsana 2001), each with their own social and historical
meaning.6 While some of these genital practices reportedly began over one hundred years
ago, historians locate the emergence of penile enhancement practices in the United States
within the last sixty years (Luciano 2002; Haiken 2000).
The development of medical interventions into the penis in the United States
coincided with the advent and proliferation of plastic surgery techniques after the First
5Feminist sociologist Travers (2018) defines gender confirmation surgery as “surgical procedures that
enable the body to conform to gender identity, including but not limited to chest reconstruction, genital
reconstruction, and facial reconstruction” (221). I limit my use of the term ‘gender confirmation surgeries’
to refer only to genital interventions for trans folks for my purposes of comparing genital surgeries elected by
trans and cis people. My hope is that this research begins to problematize this language by demonstrating
how male enhancement itself is a form of somatic intervention that works to ‘confirm’ a cis man’s gender.
6However, the majority of sources (peer-reviewed or otherwise) that state penis augmentation has existed
throughout time and across cultures rarely provide evidence to support their claims. For example, Lemperle
and Elist’s (2015) book advertising male enhancement as well as Wylie and Eardley’s (2007) peer-reviewed
article do not cite scholarship—much less provide original data—to support their claims about jelqing as
an ancient Middle Eastern practice, and should be regarded with cautious suspicion. Despite this, a dozen
articles cite these sources as authorities.
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World War; surgeons initially operated on the penis to address ‘deformities’ from birth
and war-related injuries (Luciano 2002; Haiken 2000). However, it was not until the 1960s,
according to feminist historian Elizabeth Haiken (2000), that doctors sought to perform
male enhancement procedures. In these early procedures, medical practitioners attempted
to inject liquid silicone under the skin of the penis to add girth, but negative outcomes led
physicians to search for alternative methods to augment cis men’s genitals. Haiken
explains that with the development of liposuction technologies in the 1980s, surgeons like
Dr. Ricardo Samitier saw an opportunity to reuse the otherwise discarded fat by
transplanting it into the penis. These autologous fat transplants—meaning fat that comes
from one’s own body—consistently resulted in infections, a lumpy appearance due to
uneven absorption of the fat, and several other complications.
Haiken (2000) reports that length procedures began in the United States after Dr.
Harold Reed—a urologist located in Miami—imported a lengthening technique developed
in 1990 by Dao-chou Long, a physician from China. Reportedly, this technique—what
physicians in my sample called the suspensory ligament release—was originally developed
to ‘correct’ congenital disorders in infants, and was adopted by US male enhancement
physicians to elongate the penises of adults. The procedure involves cutting the ligaments
that keep the penis attached to the pubic arch and partially ‘rooted’ in the body. As
practitioners emphasized throughout our interviews, some people have more interior penile
length than others; if a patient has limited interior length, physicians are adamant that
cutting the ligaments will not result in any elongation. For patients who do have interior
penile length, severing these ligaments ostensibly allows the interior portion of the penis
to extend outward, with the aim of elongating the flaccid penis. Some of the doctors in my
sample claimed that a suspensory ligament release could result in up to two added inches
in flaccid length; however, most were skeptical of these gains. To maintain this added
flaccid length, patients need to maintain traction on the penis for several months using
various techniques and/or medical devices in order to prevent reattachment. Without
proper post-operative care, retraction can result in loss of the original penile length, not
just loss of the added length.
5
Historian Lynne Luciano (2002) describes some of the complications from the
suspensory ligament release procedure and girth augmentations using fat injections.
Problems ranged from nerve damage, scarring, inhibited erection, and lowered
erectile angle to penis shafts marred by concave areas, nodules, or benign fatty
tumors. Rare but frightening complications could also develop from the inner
root of the penis failing to hold its new position, causing it to swivel
disconcertingly. (193)
While some of these complications and negative outcomes may be reversible through revision
surgeries, doctors expressed that there is no guarantee they will resolve, or that additional
complications will not arise.
The experimental character of augmentation phalloplasty meant that most
doctors did not have training to perform these procedures, and as medical practitioners
with their own private practices, they received limited oversight and regulation (Bannon
1996).7 Moreover, not all physicians were board certified in urology or plastic surgery
(Luciano 2002). The American Urological Association—one of the most influential
organizing bodies in urology—reaffirmed their 1994 policy statement as recently as 2018,
stating that they do not support the division of the suspensory ligament nor the
subcutaneous fat injections because neither procedure has “been shown to be safe or
efficacious” (AUA 2018). Some physicians eventually lost their medical licenses for
botched procedures, or were sentenced to prison for the deaths of their male enhancement
patients (Luciano 2002; Haiken 2000; Bannon 1996).
While new lengthening procedures are relatively rare, physicians in my sample
report improved techniques to reduce negative outcomes. Fat injections now use much
smaller, micronized fat to reduce complications and poor results. Multiple other girth
augmentation procedures using saline injections, implants, fat grafting, hyaluronic fillers,
polymethyl methacrylate (PMMA) injections—an acrylic material inserted around the
erectile tissue of the penis—and other materials have since come onto the market.
Practitioners report that each of these girth procedures produces varying degrees and
7The history of scrotal enhancements in the United States or Canada is notably absent from the literature.
This absence persisted in my conversations with physicians, and therefore, in this dissertation. I agree with
Karioris and Allan (2017) that more social science research is needed about the scrotum.
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permanence of augmentation, as well as its own set of complications (see Chapter 5 for
additional information). However, even with these new materials and enhancement
techniques, litigation over botched procedures continues; current doctors face legal
consequences for negative outcomes from their male enhancement procedures, including a
physician in my sample.8
By 1996, male enhancement practitioners had performed an estimated fifteen
thousand augmentation phalloplasties on cis men, amounting to an estimated $24 million
dollar annual industry at the time (Bannon 1996).9 Luciano (2002) estimates that just one
physician, Dr. Rosenstein, had performed five thousand enhancements from 1991 to 1996,
up to ten procedures a day, amounting to about $200 thousand dollars per week in patient
fees, totaling at least $30 million dollars (191). Some claim that US physicians were
attracted to the male enhancement industry as a result of reduced incomes spurred by
managed care (Bannon 1996). This was certainly the case for four of the US practitioners
that I interviewed, like Dr. Wexler, who reported that his current career in male
enhancement is unrelated to the specialty for which he was originally trained in
medicine.10 He began performing male enhancement procedures after he realized that
cosmetic interventions could be charged at a premium out of pocket.
Cis men who engage in any degree of penis enlargement require some funds or access
to financing since none of these procedures are covered by insurance in Canada or the US
without a diagnosable problem. The prices of male enhancement procedures performed by
the practitioners in my sample range between, for example, $1,000 to $3,000 dollars for one
8This male enhancement practitioner requested that I not quote or identify him, even with a pseudonym,
due to the lawsuit he is facing.
9Unfortunately, male enhancement procedures are not delineated in the American Society of Plastic Surgery
(ASPS) report of cosmetic procedures ‘for males’. In fact, their report regularly excludes procedures men
tend to elect such as hair transplants and circumcisions (Holliday and Cairnie 2007). With that said,
the ASPS (2019) estimated that men accounted for eight percent of professionally-administered cosmetic
procedures, including both surgical and minimally-invasive interventions in 2019. That amounts to 1.3
million cosmetic procedures throughout the body performed on men within one year.
10All physicians’ names and the names of male enhancement websites from which I generated data for this
project are pseudonyms.
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Priapus Shot11—of which doctors claim most cis men seeking enhancement require three
shots or more to see any results—and upwards of $17,000 dollars for invasive surgeries.
Additional costs for airfare, hotel stays, car rentals, prescription medications, follow-up
visits, and unexpected hospitalizations make male enhancement procedures prohibitively
expensive for many cis men in Canada and the United States. Revision surgeries that
either modify an enhancement or remove enhancement materials (when possible) carry an
additional price. Some cis men from my online observations of Enhancement Forum claimed
that they spent upwards of $30,000 dollars on the entire procedure to gain half an inch to
two inches in length or girth, the permanence of which is not guaranteed. Some physicians
in my sample offer discounts, but they are usually given to firefighters, police and military
officers, or veterans.
The men who engage in do-it-yourself genital practices at home face less financial
burdens; however, they too can make costly purchases of penis enlargement equipment, such
as stretching and hanging devices, vacuum pumps, creams, vitamins, supplements, books,
and expert knowledges (such as consultations with doctors) in order to accomplish their
body projects. On the other hand, jelqing is a do-it-yourself male enhancement technique
that does not necessarily require equipment. It is often described as ‘milking’ the semi-
erect penis with strong pressure to thicken the tissue for mild enhancement (see Wylie
and Eardley 2007). Cis men perform these genital practices on their own, or sometimes in
addition to surgical interventions such as lengthening procedures. The history of these and
other at-home male enhancement practices in Canada and the United States is less clear,
and more research is needed.
Given the rise and expansion of the male enhancement market within the last thirty
years, one might expect sociologists and gender scholars to identify male enhancement
as a rich site for analysis. However, limited social science research has been conducted
on male enhancement. Beyond the medical literature on augmentation phalloplasty and
scrotal enhancements, existing research examines ads for ‘erectile enhancement’ supplements
11Physicians described Priapus Shots as a non-invasive, non-surgical injection of platelet rich plasma derived
from the patient’s own blood to “heal” and “restore” the vasculature, producing a mild girth enhancement.
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(Brubaker and Johnson 2008), compares ads for penis augmentation procedures with ads
for breast enlargement (Robinson 2008), or provides a brief historical overview of the male
enhancement industry in the United States (Luciano 2002; Haiken 2000).
None of these investigations, however, examines how male enhancement discourse
materializes and naturalizes cis men’s bodies as male, which are the aims of the present
analysis. To lay the theoretical groundwork for this project, I situate how men and
masculinities scholars and somatechnicians have made sense of the male body as socially
produced in the sections that follow. I begin by situating these bodies of scholarship in
relation to theories of masculinity.
Masculinity and the Male Body
Since knowledge has historically been produced by “men talking to men about men”
(Gutmann 1997, 385), and since patriarchal dominance works to systematically trivialize,
silence, and erase non-men, focusing on men and masculinity within a feminist and trans
somatechnic analysis may seem to detract from a larger emancipatory project that
commonly centers the lives of the subaltern. However, this project joins other feminist
scholars by redirecting my analytical gaze from the margins—from studying the bodies of
trans folks, cis women, and people of colour, for example—towards the centre—analyzing
the male body, cis masculinity, and whiteness—as a means of troubling the natural
foundations upon which so much social inequity is justified in Canada and the United
States. In this section, I contextualize my research within existing bodies of scholarship
that theorize masculinity and deconstruct the ‘male’ body.12
Early theories of masculinity in sociology, such as role theory forwarded by Talcott
Parsons (1954), conceptualized masculinity as a gender role enacted by men. The maleness
of these men’s bodies was not only assumed, but served as the foundation from which
masculinity emerged. This perspective claimed that biological differences between female
and male bodies resulted in well-defined cultural roles. Feminist theorists called into question
the naturalness of these gender roles (see Reeser 2010). In contrast to treating gender
12For a dedicated discussion of race, racialization, and whiteness, see Chapter 2.
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as essential, foundational, stable, complete, universal, or natural; gender scholars coming
from a feminist tradition conceive of masculinity as constituted through unequal social
arrangements. Sociologist R.W. Connell (1995), for example, identified a multiplicity of
masculinities that are configured in relationship to social hierarchies. After all, not all men
benefit from patriarchy equally.
The main arguments driving multiple masculinities theory depend upon the
notion that gender, sexuality, and race intersect to differentially position individuals in
relation to patriarchy, heteronormativity, racism and other systems of power (Connell and
Messerschmidt 2005; Connell 1995). Such an argument calls attention to how the field of
social arrangements generates “relations of alliance, dominance and subordination” that
pivot on different gender, sexuality, and race positions (Connell 1995, 37). Relations
between masculinities and other social positions instruct Connell’s socio-historically
mobile typology of hegemonic, complicit, marginalized, and subordinated masculinities.
Detailing each of these sets of social relations is beyond the scope of this literature review;
however, defining hegemonic masculinity is important for understanding how the field of
social relations are hierarchically organized in relationship to patriarchy.
Hegemonic masculinity is the “currently accepted strategy” for successfully
defending patriarchy, a strategy that also generates resistance to it (Connell 1995, 77).
Thus, hegemonic masculinity needs to be flexible and mobile in order to respond to
critiques that may threaten the legitimacy of patriarchal claims to authority and
dominance. Since hegemonic masculinity is not intended to serve as a stable or essentialist
character type, it manifests in diverse ways depending upon one’s socio-historical location.
Connell (1995) delimits hegemonic masculinity, stating that the “number of men
practising the hegemonic pattern in its entirety may be quite small” since hegemonic
masculinity is an ideal type that is rarely accomplished in social practice (79).
Multiple masculinities do not form a reified typology of categories, yet many
misinterpret Connell’s model in this way. A proliferation in identifying and cataloging
‘types’ of masculinity—such as ‘medicalized masculinities’ (Rosenfeld and Faircloth 2006),
‘Black masculinity’ (see Reeser 2010 for several examples), or the increasingly popular
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‘toxic masculinity’ (Berdahl et al. 2018; Kupers 2005)—has come to characterize much of
the field of men and masculinities studies.13 As sociologist and masculinity scholar C.J.
Pascoe (2007) points out, this trend tends to “construct static and reified typologies” that
neglect social context and ignore the empirical work that instructs Connell’s model of
multiple masculinities (8). Instead, Connell’s model conceptualizes masculinity as always
“historically contingent, contested, and deeply implicated in local relations of dominance
and oppression” (McLean 2017). As such, masculinity is a set of dialogical practices,
performances, and relations between the self and others configured by the larger social
context (McLean 2017; Del Rosso 2011; Pascoe 2007; Sheff 2006; Brickell 2005; Connell
and Messerschmidt 2005; Connell 1995).
The masculine formations I trace in this dissertation are socially and historically-
situated configurations of practices and discourses of dominance over one’s sexed body and
the bodies of others. Throughout this manuscript, I use the language of phallic masculine
embodiment—not to be confused with phallic masculinity (Brunner 2010; Thompson and
Holt 2004),14 and not to add to the never-ending inventory lists that classify ‘types’ of
masculinity (see Messner 2004)—but rather, to capture the practices and discourses of
dominance over one’s own body and the body of others that I identify in my analysis.
Phallic masculine embodiment is not reduced to the ‘male body’ in terms of the penis or
‘male’ genitals generally; bodies that are not socially assigned as ‘male’ can enact phallic
13Toxic masculinity is not a sociological concept (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). Psychiatrist Terry
Kupers’s (2005) article on toxic masculinity in prison reveals that the crux of the concept rests in separating
“those aspects of hegemonic masculinity that are socially destructive, such as misogyny, homophobia,
greed, and violent domination; and those that are culturally accepted and valued” (716). In addition
to implying that normalized attributes such as greed and misogyny are not “accepted and valued” by
dominant culture in Canada and the United States, the concept does little to identify the sets of social
relations and institutions that sustain it, instead gesturing to identities and attributes. Moreover, the term
does not lend itself to a historical nor an intersectional analysis because it assumes toxic masculinity is
uniform across time, space, and groups. While some feminists have adopted toxic masculinity as part of
their vernacular, the term came from the mythopoetic men’s movement that blamed mothers and women
for the production of ‘weak’ men (Ferber 2000).
14Laura Brunner (2010) develops the concept of phallic masculinity in her media studies analysis of the
television series Sex and the City, suggesting that phallic masculinity is an ideal type, rather than a
specific or diverse representation of real men’s experiences in the world. Rooted in physical strength,
disembodiment, and high socio-economic status and prestige, phallic masculinity is representative of the
‘universal male subject’. While phallic masculinity depends upon disembodiment—meaning an absent
presence of the body—Brunner seems to conflate phallic masculinity with the male body.
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masculine embodiment even if those bodies are not centered in this present manuscript.15
By using the term ‘phallus’ to indicate domination (see Pronger 1999), phallic masculine
embodiment refers to dominance practices enacted through and over the body.
Whereas many contemporary sociologists and feminists who study masculinity
theorize gender as a social construction and problematize the ways in which masculinity is
made to appear natural—replicating some of the issues from a Parsonian theory of
masculinity—they do not always successfully call into question the ‘naturalness’ of the
male body, much less acknowledge the social processes that constitute the body as ‘male’.
Some masculinity scholarship offers descriptions of the social behaviours of men,
acknowledging that the forms masculinity takes are socially constructed and thus
contingent upon unique socio-historical contexts; however, this work often reduces
masculinity to men and male bodies (see Gutmann 1997 and Connell 1995 for critiques of
this body of literature). Some anthropological scholarship, for instance, treats the male
body as the biological foundation for social patterns of behaviour (Friedl 1975); as the site
for inherent drives that determine masculine subjectivities (Tiger 2004); and as the
somatic material that limits masculinity to cis men (Gregor 1985).
According to this scholarship, masculinity is a social scaffolding that may differ in
its presentation, but nevertheless tends to be constructed upon a ‘natural’ male body as
foundation. By reducing masculinity to the male body, scholars render the male body as
the presocial, pre-discursive site from which masculine identity ‘naturally’ emerges.
Theories that naturalize the body as the origin of gender offer an inadequate contribution
to emancipatory politics for grounding identity in a ‘stable’ and ‘immutable’ body. While
descriptive studies of masculinity in cross-cultural contexts effectively illustrate the
socio-historical specificity of masculinity, the field of masculinities studies requires a
corresponding theoretical understanding of gender that problematizes the naturalization
of sexed bodies and their entangled but irreducible relationship with gender, sexuality,
race, and other systems of power.
15Taking cue from trans scholars and activists who use the language of ‘sex assignment’, I avoid using
language of ‘being born’ a particular sex as this obscures the social processes that are actively sexing the
body into a binary categorization.
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A few ways masculinity scholars have disentangled the relationship between
masculinity and maleness is by examining female (Pascoe 2007; Pronger 1999; Halberstam
1998) and trans masculinity (Halberstam 1998; Connell 1995). At the centre of their
argument is an insistence that non-male bodies that enact masculinity undermine a
naturalized alignment between sex as the foundation and gender as its effect. Positioning
themselves within a larger framework of queer and feminist theory, non-male masculinity
scholars strategically and provisionally stabilize the contours of the sexed body for the
purposes of deconstruction.
Pascoe (2007), for example, draws from her ethnographic field work observations of
masculinity and (hetero)sexuality in a US high school to build the argument that girls who
enact female masculinity trouble the naturalization of the male body as the core from which
masculine subjectivities emerge. How girls carried, positioned, and talked about their bodies
as differently-sexed accomplished the discursive work of recasting themselves as masculine.
Metaphorically donning a phallus, for example, or fashioning one’s chest as muscle, not
breasts, helped render intelligible their masculine enactments. Even though the masculine
girls cite the phallic or muscular body, Pascoe (2007) demonstrates that their gendered
enactments were not reduced to the material body, and therefore, disrupted the naturalized
alignment between male bodies and masculinity.
While non-male masculinity may decouple gender from the body, it does not
necessarily demonstrate the social materialization of the body. Other scholars (Del Rosso
2011; Rosenfeld and Faircloth 2006; Longhurst 2005) investigate the vulnerability of the
male body to performative failure, attending to cases when the male body fails to cite the
regulatory norm of sex, thereby necessitating the ongoing reiteration of its stability to
shore up its contents and boundaries.16 Employing a sociological lens, Jared Del Rosso
(2011) analyzed cis men’s understandings of their penis and its size by observing internet
forums for cis men who believe their penises are ‘short’. While still coded as ‘male’,
penises that are perceived as ‘short’ nonetheless pose a threat to the natural male body.
Central to Del Rosso’s claims is an insistence on the fragility of the discursive contours of
16Judith Butler (1993) explains that a regulatory norm “produces the bodies it governs” (1).
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the penis and male body. His work suggests that somatic failure exposes how bodies
materialize through gender. From his observations, for example, he learned that men
cajole their penises by stimulating a mild erection to “fluff up” their size so they appear
larger before a sexual encounter or in homosocial spaces, such as the gym or men’s
bathroom (715).17 The meaning of the sexed body emerges within a field of social
relations, in this case, under the gaze of sexual partners and other men. The male body,
therefore, does not transcend the social; it is made and remade through social practice.
Scholarship that examines the medicalization of cis men’s bodies has also
effectively demonstrated the social production of the male body (Szymczak and Conrad
2006; Longhurst 2005; Saint-Aubin 2002). Medicalization refers to the expansion of
medical jurisdiction, a process by which elements of everyday life are defined as illnesses or
disorders and are brought under the management of medicine (Conrad 2007; Rosenfeld
and Faircloth 2006). One of the strengths of this literature lies in its ability to render
visible how the male body materializes through medical discourse. Social geographer
Robyn Longhurst (2005), for example, demonstrates that cis men with breasts—who
would be diagnosed in Canada and the United States with gynecomastia—are rendered
abject in ways that normalize and naturalize men with flat chests. Parts of the male body
that are incompatible with binary sex illustrate how a “whole series of corporal
exclusions” are required for male bodies to remain discrete and intelligible as naturally
male, and reveal the persistent social energy needed to bring male bodies back into
alignment with binary sex (Reeser 2010, 94).18
Learning from these bodies of literature, this dissertation focuses on how the
processes that naturalize the ‘male’ body become more visible when the body is
destabilized or fails to cite regulatory norms of gender, sex, and race. Therefore, it is in
part when the naturalness of the male body becomes more vulnerable within male
17For the purposes of this manuscript, the term ‘homosocial’ refers to social interaction between people of
the same (‘homo’) gender or sex (Maddison 2009, 48). Homosocial spaces include locker rooms, bathrooms,
sex-segregated sports, ‘man caves’, and virtual male enhancement forums.
18Similarly, Butler (1993) queries “What is excluded from the body for the body’s boundary to form?” (65).
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enhancement discourse—such as from a possible diagnosis of an intersex condition19—that
I direct my attention (see Chapter 4 for an example of this analysis). As the analytical
chapters in this manuscript demonstrate, the threat of the unstable ‘natural male body’ is
contained through male enhancement discourses and practices that position cis men’s
bodies simultaneously as less male and as always already male. By repudiating the spectre
of failed ‘male’ embodiment, physicians can momentarily neutralize threats against the
integrity of masculinity and the male body. Maleing the body, therefore, is a constant
process of being and becoming, vulnerable to failure.20
There are additional means, however, of demonstrating the social materialization
of the ‘natural male body’ within male enhancement discourse that do not rely on bodily
failure as a necessary analytical entry point. In particular, men and masculinities studies
can learn from the theoretical and analytical tradition of somatechnics to demonstrate how
the sexed and racialized body is an unstable artifact of social and historical discourses that
naturalize the body. In the section that follows, I explain how a somatechnic method aids
this research, and briefly outline the comparative analysis I take up in this project.
The Somatechnics of Male Enhancement
Since masculinity and male embodiment are social and relational processes, I must
necessarily engage with other bodies, identities, and somatic practices. I can follow the
example of somatechnicians who map the materialization of the male body as natural by
19For the purposes of this thesis, the term intersex refers to bodies that display a range of traits (such as
hormones; chromosomes; gonads; reproductive organs; hair, fat, and muscle distribution; bone structure,
etc.) that do not correspond according to cultural expectations for binary sex. A person culturally and
medically-assigned as intersex, for example, could have ‘male’ XY chromosomes; but their body could
also be resistant to androgens or ‘male hormones’; and have hair, fat, and muscle distribution that is
culturally interpreted as ‘female’. I employ this definition of intersex in this thesis for the sake of clarity, as
a socially-agreed-upon understanding of the term broadly used within feminist theory. There is a long (and
problematic) history within feminist theory of gesturing to intersex people to show that the gender and
sex binary is a particularly social fiction (see Magubane 2014; Alm 2013 for critiques of this scholarship);
however, in many ways, the definition of intersex I just provided upholds the naturalness of the binary
by suggesting that intersex embodiment is separate from, and an aberration of, femaleness and maleness.
Despite my strategic use of the term in this thesis, my political and ethical commitments to troubling the
binary extend beyond this definition of intersex, and are explained in more detail in Chapter 2.
20Similar to how gender (Messner 2000; West and Zimmerman 1987) along with race and class (Jones 2009;
Vidal-Ortiz 2009; West and Fenstermaker 1995) are processes of ‘doing’ difference as ongoing social and
relational accomplishments, within this dissertation, the sexed body is not a noun but a verb.
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placing them in relation to other bodies, subjectivities, and somatic transformations
(Garner 2011; Fox and Thomson 2009a, 2009b). I explain the aims and methods of a
comparative somatechnic approach in more detail in Chapter 2, but briefly, somatechnics
understands all bodies as an ongoing process of somatic materialization that is
continuously shaped by socially and historically-specific discourses (Sullivan and Murray
2009). A somatechnic understanding of the body troubles the division between nature and
technology by emphasizing how all bodies are constituted through technologies, not only
those bodies that carry the most visible traces of explicit ‘modification’, surgery, or other
interventions (Sullivan and Murray 2009; Sullivan 2005b). A somatechnic method
prioritizes a comparative analysis that juxtaposes bodies and somatic transformations in
relation to each other to reveal the underlying assumptions, justifications, and
prohibitions for particular forms of bodily being (Sullivan 2009b).
As I demonstrate throughout the analytical chapters of this manuscript, the ‘natural
male body’ invoked by the practitioners who participated in this research is the effect of what
somatechnician T. Garner (2011) calls technologies of the natural: “the specific discursive
operations through which the male and female body are materialised as natural” (35).
Identifying the technologies that render the male body natural helps to show how the social
processes upon which maleness, masculinity, and whiteness rely are concealed both before
and after surgical intervention. Employing this concept reorients my analytic gaze towards
the socio-historical context and the discursive devices that constitute the body as naturally
male.
Adopting a somatechnics approach, I read the male body in relation to trans,
female, and racially-marked bodies, particularly Black cis men’s and Asian cis women’s
bodies. Confirming and extending the work of somatechnicians—resembling most closely
Garner’s (2011) analysis comparing gynecomastia surgery for cis men with trans chest
surgery—I first compare how male enhancement for cis men and gender confirming genital
procedures for trans people are discursively produced in contrasting ways. Gender
confirmation surgery is medically (and culturally) regarded as construction, while
cosmetic genital procedures for cis men are characterized by male enhancement
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practitioners as “restorative”, “therapeutic”, and “augmentative” of the ‘natural male
body’. This is despite how both sets of these procedures use overlapping medical
knowledges to intervene on genitals, often aiming to produce similar aesthetic results and
to reduce patient suffering. Surgical expertise and knowledge of the body overlaps
considerably between these two sets of patients and procedures, as six doctors within my
sample perform both male enhancement procedures and gender confirmation surgeries.
The contrasting ways in which these two procedures are discursively framed
constitute cis men’s bodies as ‘natural’ by presuming that ‘maleness’ not only preexisted
medical or do-it-yourself genital interventions, but that despite explicit intervention, the
‘maleness’ of the body remains intact after cis men obtain male enhancement. As Garner
(2011) notes:
[I]t is important to emphasize that the attribution of construction is not
strictly associated with surgical intervention—some bodies pass through
surgery unscathed—rather, the accusation of construction is a hierarchical
judgment used to perpetuate injustices and violence in the name of the
“natural” body (2).
In my project, by charting practitioners’ inferential and explicit invocation of the ‘natural’
and the ‘unnatural’, we can see how cis men’s bodies within male enhancement discourse
are renaturalized and rescued from abjection at the expense of trans bodies. Deconstructing
the discourses employed by male enhancement practitioners about the ‘natural male body’
helps us to trace how power (and resistance) constitute cis men’s bodies.
In the second half of this analysis, I apply the insights of somatechnics—including
the inextricability of technology and the body, the materialization of the body through
discourse, and the relational comparative analysis between bodies and somatic practices—
to trace physicians’ erasure and selective invocation of the ‘monster cock’. A ‘monster cock’
is defined by Enhancement Forum members as a penis whose size relative to the sexed
bodies of circlusive21 sexual partners (often after an augmentation) makes penetrative sexual
21‘Circlusion’ refers to the way a ring or tube—for example, a mouth, anus, or vagina—actively pushes on
something else—like a dildo or penis (see Adamczak 2016). I use the language of ‘circlusive sexual partners’
instead of ‘penetrated partners’ so as to avoid constructing them as passive objects of phallocentrism.
However, one may engage in both circlusive and penetrative sexual practices. For my purposes in this
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practices impossible, or causes sexual partners pain. I demonstrate that the figure of the
monster cock creates a tension between the ways in which the male body is constituted as
male, and how cis men accomplish masculinity: through heterosexual penetrative ‘success’,
and through phallic masculine embodiment serving as a sign that one has the largest penis
that a sexual partner has ever circluded (which necessarily compares one’s penis to the
penises of others).22 I trace how male enhancement discourse works to shore up the contours
of whiteness and the male body through heterosexuality, the ‘reproductive body’, and the
normalization of the particularly white male body. Through discourse analysis, I am able
to witness the male body as the effect of gender, sexuality, and race.
I lay out my approach to discourse analysis in Chapter 3, but discourse broadly
refers to the set of statements that direct what counts as ‘truth’. While discourse is made
up of statements, my aim is not to interpret language to unearth the hidden meanings of
speech, to excavate the intentions of the cis men posting on Enhancement Forum or the
physicians during our interviews, nor to assess and declare what is ‘truth’ and what is
not. This is why I mostly avoid making (counter)claims about the veracity of physicians
statements, about their procedures or otherwise. Similarly, discourse analysis does not ask
what statements essentially mean, but rather, how do these discourses operate, and what
categories and sets of relations do they produce?
My analysis supports the claim that the ‘natural’ body operates discursively in ways
that perpetuate, maintain, and legitimize inequity along the lines of race, sex, gender, and
sexuality. Erasing the construction of the ‘male body’ through naturalization techniques—
while foregrounding the construction of trans bodies, or the (un)naturalness of cis women’s
and racially-marked bodies (particularly the bodies of Black cis men and Asian cis women)—
functions to maintain oppressive social arrangements, and undercuts our abilities to enact
dissertation, I refer to folks as ‘circlusive sexual partners’—even if they may also engage in other sexual
practices like penetrating a partner—when I aim to foreground specific sexual relations pertinent to monster
cocks. Circlusion should not be interpreted as the entirety of one’s sexual practices, just the particular
practices most salient to this analysis.
22This analysis is limited to and by physicians’ talk about cis women as their patients’ sexual partners.
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social change. Through this project, I aim to unsettle the standard of the ‘natural male
body’, cis masculinity, and whiteness.
Trans and Cis
The aims of this manuscript do not include forwarding a reconceptualization of the meanings
ascribed to ‘trans’ and ‘cis’. Recognizing that cis and trans are contested categories, and
any exegesis I could offer up for either term would be necessarily incomplete, provisional,
contingent, socio-historically situated—and therefore, circumscribed by medical, legal, and
popular conceptualizations of the terms—I nevertheless must provide some explanation of
my use of these categories in this dissertation.
The term cisgender is derived from the Latin prefix ‘cis’, meaning ‘on this side’,
in comparison with the prefix ‘trans’, meaning ‘across’.23 At birth, or perhaps during a
sonogram, declarative (and constitutive) statements like ‘it’s a girl!’ are a social assignment
of gender—based most often on a doctor’s or parent’s observation of an infant’s genitals—
that carries with it a host of assumptions about the gender (and sexual) development of
the infant into a feminine person, a girl, a woman. In Canada and the United States, ‘cis’ is
broadly used to indicate a culturally recognized-correspondence between one’s sexed body
assigned at birth and one’s gender (Kolysh 2016; Schilt and Westbrook 2009). In this way,
cis implies agreement, but also immutability, meaning a retention or maintenance of one’s
gender and sex assignment from birth (Enke 2012). This implied stability in cis identity
and embodiment, however, runs counter to gender scholars’ insistence that gender is an
ongoing social and relational process of accomplishment (West and Zimmerman 1987) and
repudiation of other gendered ways of being (Pascoe 2007) that can change throughout
the life-course (Simon 2015), and that only persistent social energies make gender appear
immutable.
Garner (2011)—a trans scholar who uses the pronouns ‘they’ and ‘their’—explains
that before the emergence of the terms ‘cis’ and ‘cisgender’ in common vernacular, ‘bio
23Throughout this manuscript, I try to explicitly identify cis people as ‘cis’ out of recognition for, and in an
effort to balance, how trans people and their bodies are constantly marked in and outside of this text.
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female’ and ‘bio male’ were common descriptors used by the trans community in Canada and
the United States. However, they illustrate that emphasizing biology when distinguishing
between trans and non-trans people has the tendency to attribute authenticity to biology
and artificiality to trans identity.
The dichotomy of ‘cis’ versus ‘trans’ is intended to avoid the delegitimisation of
transsexual bodies associated with the attribution of ‘bio’ to non-trans people.
‘Cis’ does not have the same implications of devaluation because it is not a term
through which power operates as the term ‘biological,’ or its synonym, ‘natural,’
is. (168)
With that said, there have been some critiques from within the trans community of the term
‘cis’ for being elitist and inaccessible along class lines (Garner 2011) as well as concerns about
creating a new binary separating trans from cis existence and experience (Manion 2018).24
Holding these critiques in tension, I have elected to use the language of ‘cis’, not only
because it is now relatively well-established terminology amongst trans communities (and
the wider public), but also because it foregrounds the culturally-recognized correspondence
between sex assignment and gender, which holds particular relevance for the analysis of this
project.
Any definition of the term ‘trans’ also delimits its application and membership,
and “has the potential to inadvertently reproduce exclusions at its boundaries, be counter
to alternative trans significations, and render invisible inequalities within the category
through the erasure of difference” (Simon 2015, 1). Perhaps this explains in part why
there exists a productive tension within trans studies between explicitly defining what
‘trans’ means, and leaving the concept open. I offer up this attempt at definition as a
necessarily partial explanation. In Canada and the United States, the category ‘trans’ is
commonly understood as describing people whose sex and/or gender assignment at birth
does not culturally correspond with their sense of self. Trans folks disrupt assumptions of
24Some scholars, like feminist sociologist Meagan Simon (2015), suggest that “[b]oth people who have
and have not transitioned can use cis to mark a coherently gendered body” whereby ‘trans’ serves as
a temporary identity through hormonal and surgical transition towards cis subjective embodiment (83). In
this formulation of ‘cis’, socially-recognized coherence between one’s body and gender forms the bedrock for
cis identification, regardless of when that coherence materializes, not necessarily ‘matching’ one’s assigned
gender/sex at birth. This (re)conceptualization, while useful in capturing some trans peoples’ experiences,
can limit the meaning of ‘trans’ to somatic transition that only some trans folks (can) pursue or experience.
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cultural correspondence between gender and sex assignment, as their sense of gender
throughout the life course may not always or ever culturally ‘agree with’ how they were
socially assigned.
Using the language of ‘transgender’ as an umbrella term, trans theorist Susan
Stryker (2008) conceptualizes this category in relationship to a starting point to which one
has not consented, a “movement across a socially imposed boundary away from an
unchosen starting place” (1). Echoing this movement, cultural theorist C. Riley Snorton
(2017) understands ‘trans’ as a “movement with no clear origin and no point of arrival”
(2). Feminist sociologist Meagan Simon (2015) centers gender within the the term ‘trans’
“to signify a constellation of embodied subjectivities that somehow transgress or trouble
normative understandings of gender” (1). According to this description, those who may
‘fit’ under the umbrella term ‘trans’ include those who identify as transgender,
transsexual, genderqueer, nonbinary, bigender, pangender, and agender, etc. I loosely
adopt these definitions of ‘trans’ for this manuscript. Understanding ‘trans’ in terms of a
demarcation between gender and sex assignment is useful for this project in part because
it is upon this gender trouble, this movement, that doctors’ logics hinge for both opening
and closing the gate for trans folks’ access to genital technologies.
Any definition of ‘trans’ within a project that analyzes the ‘natural body’ must
explicate their relation. Transgender theory coming from a queer or poststructuralist
tradition often defines ‘trans’ as rooted in a transgressive politics that denaturalizes
gender and the sexed body, representing gender as fluid and fragmented (Whitehead et al.
2015; Whitehead and Thomas 2013; Enke 2012; Whitehead et al. 2012; Garner 2011;
Sullivan 2009b; Stryker, Currah, and Moore 2008; Stryker 2006b; Halberstam 1998),
whereas other threads of transgender scholarship define ‘trans’ in alignment with a politics
of human rights and recognition, and typically foregrounds trans narrative and the
phenomenology of the body (Namaste 2000; Prosser 1998). As Namaste (2000) makes
clear, some of the scholars coming from a poststructuralist tradition can—in their efforts
to demonstrate that gender and the sexed body are socially constructed—neglect the
everyday experiences of trans people, fail to center their needs, and can problematically
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represent trans folks as cultural dupes of the gender binary. This project agrees with
others (S. Hines 2006; Hird 2002) that attention to the everyday lives of trans people is
compatible with understanding gender and sex as discursive, yet entirely real and material
in their consequences. While my objective in this manuscript is to denaturalize the body
in alignment with a more transgressive politics, I do not take aim at the bodies nor the
identities of historically-oppressed groups. Rather, I aim to deconstruct the ‘natural male
body’, cis masculinity, and whiteness. In the next section, I list the research questions that
orient this project in order to accomplish such a deconstruction.
Research Questions
This research is founded on a loose patchwork of inquiries seeking to engage with multiple
sets of intersecting and competing discourses that arise within the private practices of
twenty medical practitioners who specialize in male enhancement. The questions below seek
to identify the seams and sutures of the ‘natural male body’ through male enhancement
discourse. This research asks:
• What is the character of the relationship between ‘male enhancement’ discourse and
the materialization of the male body?
• How are particular bodies and subjectivities rendered (un)natural in male
enhancement discourse both before and after somatic intervention?
• Which bodies and subjectivities are excluded from male enhancement? How do these
absences point to the social materialization of particular configurations of gender and
the ‘natural’ sexed body?
• How does male enhancement discourse operate in relation to the male body compared
to trans, racially marked, and female bodies?
Organization of the Dissertation
In Chapter 2, “Theorizing Male Enhancement”, I detail the theoretical debates, historical
analyses, and conceptual tools from which I draw to identify the character of the
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relationship between ‘male enhancement’ discourse and the materialization of cis men’s
bodies. This project builds on and is indebted to thinkers who have come before me
within trans studies, critical race theory and whiteness studies, queer theory, feminist
science studies, somatechnics, masculinity studies, sociology of the body, disability studies,
and poststructuralism.
I begin by outlining Michel Foucault’s conceptualization of power, which instructs
the theoretical and methodological choices of this project, including my use of
somatechnics as an analytical framework. Somatechnics helps to resolve a theoretical
tension within feminist literature; by reimagining the body and technology as inextricable,
somatechnics disrupts the veneration of the ‘natural’ body and the antagonism leveraged
against the ‘modified’ body. As a theoretical tradition and analytical method,
somatechnics is compatible with the overall aim of this project in deconstructing the
‘male’ body and identifying the operation of (de)naturalization techniques invoked by
male enhancement practitioners. In the remainder of the chapter, I synthesize feminist
science with the history of the sexed and racialized body to equip readers with an
understanding of how male enhancement physicians’ statements fit within or trouble the
ongoing legacies of binarist and bioreductive science. The focus of feminist science studies
on sex ambiguity, the sexed body as a racial project, and sex similarity sets the stage for
how I conceptualize the social production of the sexed body, gender, and race in this
manuscript.
It is within Chapter 3, “Method and Methodology”, that I discuss the paradigms
that orient this research and inform the creative processes—the methods that generated
research data—for this project. Here I delineate the pilot study I conducted through
observations of a virtual male enhancement forum that enabled me to ground my
interview schedule with physicians in existing discourses of male enhancement. I provide a
broad overview of my research field in the private medical practices of twenty male
enhancement doctors; my recruitment methods; the characteristics of my sample; the
expertise of the practitioners I interviewed; and my semi-structured interview protocol. An
outline of how I use grounded theory and an explanation of the comparative analytical
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method of somatechnics precedes a description of my approach to discourse analysis.
Taking account for my part in the generation of knowledge, I reflect on my situated
position in relation to my participants and this research, including some of my ethical and
political commitments. I conclude the chapter by reflecting on the uneven relationship
between investigators and participants—particularly between women researching men
while discussing sexual themes—and the absence of institutional support from research
ethics boards and universities to help researchers navigate their vulnerability to violence
in the field.
The analytical chapters in this dissertation are divided into two sections. The first
primarily relies on physicians’ responses to one question from my interview protocol: “Why
do you suppose that transgender people require counseling and a professional letter written
on their behalf to receive elective genital procedures and your cisgender patients do not?”
Building on the work of somatechnician T. Garner (2011), the first two analytical chapters
of this dissertation examine the naturalization of cis men’s bodies through a comparative
discourse analysis of male enhancement and gender confirmation surgery. The theme of the
second section analyzes how male enhancement practitioners erase or selectively invoke the
trope of the ‘monster cock’. I demonstrate how male enhancements that result in ‘monster
cocks’, by definition, make heterosexual penetrative practices impossible or cause sexual
partners pain, thereby creating a tension between sexual practices that male the body,
and dominance practices that accomplish masculinity. In addition to examining the way
that ‘the natural’ is leveraged against historically-oppressed groups, the through line that
connects all analytical chapters is the (re)naturalization of the ‘male’ body and cis men’s
subjectivities through male enhancement discourse.
In Chapter 4, “Authenticity and Suffering: Juxtaposing Gender Confirmation
Surgery and Male Enhancement Discourses”, I analyze how the operations of authenticity
and suffering function within the differential medical management of trans and cis bodies
to naturalize one’s sex assignment at birth, thereby characterizing the post-surgical trans
body as ‘unnatural’. Male enhancement practitioners commonly offer cis men access to
genital technologies after one consultation—sometimes within the same day—without
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questioning cis men’s identities as authentic, and in fact by locating their gender
authenticity within the male sex assignment they were given at birth. Even when cis
men’s bodies fail to cite the regulatory norm of sex—as in the case of intersex patients, for
example—practitioners reassert cis men’s gender and sex authenticity by separating their
shortcomings of an “underdeveloped penis” or “boobs” from the rest of the ‘male’ body.
On the other hand, practitioners express doubt in the authenticity, stability, and
permanence of trans identity, reflecting wider social anxieties that there are ‘fake’ trans
people who will change their minds after surgery. Trans patients are required to prove
themselves authentic by living in their affirmed gender, sometimes waiting years to receive
letters of support from mental health professionals in order to gain the kind of access that
cis men are readily provided.
In the second half of this chapter, I examine how even though both trans folks
and cis men experience suffering, it only makes sense to practitioners to alter the body to
ease cis men’s suffering from what they perceive to be social burdens, but not to ease the
so-called “inner”, mental anguish of trans people. Trans people’s suffering—despite serving
as the key criterion for diagnosing trans folks with Gender Dysphoria, and the primary
symptom to be addressed by gender confirmation surgery—works to undercut their access
to genital technologies. As I demonstrate through physicians’ comments, they continue to
pathologize and individualize trans suffering as an “inner”, “psychological problem” of
mental and emotional instability—ignoring experiences of gender euphoria and creative
transfiguration—while normalizing cis men’s suffering as a predictable and acceptable
response to suffering from “genital ridicule”. Even though physicians acknowledge that the
“genital ridicule” cis men can experience is often perpetuated by other men, practitioners
largely ignore these forms of harassment, claiming that the “demands” from the “liberated
female” for equal access to sexual pleasure are “more damaging”. In some cases, doctors
identified suffering as the clearest indication that cis men are eligible for male
enhancement procedures, rather than a clear sign that they need mental health support.
Physicians’ logic appears to suggest that internal, psychological problems cannot be
ameliorated by external, medical interventions into the soma.
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I continue this comparative analysis in Chapter 5, “Harm, Regret, and
Dissatisfaction: A Somatechnic Analysis of Trans and Cis Genital Interventions”, to
understand how ‘the natural’ structures the somatic (im)possibilities for cis and trans
folks differently through discourses of harm, regret, and dissatisfaction. Doctors frame
trans people’s gender transition as harmful to the sex they were assigned at birth,
claiming they are “swimming against the stream of nature”, whereas the sexed bodies of
cis men do not experience harm despite genital interventions through male enhancement.
Instead, physicians suggested that cis men can experience harm to whiteness from
receiving “unorthodox” procedures that racially mark the body, such as bead inserts into
the shaft of the penis. According to practitioners, cis men can also experience harm to
normative masculinity by undergoing penile reductions, or any enhancement while
suffering from Body Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD). In the case of BDD—which like Gender
Dysphoria is a condition outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders—we see a rare overlap between the gatekeeping of trans patients and the
gatekeeping of body dysmorphic cis men. While the two cases are irreducible, physicians’
logics are fairly consistent across their medical practices that external modifications to a
patient’s genitals are inappropriate interventions for addressing internal, diagnosable,
psychological problems that doctors view as defying the ‘natural’ body or mind.
The second half of this chapter is dedicated to understanding how regret and
dissatisfaction operate differently within the medical management of trans and cis patients
undergoing genital interventions. Practitioners police the embodiment projects of trans
people under the assumption that they will inevitably regret irreversible transformations
because the sexed body—the ‘natural core’ from which gender identity ostensibly emerges,
according to physicians—will persist even after genital interventions. However,
gatekeeping gender confirmation surgeries on the basis that they are irreversible, while not
gatekeeping male enhancement procedures—which are not necessarily reversible nor
predictably safe—demonstrates the asymmetrical treatment of these two groups of
patients, and the shaky foundation upon which doctors justify closing the gate to genital
technologies for trans patients, while keeping it open for cis men. Moreover, the
26
presupposition that trans people regret somatic transformation is not borne out by clinical
research, which shows the incidence of trans people’s regret is incredibly rare. Only one
practitioner resisted discourses of trans regret, and I share his comments in this analysis.
While doctors were apprehensive about trans patients regretting transition—locating
regret within a ‘core bodily identity’—they only expressed concern about cis men’s
potential dissatisfaction with the results of a male enhancement procedure.
I transition my focus to the second theme of this dissertation in Chapter 6, “‘Too
Big Doesn’t Mean Anything’: ‘Monster Cocks’, the ‘Reproductive Body’, and the
Racialization of Genitals”. Here I map out the erasure and selective invocation of the
monster cock. According to cis men’s accounts on Enhancement Forum, acquiring a
monster cock through penile augmentation is a process of exerting dominance over female
bodies, and by exercising physical and sexual superiority over other male bodies, a process
of dominance I call phallic masculine embodiment. However, given that monster cocks, by
definition, impede penetration due to their size, accomplishing phallic masculine
embodiment through monster cock augmentations competes with how the body is maled
through heterosexual penetrative practices. Physicians work to frame the ‘female
reproductive body’ as naturally capable of “accommodating” any size penis as a means to
confirm cis men’s bodies as male through heterosexual penetration. Physicians claim
that—for their heterosexual patients—a penis could never be ‘too big’ or cause a circlusive
‘female’ sexual partner pain from penetration because of the biological “design” and the
“natural” capacity of the vagina to birth babies.
In physicians’ limited attempts to acknowledge cis women’s unwanted pain from
penetration, they (de)naturalized cis women’s sexed bodies as ill and aging, or racialized
Asian cis women’s vaginas as “small by nature” for failing to “accommodate”—much less
sexually enjoy—a monster cock. (De)naturalizing cis women’s bodies that ‘fail’ thus shores
up the naturalness of the male body. Practitioners also denaturalized the genital size of
Black cis men as the only people with penises large enough to cause cis women unwanted
vaginal pain through penetration. Both the ‘big Black dick’ and the “tight Asian pussy”
function discursively to naturalize and reassert the maleness of particularly white cis men’s
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bodies. Overall, this chapter traces the discursive devices employed by male enhancement
practitioners in service of naturalizing penetrative heterosexuality, the ‘female reproductive
body’, whiteness, and the ‘male body’.
In Chapter 7, I conclude by identifying the significance of the similarities and
divergences between this research and similar scholarship, explaining the implications of
this research for different bodies of scholarship, and by outlining possible future directions




Physical bodies, like the material world that encloses them, really exist. But by
the very nature of their existence, nothing is actually self-evident about what will
be seen as self-evident in the nature of the body. And often, what seems so
self-evident about the experience of the body belongs to history, not nature.
—Roger Lancaster
The Trouble with Nature: Sex in Science and Popular Culture
Throughout this chapter, I explain and contextualize the theoretical foundations
and analytical devices I use in this project to identify how bodies come to matter through
male enhancement discourse. I begin by outlining Michel Foucault’s theory of biopower,
which grounds this research and informs my somatechnic understanding of bodies. This
chapter critically analyzes a central theoretical tension within feminist theory about the
character of the relationship between the body and technology, which tends to treat body
projects as either liberatory or oppressive and creates a false dichotomy between a
‘natural’ body untouched by social intervention versus an artificially ‘constructed’ body.
The theoretical tradition of somatechnics—which understands bodies as inextricably
bound up with technologies—provides a way out of these worn debates. From here I detail
a set of conceptual tools, including (de)naturalization, that are situated within
poststructuralist theory and aid me in deconstructing the ‘natural body’ invoked by male
enhancement practitioners. A brief synthesis of feminist science studies, as well as the
history of the sexed and racialized body in Canada and the United States set the stage for
how I conceptualize the ‘male’ body within medical discourse.
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Conceptualizing Power
Social scientists often theorize power in its juridical form, explaining how institutions—as
well as subjects—can possess power, exercising it from the top-down onto a population,
and wielding power so as to be repressive through prohibitions, punishment, and negation.
According to this punitive, hierarchical framework, those who possess power are in a position
of authority to oppress those who lack power. Foucault (1990) traces the historical transition
away from this form of juridical power—the sovereign power over the life and death of
subjects—to what he distinguishes as biopower as a more effective form of managing and
controlling bodies and populations through productive measures rather than direct physical
punishment. Since Foucault’s use of biopower diverges from common interpretations of
juridical power, it is particularly instructive in this project and germane to the analytical
framework of somatechnics that orients this research.
Biopower refers to historically-specific technologies of the state that invest in and
administer life (rather than death) through regulation and discipline (rather than
punishment) of the population and the body. Two interconnected strategies constitute
biopower’s management of the population and the body, biopolitics and anatomo-politics,
respectively. Biopolitics of the population refers to the regulation and surveillance of
births, mortality, health, sanitation, marriage, divorce, and other social problems faced by
the state managing a population. In other words, biopolitics invests in and manages the
productive and reproductive capacities of life and the health and longevity of the
population. Anatomo-politics of the human body, on the other hand, is the materialization
of relations of power in the individual body, the disciplining of the bodily form as an
investment in and resource for sovereign power. Institutions such as schools, prisons, and
the military render the body a disciplined site for subject formation to optimize its
efficiency, utility, and political docility. Through anatomo-politics, power produces
obedient and ‘willing’ bodies as a state resource. Power that conceals our submission to
regulation because we are disciplined, ‘willing’ subjects is arguably far more insidious than
punitive hierarchical forms of power that come from external authorities.
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Foucault (1990) focused on, among other things, the history of sexuality because
it demonstrated a nexus point between biopolitics of the population and anatamo-politics
of the human body. Sexuality is at the center of both biological reproduction necessary
for sustaining a population (biopolitics), and is “a vector through which power insinuates
itself into subjectivity” through discourse to produce “comportments, miens, attitudes, and
other bodily postures and practices” (anatamo-politics) useful to sovereign power (Pugliese
and Stryker 2009, 3). Furthermore, non-normative sexuality serves as a justification for
disciplining the body and the self through institutions such as the heteronormative family,
the church, the mental asylum, and the internment camp (see Pugliese and Stryker 2009).
As such, Foucault claimed that sexuality became an important nexus point through which
power operates for the management of life.
In this research, the connection between biopolitics and anatamo-politics hinges
on somatechnologies that Stryker and Sullivan (2009, 52) suggest “function as ‘the
capillary space of connection and circulation between the macro- and micro-political
registers through which the lives of bodies become enmeshed in the lives of nations, states,
and capital-formations’ (Stryker, Currah, and Moore 2008, 14)” [citation in original]. In
other words, the possibilities for bodily being, the possibilities for bodily formation and
transformation are entangled with the integrity of the body politic. Bodily
(trans)formations through somatechnologies are possible insofar as they enable bodies “to
be integrated into a particular social field as a resource for the exercise of sovereign
power” (Stryker and Sullivan 2009, 57). I provide an exegesis of somatechnics as a
theoretical tradition and method of analysis later in this chapter.
Foucault demarcates his scholarship on power from other theories by treating
power not as a possession—something that some subjects or institutions ‘have’ and others
do not—but rather, as diffused, enacted over and through all bodies through normative
expectations. Trans activist and legal scholar Dean Spade (2015) summarizes a
Foucauldian conceptualization of power with the following:
Power is not a matter of one dominant individual or institution, but instead
manifests in interconnected, contradictory sites where regimes of knowledge and
practice circulate and take hold. This way of understanding the dispersion of
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power helps us realize that power is not simply about certain individuals being
targeted for death or exclusion by a ruler, but instead about the creation of
norms that distribute vulnerability and security. (4)
Thus, power is not a tool wielded by authorities, but rather, exists at the level of everyday
life. A Foucauldian conceptualization of power is distinctive because it is not just prohibitive,
repressing the subject and the body through coercion. According to Foucault, it is also
productive, applying positive techniques through normative expectations that both enable
and control the body and the subject. Power has positive content; “it traverses and produces
things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourses” (Foucault and Gordon
1980, 119). In this way, power is not simply top-down, but capillary from the bottom up
whereby subjects participate in our own discipline through norms, because power incites
desire and a “will to knowledge” (Foucault 1990, 12).
Norms do not merely act upon the body as if it is an existing canvas ready to
be painted, but rather, norms discipline and constitute the body. The normative power
of gender, sex, and race, for example, are not deterministic, nor are they negotiated by a
presocial self who can enact their unencumbered agentic will. Rather, gender, sex, and race
are compulsory. According to Foucault, absolute abstention from these unequal systems of
power is not possible since power is everywhere, always changing, multiple, and conditional.
Our bodies and selves are rendered intelligible in relationship and in resistance to the
operation of power.
In contrast to other conceptualizations of power, normative power masquerades as
our own agentic choice and individual responsibility to improve our bodies and selves. Self-
reflection and self-regulation of one’s body, soul, thoughts, and comportment—also known
as subjectification—is not evidence of a presocial self, capable of negotiating how much
it will ‘listen’ and ‘conform’ to normative expectations. Instead, subjectification is always
mediated and circumscribed by discourse, especially by expert knowledge. In other words,
the self is the effect formed through these social expectations, not the cause. Disciplining
bodies through normative power produces:
[m]odes of subjectification, through which individuals are brought to work on
themselves, under certain forms of authority, in relation to truth discourses, by
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means of practices of the self, in the name of their own life or health, that of
their family or some other collectivity, or indeed in the name of the life or health
of the population as a whole. (Rabinow and Rose 2006, 197)
Thinking through body projects using a Foucauldian analysis of power enables sociologists
studying the body to conceptualize cosmetic interventions—which are commonly framed
and experienced as an empowering lifestyle ‘choice’—as rendering individuals responsible for
embodied self-improvement. Participating in medical discourse can certainly help us to take
care of ourselves, while also rendering us increasingly dependent upon expert knowledges;
engaging in male enhancement can feel like self-authorship, while making our bodies more
docile; transforming our bodies through cosmetic interventions can induce new pleasures,
while also constraining somatic possibilities.
A Foucauldian analysis of normative power allows me to study the social
materialization of gender, the sexed body, and race within discursive sites where power
and resistance take place simultaneously. Understanding normative power as it relates to
my research, individual social actors who elect or perform male enhancement procedures
are not simply cultural dupes or disempowered casualties of medical discourse and
cisgender masculinity, for this implies that we can transcend the systems of power that
constitute our bodies and subjectivities. Social actors are neither passive conformists nor
free agents—for that would misunderstand the operation of power—rather, social actors
always exist in some way related to or in resistance against technologies that (trans)form
our bodies and selves.
Situated within a Foucauldian conceptualization of power and the body is where
I locate the analytical framework of somatechnics that lies at the center of this project,
both in terms of broader theory about the body and analytical method. In the sections that
follow, I introduce this theoretical tradition and analytical approach. As a way to situate
and contrast my analysis, I start with a brief explanation of how many feminist theorists
in the west—particularly Canada and the United States—have historically conceptualized
the body as natural, biological, and separate from technology and social materialization.1
1The terms ‘western’ and ‘eastern’ are colonial language that centers England (the site of the prime meridian
that divides the earth into two hemispheres), while erasing Indigenous peoples, practices, and ways of
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The Body and Technology
Contemporary, commonsense understandings of the body in dominant western thought are
often rooted in ancient Greek philosophy and Enlightenment thinking, conceptualizing (and
thus bringing into being) the body as natural, biological, and material flesh independent of
social influence and ‘immaterial’ discourse. In this construction—which invokes Cartesian
dualism—the body is ontologically separate and inferior to the mind,2 and therefore, must
be controlled, regulated, and mastered (Grosz 1995).
As Sullivan and Murray (2009) make clear, Cartesian dualism permeated some of
early second wave feminism in Canada and the United States, which valued intellectual
participation in public life over reproductive labour, largely because the biological body
functioned as such an unyielding site of oppression and subjugation for women that
feminists sought to move beyond and overcome the body.3 Liberal and radical feminists
such as Betty Friedan (1963) and Shulamith Firestone (1970), respectively, often targeted
the ‘female body’—particularly cis women’s reproductive capacities and the
socially-imposed obligations to bear children—as central to women’s subordination to
men, preventing women (particularly white, wealthy, and married women) from
participating equally in ‘matters of the mind’, like economic and political life.4 In the
Feminine Mystique, Friedan (1963) confronts Sigmund Freud’s assertion that anatomy is
woman’s destiny, claiming that the lack of fulfillment that (white, wealthy, married)
women experience in the mid-century United States is a result of being relegated to the
knowing in their ancestral lands. My reluctant use of the term ‘western’ in this dissertation refers to
various, sometimes disparate modes of thought—from ancient Greek philosophy to contemporary allopathic
medicine—at the centre of white and colonial institutions situated within the geographical space of what
is now known as Canada and the United States.
2Disability scholars like Tobin Siebers (2008) argue that treating the body as inferior or inconsequential
compared to the mind is an effect of ableism.
3See also Simone de Beauvoir’s (1989) The Second Sex for a critique of women’s “subordination to the
reproductive function” (66).
4Poor working women, single women, women of colour, and lesbian women had to engage in paid labour
by necessity, because class exploitation, sexism, racism, and queer oppression prevented them—or their
partners—from accessing a ‘family wage’ sufficient to support their family’s basic needs (hooks 2015; Lorde
1984; A. Davis 1983; Rich 1980). This is often ignored in white feminist theorizing.
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“drudgery” of fulfilling the female role as a mother and wife (13). Friedan advocates for
women to pursue an intellectual life, participate in politics, discover personal passions,
enter the paid economy, and refuse to be limited to female biology.
Firestone (1970) took a more militant approach against the reproductive body in
The Dialectic of Sex. “Pregnancy”, she writes, “is barbaric” [emphasis original] (184).
Extending Marx and Engels’ work, which advocates for the proletariat’s seizure of the
means of production as the path to overcoming class exploitation, Firestone identifies
reproduction within the biological family as the site through which women—as a sex
class—must overcome their oppression by men. Identifying women’s subordination to and
dependence upon men as originating within the ‘nature’ of the body—pointing to how
non-human animals mate, reproduce, and care for their young as a reflection of humans’
originating nature—Firestone dismisses socio-cultural explanations for the oppression of
women. She, therefore, renders women’s inequality a natural consequence of the biological
division of reproductive labour. Reproductive technologies create what Firestone (1970)
sees as an opportunity for women to “transcend Nature” (10).5 Overcoming ‘female
biology’—what Firestone (1970) referred to as “the tyranny of reproduction”—was, among
other goals, necessary to achieve feminist revolution (185).
Histories of the regulation of the ‘reproductive body’ demonstrate, however, that
technologies purported to help overcome problems associated with female biology and
reproduction are not liberatory for women universally. Cultural theorist C. Riley Snorton
(2017) offers a critical examination, for example, of how various techniques and
technologies that formed the foundation of contemporary gynecology as a medical practice
in the United States were made possible by white men doctors’ experimentation without
anesthesia on enslaved Black women’s bodies, including Anarcha, Betsey, Lucy, and the
many others who went unnamed. By the very condition of their enslavement, their bodies
were not only accessible to James Marion Sims—the white doctor who experimented on
them—but enslavement also made their bodies controllable, and “inexhaustibly available
5On the other hand, Firestone (1970) did not support the use of technologies altogether; she also cautioned
that “the new technology, especially fertility control, may be used against [women and children] to reinforce
the entrenched system of exploitation” (11).
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through their interchangeability” (24). Enslaved Black women’s bodies became a “living
laboratory within a political economy wherein their atomized flesh took on an adjunctive
function in the production and reproduction of a series of proprietary instruments and
procedures” in gynecology (18).
So the medical ‘progress’ of gynecology from which white women particularly
benefited to overcome ‘female biology’—one of the cornerstone goals of early second wave
feminism—came at the expense of Black women who were enslaved and tortured by white
men. Other feminist scholars have rightly problematized and offered alternatives to the
racist (hooks 2015; Briggs 2002; Lorde 1984; A. Davis 1983), colonialist (Briggs 2002),
classist (hooks 2015), heteronormative (Rich 1980), and essentialist (Grosz 1995) logics of
early second wave feminism, including its focus on overcoming ‘female biology’ and
reproduction.
However, less often critiqued are the problematic idea(l)s central to second wave
(and other) feminist conceptualizations of technology and its relationship to the body as
either liberatory or oppressive (for critiques of this dichotomy, see Pentney 2012; Sullivan
and Murray 2009; Sullivan 2006). Feminist debates have historically treated technologies
as either an escape from the burdens of the female body that I detailed above, or as a
vehicle to re-entrench women’s inequality (Braun 2010, 2009, 2005; Jeffreys 2006; Green
2005; Bordo 1998; Raymond 1994), arguing that narratives of empowerment through
technology ignore the larger structural systems—such as patriarchal institutions—at work
in disciplining women’s bodies through interventions such as cosmetic procedures and
reproductive technologies. For example, regarding cosmetic body projects, feminist
philosopher Susan Bordo (1993) claims that “to feel autonomous and free while harnessing
body and soul to an obsessive body-practice is to serve, not to transform, a social order
that limits female possibilities” (179).
While these two positions within feminist theory seem to be diametrically
opposed—either celebrating freedom from the ‘female’ body brought on by technologies or
warning against these technologies as weapons of patriarchy—both arguments rest on the
assumption that ‘nature’ is fundamentally independent from technology. This project
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takes as its starting point a somatechnic understanding of the body, which posits that
bodies are continuously constituted through technologies and techniques of the soma.
Somatechnics
At the same time as technologies proliferate in almost every field, increasingly gaining access
to the body—through fitness and sleep trackers, sex toys connected to cell phones that
enable self-administered oral sex (Yagoda 2017), and implantable art technology powered
by energy from our bodies (Treggiden 2014)—in Canada and the United States—despite
our consumption of these somatechnologies and the normalization of others—we value the
‘unmediated body’ exempt from social interventions (see Garner 2011). This is reflected
in one of the most common responses I received from professors, colleagues, friends, and
strangers alike upon learning the substance of my work: surprise, uncomfortable laughter,
and disgust from the “unnaturalness” of male enhancement.
These reactions, I came to recognize, are largely predicated on the broad
assumption that bodies ‘should’ be—let alone can be—‘natural’ and free from
technological and social materialization. To quote trans historian Jules Gill-Peterson
(2014), “The ontological separation of technics and living beings underwrites the notion of
an integral body, according to which incorporation of technology is a fall from the original
wholeness of birth” (405). Dominant bodily imaginaries in the contemporary western
social and political landscape assume and value the existence of the ‘natural’ body—a
body not subject to modification, mutilation or other forms of construction—which
contrasts sharply with the sociological understanding of the body as socially (re)produced.
The proliferation of technologies that gain access to our bodies means that all
bodies are increasingly constituted through somatechnologies. Even those who do not
submit to surgical interventions are somatechnic. Consider the example forwarded by
feminist theorist and somatechnician Beth Ann Pentney (2012), that human development
itself is somatechnic. While many may recognize reproductive technologies, such as
in-vitro fertilization, as undeniable examples of the somatechnic development of a human
zygote—the single-celled organism that results from a fertilized egg—few would likely
imagine how even the cessation of birth control technologies makes “human development
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somatechnic at pre-conception” (Pentney 2012, 19). In other words, the development of a
human zygote is enabled and foreclosed by the gestational parent’s relationship to
technology.
Somatechnologies are not merely medical interventions into the body, such as
through pharmaceuticals and surgeries. Consider the insights from anthropology that
cooked food—a result of using fire as a tool—has dramatically constituted human bodies.
Cooked food increases digestibility, and therefore, caloric intake; with increased calories,
cooked food reduces the time humans have to dedicate to acquiring and consuming food,
enabling other pursuits; it reduces the amount of time foods need to ferment in the gut to
extract nutrients, so the length of the intestines decreased in size; and it reduces the size
of our molars and the frequency of oral cavities (Wrangham and Carmody 2010). The
human body is therefore necessarily somatechnic.
Both the general population and many feminist scholars often regard technologies
thought to ‘modify’ the body as fundamentally distinct from the basic, yet largely
unacknowledged ways our bodies are socially crafted. Imagine how knowledge and
service-based labour structurally enable increasingly sedentary lifestyles and particular
forms of embodiment compared to work that demands more physical exertion or facilitates
leisure time to engage in more movement (see Cadwallader and Murray 2007). Consider
the numerous quotidian, yet unexamined bodily grooming and hygiene practices, use of
‘corrective’ devices such as prescription glasses and braces, and eating habits that all
shape bodily being, and how we take these practices up in situated ways related to our
gender, race, age, and cultural position(ing)s.
Similarly, the concept of body-reflexive practices, coined by sociologist and
masculinities scholar R. W. Connell (1995), helps elucidate how gender constitutes the
body: “the social relations of gender are experienced in the body (as sexual arousals and
turn-offs, as muscular tensions and posture, as comfort and discomfort) and are
themselves constituted in bodily action (in sexuality, in sport, in labour, etc.)” (231).
Imagine the ways that disability, sexuality, class, and other systems of power shape bodily
being. As such, our bodies are not natural biological facts versus purposefully modified
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aberrations from nature, but rather, all bodies reflect an ongoing process of bodily
becoming that is continuously shaped by socially and historically-specific techniques and
technologies. As sociologists Holliday and Cairnie (2007) contend “the ‘natural’ body is a
discursive illusion” (73).
As a means of disrupting these false dualisms—of technology versus the ‘natural’
body, and of worn feminist debates about the liberatory potential versus inherent
oppression from technological interventions into the body—I situate this work within the
scholarly tradition of somatechnics. This research draws from previous somatechnicians
who analyzed gender and the sexed body (Alm 2013; Pentney 2012; Garner 2011; Fox and
Thomson 2009a, 2009b; Sullivan 2009a, 2009b, 2007), disability and normalcy (Sullivan
2008b, 2008a; Cadwallader 2007; Sullivan 2005a), as well as whiteness and racialization
(Sullivan 2012, 2007; Pugliese and Stryker 2009).6 Rooted in a Foucauldian
conceptualization of power and the materiality of discourse, somatechnics understands
technologies and bodies as inextricable. A somatechnic account of the body troubles the
division between nature and technology by emphasizing how all bodies materialize
through technologies, not only those bodies that carry the most visible marks of explicit
construction through cosmetic body ‘modifications’, surgery, and other interventions
(Sullivan and Murray 2009; Sullivan 2005b). Within this framework, soma (body) and
techné (technologies and techniques) are intimately entangled; the body is only rendered
intelligible through the technologies that constitute it.
As a theoretical framework situated within poststructuralism, somatechnics
foregrounds how discourse and materiality are inseverable; bodily being is “always already
technologised, and technologies as always already enfleshed” (Sullivan and Murray 2009,
3). The material body does not precede technologies as a presocial form, but rather, it is
“the incarnation or materialization of historically and culturally specific discourses”
(Sullivan and Murray 2009, 3). In this way, there is no natural body upon which social
interventions—such as male enhancement technologies—can inscribe themselves. There is
6However, the field of somatechnics that studies trans/gender and sexuality is largely “racially unmarked
with an assumed whiteness” (Janzen et al. 2020, 379).
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no pre-discursive body that is ‘modified’ by culture. Instead, as the Somatechnics
Research Center website explains, “technologies are the means in and through which
bodies are constituted, positioned, and lived” (cited in Pentney 2012, 19). In other words,
it is in relation to technologies that bodies become meaningful.
Thinking through the body as a “tangible outcome of historically and culturally
specific techniques and modes of embodiment processes”, this project recognizes that the
body is not only constituted through technologies like the surgeon’s knife, but also by the
ontological assumptions about bodies and somatic practices that lead to their legitimation
or prohibition (Pugliese and Stryker 2009, 2). A somatechnic lens understands that
technologies are not simply machinic—the popular understanding of technology as
tangible tools—such as the scalpel, silicone implants, fat transplants, and other
technologies that physicians use in male enhancement procedures; they are necessarily
epistemic, meaning technologies are related to the production of knowledge and the
operation of power through bodily practices such as male enhancement (see Sullivan
2009a). The aim of the somatechnician, then, is to simultaneously inhabit and challenge
categorical knowledge—meaning to strategically and provisionally invoke categories of
being (such as ‘cis’ or ‘man’) and embodiment practices (such as ‘enhancement’ or
‘mutilation’)—while troubling these categories as contested sites of social and political
meaning (Sullivan 2009b).
Within the analytical chapters of this dissertation, I explore how bodies come to
matter through various somatechnologies. In the next section, I identify some of the
conceptual tools that I use to accomplish this goal, while contextualizing their relationship
to trans, queer, and poststructuralist theory.
Technologies of (De)Naturalization
Given that the sexed and racially-marked body is a dense nexus point—or what Sullivan
(2009b) refers to as “profoundly significant battleground”—through which unequal relations
of power are perpetuated in our present socio-historical moment in Canada and the United
States, this project examines the operation of power and resistance through the naturalized
body (283). In other words, this research analyzes the ‘natural’, concentrating on how
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bodies—and behaviours that my participants framed as effects of those bodies—are rendered
(un)natural. The term naturalization is particularly useful in this project, and refers to the
process by which social phenomena—such as gender, the sexed body, and race—become
understood as natural, biological ‘truths’ (see Lancaster 2006, 2003). Instead of assuming
that female and male bodies or Black, white, and Brown bodies are biological, material
realities of sex and race, respectively, employing the concept of naturalization reorients our
analytic gaze towards the socio-historical context and the discursive devices that materialize
the body as natural.
Locating processes of naturalization enables me to deconstruct the static, presocial
‘body with a sex’ or ‘body with a race’. Deconstruction as an analytical tool allows me to
refer to the body without necessarily reifying the body as natural. Within this dissertation,
when I acknowledge the processes by which the body becomes naturalized, it gives me more
theoretical license to study the ‘natural body’ as an unstable artifact of these processes,
opening up the theoretical terrain for understanding how bodies materialize. Utilizing the
body as a conceptual object does not detract from, but rather, facilitates my project of
rendering visible the social materialization of the body and the processes that naturalize
it. Applying the concept of naturalization, for example, enables me to differentiate between
processes that are actively sexing the body7 from the idea of the natural, fixed ‘body with
a sex’.
Given that the term ‘naturalization’ refers to the processes by which gender, the
sexed body, and race appear to be natural, then the term technologies of the natural—
coined by somatechnician T. Garner (2011)—refers to the discursive devices that accomplish
the work of naturalization. Writing particularly about the sexed body, Garner describes
technologies of the natural (or “naturalization techniques”) as
the specific discursive operations through which the male and female body are
materialised as natural, in other words, how the natural sexed body is itself
constructed. By applying the term ‘technology’ to the idea of the ‘natural,’ two
7The phrase ‘sexing the body’ comes from Anne Fausto-Sterling’s (2000) book Sexing the Body: Gender
Politics and the Construction of Sexuality, which I describe in more detail in the next section whose title
is an homage to her book.
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concepts considered mutually exclusive, I maintain the emphasis on the principal
tenet of ‘somatechnics,’ that the body is always in a state of becoming, even
the “natural” body. I undermine the binary of constructed versus natural by
changing the terms to constructed versus naturalised, where the naturalised
body is one whose construction has been successfully erased. (35)
As I demonstrate throughout the analytical chapters of this manuscript, the ‘natural male
body’ invoked by the practitioners who participated in this research is the effect of
technologies of the natural, whereby the social predicates and processes upon which
maleness, masculinity, and whiteness rely are successfully concealed both before and after
surgical intervention. I suggest in my analysis that erasing the construction of the cis male
body through naturalization techniques—while foregrounding the construction of trans,
cis women’s, and racially-marked bodies—works to maintain oppressive hierarchies. In
borrowing the term ‘technologies of the natural’, however, I apply it to more than the
materialization of the sexed body into a binary; I also understand naturalization
techniques as the specific discursive operations through which the body is marked by race
as a biological reality. I use the concepts ‘technologies of the natural’ and ‘naturalization’
interchangeably throughout this manuscript.
Similarly, I use the terms ‘denaturalization’ and ‘renaturalization’ throughout this
manuscript by drawing upon trans, queer, and poststructuralist theory (see Simon 2015;
Whitehead 2012; Garner 2011; Stryker 2006a).8 1 Some may interpret these terms to
imply that the sexed or racially-marked body was natural from the outset, only to become
undone or redone, respectively. Contrary to this reading, the term ‘denaturalization’ refers
to processes that render bodies unnatural without invoking an original nature.
‘Renaturalization’ appears in this manuscript to communicate how bodies that are
naturalized—such as the ‘female’ or ‘male’ body—can fail to cite the regulatory norms of
gender and sex, and go through a process where they are renaturalized through discourse
to shore up their fragile boundaries and contents to make them appear natural. For both
terms, the difference between ‘nature’ and ‘naturalization’ is key to their meaning. It
would be a mistake to interpret these terms as a return to or departure from an
8See also Judith Butler’s (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity.
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originating nature; rather, they signal a reassertion of or desertion by naturalization
processes.
Some scholarship within trans studies affirms the naturalness of trans identity and
embodiment throughout history and across cultures (see Namaste 2000; Prosser 1998;
Feinberg 1996), in part for reasons of gaining broader intelligibility and social legitimacy
(DeVun and Tortorici 2018), and for finding community across time (Chu and
Harsin Drager 2019). While I am circumspect and critical of naturalization processes
generally—including narratives that treat trans bodies and subjectivities as natural and
universal across time and space—some trans folks have been able to mobilize
naturalization techniques as a strategic tool to enable particular embodied subjectivities,
as well as to secure greater safety in some contexts. The everyday realities of trans folks
who navigate cisnormativity and the violence of trans-oppression that make drawing on
tools like naturalization a necessary means of survival should not be minimized. And I
must be transparent that I do not face the everyday violence of trans-antagonism; as a cis
person, I benefit from the system-wide normalization and renaturalization of my body and
gender. Recognizing that naturalization discourses can leave behind multiply-marginalized
trans folks,9 and acknowledging that this tool is partial (if not problematic) for a larger
project of emancipatory trans/gender politics, naturalizing discourses have—to different
degrees—expanded the possible forms of embodiment and subjectivity to include
otherwise historically-oppressed groups of people.
With that said, this project aligns itself with trans scholars (see Gill-Peterson
2018b; Snorton 2017; Stryker and Aizura 2013; Garner 2011; Towle and Morgan 2002)
who are cautious, if not critical of claiming—and appropriating (Pyle 2018)—historical
figures as ‘trans ancestors’ as evidence that trans subjectivity and embodiment are natural
or universal throughout history and across cultures, in part because it decontextualizes
9See Skidmore (2011) for a discussion of how processes of naturalization have historically been possible
through disciplinary mechanisms like whiteness, heteronormativity, and middle-class respectability politics,
enabling some trans folks to be integrated into the social order at the expense of racialized, working class,
and queer others.
43
trans and Two-Spirit identity, embodiment, and experience.10 Instead of reading
backwards in time as a method of granting nature and universality to trans
people11—with the aim of securing greater safety and cultural recognition—I ask, how do
both trans and cis bodies materialize through socio-discursive fields of power? How does
the social materialization of cis men’s bodies become successfully concealed within male
enhancement discourse so as to be regarded as natural, whereas trans—and at times—cis
women’s and racially-marked bodies are deemed unnatural?
Sexing the Body
At the centre of a project theorizing male enhancement is the need to conceptualize ‘the
body’ generally, and the ‘male body’ specifically, recognizing as feminist poststructuralists
insist, that any reference to the body further brings that body into being (Sullivan 2009a).
This work is no exception. The current social imaginary of the sexed body in
contemporary, dominant, western culture—including most medical and scientific
thought—claims that there are two sexes—‘female’ and ‘male’—from which binary gender
‘naturally’ materialize feminine and masculine identities. While western science, medicine,
and popular discourse may increasingly acknowledge that there are intersex bodies, by
10While Two-Spirit is a contested term across different Indigenous groups, Kai Pyle (2018)—a Two-Spirit
Métis and Sault Ste. Marie Nishnaabe scholar in American Studies—defines Two-Spirit as a term that refers
to “Indigenous people who fall outside the accepted boundaries of modern white or “Western” gender and
sexuality, both past and present” (576). Pyle (2018) problematizes non-Indigenous appropriation of Two-
Spirit peoples as trans ancestors, making clear that ‘Two-Spirit’ is not language for either cisgender or
transgender non-Indigenous people; it was developed by and for Indigenous Peoples to describe their gender,
sexuality, and spirituality. Some Two-Spirit people also use terms specific to their Indigenous Nations, as
well as LGBTQ descriptors. Instead of attempting to reclaim Two-Spirit people from history as trans-
ancestors, Pyle (2018) advocates for trans*temporal kinship: “the ability of transgender and Two-Spirit
Indigenous people to establish kin relations across time, with both ancestors and descendants” (575-576).
This is not a flattening of Two-Spirit people across time; “even though modern Two-Spirit people may not
be identical to historical Two-Spirits, both Two-Spirit and non-Two-Spirit Indigenous people nonetheless
recognize a continuity, a kinship, between the two” (584).
11Jules Gill-Peterson (2018a) claims a different approach to reading archives; instead of taking up a
recuperative project that stretches “contemporary categories backward” (8) to locate trans children in
medical archives from the twentieth century, she suggests that the children identified in her book expand,
refigure, and “multiply the meanings of ‘trans’, moving it in many different directions” (10). In other
words, instead of applying our current categories backwards, Gill-Peterson brings forward children from
the twentieth century to remake the meaning of ‘trans’. For an additional example of how scholars can
read historical archives for gender fungibility without declaring it is a “matter of personal definition—a
kind of trans self-fashioning”, see Snorton’s (2017, 63) chapter “Trans Capable: Fungibility, Fugitivity, and
the Matter of Being”.
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and large Canadian and US culture regards these bodies as ‘aberrations’ from the binary
norm that do not challenge the transhistorical existence of female and male as natural,
biological, stable, definable, measurable realities (Sanz 2017; Davis, Dewey, and Murphy
2016; Magubane 2014; Fausto-Sterling 2000; Dreger 1998; Kessler 1990).
However, as I demonstrate below, the sexed body is far more of a social and
historical object than a biological truth, owing in part to the fact that the sex binary is so
fragile. Evidence from historians of sex and feminist science scholars demonstrates that
the sex binary is a relatively recent creation, that neither medicine nor the natural
sciences (the presumed authorities on bodies and on sex) can reliably define and measure
the sexed body, and moreover, medical doctors actively engage in the physical creation of
binary sex alongside the material erasure of sex-ambiguous bodies in order to shore up the
binary. Below I provide a brief history of the sexed body and feminist science scholars’
responses to binary sex research. It is not my intention to provide a detailed and thorough
review of their critiques here; other feminist science scholars like Veronica Sanz (2017)
have already published more comprehensive analyses. Rather, my aim is to set the stage
for how the sexed body is conceptualized in this project.
The One-Sex Model
Troubling the stability and transhistorical existence of ‘female’ and ‘male’ bodies helps to
identify how they are socially (re)produced, rather than natural divisions of materiality.
While bodies may have material limits, they cannot be defined as female, male, or intersex
outside of the historically-situated discourses that materialize particularly sexed bodies.
Historians of sex (Richardson 2013; Delgado-Echeverría 2007; Meyerowitz 2002; Oudshoorn
1994; Laqueur 1990) offer multiple accounts for how bodies materialize as female and male
by challenging the ahistoricity of stable, ‘natural’, binary bodies, and by temporally and
socially locating the emergence of the sex binary and other explanations of materiality
throughout history.
By analyzing scientific discourse, historian of sex Thomas Laqueur (1990)
examines the (re)making of the sexed body over the centuries from Ancient Greece to the
contemporary west. The ancient Greeks made sense of bodily existence through a
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“one-sex” model, which treated women as an imperfect version of men. According to this
model, “the vagina is imagined as an interior penis, the labia as foreskin, the uterus as
scrotum, and the ovaries as testicles” (Laqueur 1990, 4). By the beginning of the
nineteenth century, however, dominant western discourses shifted and began
differentiating bodies and social practices into a “two-sex system” that created
ontologically distinct female and male bodies as “stable, incommensurable, opposite sexes”
with corresponding genders (Laqueur 1990, 6).12 Through European colonialism, this
two-sex system—interwoven with race classifications rooted in eugenics—were forcibly
adopted throughout the world (see Morgensen 2011; Schiebinger 1993; Bleier 1984). In
fact, the materialization of the sexed body is intimately entangled with the social
(re)production of race (Gill-Peterson 2017, 2014; Snorton 2017; Stein 2015; Magubane
2014), which I detail later in this chapter.
Instead of interpreting this shift from the one-sex to the two-sex model as a linear
progression in the sophistication of scientific thought (as most positivists and
post-positivists would suggest), this shift demonstrates how the body is socio-historically
contingent and multivalent. If the sex (and gender) binary were a natural reality, it would
remain stable across time (history) and place (culture). Cases culturally regarded as
‘outliers’ (such as intersex bodies, trans folks, cyborgs,13 and infertile bodies)14 would not
compel the reiteration of the binary’s boundaries because they would pose no threat to its
coherence. For Laqueur and other historians of sex, the distinction between females and
12Thanks to Dr. Susan Stryker for informing me that historians have called into question the accuracy
of Laqueur’s account of the “one-sex” / “two-sex” models, claiming that his text Making Sex does not
capture the messy nuances of the changing conceptualizations of the sexed body throughout time. See
Brooke Holmes (2019) “Let Go of Laqueur: Towards New Histories of the Sexed Body” for a summary of
these critiques.
13See cyborg feminist Donna Haraway’s (1991) manifesto Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention
of Nature for a detailed account of how the “cyborg enjoys the pollution of categories and illegitimate
fusions”, disrupting the ‘natural body’ and the strict distinction between technology, human, and animal
(176).
14See Garner’s (2011) chapter, “Infertility and the Failure to Achieve Femaleness: Pregnancy as Technology
of the Natural” arguing how pregnancy is not a natural experience of a female body, but rather, a form
of body modification that actively engages in female-ing the body. Pregnancy is not so much an effect of
the sexed body, but rather, a cause. The bodies of cis women who cannot bare a pregnancy—which is
constructed as essential to being ‘female’ in the contemporary west—thus challenge the ‘natural’, binary
division of females and males.
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males as two opposite and complementary sexes is far from a biological, natural fact; the
two-sex, two-gender model is an effect of power relations that reflect the unique historical
conditions and specific sets of social relations from which it emerged.
The Enduring Two-Sex Model
The sex binary is durable, persisting in the contemporary western context in a myriad of
forms; however, arguably the most dominant means of perpetuating this system is by
essentializing female and male bodies as sex dimorphic with corresponding feminine and
masculine genders, respectively. Essentialism in this context refers to the process by which
bodies and subjectivities are reduced to a specific set of attributes or ‘essences’ deemed
essential to their intelligibility within the two-sex, two-gender system. My colleagues and I
have demonstrated elsewhere that essentialist claims are not always grounded in scientific
or medical discourse (Whitehead et al. 2012). However, the preponderance of essentialist
explanations for human bodies and subjectivities that abound in contemporary Canada
and the United States—and specifically in my interviews with male enhancement
practitioners—find sustenance in bioreductive science (Lancaster 2006), which increasingly
reduces human identity and behaviour to biological, genetic, or evolutionary causes.
According to bioreductive science, the body is the raw biological material from which
human identity and behaviour ‘naturally’ emerge. By identifying biology instead of our
social worlds as responsible for human identity and behaviour, bioreductive science
naturalizes existing social relations (such as gender and racial inequality), thereby limiting
our capacity to change oppressive social arrangements.
Early feminist science studies scholars (Birke 1986; Bleier 1984) demonstrate how
science and medicine take up bioreductive, gendered dichotomies in ways that promote
hierarchical relations of domination, such as passive / aggressive, irrational / rational, nature
/ science, body / mind, and subjective / objective. These false dichotomies are mapped
onto the feminine and female / masculine and male, respectively, whereby the former side
of each dichotomy is denigrated and the latter is venerated. We can see this application of
essentialist, gendered binaries in, for example, scientific descriptions of bodies during the
process of reproduction; ostensibly the female ovum passively awaits insemination from an
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active, energetic, and aggressive male sperm (Campo-Engelstein and Johnson 2014; Martin
1991). Despite recent scientific ‘discoveries’ within reproductive medicine that challenge
these old gendered metaphors with new, allegedly more egalitarian ones,15 these bioreductive
logics persist, dispersed throughout disciplines of the ‘natural’ sciences, shaping scholarship
on sex differentiation (how two sexes develop, starting in the womb through death), sex
determination (how to assign a sex to ambiguous bodies), and the development of gender
identity and sexuality.
For instance, in Canada and the United States, scientists are increasingly in pursuit
of the ‘trans brain’ (see Nota et al. 2017; and Savic, Garcia-Falgueras, and Swaab 2010 for
examples of this research), and the ‘gay gene’ (see Sanders et al. 2015; and Hamer et al.
1993 for examples of these studies). One of the prevailing bioreductive hypotheses about the
existence of trans people is that prenatal hormones produce “opposite” sex differentiation of
the genitals compared to the brain (Savic, Garcia-Falgueras, and Swaab 2010, 57). According
to this hypothesis, for example, trans women develop a penis in utero, but their brains
become feminized and de-masculinized. However, brain organization researchers searching
for the ‘trans brain’ do not adequately address the existence of non-binary, agender, and
gender queer folks. Moreover, claiming that the brain is immutable contradicts the wealth
of scientific evidence of brain plasticity (Jordan-Young 2010; Lane 2009; Fausto-Sterling
2000), and sociocultural evidence that gender changes for people within different contexts,
social relationships, and throughout the life course (see Simon 2015).
The political purchase of bioreductive science can become clearer by
understanding the logics that have historically bolstered the scientific pursuit of a ‘gay
gene’ and other biological explanations that people were ‘born gay’. Mirroring some
arguments from the US civil rights movement organized by Black activists in the 1960s,
gay rights activists responded to conservative backlash by naturalizing homosexuality. Gay
rights activists suggested that, like being Black in the United States, people would never
choose an identity that carries as much risk in the US as homosexuality; that
15Recent scientific literature describes the cervix as less of a passive ‘destination’ for sperm, and more as an
active participant in reproduction, ‘storing’ sperm in its tissues to increase chances of conception, ‘sucking’
semen into the uterus, ‘sorting’ healthy sperm from damaged cells, etc. (Levin 2005).
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homosexuality is natural to their biologies; and that identities that are natural cannot be
changed by some force of will or through the tortures of conversion therapy, so therefore,
it is ethically bankrupt to persecute people for their immutable and innate natures (see
Whitehead 2012). “Rather than arguing that same-sex sexuality ought to be a valued
choice (similar to the choice to marry),” writes feminist sociologist Jaye Cee Whitehead
(2012), “marriage equality activists ceded this ground by tacitly accepting—or at least not
refuting—that only identities beyond one’s control deserve state protection” (98). Like
identifying the ‘trans brain’, locating a ‘gay gene’ could corroborate the ‘born this way’
narrative to help historically-oppressed groups secure access to official care structures like
marriage and healthcare, from which polyamorous, single, and poor people would continue
to be excluded.
While there has been a surge in identifying the ‘gay gene’ and understanding the
‘trans brain’ from biological sciences, there is a general dearth of natural science research
pursuing the discovery of the ‘cisgender brain’ or the ‘straight gene’. Bioreductive
explanations of human behaviour do little to question normalized identities or challenge
inequality. Instead, scientific ‘discoveries’ that begin with normative assumptions reinforce
the status quo and stabilize otherwise fragile categories like gender, the sexed body,
sexuality, and race. Compared to the treatment of historically-oppressed groups, those
with normative bodies and identities are less subject to the medical and scientific gaze and
the risk of pathologization.
Arguments that install the subjectivities of historically-oppressed people within the
‘nature’ of their bodies—such as installing gayness in genes—risk opening themselves up
to eugenic projects that aim to engineer heterosexuality and cis identity, and eliminate
homosexual, queer, and trans existence. The search for the trans brain and the gay gene
are examples of how the naturalization of gender, sex, and sexuality within bioreductive
science can reaffirm existing social inequalities stemming from heteronormativity, queer
antagonism, and cissexism, as well as reveal how relying on techniques of naturalization can
constrain our capacity to change these oppressive social arrangements. Avoiding the traps
of naturalization and essentialism, feminist science studies directly disrupts the narratives
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of bioreductive science primarily by identifying the social assumptions that inform their
research design and conclusions, and by challenging this body of scholarship on its own
terms according to the scientific method. I present a distillation of some of the arguments
from feminist science studies in the next section.
Feminist Science
Bioreductive scientists’ continued search for sex difference has persisted deeper “in every
tissue of the body, from the heart to the brain and the liver” (Richardson 2013, 213), and
“in every bone, muscle, nerve and vein of the human body” (Schiebinger 1986, 42).
Making determinations about sexed bodies is complicated, however, by the various ways
in which western science, medicine, and dominant culture measure sex: gauging hormone
levels (Fausto-Sterling 2000; Oudshoorn 1994); karyotyping ‘sex chromosomes’
(Richardson 2013; Delgado-Echeverría 2007); isolating genes allegedly responsible for sex
difference (Richardson 2013; Fujimura 2006; Keller 2000); studying the human genome’s
role in sex differentiation (Richardson 2013); classifying gonads (Fausto-Sterling 2000;
Dreger 1998); measuring genitalia (Fausto-Sterling 2000; Kessler 1990); identifying
reproductive tissues (Fausto-Sterling 2000); dissecting and imaging the brain
(Jordan-Young 2010; Fausto-Sterling 2000; Bleier 1984); and mapping differential bone
structure (Schiebinger 1993).
Feminists of science persuasively dispute the claim that the sexed body is binary
and natural, providing evidence that the sex binary is a socially and historically-produced
classification whose dominant organizing logic as it is currently conceived in Canada and the
United States places bodies into two dichotomous categories—female and male—based on
primary and secondary sex characteristics. Using historical and sociological evidence and
analysis, feminists of science contextualize the claims of binary sex research, identifying
how their concepts and modes of thinking about bodies emerged under—and therefore,
were made possible by—particular historical conditions and sets of social relationships,
notably during times of changing gender relations. Equipped with knowledge of biology and
the scientific method, feminists of science demonstrate how bioreductive research imposes
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gender, race, and heterosexuality onto various sites of the body, while erasing the social
and historical predicates upon which the ‘science’ of these markers of sex rely. In the next
few sections, I present several feminist responses to the claims of binarist and bioreductive
science.
Sex Ambiguity
The proliferation of bodily markers of sex within binary science research multiply the
ways in which the sexed body can be socially categorized (Sanz 2017; Shapiro 1991).16 Sex
ambiguity reveals that within a single body, not all of these traits correspond to one sex
category despite the unexamined assumptions in western science, the use of biomedical
technologies, and the persistent social energy to bring bodies into normative ‘alignment’.
Scientists’ uncritical commitment to a “unified theory of sex” (Sanz 2017)—which posits
that all markers of sex (such as chromosomes, gonads, hormones, etc.) should align
according to two, ontologically distinct female or male bodies—is therefore, a commitment
not to biological truths, but to social values that we hold about gender and bodies, and
the unequal social arrangements that stem from those values.17
In the absence of a ‘unified sex’, these bodily markers reflect how sex determination
is less a biological fact than a social process dependent on shifts in scientific thought, medical
technologies, and political expediency that enable some traits to take on “supremacy” as
the best determinant of sex at particular moments throughout history (Hirschauer and Mol
1995, 373). We can see how this history continues to play out by observing the International
Olympic Committee’s ongoing struggle to decide how athletes can compete—as a woman
or a man—oscillating between different sites of the body—such as genitals, gonads, or (as
in the recent case with Caster Semenya) hormones—that supposedly serve as a reliable
and valid indication of one’s ‘true’ sex (see Pieper 2019; Henne 2014; Jordan-Young and
Karkazis 2012; Garcia Dauder and Gregori 2009).
16While one may assume that this multiplication of variables to determine sex would destabilize the gender
and sex binary, Sanz (2017) observes that it has had a contradictory effect of fortifying the binary, whereby
some variables are invoked to compensate for the limitations of others.
17Sanz (2017) defines a unified theory of sex as “a linear model that aligns all [sex] variables in a relation of
sequential dependency by distinguishing between sex determination and sex differentiation” (19).
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In addition to the problems posed by attempting to reliably define and measure
the sexed body according to binary logics, scientists and medical doctors also actively
engage in the concomitant surgical and hormonal creation of binary bodies through the
material erasure of sex-ambiguous flesh, thereby preserving the binary (see Sanz 2017;
Davis, Dewey, and Murphy 2016; Fausto-Sterling 2000; Dreger 1998; Kessler 1990). Social
expectations about gender and (hetero)sexuality become material realities when doctors
medically ‘correct’ sex-ambiguous bodies. In the case of intersex infants, for example, parents
and doctors commonly treat intersex bodies that challenge the binary as ‘birth defects’, as
mistakes of nature,18 rather than as bodily variation. Physicians’ decisions to operate on
‘sex-ambiguous’ genitalia, gonadal tissue, and reproductive organs have been predicated less
on biological markers of sex—given that the markers of sex in these bodies do not culturally
‘align’ and are, by definition, intersex—and are instead based on “parental reaction and
the medical team’s perception of the infant’s societal adjustment prospects given the way
her/his [sic] genitals look or could be made to look” (Kessler 1990, 13). In other words,
social assumptions about gender inform the doctor’s perception of the infant’s presumed sex,
challenging the broader cultural assumption that the sexed body serves as the foundational
core from which gender identity ‘naturally’ emerges.
Heteronormative expectations also become flesh through the medical management
of intersex infants. As part of the decision-making process over medical interventions into
the bodies of intersex infants, doctors attempt to predict whether the size of an infant’s
tumescent tissue—such as a clitoris or penis—would grow to be a sufficient size as an adult
to penetrate a vagina, and whether a genital canal would be large enough upon becoming
an adult to “receive a normal-sized penis” (Kessler 1990, 19). ‘Normal’ sexual function,
therefore, centers on the ability to penetrate or be penetrated, rather than on the capacity
for sexual pleasure. When doctors suppose an infant’s tumescent tissue will be ‘too small’
to penetrate a future sexual partner, for example, many doctors assign the infant as a girl,
18Language of ‘nature’s mistake’ of sex originally comes from trans history, namely Christine Jorgensen’s
personal correspondence with family (cited in Serlin 1995). But as Gill-Peterson (2018b) points out, the
history of the medical management of intersex people overlaps with the histories of trans people, who
sometimes claimed to be intersex to legitimate their requests for medical transitions as a correction to
‘nature’s mistake’.
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they reduce the tumescent tissue to the ‘normal’ size of a clitoris, and they plan future
surgeries to widen or create a genital canal sufficient for penetration. Through this process,
doctors physically construct bodies according to the cultural rules of binary gender and
heteronormativity that work to materially erase sex ambiguity, intersex existence, and queer
sexuality.
Historically, the physical formation of binary bodies and the effacement of intersex
existence disproportionately intervenes on white bodies. The materialization of the sex
binary is, therefore, simultaneously a project of whiteness and inextricable from
race-making (see Gill-Peterson 2018b, 2017, 2014; Magubane 2014). Sociologist Zine
Magubane (2014) offers a critical examination of how the erasure of sex-ambiguous flesh
through ‘normalizing’ surgeries and hormone therapy is racially and nationally-specific. In
the United States, for example, to inherit property or to vote were exclusive to white men,
and therefore, contingent on a system that differentiated bodies by sex and race. Medical
intervention into intersex bodies was deemed necessary for white people in order to
maintain whiteness and the privileges it confers. Sex-ambiguous Black bodies created less
of a gender panic in the US, Magubane (2014) suggests, because they did not disrupt
systems of citizenship and the allocation of rights that were grounded in whiteness and a
hierarchical sex binary. Moreover, sex-ambiguity in Black and Brown bodies functioned in
the United States to confirm essential biological difference between racially-marked bodies
and whites (Gill-Peterson 2018b; Stein 2015; Magubane 2014). I provide a more detailed
social history of how race became a biological category in Canada and the United States
in the section “Racializing the Body”.
While science and medicine are often considered objective and value-free, feminist
science studies demonstrates that both are always socially and politically oriented. Our
knowledge of the body is enabled and foreclosed by preexisting discourses that are already
deeply embedded in our concepts and modes of thinking. Scientific research designs already
contain within them prevailing discourses on sex, gender, and race. Examples of how these
discourses instruct binary sex science are located in the section that follows.
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Sex Similarity
Arguably, one of the most powerful critiques on the coherence of the two-sex system
accomplished by feminist science studies is the critique of binary sex research on its own
terms, using the scientific method. Demonstrating that female and male bodies are
actually quite similar—more than they are different—is central to feminist science
critiques. While scientists behind binary sex research divide physical traits (such as hair,
fat, and muscle distribution) along the binary, scientists’ own
anthropometric research using quantitative data shows that these features
conform to a bell-curve distribution rather than a discrete binary. Often,
however, only the mean difference between sexes is given, which obscures the
intragroup variability and considerable overlap between male and female
populations. (Hubbard 1990 cited in Sanz 2017, 4)
In other words, there is more variability within categories such as ‘female’ or ‘male’ than
there is between these categories, suggesting that bodies assigned ‘female’ and ‘male’—at
a population level—have more in common with each other than they are different. If we
understand the prefix ‘inter’ of intersex to suggest that the body is “between” or “among”
sex, or is “mutually” or “reciprocally” sexed, then all bodies in varying chemical, genetic,
physiological, and morphological ways are inter-sex, not just bodies whose ambiguity is
officially diagnosed as intersex by medical authorities and socially recognized as intersex by
cultural norms.19
This conclusion is supported by the data from feminist science. For example,
feminist biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000) critically assessed the leading biological
studies in human and non-human animal research that attempts to determine sex
difference by measuring hormones, the brain, and genitals. In her analysis of hormones,
she begins in much the same way as science and technology scholar Nelly Oudshoorn
(1994) and sociomedical scientist Rebecca Jordan-Young (2010) by acknowledging that
‘sex hormones’—such as estrogen and testosterone—exist across bodily being. Bodies
culturally and medically-recognized as female require testosterone for growth and
19Dictionary.com, s.v. “inter (prefix),” accessed September 8, 2020
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reproduction, despite this hormone being considered a ‘male sex hormone’; for normal
bone development and fertility in males, they need estrogen, which is labeled a ‘female sex
hormone’. These hormones also regulate the maintenance and growth of organs that are
not sex-specific, such as the lungs, intestine, and liver. Asking why these sets of molecules
are called ‘sex hormones’ when they act on organs throughout the entire body and are not
specific to female or male bodies, Fausto-Sterling (2000) demonstrates through a history
of science how these chemical messengers “infuse the body, from head to toe, with gender
meanings” (147).
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, endocrinology and the
birth of the ‘sex hormone’ emerged parallel to a tumultuous time of (re)fashioning gender,
sexuality, and racial classifications within the United States and nations across Europe
(Fausto-Sterling 2000). Multiple social debates coalesced around the gender and sexual
panics over homosexual men, the racial anxieties about immigrants, the use of eugenics to
‘improve’ the nation’s racial stock, and the changing meanings of masculinity as a response
to women’s rights and suffrage movements. It was within this context that binary, innate
sex difference was assumed to be fact, and shaped the direction of hormone science (Fausto-
Sterling 2000).20
Much of the scientific research on hormones involved non-human animal studies that
transplanted gonads, glands, and extractions from them between ‘female’ and ‘male’ rats,
mice, guinea pigs, or chickens. The logic was that removing these gonads and glands would
produce an observable change in the animal related to the absence of hormones that they
secreted, whereas adding gonads, glands, and their extracts to animal bodies that lacked
these hormones would ‘restore’ missing functions or stimulate cross-sex growth. The study
of hormones was anchored so much in non-human animal studies, that when standardizing
the measurement of hormones across different fields of study, scientists settled on using M.U.
for mouse unit (popular in the United States) and R.U. for rat unit (common in Europe)
(Fausto-Sterling 2000, 185).
20For a dedicated discussion of the production of race through hormone science, see the section “Racializing
the Body” later in this chapter.
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With standardization came a narrowing of the definitions for these hormone
molecules. For estrogen, standardization reduced the actions of the ‘female
hormone’—which again, impacts multiple systems throughout female, male, and intersex
bodies—to its effects on the reproductive cycle of female mammals, called estrus, during
which they are in heat. Notably, understanding the ‘female hormone’ in terms of estrus
excludes primates who do not go into heat, including humans. Moreover, standardization
diminished estrogen’s role in a myriad of other physiological processes and effects
unrelated to sexed bodies, such as growth in bones, blood vessels, and kidneys.
Standardization, therefore, not only defined estrogen according to a process, estrus, that
does not occur in human bodies while still applying its definition to human bodies and
behaviour, it also contributed to sexing estrogen as female and responsible for female
sexual behaviour by obfuscating its broader actions.
The broader physiological effects of testosterone were similarly excluded from
testosterone’s standardized definition. Through standardization, scientists narrowed
testosterone’s actions to the physical developments that were thought to distinguish
non-human animal males from females. Scientists chose to observe testosterone’s effects,
for example, on the growth of deer’s horns, enlargement of the prostate in castrated rats,
or the development of mating plumage in select birds (Fausto-Sterling 2000). However,
unlike estrogen, which was limited to effects found in the sexual cycles of some female
mammals, research on testosterone could not identify an “acceptable” mammalian source,
and settled for standardizing the measurement of testosterone based on the degree to
which it develops the fleshy growth atop the heads of roosters, known as the cockscomb
(Fausto-Sterling 2000, 185). The unit of activity of testosterone was measured by the daily
dose required to produce a measurable growth of the comb in castrated male chickens.
The problematic science behind the standardization of estrogen and testosterone
was met with great skepticism at the time it went into effect, but not enough to unsettle
the standard that continues to inform our knowledge of these molecules as ‘sex hormones’
rather than as ‘growth hormones’ today, much less how scientists apply standards for non-
human animals to human bodies. Since standardization, “any physiological activity those
56
hormones had were, by definition, sexual” even though scientists knew then as they know
now that hormones have broader effects on parts of the body that are not sexed, such as
nerves and the heart (Fausto-Sterling 2000, 187).
Many prominent scientists studying hormones at the time carried unexamined social
assumptions of natural biological difference between females and males into their research.
Physiologist Eugen Steinach, among other medical scientists, described gonadal secretions—
what are now referred to as estrogen and testosterone—as antagonistic. While Fausto-
Sterling (2000) suggests this could be a plausible description of their findings, descriptions of
sex hormone antagonism was not inevitable; other scientists such as Dorothy Price and Carl
R. Moore reproduced Steinach’s research and found that hormones were certainly powerful
growth regulators, but they were not specific to sex. Fausto-Sterling (2000) concludes that
by diminishing the role of both estrogen and testosterone acting on organs that are not
sexed in both female and male bodies, while also labeling these hormones as antagonistic
superimposed on the chemical processes of guinea pig and rat gonads a
political story about human sex antagonism that paralleled contemporary
social struggles. Physiological functions became political allegory—which,
ironically, made them more rather than less credible, because they seemed so
compatible with what people already “knew” about the nature of sex
difference. (162)
Social assumptions about gender difference, in other words, brought into being hormonal
difference through scientific discourse. The sexing of hormones within science
demonstrates the power of discourse to make the “social become material”
(Fausto-Sterling 2000, 235). Describing sexed bodies—which is always filtered through a
social and political lens—does not simply reveal the nature of those bodies. Scientific
research shapes the meaning and social materialization of bodies, further bringing the
binary body into being. To quote Fausto-Sterling (2000),“[s]cientists use truths taken from
our social relationships to structure, read and interpret the natural” (116).
Feminist science scholars have found that unexamined assumptions about the
essential nature of bodies shape the research process (Jordan-Young 2010; Upchurch and
Fojtová 2009; Scully and Bart 2003; Nechas and Foley 1994; Martin 1991; Hubbard 1990;
Messing 1983). From the research questions that scientists consider to have merit, to the
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particular tools of measurement they choose to use, to the participants they decide to
include or exclude from a study, scientists make socially-informed decisions that are
inextricable from their knowledge claims. How scientists operationalize variables, how they
create categories and manipulate data into interpretable research results, and what they
do with cases that do not conform to a binary vision of bodies are dependent in part upon
the scientists’ history and social location, and therefore, their vested interests and those of
the institutions within which their knowledge production is situated (see Fausto-Sterling
2000).
However, even if the social assumptions that undergird scientific claims about
differently-sexed bodies were scientifically sound, the methodological rigor and research
findings of binary sex research in pursuit of measurable sex dimorphism are flawed since
these investigations by and large do not fulfill basic tenets of scientific investigation.
Departing from Fausto-Sterling’s analysis, which analyzed the social and historical
contexts and assumptions about gender that informed scientists’ research designs and
conclusions, sociomedical scientist Rebecca Jordan-Young (2010) synthesized and analyzed
the current body of research investigating hormones and ‘hardwired’ differences between
women and men’s brains—referred to as brain organization research—by assessing the
accuracy of these studies against their own internal metric of study validity and reliability
(meaning, are their conclusions accurate and can you reproduce the results?). Specifically,
Jordan-Young assessed the extant brain organization research for sufficient sample sizes,
standardized measures, control groups, the validity of quasi-experimental research designs,
how the studies fit together (or do not) to form a theory, and replicability—an essential
part of the scientific method.
After reviewing more than three hundred research studies on brain differences from
the 1960s to 2010, Jordan-Young found that any ‘discovered’ differences between female
and male brains come from a limited number of small scale studies that show only small
statistical differences in the averages, ignoring the vast similarities between female and male
brains, neglecting the wealth of studies that contradict these findings, as well as overlooking
the social and cultural influence on brain development. Jordan-Young persuasively argues
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that the extant biological findings on brain differentiation by sex lack basic scientific rigor,
challenging science on its own terms. Jordan-Young (2010) summarizes the research on
brain difference as “longstanding folk tales about antagonistic male and female essences
and how they connect to antagonistic male and female natures” (291). She concludes that
it is deceiving for brain difference research to suggest that cognitive patterns can be divided
by female and male brains, because there is too much overlap between and variation within
these categories for them to be substantively meaningful.
Whether binary sex researchers consider negligible findings problematic, or whether
they are aware of how their social decisions shape the research design and findings, as Sanz
(2017) makes clear:
The problem with this commitment [to the binary] is precisely its character of
assumption. In an enterprise (science) that bases its epistemic legitimacy in
demonstrations and proof, the problem with the sex binary is that there has
never been a hypothesis or a theory to test—it is an epistemological framework
that runs behind, above, and beyond particular theories and research projects.
In Western biological sciences, the binary is common sense, a kind of tacit
knowledge that permeates many other aspects of our culture. (20)
Scholars who claim that western science and medicine are transcendent above cultural
influence and are capable of producing objective and value-free results have not examined
how their situated position impacts their knowledge production and conclusions, much less
taken responsibility for how their positionality is reflected in their research.21
Findings of sex similarity that complicate or refute the binary science of the sexed
body largely remain hidden from public view (see Richardson 2014; Fausto-Sterling 2000).
When scientists are faced with results that belie their assumptions about femaleness and
maleness, they often exclude this finding from their analysis, effectively ignoring
contradictory information to their original hypotheses (see Fausto-Sterling 2000;
Oudshoorn 1994). Hyde (2005) makes the case that sex researchers have had a history of
excluding findings of sex similarity, and moreover, are over-reporting results that point to
21Through the concept ‘situated knowledge’, Donna Haraway (1991) is “arguing for politics and
epistemologies of location, positioning, and situating, where partiality and not universality is the condition
of being heard to make rational knowledge claims” (195). For an elaboration of this term and how it impacts
my approach to knowledge production in this research, see Chapter 3.
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sex difference; seventy-eight percent of research results that indicate sex difference
contained such negligible findings as to be close to zero. This is not an ‘objective’ research
approach, but a socially-informed decision to make the data speak a particular narrative
that conforms to the status quo. Feminist science studies scholar Sarah Richardson (2014)
also identified several cases that even when natural science research produced evidence of
sex similarity between ‘female’ and ‘male’ bodies, the news media misrepresented the
findings as evidence for sex difference. Richardson notes that this is a common trend in
the media, whereby “gender beliefs can distort our interpretation of scientific results” (no
page). When natural science research challenges sex difference, Richardson claims it often
does not become a major story in the news media because sex similarity garners less
readership than sex difference.
Far from being a natural fact, the creation of the sex binary is a reflection of the
cultural values we hold about gender, (hetero)sexuality, and race—as well as a tool to
legitimize the inequality brought on by those values. To quote Patrick Geddes, a prominent
biology professor during the emergence and popularization of the two-sex model, he said
“[w]hat was decided among the pre-historic Protozoa cannot be annulled by an act of
Parliament” (cited in Laqueur 1990, 6), meaning the dimorphic nature of the body that
was decided among early life forms cannot be undone by social policy. Consequently, when
we treat the sex binary as a biological fact, we embed inside the body any and all social
inequality that stems from the binary division of sex. Worse yet, we absolve ourselves
of changing these oppressive social arrangements because, as Professor Geddes contends,
no social legislation can change the natural order of sex, much less the inequality that
stems from it. This manuscript challenges the cultural assumption of ‘woman’ and ‘man’,
‘female’ and ‘male’ as stable categories of biological difference, recognizing them instead as




Similar to the medical construction of the sexed body that seeks to identify sex “in every
bone, muscle, nerve and vein of the human body” (Schiebinger 1986, 42), the scientific
production of race also took on an interior, constitutive role starting in the 1760s (Snorton
2017), and lasting throughout the practice of ethnology in the mid nineteenth century,
whereby “the African race’s darker color infiltrated ‘the whole inward man,’ inside and
out, including organs and viscera” (Stein 2015, 48). Returning to Eugen Steinach, the
physiologist who framed hormones as ‘antagonistic’, he did not limit his research on
hormones to sexing the body; social assumptions about colonized peoples also informed
his investigations. Collaborating with his colleague in endocrinology, Paul Kammerer,
Steinach made race and sexuality chemical by tethering them to hormone molecules
(Gill-Peterson 2014).
Continuing with non-human animal studies, Steinach and Kammerer conducted
experiments to track how heat impacted the gonadal development of rats, and claimed
that elevated temperatures stimulated gonadal tissues to produce sex hormones earlier
than under cooler temperatures. Correlating these observations of rats with white
anthropologists’ claims about colonized peoples in tropical climates—which were replete
with their own colonizing logics and racist assumptions (Lewis 1973)—Steinach and
Kammerer postulated that people in warmer climates experienced puberty, and thus
sexuality much earlier compared to whites (Gill-Peterson 2014). By cohering the sexed
body (of rats), through climate, to race and sexuality in humans, they naturalized
racially-marked peoples as hypersexual, a stereotype that continues to exert influence in
the lives of people of colour today.
Similar to the sexed body, race continues to be conceived in the popular
imaginary as a natural, biological reality of human bodies, often thought to be primarily a
result of genetics passed down through families. This is despite the wide recognition
within both social (Stein 2015; B. Lawrence 2003; Frankenberg 1993) and contemporary
biological sciences (Hunley, Cabana, and Long 2016; Brace 2002) that race is not a
natural, biological phenomenon that is universal in its meaning and effects across space
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and time. Rather, race is a socially-(re)produced and historically-situated system of
classification that organizes bodies into multiple groups, largely based on physical
features, but also cultural practices. Similar to feminist biologists who demonstrate that
there is more variation within sex categories than between them (Fausto-Sterling 2000;
Hubbard 1990), biologists who search for a genetic cause of race demonstrate that within
race categories there is more genetic variation than between them (Hunley, Cabana, and
Long 2016; Lewontin 1972). Comparing the genetics of Black peoples as a group with
Asian peoples as a group results in less genetic variation, for example, than comparing
Black peoples to each other, which results in more variation, calling into question the
dominant organizing logics of ‘biological difference’ that work to classify populations as
separate ‘races’. Like sex, race is not a natural characteristic of the body, but rather, is
socially and historically assigned to bodies.
While observable physical traits that are typically associated with race—such as
skin and eye colour; facial morphology; hair colour, texture, and distribution; bone structure;
as well as body fat distribution—are produced from the expression of sets of genes and
interaction with one’s environment (called a phenotype), race is not reducible to these
traits—much less these genes. Race categories built on these traits are the unstable effect
of splicing up the continuum of possible bodily features into boxes imagined as tidy, but
consequently, subject to failure. As author and journalist Ta-Nehisi Coates (2015) writes,
Difference in hue and hair is old. But the belief in the preeminence of hue and
hair, the notion that these factors can correctly organize a society and that they
signify deeper attributes, which are indelible—this is the new idea at the heart
of these new people who have been brought up hopelessly, tragically, deceitfully,
to believe that they are white. (7)
As Coates points out, the term ‘race’ connotes more than just a range of possible physical
traits. ‘Race’ also implies “deeper attributes” like morality, ‘civility’ versus ‘barbarity’,
physical and mental capacities, personalities and dispositions, and social behaviours
attributed to people with particular phenotypes. Therefore, race categories manufacture
groups of people as sharing not just physical traits, but also particular expressions of
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social—yet naturalized—characteristics upon which white supremacy “distribute[s]
vulnerability and security” (Spade 2015, 4).
For instance, a common rationalization for Black people’s disproportionate
vulnerability to police brutality and other state-sanctioned violence in Canada and the
United States is predicated on the racist presupposition that Black people are ‘naturally’
violent as a race, so therefore, vulnerability to the deadly force of the state is not only
reasonable, but just. This argument refuses to acknowledge structural racism in Canada
and the United States, including the historical origins of policing rooted in slave-catching
(Stein 2015). Significantly, the histories of slavery—as well as colonialism and white
nationalism—in the US and Canada helped inaugurate the dominant conceptualizations of
race that we continue to operate with today. I turn to this history in the section that
follows.
Race in Canadian and US History
Sociologists know that race is socially (re)produced in part by historically tracing how
‘race’ as an overarching concept—as well as its specific categories—have been created and
transformed throughout time and space. Early in European colonization of what is now
known as Canada and the United States,22 for example, colonists constructed difference—
and systemic exclusion from social, political, and economic life based on this difference—
between them and Africans and Indigenous Peoples primarily according to culture and
religion. However, as chronicled by Melissa Stein (2015)—a historian of race and gender—
since non-European people could convert and their cultures adapted, Europeans sought to
structure society around a visual economy of permanent physical differences as a means to
institutionalize sociopolitical division and entrench their power. Europeans aimed to justify
their social dominance with biological claims about bodily difference. Turning to scientists
to help him naturalize existing institutions and sets of social relations, for example, Thomas
22Indigenous groups have different names for the land now known as Canada and the United States. Many
Indigenous Peoples refer to this land as Turtle Island. The Iroquois story of Creation, for example, explains
how the land came to be known as Turtle Island. Instead of attempting to produce an incomplete summary
of this Traditional Story filtered through my understanding as a white settler, I encourage readers to refer
to the book And Grandma Said–Iroquois Teachings as Passed Down through the Oral Tradition recorded
by Tom Porter (2008) (Sakokweniónkwas), a Bear Clan Elder of the Mohawk Nation.
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Jefferson sought to justify his and his peers’ enslavement of African peoples, as well as the
genocide and subjugation of Indigenous Peoples that was central to the white settler nation-
building project of the United States (Stein 2015). Jefferson called upon white scientists
of race to find evidence of natural, physical differences between Europeans and African
peoples.23
For these white scientists, studying race enabled them to assert social and political
influence. That influence was reflected early in the kinds of questions they thought merited
investigation. Whiteness studies sociologist, Robin DiAngelo (2018) writes, “Illustrating the
power of our questions to shape the knowledge we validate, early race scientists didn’t ask,
‘Are blacks (and others) inferior?’ They asked, ‘Why are blacks (and others) inferior?’” (16).
Operating with the preconceived assumption that Europeans were superior to African and
Indigenous Peoples (among others), physical differences, including colour, became central
to determining social status. According to Stein (2015), Anglo-Christians gradually began
to think of themselves as white, and whiteness conferred material rewards and rights of
citizenship that shielded white people from the social vulnerabilities to which they subjected
people of colour.
We also know race is a social technology by observing how different physical traits—
from skulls, hair, and skin, to beards and breasts, to genitals—took on supremacy and
particular racial meanings at different points in time to serve the needs of white colonists
(Stein 2015). Scientists’ attribution of racial meanings to sexed bodies—including genitals
and their reproductive capacities—cohered around the aims of white society. Indeed, race
science often framed Black people as failing to perform gender and embody sex according to
white standards (see Snorton 2017; Stein 2015; Gill-Peterson 2014; Magubane 2014). Given
the centrality of gender and sex to the intelligibility of social subjects, any deviation from
normative whiteness functioned to justify race scientists’ and enslavers’ dehumanization
23In Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson speculated about the theory of polygenesis, that Black and
white people were likely different species, before calling upon scientists to seek out evidence to support
this theory: “It is not against experience to suppose, that different species of the same genus, or varieties
of the same species, may possess different qualifications. Will not a lover of natural history then, one who
views the gradations in all the races of animals with the eye of philosophy, excuse an effort to keep those
in the department of man as distinct as nature has formed them?” (cited in Stein 2015, 8).
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and exploitation of Black people. Interests and anxieties of white society that related to
race and the sexed body included preventing miscegenation,24 homosexuality, and relatedly,
the perceived ‘race suicide’ of whites (Stein 2015); expanding medical science—such as
endocrinology and gynecology—that largely benefited whites at the expense of enslaved
Black people (Snorton 2017); as well as controlling the bodies and sexualities of Black men
who were constructed as threatening to white men’s dominance (Stein 2015; hooks 2004;
A. Davis 1983).
The science of race and sex thus formed a nexus on disciplining the body. While
remaining irreconcilable and irreducible, race and the sexed body were co-constituted
through discourses of scientific racism (see Gill-Peterson 2017, 2014; Snorton 2017; Stein
2015). As one example of many, race and sex materialized through justifications for
maintaining and expanding the institution of slavery, which relied on exploiting the
reproductive labour of Black women “as breeders to increase the slave population” in both
Canada (Kihika 2019, 28) and the United States (see Stein 2015).25 In the United States
during the mid nineteenth century—after the transatlantic slave trade had ended, during
the rise of abolitionism, and at a time when proslavery authorities were intent on
expanding slavery into the territories—US physician Samuel Cartwright entered the
debate on race. He claimed that Black women had larger pelvises than white women,
leading him and many of his colleagues to believe that Black women experience less pain
during childbirth (Stein 2015).26 Cartwright decided that Black women’s fertility and
purportedly limited birthing pains functioned as evidence that Black women were
“designed for reproduction”, a conclusion that served to legitimate the perpetuation and
24Miscegenation refers to “a mixture of races” particularly through “marriage, cohabitation, or sexual
intercourse between a white person and a member of another race”. Merriam-Webster, s.v. “miscegenation
(n.),” accessed September 18, 2019.
25For a more detailed accounting of slavery, Black women’s labour history, and anti-Black racism in Canada,
see race and labour scholar Maureen Kihika’s (2019) dissertation Negotiating Borders: The ‘Everyday’
Encounters of Black African Immigrant Caregivers in Vancouver, British Columbia.
26This notion that Black and white people have biological differences in pain tolerance persists today, whereby
both laypeople and medical professionals believe Black people can handle pain better than whites; as a
result, medical professionals do not take the pain of Black people seriously when managing their health care,
and make less accurate treatment recommendations (Hoffman et al. 2016). Moreover, this idea reinforces
the racist assumption that Black people are ‘drug seeking’.
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expansion of slavery as an institution (Stein 2015, 80).27 In other words, ethnologists like
Cartwright naturalized race and sex as rooted in biology—as impossible to legislate
away—as a means of protecting the wealth of colonial empires, extracted from the
reproductive potential of Black women, and—as I demonstrate below—from the theft of
Indigenous Land.
In Canada and the United States, ‘Indian’ identity has also historically been, and
continues to be, a highly contested racial category created by and for white settler society.
Colonial governments such as Canada’s sought to limit Indigenous28 resistance against white
settlers’ theft of the territory by eliminating Indigenous Peoples from their land—both
through physical genocidal violence, but also through cultural genocide—by codifying who
was white and entitled to land, who was a ‘status Indian’ and legally-permitted to live on
‘Indian’ reserves, and who would remain landless (B. Lawrence 2003). The construction of
‘Indianness’—a race-based discourse of classification, regulation, and control of Indigenous
populations—enabled colonial governments to dispossess Indigenous Peoples of their land.
This process aimed to reduce hundreds of extremely diverse ethnicities, language groups, and
nations to a single racial identity as ‘Indian’, at times sharing little more than “common
experiences of subjugation” (B. Lawrence 2003, 5). Several pieces of legislation, such as
the Canadian Indian Act, sedimented a process of constructing and regulating Indigenous
identity that continues to shape the lives of diverse Indigenous Peoples in the land referred
to as Canada today.
One of the ways in which the colonial government of Canada constructed who
was white and who was ‘Indian’ was through marriage. The Gradual Enfranchisement Act
passed in 1869, for example, legislates how the social production of race is co-constituted by
27As I demonstrate in Chapter 6, similar discourses about the “design” of women’s ‘reproductive bodies’
persist in contemporary medicine in Canada and the United States, but to serve different, socio-historically
specific functions.
28The term ‘Indigenous’ in the context of Canada refers to groups such as First Nations, Métis, and Inuit
peoples. Some Indigenous individuals refer to themselves as ‘Native’ and ‘Indian’, and moreover, Canadian
federal legislation and policy—as well as dominant public discourses—continue to use these labels. However,
on the advice of Greg Younging (2018)—a member of Opaskwayak Cree Nation in northern Manitoba and
publisher of the writing guidebook Elements of Indigenous Style—this language is not what I, as a white
settler, have adopted in this manuscript, except when I am referencing those discourses in historical
documents and legislation.
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gender, whereby Indigenous women who married white men would legally lose their status as
‘Indian’ so that their children could be classified as white, and thus their white boys would
be able to inherit property according to the aims of white settler nationhood. European
women who married Indigenous men, on the other hand, defied the “social boundaries of
whiteness” so their racial status was legally changed to ‘Indians’ (B. Lawrence 2003, 9). The
racial classification of white and Indigenous men did not change through marriage, however,
demonstrating how the attribution of race is a particularly gendered project. Between 1876
and 1985, about 25,000 Indigenous people lost their status, the majority of which were due
to gender discrimination in Section 12(1)(b) of the Indian Act (Holmes 1987 cited in B.
Lawrence 2003). The exponential loss from cultural genocide beyond this initial calculation
only starts to become clear when we understand that for every woman who lost status and
band membership, all of her descendants also lost status (B. Lawrence 2003). Legal historian
Peggy Blair (2005) estimates that “[b]etween 1958 and 1968 alone, more than 100,000 women
and children lost their Indian status” as a result of the Indian Act of Canada (1).
Throughout both Canadian and US history of colonialism, the construction of
‘Indianness’ has taken on different forms—from revoking or assigning racial identity
through the perpetuation of gender discrimination in marriage, to attributing racial
classifications to people by evaluating their lifestyle and language through a colonial gaze,
to instituting a system of blood quantum (B. Lawrence 2003). At each level, the process of
constructing ‘Indian’ identity was rendered a reflection of an Indigenous person’s racial
‘nature’, rather than a social and political project that enables whites to steal Indigenous
Land. “Indeed, to speak of Native identity at all in some ways reinforces the notion that
the word ‘Indian’ describes a natural category of existence”, writes Bonita B. Lawrence
(2003), an Indigenous studies sociologist and Mi’kmaw woman (4). “And yet it is equally
clear that the label ‘Indian’ has been an external descriptor, meaningless to the
Indigenous peoples of the Americas prior to colonization” (B. Lawrence 2003, 4).
To be clear, claiming that race is a socially (re)produced technology rather than a
natural ‘truth’ of the body does not empty it of all meaning. Race is certainly not ‘fake’;
it continues to have real, material effects in the lives of Black and Indigenous Peoples,
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other people of colour, as well as whites. While the creation of ‘Indianness’ in Canada and
the United States enables the dispossession of Indigenous Land (B. Lawrence 2003), and
the invention of Blackness in Canada and the United States aimed to legitimate colonists’
enslavement of African peoples (Stein 2015), the manufacturing of whiteness functions—at
least in part—as “a guarantee of immunity from such social degradation” as slavery (Chang
1985, 44), as well as a chance for white men to secure and own property.
Like other racial categories, whiteness does not carry a transhistorical essence,
rather, it is constantly changing across time and space. Unlike other racial categories,
whiteness is a social location of structural advantage, the accrual of material rewards and
rights of citizenship (Stein 2015) that is maintained largely by remaining “unexamined
and unnamed” (Frankenberg 1993, 1), or as feminist and social activist bell hooks frames
it, by investing in “whiteness as mystery” (hooks 1997, 340). Its invisibility “at once
insists on objectifying and rendering its others in racialized terms, even as it effaces its
own racial status” so as to claim universality (Pugliese and Stryker 2009, 4). Indeed,
whiteness as normative power functions to universalize “its claims, entitlements and
privileges whilst also relegating it beyond the purview of critical inquiry” (Pugliese and
Stryker 2009, 4). Ta-Nehisi Coates (2015) asserts that
“White America” is a syndicate arrayed to protect its exclusive power to
dominate and control our bodies. Sometimes this power is direct (lynching),
and sometimes it is insidious (redlining). But however it appears, the power of
domination and exclusion is central to the belief in being white and without it,
“white people” would cease to exist. (42)
Similarly, bell hooks (1997) describes the way that “whiteness makes it’s presence felt in
black life [...] as a terrorizing imposition, a power that wounds, hurts, tortures, is a reality
that disrupts the fantasy of whiteness as representing goodness” (341). The idea of race and
the social categories it produces or renders invisible, therefore, emerged not from ‘objective’
observations of human biology and behaviour, but from the social and ‘scientific’ pursuit of
naturalizing existing inequalities from oppressive social arrangements.
However, the construction of race is not a relic from a distant colonial or antebellum
past. Throughout Canadian and US history into our colonial present, white society has
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used race as a set of biologized categories to naturalize hierarchies according to the needs
of fluctuating political priorities. The Indian Act still exerts its influence over the lives of
Indigenous Peoples in what is known as Canada today. In the United States, the attribution
of racial status to Black bodies differed according to state law, meaning that if one crossed
state lines, their racial status could change. In 1924, for example, the anti-miscegenation
legislation of the Virginia Racial Integrity Act instituted the ‘one drop rule’, declaring that
a person with any African ancestry would legally make a person Black (see Khanna 2010;
Dorr 1999). Today’s taxonomies of race may construct people with European ancestry as
white, but poor and working-class immigrants with the same ancestry would not have been
regarded as white in the recent past (Barrett and Roediger 1997). In the United States,
Italian and Irish immigrants were not always white (Guglielmo and Salerno 2003; Barrett
and Roediger 1997; Ignatiev 1995), and in Canada, Slavs may have been regarded as white,
but were still subject to processes of racialization (Burkowicz 2016). Between 1940 and
1970 when the US wanted to recruit more labour from Latin America, those who are now
referred to as Latinx people29—who have primarily Indigenous, African, and/or European
ancestry—were largely considered white in the United States (see Rodriguez 2000). After
9/11, Arab peoples—despite officially being recognized as white in the US census—have
increasingly become understood as sharing particular, identifiable, physical, and social traits
that are framed as inferior to whites (Selod 2015).
Racialization
In lieu of treating race as a fixed, biological, and natural reality of the body, this project
understands race as the unstable effect of a social process identified in sociology as
racialization. According to sociologists Murji and Solomos (2005), the concept of
racialization describes the “processes by which racial meanings are attached to particular
issues—often treated as social problems—and with the manner in which race appears to
29The ‘x’ in Latinx replaces the gendered ‘a’ (feminine) and ‘o’ (masculine) at the end of the term so as
to be gender inclusive. Other terms, such as Latine, also exist. However, some people reject designations
like Latinx, claiming that even though it moves towards gender inclusivity, it maintains a colonial project
that erases Indigenous existence by labeling Indigenous Peoples as ‘Latin’ (Tlapoyawa 2019). I hold this
concept in tension while learning from others who are building anti-oppressive language in its place.
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be a, or often the, key factor in the ways they are defined or understood” (3). In this way,
processes of racialization tend to center race as the axiomatic and essential characteristic
to understanding social problems.
Racialization applies to more than social problems, however. Here I draw on
sociologist of race, Saher Selod’s (2015) conceptualization of racialization as a social
process whereby “new racial meanings are ascribed to bodies, actions and interactions.
These meanings are not only applied to skin tone, but other cultural factors such as
language, clothing, and beliefs” (79). Identifying a hierarchy in processes of racialization,
anti-racist feminist Yasmin Jiwani (2006) describes this concept as “the meanings
attached to physical and cultural differences [that] imply inferiority where such differences
are seen as departing from a norm” (272). And borrowing from sociologist Jakub
Burkowicz (2016)—whose work within whiteness studies identifies how that hierarchy is
structured in Canada—racialization refers to the processes by which a group of people
become “represented and interpreted as possessing certain identifiable and immutable
racial traits which [are] often judged inferior” to whiteness (8). This does not mean that
whiteness is exterior to processes of racialization; as feminist sociologist Gillian Creese
(2007) argues, power relations in both Canada and the United States are dependent upon
whiteness as a racialized category.
The concept of racialization redirects our analytical gaze towards that which is
constantly generating, transforming, and eliminating racial categories that refer to, but
are not reducible to the body. Understanding bodies as racialized is compatible with a
Foucauldian analysis of discourse; both conceive of social processes as marking and
organizing bodies into categories as a disciplinary technique. Racialization enables me to
deconstruct race as a biological ‘truth’, to understand race as constructed by racism. In
popular conceptions, race is the material reality of the body upon which racism is based;
however, the concept of racialization inverts this narrative. Race is the effect—not the
cause—of racism. To quote Coates (2015), “race is the child of racism, not the father” (7).
As I demonstrated previously with a brief history of the emergence of race as a
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concept—particularly the construction of Black and ‘Indian’ identity—exploitation came
first, then ideology followed to justify that exploitation.
One of the ways in which white society maintains and justifies racial exploitation is
through powerful organizing tropes that construct Black people as threatening. In Canada
and the United States, the constructed threat of Black masculinity to the propriety of white
femininity has historically and presently fomented anti-Black racism, and works to justify
state-sanctioned police brutality and other forms of everyday violence against Black men
under the assumption that they are sexually violent. This is reinforced by the discourse of
the ‘big Black dick’, which I identify and contextualize in the next section.
The ‘Big Black Dick’
The popular perception within the United States and Canada is that penis size is related to,
if not determined by race. According to the prevailing stereotype, Black cis men have the
largest penises compared to all other racial groups. English scholars Gary Lemons (1997)
and Scott Poulson-Bryant (2006) refer to this racialized discourse as the ‘big Black dick’.
Operating across multiple spaces, the discourse of the ‘big Black dick’ forms the basis
of everyday expressions (i.e. ‘once you go Black you never go back’), is common within
entertainment media, is represented in its own genre of pornography, and permeates the
male enhancement industry (see Chapter 6). At the time of this writing, the ‘big Black dick’
discourse is circulating at Black Lives Matter protests against police brutality in Canada
and the United States. Some protest signs mobilize essentialist and objectifying expressions
such as “I love ♥ black dick so you will hear me speak”, “Your daughters love every INCH
of us so why can’t you?!”, and “Black dick matters” (see Craven 2020).
With a few exceptions among the twenty male enhancement practitioners who
participated in this research, the majority reproduced ideas about the racial genetics of
penis size and the stereotype of the ‘big Black dick’ during our interviews. Despite
physicians’ confidence in the racialized genital taxonomy they shared with me, there is no
reliable nor conclusive scientific research supporting these claims.2 There is no evidence
that the median penis size of Black cis men is larger than the median penis sizes of other
groups divided by racial categories, despite the tenaciousness of penis size researchers to
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find such evidence. There is not even a scientific consensus attesting to the median penile
length of human beings regardless of race category. Existing statistical averages of cis
men’s penile dimensions are scientifically suspect; studies calculating penis size often
sample—and therefore, center as normative—white, young, working-class, cis men enrolled
in the military; they lack standardized methods for measuring penile length and girth; and
produce unreliable results that are not generalizable.3
Even if researchers collected a large, racially-diverse and representative sample of
the population, even if they were able to standardize their methods of measurement, and
even if they designed a study that could control for all variables that might affect the
accuracy of measuring penile length and girth—which many male enhancement practitioners
doubted was possible—it would not change the analysis in this manuscript. It matters very
little whether the ‘big Black dick’ is a material reality of the Black body; it has already
produced very real social, historical, and material effects. Seeking out racialized differences
in genital dimensions is part of a long history of attributing racial meanings to bodily
difference that I discussed previously.
In fact, physicians’ taxonomy of penis sizes by race is reminiscent of ethnological
studies in the nineteenth century. Consider, for example, US ethnologist Samuel Morton’s
study in phrenology and craniology30 whereby classifying human skulls—specifically,
measuring their size and shape to attribute social values to different ‘races’—was a means
of naturalizing racial difference and the social inequities that are justified as stemming
30Stein (2015) explains: “Whereas phrenology typically read the bumps on the head for clues about
personality traits and abilities, craniometry or craniology measured and/or weighed the capacity of the
skull: the bigger the capacity, the bigger the brain it must have held and thus the bigger the intellect
and reason” according to psuedo-scientific logics (37). Both fields of study have been debunked as racist,
and largely abandoned by academics. For an example of how a male enhancement practitioner from my
sample reproduced similar logics of phrenology—by measuring physical traits for clues about personality
traits—see Chapter 6 under the section “The ‘Genetics of Race’ and the Racialization of Black Men’s
Genitals”.
72
from that difference (Stein 2015).31 Penis size research has already been taken up by
contemporary eugenicist and white supremacist academics to naturalize race inequality.32
Despite the lacunae in the medical literature on penis size for cis men of colour,
the ‘big Black dick’ is still defined as real in the broader social imaginary of contemporary
Canada and the United States. Therefore, it produces material consequences in the lives of
Black cis men. We can witness this assumption as well as the white appropriation of the ‘big
Black dick’ in director Jordan Peele’s (2017) horror film Get Out. The plot hinges on white
enslavers who lure, hypnotize, and abduct Black people to either auction off or purchase
their living, but sedated bodies. After purchasing Black people’s bodies, white characters
transplant their brains into the heads of their Black victims so that they can gain the alleged
assets or skills of Black bodies. When the Black protagonist, Chris, unknowingly meets these
white body-enslavers at a social gathering, they each objectify his Black body as athletic or
exotically “in fashion”. One white woman asks Chris while glancing at his groin “Is it true? Is
it better?” wanting to confirm her assumption that he has a large penis, and if sex is better
with a ‘big Black dick’. Peele’s portrayal speaks to the white objectification and (in this
film, literal physical) appropriation of Blackness—including the ‘big Black dick’—without
threatening whiteness, and indeed, while upholding white supremacy.
While the story of Get Out is a fictional representation of contemporary racism in
the United States, white objectification and appropriation of the Black body generally,
and the ‘big Black dick’ specifically, is palpably real. Drawing on feminist philosopher
Cressida Heyes’s (2009) work, which contends that all cosmetic surgeries are racially
marked—including somatic projects of whiteness and racial appropriation taken up by
31Morton actually created his taxonomy of racial difference by unintentionally measuring sex difference: “his
sample of nonwhite races included more female skulls, usually smaller in size than male skulls, and he—and
the many scientists who cited his work—read the smaller average skull size he calculated for those races as
evidence of their inferiority. In other words, he read sex difference within a race as proof of physiological
and intellectual difference between the races” (Stein 2015, 38).
32Self-proclaimed eugenicist Richard Lynn claimed in a 2013 peer-reviewed journal that—because Black cis
men’s penises are on average larger than the penises of other ‘races’—Black people in general are less
evolved, especially when compared to white people. Instead of lending credibility to Lynn’s racism by
citing this publication, see Thomas (2011) as well as Volken (2003) for critiques that establish how Lynn’s
research methods generally lack basic scientific rigor, and see Valone (2002) for a critical review of one of
Lynn’s prior publications identifying it as racist and xenophobic.
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white people—this dissertation understands male enhancement as a racialized somatic
practice.33 The distinction between race and racialization is meaningful here. I am not
suggesting that the ‘big Black dick’ is a natural, biological reality of Black men’s bodies
that white people appropriate; that argument would rely on the ontological stability of
‘race’. Rather, since in Canada and the United States our cultural, medical, and scientific
understanding of Black cis men’s bodies is that, on average, they have larger penises
compared to the penis sizes of all other racialized groups, and because male enhancement
is a procedure that seeks to augment the dimensions of cis men’s penises, these genital
practices are racially inflected as Black. Male enhancement is a set of cosmetic
interventions that facilitate the appropriation of the ‘big Black dick’ without threatening
whiteness. Indeed, white cis men can “appropriate pieces of ‘ethnic’ physicality for their
exoticism and eroticism, without risking the oppression that more marked bodies are
vulnerable to” (Heyes 2009a, 203).
The oppression that white cis men are spared when appropriating pieces of racialized
physicality through male enhancement is partially rooted in the history of the ‘big Black
dick’ discourse. This discourse works to reduce Black cis men to their bodies and reinforces
the figure of the Black rapist, that Black cis men allegedly “harbour irresistible and animal-
like sexual urges” (A. Davis 1983, 182) that are reflected in and through their biological,
sexed bodies (Stein 2015). Political activist and feminist philosopher Angela Davis (1983)
makes clear that the figure of the Black rapist who targets white women did not exist
during the Civil War, even though white women were left unattended while white men
were fighting, calling into question the assumption that Black men are naturally violent.
It was not until after the Civil War that the figure of the Black rapist became politically
33Heyes’s (2009) work suggests that “refining a nose that carries the implication of Mediterranean or Middle
Eastern ancestry” can “aim to make already white people whiter” (203). She identifies cosmetic procedures
that result in “pouty, bee-stung lips, or ‘Latin’ buttocks modeled after Jennifer Lopez” as common
interventions white women in Canada and the US undergo to appropriate racially-marked, exotic, and
erotic physicality without the intention to necessarily “pass as racially transformed” (203). Taken even
further to look like or ‘pass’ as Black women, the term ‘blackfishing’ identifies how white women appropriate
physicality racialized as Black by wearing dreadlocks and other uniquely Black hairstyles, applying deeply
pigmented makeup or self-tanning lotion, and undergoing cosmetic procedures to produce features racially-
inflected as Black. Celebrities like Kim Kardashian and Ariana Grande, as well as race scholars such as
Rachel Dolezal and Jessica Krug have all been accused of blackfishing (see Rasool 2018).
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instrumental. She writes: “Before lynching could be consolidated as a popularly accepted
institution [...] its savagery and its horrors had to be convincingly justified. These were the
circumstances which spawned the myth of the Black rapist” (A. Davis 1983, 185).
Of course the figure of the Black rapist inverts the actual direction of violence,
which is disproportionately and structurally enacted by whites against Black communities,
what bell hooks (1997) describes as the projection of ‘terrorist’ onto Black people, despite
whiteness being terrorizing (174). Indeed, white men’s sexual terror against Black women in
particular was integral to the operation and perpetuation of slavery as an institution that has
ongoing repercussions in contemporary Canada and the United States. The reverse framing
of the actual direction of sexual violence is bound up with Canadian and US histories of the
‘big Black dick’ and the Black rapist trope. Acknowledging the legacies of the ‘big Black
dick’ within the Black rapist trope, we can see how white supremacist society mobilizes this
discourse to justify lynching and other state-sanctioned violence against Black bodies. And
as I demonstrate in the analysis of Chapter 6, the ‘big Black dick’ is also an easy scapegoat
used to distract from the violence enacted by particularly white cis men.
The ‘Natural’ Body
The aim of this chapter was to present the theoretical, historical, and analytical
foundations for theorizing the ‘natural’ body as an effect of power. By drawing on
Foucault’s work—which understands the body as the materialization of relations of
power—I can examine how the ‘natural male body’ comes to matter through male
enhancement discourse. Employing a somatechnic analysis—which conceptualizes bodily
being as inextricable from technology—provides a way out of worn debates about whether
somatic transformation is liberatory or oppressive, and disrupts the false dualism of the
natural versus constructed body. A somatechnic orientation, therefore, enables me to
examine how all bodies materialize through socio-discursive fields of power. In this
chapter, I also defined (de)naturalization, racialization, and other conceptual tools that
aid me in this analysis. In the analytical chapters that follow, I juxtapose male
enhancement with gender confirmation surgery, and the ‘monster cock’ in relation to the
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bodies of cis women and cis men of color, to show how the racialization and sexing of
particularly white cis men’s bodies becomes successfully concealed within male
enhancement discourse so as to be regarded as natural.
The task of the next chapter, however, is to outline the epistemological and
ontological assumptions that instruct the creative processes in the generation of data and
knowledge for this research. Here I delineate the pilot study I conducted observing online
male enhancement forums; the characteristics of my sample, the methods I used to recruit
twenty male enhancement practitioners to participate in semi-structured, in-depth,
qualitative interviews; my approach to coding interview transcripts and analyzing
discourse; and a necessarily partial accounting for how my situated position shaped the
generation of knowledge in this project. I conclude the next chapter with a call for
institutional accountability for supporting academics who face gendered and other forms
of systemic violence while conducting research in the field.
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Notes
1Throughout this dissertation, readers may notice that attribution to some authors (specifically Judith
Butler and Donna Haraway) who are key to poststructuralist theory on gender—and therefore, would
otherwise figure prominently in the body of this dissertation—is limited exclusively to the notes section. I
made this decision after witnessing their responses to survivors of sexual assault and harassment enacted
by other professors. As one example, Butler has responded to allegations of sexual assault made against
her friend and colleague Dr. Avital Ronnell in ways that are disappointingly incongruous with her stated
commitments to social justice (see Greenberg 2018). Feminist scholar Haida Arsenault-Antolick claims that
instead of publicly supporting and believing survivors of sexual assault, Butler has defended a confirmed
sexual abuser by mobilizing Dr. Ronnell’s “power and status as a rationale to dismiss her victim’s
experiences” (personal communication). These actions are inextricable from her scholarly work about
gender violence and “whose lives and trauma are ‘grievable’”. Butler’s actions do not undercut her
scholarship, but there is a clear “disconnect from her work and her own actions” that “needs to be
reckoned with”. For a discussion of Donna Haraway’s responses to survivors of sexual assault, see
Subbaraman (2018). On the other hand, I have entirely removed from this dissertation scholars who have
been publicly accused of engaging in sexual misconduct, such as Michael Kimmel. Notable gaps in this
dissertation’s review of theory and literature that may result from their removal should demonstrate that
as white cis men, they have been afforded a lot of space in the discipline. My aim was to make space for
others in this dissertation, including queer, trans, and nonbinary theorists; academics of colour; early
career scholars; and cis women intellectuals.
2Most of the penis size studies mentioned by male enhancement practitioners in our interviews reflected
sampling issues common to penis size research; cited investigations were often conducted in the United States
during the 1950s and 60s, and focused exclusively on white, working-class men, whose penile measurements
were most often recorded during their time in the military. Cis men who discussed racialized penile dimensions
on support sites like Enhancement Forum sometimes gestured to sales information from condom companies
that suggest people in African countries tend to purchase larger condom sizes compared to people in Canada
and the United States, and people in Asian countries tend to purchase the smallest condom sizes compared to
all others. Enhancement forum members do not problematize to what extent existing stereotypes may have
impacted consumer’s purchasing habits. Nor have they considered how sex education varies widely between
and within these countries about how to use prophylactics effectively, including education about the proper fit
of condoms, which remains an important variable (among others) unaccounted for in corporate sales records.
Moreover, basing our understanding of human bodies on sales information from for-profit companies seems
dubious at best, and cannot be generalizable.
3For example, some penis size research measures erect length (see Habous et al. 2015), others gauge flaccid
stretched length (see Spyropoulos et al. 2002); some calculate penile length from the skin on the upper side
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of the shaft to the tip of the glans, others employ a ‘bone-pressed’ method by pressing into the suprapubic
fat pad on the upper side of the shaft measuring out to the tip of the glans; some calculate penile girth
using the dimensions of the base of the penis as well as the coronal ridge (see da Ros et al. 1994), whereas
others measure the midshaft to quantify penile circumference (for examples of this research, see Ponchietti
et al. 2001; Wessells, Lue, and McAninch 1996; Alter 1995). Given that a researcher touching and measuring
study participants’ flaccid or erect penises would largely impact the results, it is common within this body
of research to ask participants to privately measure and report their own penile dimensions. However, this
creates other inaccuracies and inflations of the figures; problems with participant self-measurement and self-
reporting of those measurements are widespread within penis size research (for examples of this research, see
Grov, Wells, and Parsons 2013; Bogaert and Hershberger 1999; Choi et al. 1999; Smith et al. 1998; Richters,
Gero, and Donovan 1995; Jamison and Gebhard 1988). It is in part for this reason that the Kinsey data on
penile dimensions is imprecise and unreliable (see Sutherland et al. 1996; Wessells, Lue, and McAninch 1996).
Harding and Golombok (2002) concluded that self-reporting measurements has very low test-retest reliability
(r = .60 for length, and r = .53 for girth) (355) due to “unreliability of the measurement method”, but also
due to “natural variability” (356) in testing conditions: “temperature, arousal, and previous ejaculation can
affect the dimensions of both the flaccid and erect penis” (352). The tendency for penis size research to have
very small sample sizes limits the generalizability of results from this body of scholarship (for examples of
this research, see Spyropoulos et al. 2002; Wessells, Lue, and McAninch 1996; Richters, Gero, and Donovan
1995; da Ros et al. 1994). A failure in some studies to report a standard deviation and a range alongside
mean penile dimensions (for example, see Jamison and Gebhard 1988) also limits our interpretation of the
data considerably. The overwhelming focus in penis size research on white participants (see Spyropoulos
et al. 2002; Richters, Gero, and Donovan 1995; da Ros et al. 1994; Jamison and Gebhard 1988), cis men in
the military (see Spyropoulos et al. 2002), and cis men under the age of 40 (see Spyropoulos et al. 2002;






The aim of this chapter is to be transparent about the orienting paradigms and creative
processes that generated the knowledge claims in this manuscript. Before identifying the
creative processes, meaning the methods I used to co-generate data with male
enhancement practitioners, I want to first identify the paradigms—the “world-views
through which all knowledge is filtered”—that orient this research as they relate to
ontology and epistemology (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2004, 6). ‘What can be known’ from
male enhancement practitioners about the materialization of particularly-sexed and
racialized bodies is a question of ontology. Whereas the ‘ways of knowing’ how sexed and
racialized bodies materialize through discourse, and the relationship between the research
field and the researcher, is a reflection of epistemology. The ontological and
epistemological presuppositions that underlie this project are rooted in a critical
constructivist paradigm or world-view.
A critical constructivist position in relation to knowledge production recognizes
that claims to ‘objectivity’ and ‘universal truth’—as well as the ‘view from nowhere’ that
underlies such claims—are misrepresentative at best, and deliberately dangerous at worst
(see Smith 2012; Sullivan 2009b). Knowledge claims always emerge from somewhere, from
some situated position in relationship to systems of power, within particular sets of social
relations, and under specific historical conditions (see Kihika 2019; Smith 2012; Guba and
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Lincoln 2004). Feminist biologist Ruth Hubbard (1995) explains that western scientists’
claims to objectivity
cannot guard against the biases and commitments shared by substantial
interest groups, and it can avoid them even less if these commitments are
shared by the entire culture. [...] Since scientists are a rather homogeneous
group—predominantly European or Euro-American, male, upper middle
class—and have passed through an educational process that has taught them
to look at the world in specific ways, their so-called objectivity is enclosed
within their shared commitments. [...] Scientists always make choices; but they
pretend that their choices are driven by the internal logic of their subject and
by the free play of their educated curiosity. Yet it is dangerous to ignore the
contextual framework that shapes their subject matter, their curiosity, and
their choices. (208)
Since all knowledge is shaped by context as well as the situatedness of our subjectivities
and ethical commitments, feminist and critical race scholars call for a transparent
accounting of how our situated positions inform the knowledges we create (Kihika 2019;
Harding 2004; Hubbard 1995).1 True to a critical constructivist paradigm, I recognize that
data generation between male enhancement practitioners and myself is a social and
relational process of meaning making. For this reason, I have taken account for my role in
the research process in the section “Situating Myself” at the end of this chapter. The data
we generated in the form of written notes about practitioners’ comments, descriptions of
practitioners’ mannerisms or appearance, and illustrations of the interview context that
accompanied audio recordings and interview transcripts are a necessarily situated and
partial construction of our interactions and the events that unfolded during interviews.
1It is important to note here that the situatedness of knowledge does not mean that all knowledge is
equally valid. While Donna Haraway (1991) problematized dominant forms of western scientific thought in
her original writings about the situated character of all knowledge, she did not reject wholesale scientific
inquiry or method. One common misinterpretation and dangerous co-optation of poststructuralist critiques
of scientific knowledge specifically is that if we can problematize scientific thought as socially informed
rather than as objective ‘truth’, then ‘alternative facts’ and uncritical opinions are equally as credible as
scientific inquiry and evidence-based knowledge within the ‘marketplace of ideas’. To combat this narrative
and effect political change, scholars, educators, and activists must situate ‘alternative facts’ within the
specific social and historical conditions that produce them, namely under white supremacy, colonialism,
neoliberal capitalism, and heteropatriarchy. This renders visible the relations of power and systems of
domination that make ‘alternative facts’ appealing and seemingly advantageous to particular groups of
people. Furthermore, as academics and community activists, we need to be cognizant of and transparent
about the tension within our own work between commitments to generating knowledge, while we are at the
same time embedded in fields of power.
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Guba and Lincoln (2004) suggest that the ultimate objective of constructivist
research is to “distill a consensus construction” of reality (27). This is not the aim of the
present research. For this reason, in addition to a constructivist world-view, this
investigation is expressly critical; in particular, this research seeks to locate the interstitial
spaces within the operations of power in our socio-historical moment to create openings
for alternative forms of embodiment and subjectivity beyond cisnormativity, whiteness,
and phallic masculine embodiment.
Early Observations of Virtual Male Enhancement Forums
Recognizing myself as an outsider to the populations and genital practices central to this
project, I began this research with a pilot study observing virtual homosocial spaces like
online support sites for cis men interested in ‘do-it-yourself’ and medically-assisted male
enhancement. Informed by this pilot study, I could come moderately prepared to my
interviews with male enhancement experts. By observing the talk of cis men in these
virtual spaces before building an interview guide for my discussions with practitioners, I
could ensure that my lines of inquiry would center existing discourses within the field of
male enhancement.
Enhancement Forum—a pseudonym for one of the primary websites I observed for
the pilot study—allows forum members to develop personal profiles, post customizable
avatars (which often depicted sexualized images of women’s bodies), exchange private
messages with other users, post before-and-after photos of their flaccid and erect genitals
to share their enhancement gains, publicize their genital measurements and assessments of
their erectile quality in the signatures of their posts, and contribute to a wide assortment
of thread topics. Common topics contained in these forums include information about new
products and techniques that enlarge ‘male’ genitalia, narratives about embarrassing
locker room interactions and sexual experiences—many of which are framed as traumatic
‘origin stories’ for why cis men started their male enhancement ‘journey’—requests for
and suggestions about reputable male enhancement practitioners, and advice for pre- and
post-operative care.
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At the time of my observations, Enhancement Forum offered over 3,900 individual
members support, guidance, and community where they can share humorous,
heart-breaking, embarrassing, confessional, and explicit conversations and photographs.
Sociologist Jared Del Rosso’s (2011) observations of virtual communities on
PenisSanity.com—a forum for men with small penises—resemble my own readings of
message board participation on Enhancement Forum:
Missing were the antagonistic markers of many online forums, such as ‘flaming’,
which is characterized by postings of ‘profanity, obscenity, and insults that inflict
harm to a person or an organization’. [...] In their place seemed to be a collective
ethos of care and support. (709)
Disagreement and debate were present on Enhancement Forum; however, they often related
to questions such as “How big is big enough? What is the ideal penis size?” or “Who is best
qualified to receive elective surgical procedures? Those with a deformity, disease, or small
measurements? Or does everyone have equally as legitimate reasons for electing surgical
intervention?” These disagreements never resulted in a consensus and often generated some
of the most compelling discourses and data.
For the pilot study, I visited forums twice per week for a period of two months
in 2013, amounting to about fifty hours of observations. I chose Enhancement Forum and
other support sites as my fields for virtual observations because compared to other websites,
they had some of the highest post traffic dedicated to discussions about male enhancement
at the inception of this study. My degree of participation in these forums was limited to
registering with the websites and observing a variety of threads; I did not post on forums or
contact site members, but instead acted as what site members call a “lurker”. The greater
part of my observations were directed by the most popular and current threads, which the
website tracked and updated as members contributed to them. Upon locating analytically
compelling themes, I used the website’s search function to see how common these themes
were; how forum members participated in discussions about these themes, especially noting
dissenting voices; and to situate these themes in various contexts. I used a similar coding
method for these websites as I did for interviews with practitioners, which I describe later
in this chapter in the section “Coding and Analysis”.
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My observations of male enhancement forums inform some of the building blocks
of this research, including the interview questions I asked male enhancement practitioners.
For example, section five of my interview guide explicitly states that the questions
contained therein were inspired by my observations of online support sites like
Enhancement Forum (see the “Semi-Structured Interview Guide” in the Appendix). Some
of the questions I crafted based on my initial observations of male enhancement
forums—such as inquiries about the relationship between pornography and physicians’
medical practices in the materialization of cis men’s bodies—did not survive past the first
several interviews as they failed to generate much of a response from practitioners.
Notable conflicts between patient desires and expectations expressed on Enhancement
Forum and practitioner policies and practices also characterized my interviews with
doctors. As one example, a large number of Enhancement Forum members wanted access
to genital technologies as a means to secure multiple sexual partners, to which several
practitioners such as Dr. Tabibi were vocally opposed (see Chapter 6).
However, other themes I originally identified within male enhancement forums are
central to the analysis of this manuscript, including the suffering that characterizes cis
men’s ‘origin stories’ explaining why they became interested in genital technologies (see
Chapter 4), discourses that racialize genitals (see Chapters 5 and 6), and themes related
to the ‘monster cock’ (see Chapter 6). While I may have arrived at similar discourses
about suffering and the racialization of sexed bodies without observing cis men’s talk on
male enhancement forums, it is unlikely that Chapter 6 about ‘monster cocks’ would exist
without this pilot study.
Research Field
This project joins the ongoing conversation amongst many somatechnicians (Gill-Peterson
2018a, 2017, 2014; Alm 2013; Garner 2011; Sullivan 2008b, 2007) and gender scholars
(Davis, Dewey, and Murphy 2016; Campo-Engelstein and Johnson 2014; Fujimura 2006;
Green 2005; Dreger 1998; Martin 1991) who have taken up medical discourse of gender,
sex, and/or race construction as their conceptual object, critiquing the role of psychology
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and the medical establishment for defining bodies and identities in a way that privileges
essentialist and bioreductive models of gender, sex, and race. Following in the footsteps of
feminist theorists who have taken the clinical context as the specific site of their analysis
of these discourses (Whitehead et al. 2015; Whitehead and Thomas 2013; Whitehead et al.
2012; Kessler 1990), this investigation looks at the medical practices of male enhancement
physicians, investigating how they naturalize the cis ‘male’ body and normative whiteness
in the process of opening and closing the gate to male enhancement technologies, while
(de)naturalizing the bodies of trans folks, cis women, and Black cis men.
Sampling and Recruitment of Male Enhancement Practitioners
At the time of recruitment, eligible participants included anyone who legally performed
male enhancement procedures in Canada and the United States, including penile length
and girth enhancements, procedures on the scrotum, and adult circumcisions.2 I initially
identified potential participants and obtained their contact information through three
avenues: examining publicly-available websites that profile and provide patient reviews of
medical professionals; reading online support sites like Enhancement Forum where cis men
shared their experiences with particular male enhancement practitioners, or asked other
forum members for recommendations of doctors in the field; and searching for physicians’
professional websites where they advertise their services. Through an e-mail recruitment
script (see the “Recruitment Email” in the Appendix), I invited doctors who perform male
enhancement procedures to participate in this research. If I did not receive a response
within a week, I sent a follow-up email. Occasionally I called doctors’ offices to confirm
their receipt of the original email, as I discovered later in the recruitment process that
email filters often directed my research invitation to spam folders.
After conducting each interview, I employed a chain-referral recruitment method
as a tactic for accessing participants who may not have as much of an online presence,
2Three participants who exclusively perform adult circumcisions—Doctors Trotter, Grassa, and Wilson—
are still represented in aggregate descriptions about practitioner responses (i.e. “the majority of doctors
claim...”), but otherwise are largely absent from the analysis of this dissertation because the research focus
shifted more towards penile length and girth augmentations. As a result, the questions pertinent to these
doctors’ expertise are not centered in this analysis.
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and who may feel more inclined to participate after their colleagues vouch for me (Penrod
et al. 2003). From this additional recruitment method, I received the names of just three
physicians, but only secured one additional interview. Chain-referral recruitment posed a
significant challenge, because unlike my previous experiences interviewing mental health
professionals who are incredibly networked, male enhancement practitioners often claimed
they did not know other physicians in their field. While this is possible, it seems unlikely
given that many male enhancement practitioners perform revision procedures to reverse
enhancements carried out by other doctors, whereby they become aware of their colleagues
and the procedures they perform through their common patients. Moreover, several of the
physicians I interviewed attend professional conferences where they network with other
specialists in the field.
What is more likely is that practitioners refrained from providing referrals because
they hold deep disagreements with how other physicians manage their practice and do not
want the opinions of those doctors to be represented in a germinal study about male
enhancement (see Robinson (2008), Luciano (2002), and Haiken (2000) for the few
historical and social analyses of male enhancement). This seemed to be the case for a
handful of physicians who explicitly stated during our interviews that other male
enhancement practitioners were unprofessional or primarily motivated by profit rather
than patient care, and that I should exercise caution about who I include in this research.
Additionally, the male enhancement industry generally, and the private medical practices
of physicians specifically, may be more competitive than I originally anticipated,
potentially explaining why collaborative relationships between male enhancement
practitioners may be much less common than for the mental health professionals with
whom I previously conducted research.
After three months of active recruitment, of the seventy-two practitioners I invited
to participate, twenty-six agreed to an interview, and twenty fulfilled the interview process.3
All of the doctors who participated in an interview are cis men. I am aware of a handful
3Four practitioners requested to reschedule the interview, but did not respond to follow up emails; one
physician passed away in the course of this research; and I chose not to interview the final doctor.
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of women who perform male enhancement procedures, but they did not respond to my
invitation to participate in the research. Two practitioners in my sample are racialized men,
which seems proportional to the number of male enhancement doctors of colour from which
I recruited participants; all other participants were white. I did not formally ask physicians
to share their ages during our interviews, but based on their online profiles, their ages
ranged between forty and eighty years. I estimate that most doctors were in their fifties or
sixties, which is congruent with the typical level of experience and number of years most
practitioners had accrued as practicing physicians. Only three participants in my sample
were located in Canada, which limited my ability to draw conclusions about how the different
health care systems in Canada and the United States oriented physician’s medical practices;
the remaining practitioners worked in the United States, with every region represented in
my sample. California was the location in which most doctors from my sample practiced
medicine. Some physicians performed male enhancement procedures at multiple offices in
different regions of the United States, and a couple of doctors practiced medicine in other
countries throughout the world in addition to their US location. All practitioner names used
in this manuscript are pseudonyms that I selected.
The practitioners in my sample who gave informed, expressed consent to
participate have different kinds and degrees of medical training, and wide-ranging levels of
experience performing male enhancement procedures. Practitioners’ formal training as
they described it included urology; plastic, cosmetic, reconstructive, and general surgery;
family medicine; anesthesiology; and several other specialties. The most common training
doctors in this sample completed was in plastic surgery. Every participant was a doctor
except one who performed male enhancement procedures as a clinical cosmetic specialist.
The procedures that participants perform and that qualify for this analysis are various
penile and testicular enhancements including, but not limited to, suspensory ligament
release for penile elongation, penile and testicular implants, autologous fat
injections—meaning fat that comes from patients’ bodies—dermal fillers of the penile
shaft, Scrotox to smooth out the wrinkling of scrotal skin, suprapubic fat removal, and
revision procedures of prior enhancements. Participants’ other surgical expertise that to
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varying degrees falls under the purview of this analysis includes surgeries to ‘correct’
buried penis syndrome, intersex surgeries, and gender confirmation surgeries for trans
patients (described by most practitioners as ‘Female-to-Male’ [FtM] and ‘Male-to-Female’
[MtF] genital procedures).4
Experience performing male enhancement procedures specifically ranged between
about two to forty years, with a mean duration of seventeen years. However, several doctors
had been practicing physicians much longer than they had been offering male enhancement
procedures. The estimated number of male enhancement patients that practitioners had
worked with also varied considerably, between ten and ten thousand patients. Operating
on more than ten thousand patients was a notable outlier; the second highest number of
patients on which a doctor in this sample had performed male enhancement procedures was
two thousand. Excluding the surgeon with the most prolific experience, the mean number of
male enhancement patients with whom participants had worked was four hundred. The six
physicians in my sample who—in addition to performing male enhancement procedures—
had a range of experience between four and forty years of specializing in gender confirmation
surgeries, with a mean duration of about twenty-two years.5
Conducting Interviews
Congruent with the critical constructivist orientation of this research, I employed an
active interviewing approach that treats the participant as a colleague in knowledge
production, rather than as an object for knowledge extraction (Holstein and Gubrium
2004). During interviews I utilized an inductive, modified grounded theory approach with
open-ended, semi-structured interview questions so as to draw out rich qualitative themes
(Charmaz 2014, 2004; Strauss and Corbin 1991; Glaser and Strauss 1967). Crafting
4This dissertation does not use the language of ‘male-to-female’ (MtF) or ‘female-to-male’ (FtM) except
when quoting male enhancement practitioners. While trans folks can and do use this language for self-
identification, it is not language that is more useful to this research than the umbrella term ‘trans’, which
is more reflective of the range of bodies and subjectivities contained under the purview of this project.
5Unfortunately, I did not anticipate early in the interview stage of this research the centrality of practitioners’
comments about gender confirmation surgery to this project, and as a result, did not record the estimated
number of trans patients with whom these physicians previously worked. However, I am familiar enough
with their medical practices that I am able to make general claims about their level of experience working
with trans patients.
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interview questions was an iterative process based on emerging theoretical considerations,
observations of virtual homosocial spaces for cis men seeking to enhance their genitals, as
well as the experience and knowledge I gained after completing each interview with male
enhancement practitioners. Questions in the interview protocol (see the “Semi-Structured
Interview Guide” in the Appendix) addressed physicians’ qualifications and experience;
the logics they use for accepting or rejecting a prospective patient for male enhancement,
affording careful consideration to negative cases; and their expert understanding of their
patients’ bodies, paying particular attention to discourses about sex, race, and other
markers of the body.
One of the most successful strategies for soliciting theoretically compelling data
was derived from the analytical methods of somatechnics described by cultural studies
scholar Nikki Sullivan (2009b) (which I present in the section “Coding and Analysis”). As
part of this method, I regularly invited doctors to consider and juxtapose male
enhancement procedures and patient cases in relation to other forms of somatic
transformation, embodiment, and subjectivity. This included trans bodies and gender
confirmation surgery, intersex bodies, the ‘monster cock’, ‘genital mutilation’, ‘body
dysmorphic’ cis men, and the bodies of patients’ sexual partners (almost exclusively
discussed by physicians as cis women).
The interview guide located in the appendix of this dissertation presents a sample
set of the questions I asked participants. However, in practice, the lines of inquiry and
delivery of the questions were customized for each participant—including their expertise and
the procedures they perform—and our conversations regularly went ‘off-script’. Moreover,
this sample guide contains more questions than I regularly asked in each interview; since
some practitioners limited their responses to just a few short sentences, I wanted to ensure I
had follow-up questions prepared to solicit more about their medical practices and expertise.
Other physicians spoke at such great length about their practices in male enhancement (and
gender confirmation surgery) that I was compelled to limit my questions to those that—
based on previous interviews and the unfolding of the current conversation—I anticipated
would solicit the most theoretically engaging responses. On the other hand, sometimes
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the questions that received little engagement in previous interviews would glean the most
surprising responses in subsequent interviews.
I originally planned as part of my research design to organize in-person interviews
with male enhancement practitioners, as well as immersive observations of their clinical
appointments with cis men. I was partially successful, having conducted a handful of in-
person interviews with physicians. It is uncommon for social science research to proceed
without the need for adaptation and improvisation, however. This research is no exception.
After only one month of active recruitment, I needed to leave Los Angeles, so I adapted my
project to center virtually-mediated interviews with physicians. From these adaptations I
may have lost the experiential and embodied richness that typically comes from in-person
interviews, observations, and ethnographic immersion, but in my estimation, using mediated
interviewing increased participation in this research because it offered flexibility for doctors’
busy schedules (Deakin and Wakefield 2014). Some practitioners only agreed to an interview
because they could accommodate our virtual conversation during a flight layover, in-between
patient consultations, or after arriving home from work before cooking dinner.
As other qualitative research has confirmed (Jenner and Myers 2019; Deakin and
Wakefield 2014), I was still able to build rapport with my participants and generate in-
depth research through mediated interview contexts such as Skype, contrary to some of the
concerns raised previously by other scholars (Seitz 2016; Weinmann et al. 2012). While call
quality issues occasionally required participants and me to engage in mitigating strategies—
such as slowing and clarifying our comments and remaining open to repeating questions
and answers (Seitz 2016)—the majority of interviews benefited from these strategies.6 It is
also possible that some of the ‘exceptional disclosures’ (Jenner and Myers 2019) made by
practitioners like Dr. Perry that I detail elsewhere in this chapter (see the section “Situating
Myself”) could have resulted in part from the physical separation made possible by virtual
interviews (Weller 2017).
6My interview with Dr. Schneider created unique challenges, as he was able to hear me without call
interference, but on my end, the call was characterized by persistent speech delay and feedback echoing my
every word. This did have a notably negative impact on our rapport.
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Most interviews took place in the fall of 2014; over the years I conducted a few
additional interviews, culminating in the winter of 2017, mostly as follow-up discussions
aimed at clarifying physicians’ former comments. Interviews either took place in-person at
medical practitioners’ offices, over the phone, or via Skype. During virtually-mediated
interviews, I was in my apartment and physicians were located in their offices, homes, at
the airport, or driving their car during their commute. Our in-depth, qualitative
interviews lasted between forty-five minutes and two hours forty minutes, with a mean
interview duration of about one-and-a-half hours.
Coding and Analysis
Consistent with a critical constructivist paradigm, I favoured a modified grounded theory
approach in this research out of recognition that the codes I construct and the analysis I
produce are my interpretation of the data (Charmaz 2014, 2004; Strauss and Corbin 1991;
Glaser and Strauss 1967). Instead of working through distinct phases, the generation, coding,
and analysis of the data overlapped throughout this project. Building an interview guide
by drawing from my coded observations of online support sites; analyzing data during the
interview moment; memo writing throughout the transcription, coding, and analysis of the
research; and continuously reconceptualizing and contextualizing practitioners’ comments
during the writing process reflect my iterative approach to the data.
After transcribing and organizing the audio data and my written notes for the
first initial interviews, my approach consisted of identifying and managing emergent
themes grounded in the data and emphasized by participants. By ‘emergent’ here I am not
suggesting that they exist a priori and I simply encounter them; rather, “emerging data”
refers to the co-constructive process whereby I actively conceptualize and contextualize
the content of practitioners’ comments and the work accomplished by their discourses
(Charmaz 2014, 115). After coding these first few interviews, I revisited and revised my
interview guide to reflect what I learned from our conversations.
During the initial rounds of open coding, I used the comments function of
LibreOffice—an open-source, Linux-based word processor similar in functionality to
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MicrosoftWord—to organize and conceptualize my codes and memos. After I had
developed an initial but flexible coding scheme, I returned to the interviews using NVivo
software to continue extensive memo writing and multiple waves of focused coding. At the
peak of code identification, practitioner interviews contained anywhere from 30 to 71
different themes, with a mean of 53 different themes. Coding for those themes produced
between 54 and 550 references per interview, with a mean of 213 references of those
themes. Interviews that contained more themes and references—such as Dr. Fray (71,
550), Dr. Tabibi (65, 301), and Dr. Rosenburg’s (63, 262) interviews—tend to be
represented more often in the analysis compared to interviews that contained the fewest
themes and references—such as the interviews with Dr. Lieberman (46, 118), Dr. Trotter
(32, 70), and Dr. Grassa (29, 58). On the other hand, Dr. Allen’s interview contained
some of the fewest themes and references (30, 54), yet this dissertation contains and
analyzes several of his quotes.
During analysis, I aimed to juxtapose practitioners’ discourses about different
bodies and subjectivities. Largely eschewing isolationist, analogical, and categorical
approaches to understanding body projects in favor of a somatechnological one (Sullivan
2009b), this project brings male enhancement in relation to other bodies and bodily
practices so as to locate similarities, resonances, divergences, and intersections between
them. In particular, I was able to juxtapose codes for male enhancement surgery with
codes for other somatic practices. Sullivan (2009a) describes this comparative method as
juxtaposing various modificatory procedures, the justifications that inform
their practice or its prohibition and the ethico-political lived effects of such, in
the hope that in so doing, questions, issues, and insights associated with one
particular practice may cast new light on others. This may in turn engender
more-nuanced understandings of and critical responses to the complex and
multifaceted technés in and through which embodied being(s) comes to matter
in situated contextually specific ways. (317)
Interpreting genital procedures through and against each other, I compare cis male
enhancement to other somatic practices like gender confirmation surgery for trans folks.
This strategy brings into sharp relief the ontological assumptions informing each of these
practices. Through this comparative analysis, I determined the focus of this project.
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Practitioner responses fit within a general typology of themes that were best
epitomized by the case examples shared within this dissertation. While the greater
number of the quotes I analyze in this manuscript are representative of the primary
themes that emerged during interviews, a few quotes that I examine in this project
contain relatively unique responses. I included these singular responses because they
marked the boundaries of doctors’ logics about sexed and racialized bodies (such as Dr.
Rosenburg’s quote in the section “Denaturalizing the ‘Big Black Dick’” in Chapter 6), or
because they serve as examples of resistance to dominant discourses (such as Mr. Charles
Bennett’s quote in the section “Resisting Discourses of Trans Regret” in Chapter 5). In
the section that follows, I detail how I examined physicians’ discourses.
Discourse Analysis
Foucault has been credited with saying that “People know what they do; they frequently
know why they do what they do; but what they don’t know is what what they do does”
(Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 187). Upon learning that male enhancement is the general
focus of this project, many people assumed the aim of this research is to uncover why cis
men are interested in augmenting their genitals, meaning why they do what they do. While
some cis men are uncertain about why they do what they do (see the section “Monster
Cocks” in Chapter 6), and medical practitioners are fairly clear why they perform male
enhancement procedures, neither are as clear as to what what they do does, which is a matter
of discourse. The purpose of this research is to trace what male enhancement discourses do
in the materialization of particularly-sexed and racialized bodies. This section briefly lays
out how Foucault understands discourse and how his work influences my own.
Foucault employed two methodological approaches to analyzing discourse:
archaeology and genealogy. The tools of an archaeological analysis trace the vertical
production of discourse—meaning the set of statements that direct what counts as
‘truth’—as it operates among various layers of institutional and social contexts (Foucault
1994). Archaeology does not ask ‘what is truth?’, but rather, “how is it that one particular
statement appeared rather than another?” (Foucault 2002, 30). Archaeology, therefore,
attends to the conditions in the formation of some statements, and not others; and the
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construction of objects of knowledge—such as the ‘male body’ or ‘race’—through the
productive capacity of power. The field that enabled the formation of statements and the
rules that produced objects of knowledge are the focus of archaeology.
Foucault’s (1990) genealogical method, on the other hand, maps the horizontal
production of discourse by inciting a rereading of history to unsettle the underlying
presuppositions and conditions of knowledge that comprise history. As a history of the
present, a genealogical approach poses a question about the here and now and then looks
backwards in history to map the power relations that form what counts as ‘truth’.
Foucault (1984) clarifies that genealogy does not conduct a linear search through history
for an origin, design, or foundation upon which the present rests; instead it “disturbs what
was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the
heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself” (82). A genealogy of the ‘male’
body, for example, would render visible how maleness is mutable, fragmented, and
heterogeneous.
This research deviates from Foucault’s genealogical and archaeological
methodology, as I do not engage in an historical or textual analysis. However, I follow the
example of somatechnicians (Garner 2011) and ethnographers (Whitehead 2012; Moon
2004) who adopt Foucault’s conceptualization of discourse to the extent that they can
with the data they have generated. Since somatechnics understands discourse and
materiality as inextricable—that discourse is constitutive of the contours of our bodies—it
is compatible with a Foucauldian conceptualization that affords discourses material
existence. Instead of employing an historical analysis to identify the ruptures and fissures
between different discursive formations, I use a somatechnic method resembling the
research of Fox and Thomson (2009b) and Sullivan (2009b) which juxtaposes similar
somatic practices around which different discursive systems form. To borrow Garner’s
(2011, 45) astute observation, I do not have to analyze the past to “reveal the relations of
power through which the body is materialised” because a somatechnic method allows me
to examine, for example, the discourses of gender confirmation surgery alongside “the
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other real possible statements, which are contemporary to it” in male enhancement
discourse (Foucault 1994, xvii).
While I could have conducted a discourse analysis of male enhancement using
various texts—including surgery journals or content published online—these texts do not
necessarily demonstrate the ways discourses operate at the level of everyday life.
Sociologist of gender and sexuality, Dawne Moon (2004) contends, “if we want to look at
how people go about reproducing power in the capillaries of everyday thought and
interaction, there is a paradox in looking at something so fixed as a text” (12). She
suggests that ethnographic methods—including interviews and observations—“add to
Foucault’s theory of power from a perspective that more closely reflects his theory, by
examining the micro-level interactions in which he sees power inhering” (12).
Feminist sociologist Jaye Cee Whitehead (2012) makes a similar argument that
interview and observational data enriches an analysis of power.
Textual analysis cannot uncover how discourses can be forged, appropriated, and
locally adapted in particular moments that may never leave an historical trace.
[...] Interactive methods allow researchers another lens to study the “capillary”
effect of power to bleed its way into seemingly insignificant slices of everyday
life and fleeting moments of individual’s feelings and thoughts. (20)
Given that some of the discourses physicians invoked in our interviews do not exist in texts,
and therefore, “may leave only a thin and ambiguous historical residue for genealogical or
archaeological analysis”, research like this present manuscript is unique in mapping out their
operation, including how practitioners employ or disrupt these discourses in their everyday
practices (Whitehead 2012, 21).
Mirroring Nikki Sullivan’s (2009) acknowledgement that any intervention into
debates about bodies further brings those bodies into being through discourse, I too
recognize that “my contribution is no less an effect of the operation of power” (314). My
contribution to the generation of knowledge through this research is shaped in part by my
situated position. True to a feminist epistemology, which calls for a transparent
accounting by the researcher to situate themself in relation to their research, I discuss my
positionality in the following section.
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Situating Myself
In this section, I offer a necessarily incomplete accounting for how my situated position is
reflected in the generation of knowledge for this dissertation. My relationship to the land
is one of the conditions that made the production of knowledge in this research possible. I
began this investigation while living and working on the unceded, traditional, and
ancestral land of the xwmSkwým (Musqueam), Skwxwú7mesh (Squamish), Sĺilwtab/
(Tsleil-Waututh), kwikw3m (Kwikwetlem), Qayqayt, and Stó:lō Nations in what is now
referred to as British Columbia, Canada.7 In the territory of the Chumash, Tongva, and
Kizh peoples, what is now known as Los Angeles, is where I conducted the majority of my
in-person and virtually-mediated interviews. The greater part of my writing this
dissertation took place in—to the best of my knowledge—Chinook and Stl’pulmsh
(Cowlitz) territory in the Portland metro area.
As a white settler to these territories, and an immigrant to Canada, I was able to
accomplish this research due to my general access to and mobility through the world that
the privilege of whiteness, access to economic support through my family, and US citizenship
affords me, in part as an outcome of the US and Canadian theft of Indigenous Land. While
Indigenous Peoples are not at the center of this project on male enhancement, I hope that
this manuscript begins to effectively situate the social and historical processes of gender,
the sexed body, and race within white settler colonialism as one way of unsettling ‘western’
history and troubling naturalized categories that continue to shape the lives of Indigenous
Peoples today.
In congruence with a constructivist and grounded theory approach, I similarly
recognize that the results of this research are not independent of my own epistemological
and ontological assumptions—some of which are inevitably unconscious—nor my former
education, experiences, and political commitments. In agreement with feminist reflexivity,
who I am, what my relationship is to the research, and my commitments to feminist social
7The spelling of the Indigenous names listed here reflects the best of my knowledge of these names as well
as my ability to use diacritics and other special characters within the limits of the LaTeX program I used
to code this dissertation. See native-land.ca for the full spelling of these names. This website also contains
continually-updated maps of Indigenous territories, languages, and treaties primarily in North America.
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justice organizing guide the kinds of questions that I think merit investigation, the tools I
select to answer those questions, as well as the results I co-generated and share in this
manuscript. The very act of, for example, selecting male enhancement as my primary field
and gender confirmation surgery as a comparative medical practice is an extension of my
previous research projects about cis men’s body work and the logics of mental health
professionals who gatekeep trans folk’s access to appropriate medical care (Whitehead and
Thomas 2013; Whitehead et al. 2012).
Investigating the ‘natural male body’, thinking through cisnormativity and trans
oppression, and deconstructing racializing discourses—particularly of the Black ‘male’ body
and Asian ‘female’ body—enable me to locate gendered and racialized operations of power
from a relative position of ontological safety. After all, as a woman, it is not my own social
location that I am unsettling (however, that project is on the horizon). And as a white
cis person, I have the privilege to withdraw, at least to some degree, from the violence of
the racializing and trans-antagonistic discourses I analyze in this notably academic text.
Whereas for Black and trans communities, the struggle against anti-Black racism and trans
oppression is not something they could simply elect to opt out of. So my outsider position
in relation to this project is constitutive of the knowledges that I co-created within it, in
many ways from a shifting location of systemic advantage.
Both my ethical and political commitments, as well as how my social position was
read by participants, shaped every aspect of this research. As an ‘undercover’ feminist
researcher working to end white supremacy, I remained vigilant about how white
physicians perceived and interacted with me in ways related to our whiteness, especially
during conversations that were explicitly about race and people of colour. Many
practitioners such as Mr. Bennett, Dr. Rosenburg, Dr. Lieberman, and others regularly
prefaced their comments about race by saying they “do not want to sound racist” or they
“in no way mean to be racist”, often before making racist comments, as if their intentions
are more important than the impacts of their claims.
Whiteness studies sociologist Robin DiAngelo (2018) argues that statements like
these demonstrate white fragility: “a state in which even a minimum amount of racial stress
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[...] becomes intolerable [for white people], triggering a range of defensive moves” (103) such
as anger, guilt, argumentation, silence, leaving the stressful situation without addressing the
problem, and—in this particular case from practitioners—fear of being read as racist and a
‘bad person’. Statements like “I do not want to sound racist” prioritize protecting whiteness
and centering white people’s feelings and moral reputations, rather than prioritizing the
safety of people of colour from exposure to racist oppression. White fragility is “an outcome
of white people’s socialization into white supremacy and a means to protect, maintain, and
reproduce white supremacy” (DiAngelo 2018, 113). By prefacing their comments about race
by assuring me that they are not racist, they are thus positioning me to trust that they
are not racist before they are able to speak about race; I understand this as a tactic to
solicit white solidarity from me in order to minimize a challenge against their statements,
and therefore, against having to reflect on their complicity as white men in upholding white
supremacy.
Establishing white solidarity with me during interviews also took the form of jokes
that diminish historically-oppressed groups. For example, practitioners’ consistent claims
about the existence of the ‘big Black dick’ as a biological, material reality of Black men’s
bodies coexisted alongside physicians’ diminution of the ‘threat’ of Black men’s bodies and
sexualities. While speaking about the “shrinkage” that happens to any person’s penis as a
result of disuse and aging, Dr. Wexler concluded with a chuckle, “Black don’t crack, but it
does melt”. The saying “Black don’t crack” is a ‘positive’ stereotype and refers to the idea
that Black people show less signs of aging like wrinkles than other people, namely white
people. This assumption is supported by popular (Brinkhurst-Cuff 2016) and racializing
medical discourses (Vashi, de Castro Maymone, and Kundu 2016) that Black people as
a group have more melanin, natural oils, collagen, and/or a ‘thicker’ dermis that protect
their skin from the wrinkle-inducing rays of the sun and other environmental stressors. So
when a white physician like Dr. Wexler jokes that “Black don’t crack, but it does melt” he
is suggesting that even Black cis men—whose skin may defy wrinkling or “cracking”—are
still victim to the aging or “melt[ing]” of their penises; that despite his assumption that
Black men have larger penises on average compared to other racial groups, that racially-
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determined ‘benefit’ eventually ‘shrinks’. In a society and medical system structured by
white supremacy and anti-Black racism like that of the United States where Dr. Wexler
operates his private medical practice, it is difficult to read his ‘humor’ here as if he is
not aiming to ‘shrink’ the cultural value imbued in the ‘big Black dick’, and solicit white
solidarity from me in the form of laughter. Had I not been white, physicians may not have
been as comfortable in reproducing racist stereotypes and jokes during our interviews.
The range of possible responses I have at my disposal as a white woman researcher
during these moments are still delimited by the operation of power. A tension exists between
upholding my ethical commitments to anti-racism and acting in solidarity with people of
colour on one hand, and maintaining rapport with participants on the other—not simply
to protect my access to the research field, although I predict that would have become
a problem had I challenged them repeatedly—but rather, because damaging our rapport
would likely have resulted in doctors sublimating oppressive discourses. Reflecting on her
ethnographic field research with long-haul truckers in British Columbia, Canada, feminist
sociologist Amie McLean (2017) insists that
immediately and always challenging participants’ oppressive talk, and/or
consistently and immediately identifying my own anti-racist feminist
sensibilities in the face of participants’ racism or sexism would likely have
silenced participants on those topics, or ended the research encounter
altogether. I was increasingly concerned that such self-disclosures, although
they would make me feel good about myself, would effectively extend
oppressive protections on racist and sexist speech acts and lead to an
empirically weak analytics of power by obscuring dynamics of oppression in
the industry. (110)
Remaining mindful of this tension, I relied on other tools to navigate practitioner’s
oppressive discourses. For example, in the course of our conversations, I sometimes framed
my challenges to practitioners’ claims as positions taken by other male enhancement
physicians I had interviewed previously—even when that was not necessarily the case—so
that I could still confront oppressive discourses without directing the “range of defensive
moves” identified by DiAngelo (2018) against me as a researcher (103). In practice,
however, this tactic was only moderately successful. And moreover, I had to be strategic
in selecting the moments when I used such artifice. I am not alone in conducting research
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with a thin veneer of deception, both for the sake of maintaining rapport, and for
generating a richer critique of power through those who experience multiple and
overlapping forms of social advantage (Kolysh 2019). Nevertheless, this tactic of using
prior interviews as a strategic device for ‘talking back’ is admittedly inadequate for a
larger project of emancipatory politics.
As readers can witness in the quotations I share from practitioners in this
manuscript, physicians also regularly erased the existence of gay or queer patients seeking
male enhancement, instead referring to all of their cis men patients as heterosexual and
only having vaginally-penetrative sex with cis women. This is despite the fact that at the
beginning of the interview, many participants identified gay men as a sizable portion of
their male enhancement patients.8 Doctors’ exclusion of gay men from our conversations
prompted me to include a direct question in my interview guide asking practitioners to
discuss their work with gay patients (see the “Semi-Structured Interview Guide” in the
Appendix). Undeterred, physicians consistently redirected the conversation back to their
heterosexual patients or otherwise evaded my questions. While I pushed back against this
pattern of responses, I regret not developing additional interviewing tools to address
doctors’ assumptions of heterosexuality.9
This regret extends to when Dr. Fray (quoted in Chapter 6) assumed that because
I am a woman, I have circlusive sex with cis men: “if you were dating somebody and you
got in the sack and realized that ‘I can’t take this guy’s penis’, the ability to procreate
possibly just went out the window”. This statement carries a series of other assumptions,
including that as a woman, I must have a vagina and the ability to conceive and carry a
baby. Feeling uneasy by a research participant talking about and sexualizing my body, I
fell silent. Again, ‘talking back’ against medical experts’ statements risked sacrificing the
at times shaky rapport I had worked so hard to cultivate with them, and as the quotes in
my analytical chapters affirm, there was no shortage of problematic assumptions for me to
8For example, Dr. Tabibi, Dr. Lieberman, and Dr. Harris estimated that about 30% of their patients are
gay, and Charles Bennett reported that about 50% of his patients are gay or queer. Other physicians, like
Dr. Fray, said they could not accurately provide estimates.
9See Chapter 6 for an example of how I challenged physicians’ heteronormative assumptions.
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confront in our interviews. As others have noted (Gailey and Prohaska 2011), to a certain
extent, a researcher’s comfort is subordinate to the participants’ during an investigation—
especially when social hierarchies such as gender shape the interview process—because we
are dependent upon their participation for the completion of our degrees and for the quality
of our data in future publications.
How other people outside of this project perceived and interpreted this research
was also filtered through a sexualized, gendered, and racialized lens in reference to my
partner. At social gatherings, for example, upon discovering the focus of my dissertation,
strangers subjected my partner’s body to repeated and invasive questioning centered
around the broad assumption that my selection of this research topic necessarily meant
something about my partner’s genitals. In addition to generally being inappropriate, their
assumptions also unwillingly opened up conversations that racialized the sexed body of
my Latinx partner. Luckily, my partner’s learned, dead-pan rejoinder “why do you want
to know about my genitals?” was followed by uncomfortable laughter that usually shut
down their interrogation. Nonetheless, these patterned experiences speak to how both my
subjectivity, and the embodiment of those relationally connected to me, came to bare on
this research.
Like other women researchers whose conceptual object relates to the lives of men
and masculinity, I navigated different manifestations of sexism throughout the research
process. In many ways, the part I play in this research was assumed to be “inadequate or
impoverished because as a woman investigating a male-dominated social arena, I [would] not
be able to achieve adequate access or participation” (McLean 2017, 102). Contrary to this
assumption, the gender(s) of researchers and participants can shape the process in a number
of variable, yet patterned, ways. It is true that the knowledge we co-generated is different
because of our respective social locations; if a man or nonbinary person had conducted this
research, for example, the knowledge they would have generated with doctors would be
different—not because it would necessarily be a more accurate or complete representation
of the medical practices of male enhancement physicians—but because it would be just as
situated as their claims presented here.
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Below, feminist political scientist Cynthia Enloe describes in an interview how her
gender and the gender of her participants enabled and circumscribed her scholarship on
gender and militarism, and moreover, how the research process would have been different
had a man conducted the research instead.
I think many men were much more willing to talk with me, to answer my
“dumb,” naive questions with great openness, both because of a kind of
genuinely chivalrous generosity and because it was in a sense “normal” for a
female to be asking such basic questions. Also, it was relatively easy for me
personally to deal with being in the “nonexpert” position. A male colleague
who also did interviews with powerful nuclear decision makers told me
somewhat ruefully that he and the men he was interviewing would sometimes
get into a kind of competitive “who’s-the-bigger-expert-here?” deadlock. It was
probably quite productive that my relationships with these men did not
provoke that kind of dynamic in either one of us! (Cohn and Enloe 2003, 1188)
In many ways, my research benefited from male enhancement doctors reading me as a “naive
little lady” (Cohn and Enloe 2003, 1189) rather than as an expert, albeit in different ways
than Enloe experienced in her research.
Evidenced in part by my framing of the research in my interview guide preamble,
where I state that “[s]ome of these questions may sound really basic or have obvious
answers”, I had to devise strategies to negotiate how practitioners read my gender as it
overlapped with my age during interviews.10 To quote Dr. Wexler, “you’re not that old”,
he laughed, “I can tell”. Armed with several strategies, I aimed to reduce the likelihood
that I was read as inexperienced and incompetent, while consciously choosing to not
disabuse practitioners of my perceived youthful and gendered innocence, because it seemed
to position them as experts who could ‘educate’ me. Even though it was off-putting for a
participant to explain to me what ‘intersex’ means after I already demonstrated through
how I contextualized my question that I am knowledgeable of the concept, doctors’
perception of me as not understanding the terminology I use opened up the interview
moment in a productive way; physicians assumed a position of “generous chivalry” that
resulted in nuanced descriptions of their medical practices, and therefore, theoretically
10I conducted the majority of interviews at the age of 26.
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rich data that I likely would not have obtained had they read me as an expert (Cohn and
Enloe 2003, 1188). Even though it was frustrating when doctors repeatedly interrupted
me, referred to participating in this dissertation as “helping [me] with a class paper” or
“little project”, or instructed me on what questions I should be asking or topics I should
be researching (which is similar to Arendell’s (1997) experiences),11 on the other hand,
their treatment of my youth and white femininity as green naivete also seemed to orient
their responses to be patient with me and to excuse my ‘basic’ questions.
At times, my femininity and presumed heterosexuality served as a resource for some
practitioners’ enactment of (heterosexual) masculinity. This both facilitated my access to
the field, and necessarily foreclosed some research opportunities. For example, Dr. Perry
confided in me that he had performed his male enhancement procedure on himself. After the
augmentation he said it was “kinda weird to look in the mirror and go ‘wow, you probably
could be a porn star’” and “I’ve only seen two penises bigger than mine in all the stuff
[procedures] I’ve done [on patients]”. While I was uncomfortable with the abrupt shift in our
conversation towards a more intimate (and extended) discussion of Dr. Perry’s genitals and
sex life—neither of which I ever invited—the moment of his ‘exceptional disclosure’ (Jenner
and Myers 2019) was also characterized by vulnerability that my gendered embodiment and
perceived heterosexuality likely made possible. Dr. Perry was the only participant in this
sample who disclosed that he had enhanced his own genitals; however, he was one of several
practitioners to talk about their penis during our interview.12
My age, gender, and perceived sexuality functioned in other ways during the
recruitment and interviewing processes that did not benefit the research, nor me. As one
example, a retired doctor I invited to participate stated that he would only agree to an
11For example, Dr. Schneider told me I should do “a study on female genital aesthetic surgery” only
to acknowledge immediately afterwards that it “has been done, okay”, but that men who pursue male
enhancement are “wacky” and “nuts” so “I don’t know why you’re doing a study on [male enhancement]
to be honest”. He also told me “It would be more interesting for you to do a study on the psychology of
the doctors that do the surgery than it is on the results. Okay cause there’s a lot of psychopathology in
the doctors that do the surgery.”
12Even Mr. Bennett who self-identified as a gay man felt the need to convince me that he has a sizable penis:
“I mean, I’m not- I don’t have anything- any insecurities with the size of my penis. I haven’t- I assure you
I have a big penis, I mean you don’t care, but I mean I’m not- I’m not- I don’t have a huge penis um but
I’m not insecure about it” [emphasis added].
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interview if I joined him at his farm where he would “enlighten” me about male
enhancement by personally “show[ing]” me the results of his enhancement procedures.
Suffice to say I declined his proposition, and therefore, the interview.
Negotiating Vulnerability
My social location as a woman who has experienced sexual violence from cis men is not
something I can remove from my history or from my everyday reality in some unrealistic
effort to be ‘objective’. It is unsurprising that those experiences inform the ways in which I
read practitioners’ comments about such violence in Chapter 6. Those experiences also
play an important part in shaping what considerations and precautions I felt were
necessary to undertake when deciding how to conduct this research. This project was
originally approved by the SFU Research Ethics Board (REB) to include interviews with
cis men interested in male enhancement, but I elected not to conduct those
interviews—either in person or virtually—not because there proved to be an imminent
threat, but because I was not provided any tools to effectively navigate the risks if
participants did become violent.
In contrast to other projects overseen by the SFU REB approval procedure, where
a cis woman researcher’s safety while alone with men who work in the long-haul trucking
industry was a point of concern for the institution (McLean 2017), the only populations
considered by the SFU REB to be vulnerable and in need of safeguarding in my work
were my participants. This caught me by surprise as my ethics application made clear
that I planned to be alone with cis men in secluded spaces that offered a high degree of
privacy while talking about their genitals and erotic practices. The total absence of any
discussion from the REB reviewers about my safety from men’s violence, compared to their
apprehension about protecting another woman researcher from the presumed violence of
working class men specifically, is fraught with problematic assumptions that frame working
class men as particularly dangerous, and men in general as innocent of sexual and other
forms of violence.
This is despite the fact that some of the men active on the male enhancement
forums I observed echoed the same sentiments and aggrieved entitlement to women’s bodies
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espoused by misogynist networks domestic to the United States and Canada like incels (see
Chapter 4 for more context). While I cannot and would not suggest that all men generally—
or all men seeking male enhancement specifically—are violent or would otherwise pose a
danger to me, that does not efface the patterned directionality of gendered violence by
cis men against cis women and others (see Berns 2001). Moreover, there is a wealth of
evidence that women researchers are exposed to violence due to their close proximity to,
dependence on, and vulnerability to men during their field research (Schneider 2020; Huang
2016; Gailey and Prohaska 2011; Sharp and Kremer 2006; Arendell 1997; Moreno 1995;
Green et al. 1993). In fact, women researchers’ exposure particularly to sexual violence is
an entrenched problem that Sharp and Kremer (2006) suggest is pervasive in social science
research. Why were these social and material facts not foregrounded when evaluating the
risks of conducting this research and considering how to institutionally support me as a
woman researcher?13
In part, the violence McLean (2017) could have been exposed to during her long-
haul trucking ride-alongs and truck stop visits may have seemed to the SFU REB to be
explicitly physical and immediate compared to the dangers of conducting my research. I
largely disagree with that characterization. However, even if we were to assume that physical
or sexual violence would have been less likely in the private and secluded spaces where I
had planned to conduct this research (out of concern for participants’ privacy), those are
not the only forms of possible violence. Doxxing, for example, is the practice of searching
publicly-available internet content and social media websites, hacking personal electronic
devices, and engaging in social engineering to obtain, use, and publicly broadcast private
13Anthropologist and ethnographer Luisa Schneider (2020) identified a multi-step process her institution
required for receiving research ethics clearance, which included systematic considerations for the primary
investigator’s safety. However, Schneider largely identified this process as “academic bureaucracy” reflecting
the neoliberal university’s aim for researchers to be “‘risk assessors’ and ‘risk takers’” while protecting the
institution from liability: “If a difficulty cannot be resolved successfully this is attributed to a researcher’s
risk susceptibility, lack of preparation, faulty management strategy, or flawed professionalism, while
institutions wash their hands of responsibility. [...] I expected questions along the lines of: how can we
better prepare researchers for these scenarios and respond to them? But I was asked how dangerous, on
a scale from 1-10, did I think Sierra Leone was for women, and whether women should be restricted from
carrying out fieldwork there. Their solution seemed to be ‘restrict to protect’. Rather than learning to
navigate unpredictability, which is an essential part of human interaction anywhere, they attempt the
impossible: its erasure” (178).
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and identifying information such as work and home addresses. Critical academics generally,
but feminist women specifically, are increasingly subject to doxxing (Kelley and Weaver
2020; Sarkeesian and Cross 2015) and other online harassment (DeGroot and Carmack
2020; Vera-Gray 2017). Conducting research with cis men connected to and supported by
like-minded men from virtual homosocial spaces like male enhancement forums seemed to
only make those risks more probable.
Unfortunately, in lieu of receiving institutional support, the advice offered to
women researchers—if it is ever offered at all—reads much in the same way as behavioral
adjustments women must make to ‘avoid getting raped’: do not enter into dangerous
situations and topics with men participants, especially related to emotional or sexual
themes; always meet during the day in public places; interview participants in pairs;
become aware of your surroundings by familiarizing yourself with the interiors of
buildings, exits, and nearby streets; avoid carrying something that will weigh you down if
you need to escape; program your cell phone with emergency numbers; dress
conservatively and wear minimal makeup; on and on ad nauseam (see Gailey and
Prohaska 2011; Sharp and Kremer 2006).
After a man sexually assaulted her during her field work, social anthropologist Luisa
Schneider (2020) reflected on these suggestions for women’s behavioral adjustment:
These ‘prevention strategies’ adopt a rhetoric which makes women directly
responsible for violence endured and complicit in their own discrimination and
victimization. It not only assumes that women can somehow foresee all
eventualities, but have themselves to blame in case they can’t. (188)
In preparation for recruiting cis men participants, I thought through similar forms of “safety
work” (Vera-Gray 2017), such as modifications to my comportment and embodiment in the
absence of institutional support. For example, from my key ring, I removed a rewards card
key tag to a local grocery store specific to my neighborhood so that if participants happened
to see my keys, they would not be able to easily locate the neighborhood where I live—
or at the very least—identify where I buy my weekly groceries. With my own resources,
I contracted a professional to search the internet for private information about me using
content participants would obtain from the standard consent form, such as my name, email,
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telephone number, and university affiliation.14 He not only located a wealth of information
about me, but was able to connect it to my family. There were too many possible risks, and
I could not foresee or manage them all on my own.
While I am not looking to invite more bureaucratic micromanaging of research
projects from ethics boards who are positioned to protect the neoliberal university against
liability moreso than to protect researchers (Schneider 2020; Huang 2016), I would be remiss
if I did not comment on how my graduate education and the process of gaining research
ethics approval left me unequipped to handle the potential risks of conducting the research I
originally proposed. That is why I elected in this project not to interview cis men interested
in male enhancement; I did not have the necessary tools and institutional support to navigate
the potential, but very real risks to my safety that other women academics have faced while
conducting research in the field (Schneider 2020; Huang 2016; Moreno 1995), especially
with men participants (McLean 2017; Sharp and Kremer 2006; Arendell 1997), and while
discussing sexual themes (Gailey and Prohaska 2011; Green et al. 1993). I join others in
calling for institutional accountability for supporting academics who face gendered and
other forms of systemic violence in the field (Schneider 2020; Huang 2016), recognizing that
the absence of such support impacts every aspect of research, including if that research is
even carried out.
In the remainder of this dissertation, I map the invocation of the ‘natural’ and the
‘unnatural’ in medical discourse across practitioners’ private practices. In the next two
chapters, I start with a comparative discourse analysis of male enhancement for cis men
and gender confirmation surgery for trans people, demonstrating how various discourses
operate to naturalize one’s sex assignment at birth. Then I transition into the second
thematic section of this dissertation, which examines how male enhancement practitioners
selectively invoke the trope of the ‘monster cock’ in ways that naturalize heterosexuality,
the ‘reproductive body’, whiteness, and the male body while (de)naturalizing the bodies
14The SFU library requires investigators to remove all contact information from the consent form before
publishing it in the dissertation.
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of cis women and the sexed bodies of people of colour. By attending to the norms,
histories, and discursive regimes attendant to these clinical contexts, I demonstrate how
medical discourses are a technology of the natural through which particularly-sexed and
racialized bodies and subjectivities are constituted, and how the ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’





Surgery and Male Enhancement
Discourses
“How do you know you want rhinoplasty, a nose job?” he inquires, fixing me with
a penetrating stare.
“Because,” I reply, suddenly unable to raise my eyes above his brown wingtips,
“I’ve always felt like a small-nosed woman trapped in a large-nosed body.”
“And how long have you felt this way?” He leans forward, sounding as if he
knows the answer and needs only to hear the words.
“Oh, since I was five or six, doctor, practically all my life.”
“Then you have a rhino-identity disorder,” the shoetops state flatly. My body sags
in relief. “But first,” he goes on, “we want you to get letters from two
psychiatrists and live as a small-nosed woman for three years...just to be sure.”
—Riki Anne Wilchins,
Read My Lips: Sexual Subversion and the End of Gender
The absurdity of the epigraph above critically illustrates the differential treatment
of cis people seeking medical interventions like ‘cosmetic’ surgery to alter their anatomical
structures, compared to the gatekeeping of trans people pursuing ‘gender confirmation’
surgeries in Canada and the United States. A growing number of scholars are comparing
the prohibitions and justifications of cosmetic surgeries elected by cis people with
‘transition’ surgeries elected by trans folks, taking up one of four different comparative
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approaches identified by Heyes and Latham (2018). Some social critics like Jeffreys (2014)
argue that both of these sets of surgeries are medically unnecessary and ethically
problematic, where both trans and cis patients are capitulating to normative gender. On
the other hand, some trans advocates make claims described by Heyes and Latham (2018)
as “trans exceptionalism”, where gender confirmation surgeries are framed as medically
necessary, but cosmetic surgeries for cis people are not (174). For example, bioethicists
Ashley and Ells (2018) suggest that, at least in most cases, cis people do not experience
oppression based on a “core aspect of the self” such as gender, so procedures for cis people
are not “morally necessary” like those elected by trans folks, and therefore, cis people have
no ethical claim for health insurance to cover cosmetic procedures (25). Other
trans/gender scholars (see Latham 2017; Garner 2011) have analyzed discursive devices
similar to those employed by participants in this research, who—as I demonstrate
below—argue that cosmetic genital surgeries elected by cis people are acceptable somatic
interventions for self-improvement compared to gender confirmation surgeries, which are
marked as ‘unnatural’ interventions into the sexed body.
I enter into this ongoing conversation, joining trans/gender studies scholars
(Whitehead and Thomas 2013; Whitehead et al. 2012; Garner 2011; Stryker and Sullivan
2009; Spade 2003; Wilchins 1997) whose analytical approach is characterized by Heyes and
Latham (2018) as “fruitfully” comparing cosmetic surgeries for cis people with gender
confirmation surgeries for trans folks “without either being judged negatively” (176). My
purpose in this analysis is not to frame medical interventions into the body—like gender
confirmation surgery or ‘male enhancement’ procedures—as liberatory or oppressive; but
rather, to understand what the discourses in each of these medical contexts ‘do’ in terms
of the materialization of particularly-sexed and racialized bodies, gender identities, and
the relationship between them.
In this and the subsequent chapter, I underscore the contradictory medical
management of trans and cis patients who are seeking access to genital technologies by
analyzing the (de)naturalization techniques of various discourses as they emerge within
the medical contexts of male enhancement procedures for cis men and gender confirmation
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surgeries for trans people. In many ways, these medical contexts overlap. Of the twelve
practitioners quoted in this chapter and the next, five dedicate the majority of their
practice to gender confirmation surgeries while also performing male enhancement
procedures; one physician previously worked with trans patients as a medical student, but
now works only with cis men in his private practice; and the remaining doctors perform
genital interventions exclusively for cis patients.
The aim of this chapter is to trace various discourses that naturalize the ‘male’
body while rendering trans bodies unnatural. I locate these discourses in part when
medical practitioners are screening a new trans or cis patient by evaluating patient
authenticity and suffering. In the subsequent chapter, I continue this analysis, unpacking
the discourses that operate in relation to performing each procedure (by assessing harms
to the patient) as well as the discursive devices employed during the post-operative
evaluation of somatic interventions (such as patient regret vs. dissatisfaction). Taken
altogether, these discourses serve as naturalizing techniques of the sex assigned to bodies
at birth. As I demonstrate in this and the next chapter, these naturalization techniques
pathologize particular racialized somatic practices alongside the subjectivities and
post-surgical bodies of trans people, marking them as unnatural constructions, while
naturalizing cis bodies and subjectivities, both before and after going under the proverbial
knife.
These two analytical chapters most closely resemble, confirm, and build on many
of the arguments in T. Garner’s (2011) analysis in their dissertation chapter “Chest
Surgeries of a Different Nature”. Garner analyzed in part the ontological presuppositions
underlying gynecomastia1 surgery for cis men with unwanted breasts, compared to chest
surgery for trans folks with unwanted breasts. Their critical work in the scholarly
tradition of somatechnics examined how the discourse of harm—understood through
conceptions of disorder, regret, authenticity, and bodily integrity—operates in codified
1Gynecomastia is a medical diagnosis of “excess” tissue in the chests of mostly cis men, thought to be caused
by a hormonal “imbalance” (Johnson and Murad 2009, 1012; see also Longhurst 2005). However, mental
health professionals in the US have also used the diagnosis of gynecomastia so that trans folks—particularly
trans men who also have unwanted chest tissue—can gain access to appropriate medical care.
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medical texts about gynecomastia for cis men, compared to medical texts on chest surgery
for trans patients. They ground their analysis in clinical guidelines, influential articles
from surgery journals, and historical approaches to medical intervention. Garner’s
insightful work persuasively contends that the discourse of harm in the context of
gynecomastia surgery naturalizes cis men’s bodies, yet harm operates in the context of
gender confirmation surgery to denaturalize the post-surgical trans body.
I did not predict that male enhancement practitioners would echo so closely the
discourses Garner located in medical texts. I anticipated a wide range of responses to the
open-ended question I posed to them, and which informs the majority of the analysis for
this and the subsequent chapter: “in your professional opinion, why do you suppose
transgender patients need to get letters from mental health professionals2 in order to
access genital surgeries, whereas your cisgender patients do not?” Male enhancement
physicians employing similar medical discourses found in codified texts on gynecomastia
and trans chest surgeries speaks to the stranglehold of (de)naturalization techniques
within medicine, the embeddedness of male enhancement practitioners in the medical
establishment, as well as their investment—or at the very least their involvement—in
upholding the status quo of medicine and the notion of the ‘natural’ gender and sex
binary.
With that said, my research design and analysis within this chapter and the next
depart from Garner’s work in four significant ways. First, analyzing discourses about
genitals instead of breasts anchors my research in different locations of the sexed,
gendered, and racialized body, thereby expanding and complicating our understanding of
bodily meanings. Second, I foreground medical discourses and practices within the clinic,
rather than in codified texts, enriching our understanding of how these two may overlap or
diverge. Third, the texts Garner selected were specific to each medical procedure; no
2‘Mental health professionals’ may include clinical psychologists, medical doctors who specialize in psychiatry,
licensed family therapists, and counsellors who are able to write letters in support of gender transition, as
outlined in the “Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender-Nonconforming
People, Version 7” (2012). Many trans folks seeking access to somatic technologies experience their pursuit
of these professional letters as compulsory, whereas cisgender patients do not need to obtain anyone’s
approval except the surgeon’s for genital intervention (Latham 2017).
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single text was attendant to both gynecomastia surgery for cis men and chest surgery for
trans folks. My interviews with physicians were attendant to both male enhancement and
gender confirmation surgery at the same time because, as I stated previously, many of the
doctors who participated in this research specialized in both procedures. Practitioners
whose medical practices bridge these two contexts enabled me to bring these two
procedures in relation to each other during interviews.
Finally, Garner’s work foregrounds many of the specific, technical elements of each
surgical procedure, deconstructing, for example, how medical texts bring into being ‘proper’
placement of the nipple on trans and cis bodies. My research takes a broad approach,
focusing less on the specificity of each male enhancement procedure (of which there are many
represented in my sample) compared to different genital interventions for trans patients (of
which there are many and I do not describe any in detail). The analysis in this and the
following chapter centers on physicians’ medical practices, particularly how they decide to
accept a new patient, as well as their justifications for gatekeeping trans patients’ access
to genital technologies while constructing very few barriers for cis men. Moreover, male
enhancement practitioners did not always make identical claims as those Garner found in
codified medical texts, and I call attention to those differences throughout my analysis,
especially in the subsequent chapter.
My analytical method oscillates between two approaches. At times I present
evidence that contradicts the assertions made by medical practitioners. However, the
strength of my argument comes from my primary analytical approach of somatechnics,
which allows me to explicate what physicians’ discourses of authenticity, suffering, harm,
and regret vs. dissatisfaction ‘do’ in the incarnation of bodies. Similar to Garner’s (2011)
conclusions, the discourses employed by medical practitioners in this research do
particular work that shapes people’s life chances, namely naturalizing cis men’s bodies,
while marking post-surgical trans bodies as unnatural, thereby lending legitimacy to the
violence enacted against trans people in service of the ‘natural’ body. The following two




Under a cisnormative society in Canada and the United States that assumes one’s
assigned sex at birth will—by ‘nature’s design’—‘match’ one’s gender identity,
authenticity for cis people is an ontological presupposition, whereas trans people are
positioned within both clinical and broader social contexts to prove themselves authentic.
In many ways, being read as authentic is essential to the life chances of trans folks. The
everyday violence of deadnaming trans people—using given birth names instead of
gender-affirming chosen names—as well as misgendering trans folks serves as a threatening
reminder of cisnormativity that casts doubt on trans authenticity. So-called ‘bathroom
bills’ in Canada and the United States mark and exclude trans people from social life by
legislating when, how, and if trans folks can use the restroom. These bills criminalize
especially trans women as not authentic women, as ‘males’ who are deceptive about who
they ‘really’ are as a means to gain access to ‘women’s spaces’ to harm innocent (which is
racially inflected as white) cis women and girls (Phipps 2019; Travers 2018). Trans
folks—particularly Black and Brown trans women—are systematically made vulnerable to
people who target them with violence; new records are set each year in the United States
for the number of trans lives taken through racist and cis-sexist violence (see Gill-Peterson
2018a). The inaction of police and the broader community to prevent these murders; hold
perpetrators accountable; let alone accurately report about these murders without
deadnaming, misgendering (Strangio 2018), or whitewashing victims (Lamble 2008)
demonstrates the degree to which trans people of colour are dehumanized in Canada and
the United States. Vulnerability to or security from this violence can, in many ways, hinge
on whether trans folks are read as authentic or not.3
At the same time, trans people have gained more visibility in Canada and the
United States, prompting particular strategies to emerge for managing and integrating
trans people into existing institutions, social structures, normative practices, and sets of
social relations. Prevailing strategies include the liberal humanist politics of tolerance
3Authenticity does not refer to ‘passing’ as cis. It refers to being recognized as one’s gender and/or sex.
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(Gressgård 2010), which at once calls for trans acceptance, while also circumscribing trans
normativity—or what it means to be acceptably, and therefore, authentically
trans—through normative investments in whiteness, heteronormativity, and middle class
respectability politics (Vipond 2015; Skidmore 2011; Beauchamp 2009). Tolerance and
acceptance are, at least provisionally, afforded to trans folks largely through established
narratives of authenticity under the objectifying gaze of psychology and medicine; in such
an asymmetrical relationship between gatekeeping authorities and trans individuals,
gender experts seek to authenticate if someone is—to borrow sociologist Spencer
Garrison’s (2018) terminology—‘trans enough’ to gain access to hormone therapy and
gender confirmation surgeries. ‘Trans-positive’4 mental health professionals work to
establish trans authenticity, requiring patient narratives to largely confirm practitioners’
theories of gender as binary, immutable, innate, and therefore, aligned with particularly
sexed bodies (Whitehead et al. 2012).5
Being read as authentic can produce a ripple effect in the life chances of trans people.
According to the Standards of Care (version 7, 2012), which outline the best practices in the
treatment of Gender Dysphoria, mental health professionals can write letters of support for
trans patients to access surgeries that ‘confirm’ their gender as authentic through somatic
transformation.6 However, in the majority of cases, the trans patient must go through what
is colloquially referred to as the ‘real life test’ to prove themselves authentic by living in their
affirmed gender, sometimes waiting years to receive letters of support from mental health
professionals while paying them large sums of money in order to gain access to somatic
4The term ‘trans-positive’ as it is used here describes mental health professionals and/or surgeons who
support trans individuals’ rights to self-determination. I place this term in quotation marks because this is
not my label, and it is politically contentious.
5For examples of alternative approaches to mental health treatment for trans patients, see the section
‘Queering Gender’ in Whitehead et al. (2012), which describes the practices of mental health professionals
who grant trans folks access to hormone therapy despite patients not conforming to the diagnostic criteria
in the DSM. These practitioners understand gender as a larger power structure, rather than as a natural
binary that stems from an unchanging and essential core.
6According to a report authored by the American Society of Plastic Surgeons, gender confirmation surgeries
are not divided by type of procedure, but by the binary, with “Male to Female patients” numbering 3,359
and “Female to Male patients” totaling 7,626 in 2019. Combined, these figures demonstrate a fifteen percent
increase in surgeries from 2018 to 2019.
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technologies. While not all trans people want these surgeries, for those who do, accessing
them can not only produce comfort in one’s body and gender euphoria (Ashley and Ells
2018; Benestad 2010; Spade 2003), they can also enable social and legal recognition and
the ability to change gender markers on official identification like passports and driver’s
licenses, all of which can lead to a degree of harm reduction (see Travers 2018).
However, many feminist and trans/gender scholars (Sadjadi 2019; Garrison 2018;
Simon 2015; Hird 2002) critique authenticity narratives as reflections of social expectations
of gender, rather than a sincere sense of oneself.7 Sociologist Meagan Simon’s (2015) treatise
on the oppressive demands of authenticity narratives—particularly for trans children and
youth—demonstrates how tolerance and acceptance of trans people are
routinely substantiated through the idea of ‘true self’ – gender identity is
innate and unalterable; therefore, we should accept young trans people as ‘who
they are.’ Justifying trans acceptance through the idea of ‘true self’ in many
ways demands an untenable permanence [....] Trans truth or ‘authenticity’
becomes characterized as a stubborn and heroic fixity [...] an “inner truth”
(Gressgård 2010, p. 544) separate from a variously hostile or tolerant society
[....] [T]hese ‘true self’ narratives restrict and normalize the meaning of trans
to an individualized and permanent gendered reality, which erases and
partially negates years of trans/gender activism and scholarship denaturalizing
the essentially autonomous subject and theorizing gender as a system of power.
(2-3) [reference in original]
As I detail in the following section, trans authenticity continues to operate within medical
contexts as an inherent, immutable, ‘inner truth’ irrespective of social conditions, as well as
the master criterion for determining whether psychiatric and medical practitioners will give
trans people access to appropriate health care like genital technologies. Cis authenticity,
on the other hand, is taken for granted as grounded in their sexed bodies, serving as a
technique to naturalize one’s sex assigned at birth.
7I hesitantly cite Sadjadi’s work here since trans scholars and activists like bioethicist Florence Ashley (2019b)
have serious concerns about Sadjadi and her work. In particular, Ashley notes that Sadjadi’s scholarship
imagines gender acquisition as “internally constituted”, criticizes the use of puberty blockers among trans
youth, and “has been cited favourably by anti-trans and conservative outlets”.
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“Weed Out the Real Ones”: Skepticism of Trans Authenticity
No participant in this research was as loquacious as Dr. Fray, whose responses throughout
our nearly three-hour interview were particularly telling about the differential medical
management of trans and cis patients. Dr. Fray is a US practitioner who formerly worked
with trans patients as a medical student, but now exclusively works with cis men,
including performing the Priapus-Shot for a handful of years, and the Man Shot over the
last several months.8 The Man Shot procedure aims to augment penile girth by injecting
stem-cell-enriched autologous fat—meaning enriched fat coming from one’s own
body—subdermally outside of the corpus cavernosum and corpus spongiosum, the erectile
tissue of the penis. Dr. Fray is confident that the Man Shot that he administers can
increase the circumference girth of a man’s penis by over an inch.
Multitasking during our interview, Dr. Fray was lounging at home on a Saturday
watching wrestling matches on TV. In between matches, he replied to my question as to why
trans folks must go through counseling and receive approval to access genital technologies,
but his cis male enhancement patients do not.
[T]here’s intended discrimination by the medical and insurance establishment
against adults who feel trapped in their own gender for the purpose of trying to
weed out the real ones and the ones who are in a flux. My guess is that if there
was one surgery done out of a hundred that resulted in reassigning someone
who- either was for the wrong reasons- or somebody who recanted their intent
and maybe there was a lawsuit. [emphasis added]
Practitioners’ trepidation about “real” trans people versus those who may be confused,
undecided, “in a flux”, or otherwise ‘fake’ was common throughout my interviews with
physicians, and reflects how authenticity is not limited to autonomous, self-authorization.
Dr. Fray’s statements reveal the ‘intercorporeality’ of trans identification (Sullivan 2006),
where trans people’s claims to identity must align with an established array of criteria, often
decided by cis authorities on gender, to gain access to appropriate medical care (Whitehead
and Thomas 2013; Whitehead et al. 2012). As we see in Dr. Fray’s response, just “one surgery
8In some cases, I elected to omit the number of years a physician has been offering male enhancement
or gender confirmation surgeries to maintain confidentiality. Reported years of performing particular
procedures reflect physicians’ experience at the time of our interview.
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done out of a hundred that resulted in reassigning someone who- either was for the wrong
reasons- or somebody who recanted their intent” is one surgical and social reassignment
too many for practitioners, demonstrating an exceptionally high requirement or threshold
of certainty in a trans patient’s identity out of speculation about potential lawsuits. Such a
threshold of certainty is not required for cis patients, despite the possibility that they might
pursue postoperative litigation as well.
While Dr. Fray expressed his unease about the possible legal ramifications for
medical practitioners performing gender confirmation surgeries on patients who might
later “recant their intent”, Dr. Schneider voiced his apprehension about patients who are
not “true transsexual[s]” obtaining gender confirmation surgeries, resulting in a “total
change of identity”. Dr. Schneider is a US surgeon who has more than twenty years
experience specializing in gender confirmation surgeries, having performed hundreds of
procedures for trans patients. He also performs ‘corrective’ procedures for ‘buried penis
syndrome’,9 as well as revision surgeries for ‘failed’ penile enhancements performed by
other doctors. He previously performed both girth and length enhancements for cis men,
but within a year of offering these procedures to patients, he quickly stopped the practice.
After abandoning most male enhancement surgeries over twenty years ago when he
realized the procedures resulted in “high complication rates” and poor outcomes, he now
only occasionally performs penile length enhancements for cis men. These length
enhancements sever the suspensory ligament that keeps the penis tucked up under the
pubic arch and into the body. Releasing this ligament hypothetically allows the penis to
extend outward from the body and—according to some physicians—can result in up to
two inches gained in length; however, Dr. Schneider is not confident in such a good
outcome, and therefore, tries to convince all of his patients who want length enhancements
not to pursue the procedure.
9Urologists Ho and Gelman (2018), describe buried penis syndrome as it relates to the ‘normal’: “A buried
penis refers to a normal sized phallus encompassed by either skin, subcutaneous tissue, and/or fat in the
prepubic area. Due to reduced visible and functional length of phallus, this condition is often associated
with patient dissatisfaction related to cosmetic, hygienic, voiding, and sexual dysfunction” (618). During
interviews, medical practitioners—most notably Dr. Schneider—characterized cis men with ‘buried penis
syndrome’ as the cis patients most deserving of access to male enhancement technologies.
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During our interview, while he was waiting at the airport to board an international
flight, I strained to hear Dr. Schneider over the poor cell reception echoing my every word,
the cacophony of sounds—from travelers at the airport, to overhead speakers announcing
flight times—and Dr. Schneider’s congested voice as he was recovering from a terrible cold.
After finding a more secluded lounge in the airport, Dr. Schneider responded as to why “we
have a shrink with transsexuals”.10
[W]hen you do transgender surgery, you’re taking their testicles off and you don’t
want to do that on somebody unless you’re one hundred percent sure that they’re
a true transsexual and whether or not they can handle it emotionally. So what
we’re talking about, there’s a much more dramatic surgery and a total change of
identity [....] [Y]ou’re cutting off testicles, you know you’re turning a male to girl
or vice versa and that’s a major change, that’s not improving someone’s aesthetic
appearance. That’s making a major change in their identity. So the severity of
that kind of procedure is is much more. And that’s why there’s standardization
that’s done by an organization to make sure that patients who undergo this are
good candidates. [emphasis added]
Here Dr. Schneider distinguishes trans operations from cis male enhancement by claiming
that cis men are merely “improving [their] aesthetic appearance” through penile
augmentation, rather than making a “major change in their identity” through a “dramatic
surgery”. It seems as though Dr. Schneider frames male enhancement as less “dramatic”
than gender confirmation surgeries—not because it is less physically invasive, but
rather—because he assumes that identity change is necessarily difficult to “handle it
emotionally”. Perhaps in part due to expectations of stoic masculinity, and due to
expectations of cis authenticity, Dr. Schneider assumes that male enhancement is not (as)
10This project does not use the language of ‘transsexuality’; however, it has been common language
amongst trans scholars and activists (Namaste 2000; Prosser 1998), as well as the medical practitioners
who participated in this research, especially amongst the doctors who specialize in gender confirmation
surgeries. Many trans folks reject the classification ‘transsexual’—both as an adjective and as a noun—
because it is a medicalized discourse that objectifies, pathologizes, and dehumanizes trans people (Gill-
Peterson 2018a). According to trans somatechnician Jules Gill-Peterson (2018a), the term ‘trans’ marks “a
political distinction from medical or pathological meanings that have accrued to the term ‘transgender’ in
recent years, many of which have been borrowed from the earlier term ‘transsexual’” (8). Transsexuality
invokes a particular “medical discourse and biopolitical aparatus, a colonial form of knowledge with
racializing and disenfranchising effects” (Gill-Peterson 2018a, 8-9). This present manuscript understands
and employs the term ‘trans’ as encompassing more bodies and identities than ‘transsexuality’.
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emotionally difficult as gender confirmation surgery, an assumption common amongst
most physicians in this research.
The suggestion that trans folks are undergoing a “total change of identity”
through bodily transformation implies that the sexed body assigned at birth—particularly
based on one’s gonads—is the origin of identity, and that somatic intervention necessarily
changes one’s ‘core’ sense of self. I challenged Dr. Schneider’s notion that identity is
rooted in the sexed body, as well as his presupposition that bodily intervention through
gender confirmation surgeries is the singular and most pivotal moment of identity change
for his trans patients (rather than any other point(s) throughout a trans person’s life,
rather than an ongoing fluid process of gender play and accomplishment). Upon doing so,
Dr. Schneider became noticeably vexed by my questions. While he conceded that, for
trans patients who had been living as their affirmed gender for years, access to genital
technologies merely “finishes up the identity”, he immediately doubled down on his
reasoning that “it’s a total change of identity too. Instead of an improvement it’s a total
change.” Dr. Schneider’s position on gender confirmation surgery prioritizes the sexed
body as the natural source of gender. And for this reason, he concluded that mental
health professionals as well as medical doctors need to establish the authenticity of trans
identities before cautiously opening the gate to gender confirmation surgeries.
Dr. Fraser echoed similar assumptions during our interview in his office. A Canadian
physician, Dr. Fraser specializes in gender confirmation surgeries, but has recently started
performing suspensory ligament releases, fat injections for girth enhancement, and scrotal
reduction for cis men in the last few years. In the professional opinion of Dr. Fraser, male
enhancement procedures merely improve one’s embodied masculinity, a sense of masculinity
that Dr. Fraser believes cis men already “have”. Alongside these assumptions, Dr. Fraser
articulated a cautious approach to working with trans patients seeking gender confirmation
surgeries out of concern that trans identification may be a “phase”, reflecting a medical
approach that casts doubt on trans identities as authentic. When I asked Dr. Fraser why cis
men are not required to go through counseling, but trans patients must see mental health
professionals in order to access genital technologies, he hesitated at first, saying:
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I I really don’t know [....] I think that the perception is that if you want to
change your gender, they want to make sure that you’re really of sound mind
and body. Sometimes it’s just tabled off as ‘oh they’re going through a phase’
or ‘they really don’t know what they want.’ They want to establish that they
know exactly what they want, they know the risks and benefits, they’re making
an informed decision, and I mean that’s different—switching sexes versus just
wanting to improve what you have. [emphasis added]
Like Dr. Schneider, Dr. Fraser differentiates between male enhancement as an intervention
for cis men to “improve what [they] have”, and gender confirmation surgery as “different”, as
“switching sexes”, as requiring a higher threshold of proof that trans patients “know exactly
what they want”. In other words, Dr. Fraser plainly articulates that the body provides the
material truth of gender identity.
In both Dr. Schneider and Dr. Fraser’s characterizations that contrast trans and cis
genital interventions, they invoke the ideas of cis fixity alongside trans movement through
transition. The use of genital technologies on cis men, according to practitioners, results in
the maintenance, improvement, or restoration of one’s body and one’s self, which doctors
describe as a minimal change to an otherwise fixed reality, rather than a radical gender
and sex transition. Drawing on Garner’s (2011) somatechnic comparison between trans
chest surgery and cis men’s gynecomastia surgery, they write “the distance between the
pre-surgical body and the post-surgical body [of cis men] is figured as minimal through
the absence of any preparatory requirements for the shift from one to the other” (135).
Comparatively, gender confirmation surgeries are medically
conceptualised as part of a ‘transition,’ one that needs much preparation,
including a ‘real-life experience.’ These factors situate the pre-surgical body
and the post-surgical body [of trans people] as far from each other, across an
almost impassable border, and serve to strengthen the sexual divide. (Garner
2011, 135)
Like gynecomastia surgery, male enhancement is regarded as a minor improvement, from
a male body with a small or ‘average’ penis, to a male body with an ‘average’ or large
penis. There is no discussion of cis men going through a ‘real-life test’ of having a larger
penis—resembling the satirical psychotherapy session illustrated by Wilchins (1997) at the
beginning of this chapter—to prove they are ready for life as men with larger cocks. Gender
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confirmation surgeries, on the other hand, are characterized as traversing a somatic crossing
from one sexed body to its ‘opposite’, and trans folks are required to provide mental health
professionals with convincing evidence that they are truly ready for this movement between
sexes.
Similar to Garner’s (2011) analysis, I found that male enhancement practitioner’s
comments demonstrate how their differential conceptualization of the distance between pre
and post-surgical bodies for cis and trans folks serves to naturalize cis identification, the
sex assigned to bodies at birth, and the gender/sex binary. This is accomplished by framing
gender confirmation surgeries as a dramatic, major somatic and identity change; by treating
male enhancement—not as a gender or sex ‘transition’—but as an improvement of one’s
sexed body as a ‘natural’ fixity, despite bodily intervention; and by imagining femaleness
and maleness as mutually exclusive (and exhaustive) opposing categories separated by a
great expanse of territory.
In all of these cases, where physicians cite concerns about trans authenticity,
medical practitioners make two interrelated assertions: the assumption that healthy
identity is innate, immutable, and located within the sexed body; and metaphysical
skepticism, that is a doubt about the authenticity, stability, and permanence of trans
identity, because it culturally ‘contradicts’ the sex they were assigned at birth. This
skepticism about trans authenticity reflects both medical and wider social anxieties that
there are fakes—people who are confused, undecided, or otherwise “in a flux” and not
‘really’ transgender—who will change their minds after a surgery. Practitioners’ anxieties
about ‘fake’ trans people are compounded by a perceived threat to a physician’s medical
practice if a patient later decides they are not trans, and seeks to hold their doctors
accountable for a permanent bodily intervention. Yet, as I discuss in greater detail in
Chapter 5 under the section “Regret vs. Dissatisfaction”, research demonstrates that
people who have received gender confirmation surgeries are extremely unlikely to “recant
their intent” as Dr. Fray speculated, or to have been just “going through a phase” as Dr.
Fraser surmised.
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Physicians’ skepticism about trans people’s authenticity does not seem to stem from
their past experiences with trans patients actually expressing regret, and thus demonstrating
that there is sufficient cause to doubt trans patients’ authenticity. After all, Dr. Fraser
specializes in gender confirmation surgery, yet his answer to my question shows he does
not readily know from working with trans patients why they are gatekept access to genital
surgeries. In fact, Dr. Fraser formulates his answer based on what the medical “perception”
is about the trustworthiness of trans people’s claims to authenticity.
Instead, physicians’ skepticism about trans authenticity seems to be based on
their assumption that if patients regard both gender and sex to be mutable, then through
normative discourses on bodies and identities, those patients must be confused, that they
“really don’t know what they want”. And if a trans patient is so confused about something
(culturally regarded) as core and foundational as gender identity (at least in the
contemporary west), then why should a medical practitioner trust that trans patients are
not also confused about their desires for bodily transformation? In other words, physicians
assume that trustworthy patients—those who are authentic—have a fixed gender identity.
So it is not surprising that skepticism about the authenticity of identity is not leveled at
cis men seeking male enhancement; medical practitioners assume cis men’s identities are
inherent, unchanging, and rooted within the sexed body they were assigned at birth.
Physician’s perception of cis men’s authenticity is the theme I turn to in the following
section.
“I’ve Got the Anatomy and I Want To Do Something About It”: Anatomy
as Cis Authenticity
Cis men seeking male enhancement are treated in fundamentally different ways by
physicians who do not question their authenticity. I arrived at this determination in part
by asking doctors how they decide who is an ideal candidate for the penile augmentation
procedures they perform. In general, practitioners stumbled through the interview while
trying to answer my questions about ideal cis men candidates. As the primary way in
which they decide if a cis patient is a good candidate for a procedure, doctors often
mentioned patient’s overall health—such as whether the patient had medical and/or
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mental health conditions that would make the procedure more risky, or would interfere
with the results of the procedure. Otherwise, practitioners often responded as though it
was readily evident who are ideal candidates; some physicians—namely Dr. Schneider and
Dr. Midden—became frustrated with my line of questioning for what they viewed had
obvious answers prima facie. Only through my insistent follow up questions did physicians
really begin to reflect on and articulate their process of accepting or rejecting a new cis
patient for male enhancement.
Most of the doctors who participated in this research report that they largely rely
on cis men’s self-selection for male enhancement procedures as evidence that they are “really
male”, and therefore, eligible for and deserving of genital interventions. From the account
of Dr. Wexler, we can see this process whereby he accepts new patients through their own,
‘bottom up’ self-selection. Dr. Wexler is a US physician who formerly performed penile girth
enhancements using dermal fillers and polymethyl methacrylate (PMMA) injections, but
has recently replaced that part of his medical practice with the Man Shot for mild girth
augmentation, having performed a few dozen of these procedures on cis men within the last
few years.
Fitting our interview into his busy schedule between work and cooking dinner for
his family, we rushed through my pages of interview questions. When I asked Dr. Wexler
how he evaluates who is a good candidate for the girth enhancement he performs, he replied
with a warm and jovial tone.
Usually they come in preselected [....] They’re coming to me because they have
something they want to do. They either want to be better at what they’re doing
or at what they have. Or they have an issue that they feel they need to have
treated. So they’re preselected in terms of you know “I’ve got the anatomy and
I want to do something about it”. [emphasis added]
In other words, alongside patient desire, the “anatomy” of the sexed body—the supposed
site of gender identity for medical practitioners—was evidence enough for physicians like Dr.
Wexler to believe in cis patients’ masculine identities and ‘male’ bodies as legitimate, real,
and stable. Compared to the gatekeeping of trans patients seeking gender confirmation
surgery that I outlined earlier in this chapter, Dr. Wexler assumes that his cis patients
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pursuing male enhancement are responsible consumer subjects of somatic technologies whose
bodies and identities are stable and authentic, despite the patient’s desire to “do something
about” “an issue” with their anatomy.
Dr. Martin gave a response similar to Dr. Wexler’s. Dr. Martin is a Canadian
physician who, for the last few years, has administered the Priapus Shot and Scrotox on cis
men. According to Dr. Martin, the Priapus Shot is essentially platelet rich plasma (PRP)
injections to “heal” the “damaged” vasculature of the penis for mild girth enhancement.11
Scrotox is a recently trendy procedure that injects Botox into the cremaster muscles so
as to relax the scrotum for “enhanced sexual pleasure”.12 When I asked Dr. Martin in
our interview “how do you decide if someone is a good candidate for the procedures you
perform?” he said that, apart from ruling out any notable health concerns like cardiovascular
disease or bleeding disorders, he performs these procedures based on “just patients’ desire
and I’m not going to question their desire” adding that “if the anatomy is fine, there’s really
no reason [to reject the patient]” [emphasis added].
In contrast with the quotes from physicians above expressing doubt in their trans
patients identities and desires for their bodies, from Dr. Martin we see an example of how
male enhancement doctors readily trust the desires held by cis men patients for their bodily
being, because their anatomy—their sexed body—represents the ‘truth’ of their gender
identity. Throughout the course of my interviews with medical practitioners, in fact, they
never once expressed doubt about the authenticity of the bodies and identities of their cis
men patients, including when their bodies failed to fit the narrow confines of the gender
and sex binary.
11Practitioners who administer the Priapus Shot and Man Shot talk about them as healing the vasculature
of the penis. For example, Dr. Martin claims that “the P-Shot works with platelet rich plasma therapy
which relies on inducing inflammation to rejuvenate and repair” what he calls “damage” from smoking or
Peyronie’s disease, which forms scar tissue that curves the penis and causes pain and erectile dysfunction.
It is outside the purview of this research, however, to assess the scientific veracity of these claims.
12According to Dr. Martin, Scrotox allows for easier manipulation of the testicles and enables the scrotum
to hang lower, thereby increasing sexual pleasure because the testicles are now free to “flap up against the
recipient”. Other medical practitioners interviewed for this research—like Charles Bennett—suggest that
Scrotox is exclusively used to improve the appearance of the scrotum by smoothing out the wrinkling of
scrotal skin. Both Mr. Bennett and Dr. Martin described the purpose of Scrotox based on patient experience
with the procedure’s results, rather than based on medical evidence of the procedure’s ‘function’.
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Core vs. Surface, Parts vs. Wholes: Defending the Authenticity of Male
Bodies That Fail
In recognition of doctors’ insistence on the sexed body as the site of one’s ‘true’ gender
identity, I decided to raise the possibility of bodily ambiguity to see how physicians would
respond. In particular, I asked medical practitioners if it is possible that any of their male
enhancement patients who believe their penises are ‘too small’ may be intersex. Witnessing
the quotes below, it becomes clear that despite being confronted with the possibility of
bodily ambiguity, practitioners like Dr. Rosenburg reasserted the authenticity of their cis
patients’ ‘male’ bodies and masculine identities.
Dr. Rosenburg is a US physician who, at the time of our interview, had performed
gender confirmation surgeries for almost three decades, and temporary girth enhancements
for cis men using dermal fillers for more than twenty years. Our phone interview took
place during his evening commute. Over the baritone hum of his sports car accelerating in
the background of the phone call, Dr. Rosenburg reflected on my question as to whether
any of his male enhancement patients could be intersex. Speaking about his patients, Dr.
Rosenburg stated matter-of-factly, “There are people who are classified as intersex, but
they’re really male, but they have streak gonads and underdeveloped penises. [Streak gonads
are] a form of testicular feminization” [emphasis added].
Despite a medical diagnosis of an intersex condition, where the body has a mixture
of traits (like hormones, gonads, chromosomes, and secondary sex characteristics) that are
culturally deemed both/neither ‘female’ and ‘male’—and therefore, incongruent according
to binary logics—Dr. Rosenburg’s faith in his patients’ discrete maleness was unyielding.
Locating the intersex condition in parts (gonads and the penis) of a whole (‘male’ body),
Dr. Rosenburg is able to rescue the maleness of his patients’ bodies from the feminization
of its parts. Even through the use of the term “testicular feminization”, for example, Dr.
Rosenburg isolates that feminization from the rest of the body, while suggesting that the
gonads are by essence still testicles. Similarly, as opposed to using a term like ‘large clitoris’
(which can imply a female sex designation) or ‘tumescent tissue’ (which does not imply
a particular sex designation), Dr. Rosenburg’s use of the term “underdeveloped penises”
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reaffirms this part as male while distancing its shortcomings of underdevelopment from the
whole of the rest of the body. Containing the intersex condition within body parts performs
the discursive work of naturalizing the maleness of the body as a whole to release his patients
from an intersex designation.
When some sexed traits are ambiguous or contradictory according to social
expectations for binary sexed bodies—such as “underdeveloped penises” and “streak
gonads”—presumably other sexed traits ‘compensate’ for their limitations (see Sanz 2017)
so that practitioners like Dr. Rosenburg can confidently claim that his intersex patients
are “really male” despite “feminization”. On the other hand, perhaps Dr. Rosenburg’s
assignment of the ‘male’ sex to the bodies of his patients who have been diagnosed as
intersex is actually based on his patients’ (presumed) gender. This seemingly ‘inverted’
process of assigning a sex based on one’s gender reflects a broader pattern of the medical
management of intersex bodies observed by gender scholars whereby social categories
determine the materialization of sexed flesh (Davis, Dewey, and Murphy 2016; Westbrook
and Schilt 2014; Meadow 2010; Fausto-Sterling 2000; Kessler 1990). In other words,
gender does not emerge from the sexed body, rather it is the cause. In either case, Dr.
Rosenburg fortified the gender and sex binary by minimizing his patients’ sex ambiguity.
In cases like these, physicians took for granted that cis men’s maleness was stable,
legitimate, and real even if their sexed traits were “underdeveloped” or otherwise
ambiguous, and therefore, wavered in representing male embodiment.
Other practitioners, like Dr. Fray, seemed to complicate processes that naturalize
the sexed body. When I asked him why trans folks require letters from mental health
professionals, but his cis patients do not in order to access genital technologies, he qualified
some of his former responses (shared above in the section “‘Weed Out the Real Ones’:
Skepticism of Trans Authenticity”) by comparing access to genital surgeries versus chest
surgeries. In his response, genitals served as the most important indicator of one’s ‘true’ sex
and gender, but he denaturalizes breasts in both cis boys, as well as adult cis women who
have cancer.
126
Breast augmentation is not a trans procedure. That’s not a transgender
procedure, because like in my kid’s wrestling team there are some- there’s a lot
of estrogen in the water out there- there’s about three or four boys that are
over two-hundred pounds that probably have D-cups. And these boys have the
boobs. They don’t want the boobs, and they’re not trying to be girls, but I
think that if you’re talking about breast mod, breast augmentation,
mammaplasty um I I think that’s an incorrect- that’s not a gender
reassignment surgery.13 Because there are plenty of women out there that have
mastectomy, that doesn’t have no breast at all. That doesn’t make them less of
a woman or a female. So it just depends on what you throw at me. If you say
“cock-to-vagina, vagina-to-cock”, okay that’s a different argument than
somebody’s adjunctive [procedure] uh “I wanna look more female”, you know
that’s different for me. [emphasis added]
The discourses in Dr. Fray’s quote overlap considerably with those found in Garner’s (2011)
reading of gynecomastia within medical discourse. Despite that breast development is a
common occurrence for about fifty to sixty percent of adolescent boys and up to seventy
percent of adult men aged fifty to sixty-nine years (Johnson and Murad 2009, 1010; see also
Longhurst 2005), note how Dr. Fray frames breast development in cis boys as unnatural.
He denaturalizes breasts on cis boys by citing their body fatness of “over two-hundred
pounds” to imply a weight-based ‘abnormality’. He further compounds the unnaturalness of
breasts on boys by attributing exogenous estrogen—coded by binarist science of the sexed
body as ‘female’ (Fausto-Sterling 2000; Oudshoorn 1994)—as responsible for producing
feminized parts in the male bodies of boys. Even the use of the phrase “these boys have the
boobs” dissociates breast tissue as a part/apart from the whole of the boys’ male bodies. To
13The term ‘gender confirmation surgery’ has largely replaced the less preferred terminology ‘gender
reassignment surgery’ (GRS) or ‘sex reassignment surgery’ (SRS) as well as the even more outdated term
‘sex change operation’ within spaces and institutions characterized as ‘trans-friendly’. However, I would be
remiss if I did not note that, terms such as ‘gender confirmation surgery’ (as well as ‘transition surgery’
or ‘gender affirmation surgery’) are no less politically imbued than former terminology like that used here
by Dr. Fray. As Heyes and Latham (2018) point out, “To obtain a GD [Gender Dysphoria] diagnosis,
someone seeking trans services must describe themselves as already belonging to an alternative sex-gender
category. Thus the surgeries or other services a trans person receives are not positioned in themselves as
trans-gendering (or sex changing) but gender confirming. That is, instead of saying, ‘I want to become a
man,’ a trans man is expected to explain himself by saying (in the GD vernacular articulated by the DSM),
‘I was always a man inside and I need my body to match’” (180). Thus, the term ‘gender confirmation
surgery’ continues to constrain trans self-descriptions to fit the narrative (especially of suffering) outlined
under the Gender Dysphoria diagnosis in the DSM-V as a means for trans folks to gain access to surgeries
and hormones. I continue to employ the term ‘gender confirmation surgery’ within this dissertation, but
while critically acknowledging its political alignments.
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paraphrase Garner (2011), “boobs” on boys are conceived as part of the body, something
that the body has, but is not of the body (120).
Medical framings of gynecomastia have linked “boobs” on cis men and boys to a
handful of intersex conditions (Nieschlag 2013). Yet Dr. Fray never ascribes an intersex
diagnosis to these breasted boys, demonstrating how their masculinity and maleness are
rescued from threats of ambiguity that could render inauthentic their cis identity and
embodiment. Since these boys are “not trying to be girls”, their breast development is not
a “transgender procedure” either. Implied in Dr. Fray’s remarks above is that “breast
mod” surgeries that would remove unwanted “D-cups” are not a “transgender procedure”,
but rather, a gynecomastia surgery to bring male bodies back into alignment with
‘natural’ male physiology.
Similarly, Dr. Fray claims that breast modification is not a “transgender procedure”
because cis women have mastectomies (most often due to cancer or ‘potentially diseased’
tissue)14 resulting in “no breast at all”. As Heyes and Latham (2018) point out, cis women
can only access breast removal surgeries if they have a medically-warranted reason for
needing a mastectomy. The breast is a feminized part, but its removal specifically due to
disease does not change the essence of the whole, presupposed to be the female body. Dr.
Fray concludes that when women remove their breasts due to disease, that “doesn’t make
them less of a woman” nor does it make these women trans. So according to Dr. Fray, it
follows that mastectomies elected by cis women, as well as the unwanted breast growth
(“breast augmentation”) and the surgical removal of unwanted breasts in the case of cis
boys, are not trans procedures.
Within these three distinct medical contexts—cis boys with gynecomastia, cis
women with breast cancer, and trans folks seeking gender confirmation surgeries—Dr.
Fray identifies the ‘diseased part’ in distinct locations. The ‘diseased part’ for breasted cis
boys as well as cis women with breast cancer is located within the body, namely the
breast and breast tissue respectively. On the other hand, I demonstrate in the next section
14See Nye’s (2012) treatise “Cancer previval and the theatrical fact” on prophylactic treatments to “preempt
a future breast cancer diagnosis” (105).
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that practitioners’ framings of trans identity as a “psychological problem” of instability
locates the ‘disorder’ for trans folks seeking gender confirmation surgeries, if not in their
identities, then in their minds. Containing the ‘disorder’ in different locations (body versus
mind) produces the effect of naturalizing male and female bodies without breasts,
alongside the naturalization of the sex assigned at birth of the pre-surgical trans body. So
while Dr. Fray’s response above is not about male enhancement or genital interventions
specifically, he does indirectly answer my original question about the differential
management of cis and trans people regarding mental health services. Ultimately, Dr. Fray
claims that disorders of the body in the case of breasted cis boys and cis women with
cancer have no need for psychotheraputic interventions, whereas disorders of the mind in
the case of trans people do require mental health support in order to receive access to
genital technologies.
Dr. Fray’s differentiation between trans and cis procedures appears to ‘protect’
cis women who have removed their breasts against threats to their ‘female’ designation or
femininity, as well as ‘defend’ cis boys with unwanted breasts from threats to their ‘male’
sex assignment or masculinity. Embedded in this defense, however, Dr. Fray (re)produces
a hierarchy of the sexed body at the expense of trans (as well as intersex) people. Drawing
on Hirschauer and Mol’s (1995) conceptualization of different bodily markers taking on
“supremacy” (373), whereby particular variables of sex are medically regarded as the best
determinants of the sexed body at different points throughout history, Dr. Fray argues
that chest surgery is not a “trans procedure”, implying that breasts—in the current social
imaginary—are surface and genitals are core to one’s gender and sex identity. According to
Dr. Fray’s logic, breast tissue—whether it is a young boy with D-cups or an adult woman
with(out) breasts—is superficial to a person’s claim to cis identity.
This line of argumentation is deployed in support of cis authenticity. For example,
instead of resorting to sexist and bioreductive assumptions that breasts are essential to a
woman’s claim to womanhood, and therefore, that removing one’s breasts is akin to losing
one’s ‘natural’ identity as a woman, Dr. Fray does not fix womanhood to breast tissue. His
claim that mastectomy is not a trans procedure is useful for shoring up the boundaries of
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cis authenticity for adult women without breasts. Similarly, this line of argumentation is
useful for defending against threats to cis boys’ and men’s masculinity when they present
with ‘excess’ breast tissue. Rendering breast tissue unnatural in the bodies of cis boys and
men is not new, nor particularly surprising given the social embeddedness of physicians
within the medical establishment; denaturalizing breast tissue as pathological enables
medical practitioners to naturalize the male body without breasts.
The very use of the term ‘gynecomastia’ dissociates the breasts from the body
on which they are found; gynecomastia stems from the etymological roots of the
Greek gyne meaning woman andmastia meaning breasts, so it literally translates
to ‘woman’s breasts.’ The implication of this designation of the breasts as not-
male, despite being found on male bodies, is that the male body without breasts
is discursively framed as natural from the very outset. (Garner 2011, 115)
Processes that denaturalize breasts on cis boys and men make it so that—compared to
trans folks—“psychotheraputic management is never considered as a treatment [for cis
men] or even an eligibility requirement for surgery” (Garner 2011, 116). As a result,
breasted cis boys and men can access surgical technologies as the best treatment options
for gynecomastia without having to navigate mental health gatekeepers seeking to prove
that they are authentically ‘cis enough’.
While it may appear as though Dr. Fray is problematizing processes of
naturalization—after all, he is pushing back against essentialist narratives that claim cis
women’s identities are grounded in sexed body parts such as breasts—in actuality, he is
perpetuating techniques that naturalize cis identification and embodiment. Treating
breasts as surface and genitals as core to one’s gender identity reproduces binary and
bioreductivist logics that defend the authenticity of cis identities and bodies when the
body is unreliable in citing the regulatory norms of binary gender. The hierarchy of the
body (core versus surface) that Dr. Fray manifests is deployed at the expense of trans
folks subordinated by an essentialist, bioreductive ideology of the sexed body that
reasserts—beyond birth assignment—the supremacy of genitals as core to one’s identity,
thereby rendering trans folks inauthentic.
From the responses of practitioners like Dr. Fray and Dr. Rosenburg, we see that
metaphysical skepticism about the authenticity, stability, and permanence of gender
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identity does not apply to cis men. While all physicians in this research regularly follow up
with their cis patients for post-operative care that focuses on their physical healing, none
of the male enhancement practitioners in this research reported following up with their cis
patients to gauge how they feel about their sense of self after penile augmentation, if they
regret the procedure, much less whether or not they are “really male”. Concerns about
authenticity—informed by logics of biological essentialism—thus act as a technique of
naturalization that expresses doubt about trans identity, resolute faith in the assigned sex
of the body, and certainty in the cis subjectivities that are culturally congruent with that
binary sex assignment.
Authenticity is just one discursive technique of naturalization employed by
physicians in their medical practices. In the section that follows, I share excerpts from my
interviews with practitioners that point to suffering as additional evidence that one’s sex
assignment at birth is natural and normal. Cis men’s suffering is treated by practitioners
as a normal response to living in a body that fails to cite the regulatory norm of
masculinity, and therefore, serves as an ideal justification for accessing genital
technologies. The suffering of trans people, on the other hand, is regarded by the
practitioners—including those who specialize in gender confirmation surgery—as a sign of
mental illness for failing to accept cis identification, and therefore, often served as evidence
that doctors should close the gate to surgical technologies.
Suffering
Suffering is often regarded in the west as a predictable and understandable effect of living
in a non-normative or ‘abnormal’ body. Indeed, suffering from abnormality serves as one
of the most prevailing justifications for seeking relief through biomedical interventions,
particularly cosmetic and elective procedures (Pentney 2012; K. Davis 2009; Heyes 2009b;
Blum 2003). Yet which bodies and identities are classified as ‘abnormal’, and what kind
of suffering is regarded as a ‘mentally healthy response’ is circumscribed by medical, legal,
and mainstream framings of ‘the normal’, and by extension, ‘the natural’. Building on the
work of somatechnicians (Cadwallader and Murray 2007) and critical disability scholarship
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(Siebers 2017, 2008), I identify suffering—not as an expected and unquestionable experience
sheltered from examination—but rather, as a productive site for tracing the operation of
power.15
This analysis ought not be understood as reducing the differences between the
suffering experienced by some trans people seeking gender confirmation surgery, and the
suffering experienced by some cis men pursuing male enhancement procedures; not all
suffering is the same. But rather, how (and whose) suffering is normalized or pathologized
renders visible how suffering is a technique of biopower that naturalizes some bodies and
identities, while marking others as unnatural constructions.
Over time, the suffering of trans folks has taken on different meanings in psychology
and psychiatry in Canada and the United States. Others have detailed trans history in
the west in far more depth (Stryker and Sullivan 2009; Meyerowitz 2002). But briefly,
throughout the 1960s into the 1990s mostly cis psychologists and psychiatrists theorized
that gender non-conformity was an individual mental disorder (Meyerowitz 2002), resulting
in the formal diagnosis of Transsexualism in 1980, and later Gender Identity Disorder (GID)
in 1994 outlined in the American Psychological Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual (DSM ) of Mental Disorders (versions III and III-R, IV and IV-TR respectively).
Under these diagnoses, suffering was an effect of mental illness for failing to accept cis
identification.16
15Disability scholar Tobin Siebers (2017, 2008) persuasively argues that the suffering of disabled people
directs attention to the operation of power by revealing the architectural ‘blueprint’ of ableist oppression
within the socially constructed environment.
16In the DSM-III (APA 1980) under “Associated features” of transsexualism, there is a summary of potential
patient suffering, including “considerable anxiety and depression, which the individual may attribute to
inability to live in the role of the desired sex” (262). Under “Impairment and complications”, the DSM-III
lists “Frequently social and occupational functioning are markedly impaired, partly because of associated
psychopathology and partly because of problems encountered in attempting to live in the desired gender
role. Depression is common, and can lead to suicide attempts. In rare instances males may mutilate their
genitals” (263). For comparison across newer versions of the DSM, under “Associated descriptive features
and mental disorders” in the DSM IV-TR (APA 2000), it lists that children with GID may experience
anxiety and depression, and “[a]dolescents are particularly at risk for depression and suicidal ideation and
suicide attempts. In adults, anxiety and depressive symptoms may be present” (578). The final diagnostic
criteria (out of four) for GID in the DSM IV-TR indicates patient suffering as “clinically significant distress
or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning” (581).
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Yet clinical research and practice with trans patients often departed from codified
texts; mental health professionals were abandoning the reparative, deterrent models
against transsexualism that largely characterized the treatment of trans folks before the
1990s, primarily adopting instead a ‘trans-positive’ approach to self-determination of one’s
‘true’ gender identity in order to resolve or mitigate trans suffering from distress
(Ehrensaft 2012).17 Only after a fourteen-year process of expert consultation and revision
were codified treatment and diagnostic texts amended to begin to reflect these changes in
clinical research and practice; culminating in 2013, GID was finally replaced in the
DSM-V with the diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria. With this new diagnosis, gender
non-conformity is no longer expressly classified—at least at an institutional level—as a
pathology of the mind.18 Instead, Gender Dysphoria refers to the ways in which trans
folks can suffer from distress when forced to live in a manner ‘inauthentic’ to their
experienced or expressed gender.19
Suffering then, has historically been—and continues to be by definition of Gender
Dysphoria—central to the psychological diagnosis of trans people, and the key symptom
to be ameliorated through gender confirmation surgery (Standards of Care version 7
2012). Yet as I demonstrate via the following vignettes from physicians, despite trans
folks’ suffering being the raison d’etre of gender confirmation surgery and the key criterion
for Gender Dysphoria (which again is not a pathology), it continues to be pathologized
and individualized by the doctors who participated in this research, serving as a primary
indication to practitioners that they are reasonable to gatekeep trans peoples’ access to
genital technologies. By comparison, cis men’s suffering from “genital ridicule” was
17See also Whitehead et al. (2012) for examples of different mental health practices that fall under the
‘trans-positive’ designation.
18Gender Dysphoria in the DSM-V (APA 2013b) “is more descriptive than the previous DSM-IV term
gender identity disorder and focuses on dysphoria as the clinical problem, not identity per se” (para. 3).
19Suffering, in effect, serves as one of the two diagnostic criteria for Gender Dysphoria in the DSM-V
(APA 2013b) “[t]he condition is associated with clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning” due to a “marked incongruence between one’s
experienced/expressed gender and assigned gender” (452). Moreover, “[a]dolescents and adults with gender
dysphoria before gender reassignment are at increased risk for suicidal ideation, suicide attempts, and
suicides” (454). In addition to suicide, other “[i]mpairment (e.g., school refusal, development of depression,
anxiety, and substance abuse) may be a consequence of gender dysphoria” (455).
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normalized, rendered predicable and acceptable, considered in some cases the clearest
qualification to indicate to physicians that the patient deserves access to male
enhancement procedures.
Suffering as Instability: Constructing Trans Suffering as Errant
Dr. Rosenburg expressed a high degree of caution when deciding whether or not to grant
his trans patients access to gender confirmation surgeries. When I asked Dr. Rosenburg why
cis men are not required to go through counseling to access genital surgery, but trans folks
are, he replied by describing trans people and their suffering as psychologically unhealthy
and deviant.
Up until very recently, I’m talking in the last five or six years, the transgender
community has been [an] unsupported population [of] people who were
psychologically stressed. This is a psychological problem that has not been
recognized by mainstream at all, has been shunted aside and has been
under-appreciated [....] [transgender people are a] stressed population that has
never had support, it’s an errant thread in society. And they are smokers, and
they don’t have good relationships with other people, and they may have had
schisms with their families, and they can’t hold jobs, and they haven’t gotten
higher education because their whole being has been stressed by their
transgender inner selves, and they’re unidimensional in their quest for body
transformation, and they’re often unsuccessful and unhappy in society. When
you have a stressed population, they need help [....] Um, my personal
perspective on it is irreversible gonadal surgery, I need to have somebody else
involved and I want to make sure that you’re committed to this process. If
nothing else, you having the wherewithal to go get a therapist to get you a
letter tells me you’re committed. As is walking in here, a little depressed
because mommy didn’t breast feed you long enough. [emphasis added]
Consider how Dr. Rosenburg reduces trans experience to suffering, eliding any discussion of
trans people’s experiences of contentment or trans folks who are generally happy. In contrast
to Dr. Rosenburg’s assessment of his trans patients, trans folks (Ashley and Ells 2018; Spade
2003)—some of whom are family therapists, sexologists, and medical doctors themselves
(Benestad 2010)—report experiencing gender euphoria. Trans activist and legal scholar
Dean Spade (2003) describes gender euphoria as the “joyful affirmation of gender self-
determination” (21). Characterizing gender euphoria as “the positive homologue of gender
dysphoria”, bioethicists like Ashley and Ells (2018) attest that gender euphoria “speaks
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to a distinct enjoyment or satisfaction caused by the correspondence between the person’s
gender identity and gendered features associated with a gender other than the one assigned
at birth” (24). One of the ways in which trans folks can experience gender euphoria is
through gender confirmation surgery and other forms of creative transfiguration, described
by Ashley and Ells (2018) as “the manifold ways in which we may assert ownership over our
bodies, transforming them into an art piece that is truly ours out of previously alienating
flesh” (24).
While some trans people certainly experience gender dysphoria, wholesale erasure
of gender euphoria perpetuates a cisnormative assumption that trans people are “errant”
that functions to rationalize gatekeeping access to somatic technologies (see Ashley and
Ells 2018). Dr. Rosenburg’s portrayal of the trans population as a homogeneous group of
“unsuccessful” and “unhappy” people contributes to this cisnormative rationale. And while
social researchers have observed elevated incidences of depression, anxiety, and self-harm
among trans people (Travers 2018; Duncan and Hatzenbuehler 2014; Mustanski and Liu
2013), it is irresponsible to reduce trans people’s suffering to an “inner”, “psychological
problem” simply caused by “mommy [not] breast feed[ing] you long enough”—a problem
that is merely “under-appreciated” and “unsupported” by society—rather than a direct
result of experiencing systemic oppression in the violently trans-antagonistic, cisnormative
cultures of Canada and the United States.
From Dr. Rosenburg’s comments, he renders suffering as necessarily constitutive of
trans experience. As Heyes and Latham (2018) have argued, “the more that suffering comes
to define the trans narrative, the greater the purchase of a political psychology that disallows
transformative self-descriptions and action” (175). In other words, the more that trans
experience is reduced to suffering, the the less likely that institutions responsible for trans
folks’ care will accept euphoric self-descriptions and creative transfiguration as sufficient
evidence of trans identity or reason to access somatic technologies. Such a limiting political
psychology “individualizes gender and disallows critique of the systems that contribute to
trans people’s suffering in the first place” (Heyes and Latham 2018, 183). Indeed, reducing
‘trans experience’ to suffering from oppression creates a
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paradoxical attachment of the socially marginal to the very wounded identities
they claim to want to surpass. [...] [D]istress will come to signify the essence of the
trans individual—and ultimately, for those who take a biomedical perspective
to its logical conclusion, the meaning of their bodies. (Heyes and Latham 2018,
182)
If one were to cede broader ethical commitments to transgender justice and
accept—however provisionally so that trans folks can access appropriate medical
care—that suffering is necessarily constitutive of trans experience, the physicians who
participated in my research would—as their comments demonstrate—still gatekeep access
to gender confirmation surgery precisely because of that suffering.
Almost all of the doctors who responded to my question asking why trans folks
require a letter before undergoing surgery were exceedingly circumspect, and suggested
that trans suffering is a sign of mental and emotional instability. Dr. Fray was no different;
he discussed the suffering of trans people by directly comparing it to the imagined mental
and emotional status of cis people. Through this comparison, Dr. Fray attempts to justify
why trans people’s access to genital technologies must be managed closely, whereas cis men
do not require such management.
If you asked a hundred physicians “do you think a transgender person is more
mentally, emotionally stable? Or less emotionally stable? Or the same as
someone who is not a transgender? [sic]” I think you would have an
overwhelming majority [of physicians] say that [trans people] were more
unstable. [emphasis added]
It is unclear how Dr. Fray arrived at this conclusion that trans people are more unstable
than cis people; the focus of the conversation shifted abruptly after he made this statement,
and I was not able to follow up to ask how he made this determination. However, at a
different moment during our interview, he does provide insights into how he understands the
instability of cis men, whom he claims are more mentally and emotionally stable compared
to trans people. Examining these insights can help elucidate Dr. Fray’s claim here about
trans people.
Practitioners like Dr. Fray invest heavily in the bioreductive model that reduces
human behaviour to our biological bodies. When discussing possible side-effects of penis
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augmentation—such as the impact of male enhancement on the sexual practices of patients
who have circlusive sexual partners—Dr. Fray suggested that cis men would not care about
their partner’s safety (who he referred to as cis women) because testosterone is a “warrior”
hormone that makes men actually “want to hurt” cis women. Acting as a ventriloquist for
his patients and their partners, Dr. Fray used a deep yet excited tone when trying to convey
cis men’s desires in the following quote. While speaking for cis women—the imagined sexual
partners of his male enhancement patients—Dr. Fray switched his tone to an exaggerated
higher pitch.
Look if you tell a man that “gee well you’re probably going to hurt your wife
cause you’re [your penis is] going to be bigger”, [my patient’s response] it’s
usually “well that sounds good!” rather than “oh, my poor wife I don’t want to
hurt my wife!” It’s like, “well I’ll make it fit”. So men are not the most
considerate, compassionate- in some respects- they’re in some ways kind of
sadistic and barbaric when it comes to those kinds of things. [...] I think a
woman would be like “oh I wouldn’t want to hurt you!” and the guy’s like “oh
yeeaahh I want to hurt her”. [...] I think men are in general very dominating
and very warrior-like. And they don’t care. Men don’t care. They don’t care
about their partner’s feelings. They just don’t. [emphasis added]
When I asked Dr. Fray what he thought about men not caring about their partner’s feelings,
he chuckled through his response.
Um it’s all called estrogen. Estrogen makes you sensitive. In fact when I give
testosterone to [a cis man], I try not to [...] limit the conversion of testosterone
into estrogen, because [otherwise] they become very insensitive, and harsh, and
hardened, and almost mean. And estrogen tends to be cardio-protective. [...]
If the estrogens get too high, then we get untoward effects of competition of
estrogens that get in the testosterone receptor with testosterone. And then [my
cis men patients will get] the dreaded man boobs. And nobody wants that. So it’s
all a very carefully orchestrated, almost symbiosis. So that would be the reason
that men would be not giving a shit about their partners when they get very
high T[estosterone] levels and their estrogens are low; they’re not a lot of fun to
be around. And they can get really angry. [emphasis added]
From the quote above, Dr. Fray takes up a bioreductive explanation of human
behaviour—that is, an explanation that reduces complex human behaviour to our
physiology, genetics, or in this case, hormonal chemistry (Lancaster 2006). According to
Dr. Fray, human behaviour can be explained by our biological and binary natures as
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‘female’ and ‘male’. Dr. Fray understands cis men’s aggression through the problematic
science of binary ‘sex hormones’ that often functions to naturalize cis men’s violent
behaviours. In this formulation, estrogen—which is sexed as ‘female’—is the “sensitive”,
“considerate”, “compassionate” hormone, whereas testosterone—sexed as ‘male’—is the
“mean”, “angry”, “warrior” hormone. Due to Dr. Fray’s assumption that ‘male’ bodies by
design naturally have limited estrogen and high testosterone levels, and that hormones are
responsible for cis men’s behaviours, he contends that cis men “are not the most
considerate, compassionate” people, “[t]hey don’t care about their partner’s feelings”, and
they “are in general very dominating and very warrior-like”. Dr. Fray describes cis men as
“sadistic” and “barbaric” as a natural result of their biology, and he normalizes these
forms of violent instability, rather than as grounds to gatekeep their access to genital
technologies. Yet Dr. Fray frames trans folks as “more unstable” than cis people for
wanting access to somatic technologies that in many cases enable them to be more
comfortable, if not euphoric in their bodies (Ashley and Ells 2018; Benestad 2010; Spade
2003), as well as socially and legally-recognized as their gender(s), which can lead to a
degree of harm reduction (see Travers 2018).20
Many of the physicians in this research gave similar responses as Dr. Fray and Dr.
Rosenburg, characterizing trans folks as “errant” and “unstable”. In all of these cases,
doctors used trans peoples’ mental and emotional support needs—their suffering—as
justification for enforcing mandatory counseling before granting them access to gender
confirmation surgeries. Latham (2017) summarized it best by saying:
Treating trans patients as though they inherently and necessarily require their
competency to be approved by “mental health professionals,” when this is not
standard clinical practice for all other patients, constitutes trans patients as
necessarily psychologically suspect because they are trans. (50)
Even though suffering and distress are central to the diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria, as
well as the basis upon which trans folks should—according to current standards of
20To be clear, underscoring the potential somatic comfort, euphoria, and reduction of harm related to gender
confirmation surgeries does not imply that these interventions result in trans people “finally feel[ing]
at home in his/her body, to become whole” (Sullivan 2006, 553), thereby inscribing non-surgical trans
existence as necessarily tragic or characterized by suffering.
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care—receive access to somatic technologies, the suffering of trans people is used as
evidence by the doctors in this research to distrust trans folks’ identity claims, and
therefore, as evidence that they should strictly gatekeep access to gender confirmation
surgery. Through this gatekeeping, practitioners re-entrench cisnormativity and trans
oppression in their medical practices. The institutional requirement that trans people
receive approval from mental health professionals before undergoing genital surgery
compared to the majority of cis patients who—as I demonstrate in the next section—do
not have the same requirement and are in fact institutionally enabled to get genital
surgeries, is a technique that naturalizes the sex assigned to bodies at birth.
Suffering as Eligibility: Ideal Candidates for Male Enhancement
In the course of conducting this research, I often reflected on how the topic of male
enhancement was received by others. Upon learning the focus of my interviews, for
example, complete strangers at social events would commonly ask me inappropriate
questions about my partner’s body (see Chapter 3) or divulge their sexual experiences to
me without consent. Upwards of six different women I had never met before confided in
the group—without invitation and often through inebriated laughter—that they are not
satisfied sexually by their partners. Many of these women typically understood their
sexual dissatisfaction as a result of their partner’s penis size, which they characterized as
small, often expressing that they are considering leaving their partners because of their
genital size.
This behavior reduces the penis to pleasuring others as its teleology. Public
critiques of their partners’ genitals as sexually inadequate perpetuate narrow, unrealistic
expectations for cis men’s bodies, and simultaneously police the morphology of intersex
and trans people’s genitals according to binarist and cisnormative demands. After
experiencing or simply witnessing genital mockery, cis men may seek to shore up their
masculinity by securing patriarchal dividends—or the social and material rewards cis men
receive for the subordination of others (Connell 1995, 79)—in this case through the
reassertion of their physical dominance through phallic masculine embodiment, sexual
control, and violence (which I discuss in Chapter 6).
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Stories of genital humiliation were commonly reported by cis men in online forums
and support sites like Enhancement Forum; however, suffering characterized their narratives
rather than laughter. Most often cis men expressed grief, pain, and anger about a former or
current sexual partner (always discussed as women) laughing at the size of their genitals;
refusing to have sex with them because they have small penises; stating that they “only
sleep with guys who wear Magnums”; expressing that they are sexually unsatisfied, which
forum members often assumed was a problem of penis size, rather than of intimacy or
sexual knowledge; ending their relationship because they have “inadequate cocks”; or sexual
partners being “an unfaithful slut” for cheating on them with other men. Forum members
frequently disclosed anxieties about being “cuckolded by a bigger man”. Often cis men
on forums would denigrate their partners as ‘size queens’21 for valuing a big dick over
other characteristics of a sexual partner. While genital shaming is painful, oppressive, and
reproduces constraining, impossible standards for peoples’ bodies (effects that should not be
minimized), heterosexual women alone are neither responsible for creating nor maintaining
these expectations, much less structurally positioned within the field of gender relations to
undo the problems of patriarchy.
Some may view the use of the epithet ‘size queens’ simply as men’s retort for
having their feelings hurt, but it is also an expression of cis men’s aggrieved entitlement
(Hayes and Dragiewicz 2018) to women’s bodies. Women do not owe men relationships,
sex, or orgasms—either women’s own orgasms or men’s.22 Yet women who do not give
men relationships, sex, or orgasms are often vilified and sometimes subjected to violence
by men in these online support forums. According to some cis men’s accounts in the male
enhancement forums online, they harassed, abused, or assaulted women when they refused
their sexual or romantic advances. So it is important to remember when thinking through cis
men’s discourses of suffering and practitioners’ receptivity to these discourses, that suffering
21The term ‘size queens’ originally comes from gay and queer men’s communities as a critique of men who
prioritize genital size in their sexual partners above all other personal traits (Snider 2009). Cis, heterosexual
men on male enhancement forums adopted/co-opted this language to disparage women as shallow.
22See Chadwick and van Anders (2017) for an analysis of how men feel entitled to women’s pleasure because
it makes them feel more masculine.
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frames men as victims of an unfair sexual economy, a discourse steeped in misogyny that is
central to violent networks like incels.23
Given the centrality of these discourses of suffering to cis men making sense of
their experiences, it is not surprising then that male enhancement practitioners were privy
to cis men’s ‘origin stories’ for how they became interested in male enhancement.24
Almost all of the medical doctors in my sample shared grievances that they often felt as
though—in the course of being a physician and seeing patients for physical
alterations—they were positioned as counselors and mental health supports for suffering
cis men, without having the appropriate and adequate training to fulfill that role. Despite
this, all but one practitioner (Dr. Midden) who participated in this research accepted cis
men’s suffering to some extent as a legitimate reason to grant them access to male
enhancement technologies. This contradiction—where physicians recognize they are not
qualified to evaluate patients’ suffering, yet in practice they generally accept cis men’s
suffering and reject trans people’s suffering—reveals the shaky foundation of their claims
that trans folks have problematic, unmet psychological needs that cis men allegedly do
not.
Cis men’s suffering was handled in strikingly dissimilar ways by physicians in this
research compared to how they treated the suffering of trans folks. Practitioners often
discussed cis men’s suffering as “embarrassment”, “insecurity”, “inadequacy”, “shame”,
“worthlessness”, and “feel[ing] less of a man”, but doctors rarely framed cis men’s
23The term ‘incels’ is a blending of the words ‘involuntary’ and ‘celibates’, and refers to an extremist
network of people—largely white, heterosexual men—who have been unsuccessful at finding sexual or
romantic partners despite desiring these relationships. In online activity, as well as in-person interactions,
incels espouse misogyny, racism, and an entitlement to sex to the extent that they advocate for the
legalization of sexual violence as a means to ‘redistributing’ sexual access. Incels are known for endorsing
and enacting violence, including sexual violence and (mass) murder, against people they perceive to be more
sexually active and successful than them. While not all incels engage in body projects, or “looksmaxing”
to use incel terminology, recent news reports (Dickson 2019; A. Hines 2019; Cook 2018) suggest there is
considerable overlap between incels and those who engage in genital work. See Srinivasan (2018) for an
incisive explanation and analysis of incel ideology.
24Not every member writing on male enhancement support sites like Enhancement Forum attributes sexual
humiliation from women as their reason for seeking out penile augmentation; however, it was such a
common theme that dominated forum threads for me to report these stories here. These ‘origin stories’
were particularly common from new members or “long time lurker[s], first time poster[s]” introducing
themselves to other forum members.
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suffering as a “psychological” or “inner problem”, to borrow Dr. Rosenburg’s language.
One male enhancement practitioner, Dr. Russo, even claimed that cis men’s suffering from
genital shame and “low self-esteem” should be recognized as a disability caused by social
humiliation.
In many cases—such as in Dr. Harris’ medical practice—suffering served as the
ideal reason for granting cis men access to genital technologies. Dr. Harris is a US
physician who has been performing suspensory ligament releases, dermal grafts for girth
enhancements, as well as penoscrotal webbing resections for about fifteen years. Doctors
generally describe penoscrotal webbing as an “excess amount of scrotal skin which
interferes with aesthetics” so they surgically remove the scrotal skin to make the penis
appear larger. During our interview, when I asked Dr. Harris who would be an ideal
candidate for his male enhancement procedures, he said “the people that I try to
encourage are patients who[se penis sizes] really are small or average and have some event
in the past that has scarred them” [emphasis added]. He characterizes these patients as
having “a true need.” Scarring events “which reduced their self-esteem” [emphasis added]
include:
[E]ither somebody has said something in the shower [or] locker room when they
were younger as athletes, [or] more commonly one of their partners has said
something about the length of their penis in the flaccid or in the erect state,
especially during intercourse. [...] I don’t think that their partners are nefarious
or malicious. It just happens when they’re making love and Sue says to Sam “Is
that all you got? Can you give me some more? I can’t feel you.” You know and
really I think probably a benign comment but then that goes on his hard drive
and can never be erased.... And it’s significant because that’s what happens
with a new partner, they develop what’s called performance anxiety, and when
that happens, adrenaline is released from the adrenal glands, the blood supply
is diminished to the penis so now they’ve got a secondary problem. They have
difficulty getting and maintaining an erection because they’re concerned about
the size of their penis. [emphasis added]
The suffering highlighted by Dr. Harris is two-fold and interrelated: emotional suffering and
physical suffering. According to Dr. Harris, emotional scarring and “reduced self-esteem”
caused by cis men feeling as though they cannot stimulate or satisfy their sexual partners
results in a “secondary problem” of “performance anxiety”, and therefore, sexual impotence.
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“[D]ifficulty getting and maintaining an erection” only compounds his patients’ reduced self-
esteem, framed as a vicious cycle of emotional trauma. According to Dr. Harris, the ideal
role of his medical practice is
to provide those men who were born with short penises in terms of length or
girth a way to become average or slightly above average so that you would
restore their self-esteem, and it has significant ramifications in their entire life.
[emphasis added]
For this reason, Dr. Harris suggests that patients who have been “scarred” are ideal
candidates for his male enhancement procedures. Across my interviews with other
physicians, the majority made similar claims as Dr. Harris that suffering was sufficient
evidence that cis men deserved access to male enhancement procedures, rather than a
need for mental health support.
Dr. Russo was an adamant proponent of performing male enhancement
procedures for cis men who are suffering. As the most prolific surgeon in my sample, Dr.
Russo has performed over ten thousand male enhancement procedures over the course of
more than twenty years in the United States. He specializes in suspensory ligament
releases, fat injections for penile girth enhancements, testicular augmentation, penoscrotal
webbing reductions and fat pad removal to make the penis visually appear longer, as well
as revision surgeries to correct prior enhancements performed by other doctors. I began
our interview by asking Dr. Russo to describe the patients who come to see him for male
enhancement procedures. He explained that most men have a common trauma that leads
them to his office. While he initially suggested that “genital ridicule” from other men in
homosocial spaces was a common experience amongst his patients, and a good reason to
get the procedure, he was especially sympathetic to patients who had suffered
“self-esteem” issues from “genital ridicule” by the “opposite sex” who do not feel sexually
satisfied by his cis men patients.
Most of the time it’s something they have suffered with for many many years.
Usually since high school or shortly thereafter the age of puberty where it has
prevented men from enjoying social life, enjoying sports, you know locker room
situations, also avoiding joining the military. And just a fear of ridicule, and
there’s nothing worse for a man’s self-esteem than genital ridicule, especially by
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members of the opposite sex usually you’ll find. I’ve seen many men who are
getting divorced or recently divorced, and they’re ready to go out into a new
social atmosphere, and are either unaware or made aware of the demands on
them socially by sort of the liberated female. [...] And they just have come to
the point where they want to free themselves from this burden that society has
placed [on] them. [...] It’s very common for me to hear “well my girlfriend or
my current wife, her ex boyfriend or her ex husband was you know hung like a
horse” and so this immediately puts this person on a defensive. So as I’ve said,
there’s nothing more damaging to male self-esteem than genital ridicule by the
opposite sex. [emphasis added]
Compared to how Dr. Rosenburg pathologized and individualized trans folks’ suffering,
observe how Dr. Russo characterizes cis men’s suffering as a result of social burdens that he
frames as unjustly “preventing men from enjoying social life”. Ideal candidates, according to
Dr. Russo, are patients who he estimates can begin to enjoy a social, romantic, and sexual
life after undergoing his male enhancement procedures. The patients Dr. Russo is most likely
to give a penile augmentation to are those whose self-esteem he can help restore after they
have suffered from years of “genital ridicule”. In fact, practitioners like Dr. Russo and Dr.
Harris agreed that the ideal role of medicine is the restoration of men’s self-esteem through
male enhancement. Therefore, success of a penile augmentation is assessed by physicians,
to a great degree, by the alleviation of suffering, which remains largely unquestioned by
the doctors who participated in this research. And yet, as I demonstrated previously, the
alleviation of trans patients’ suffering through genital technologies is rebuked by medical
practitioners on the presumption that trans suffering is a sign of a psychological disorder,
not eligibility for somatic intervention.
Cis men’s suffering stems from particular social contexts, according to practitioners.
Initially, Dr. Russo identifies a handful of homosocial spaces in which men’s bodies are
visible—and presumably evaluated and ridiculed—by other men. Homosocial spaces like
sex-segregated sports and locker rooms, as well as the military are particular sites where
the genital ridicule begins, according to Dr. Russo. This is not surprising as the organizing
institutional logics that undergird these mostly homosocial spaces are rooted in sexism,
queer and trans-oppression (Travers 2006), colonialism, racism, and patriarchal violence
(Spade 2015). Since sport is a central institution to the successful enactment of masculinity
(Messner 2007; Pronger 1999, 1990) and the military is deeply coded as a masculine space
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(Enloe 2004), social and relational exclusion from these spaces and the inability to enact
appropriately embodied masculinity can understandably result in suffering.25 Yet, similar
to Dr. Harris, Dr. Russo broadly glosses over these forms of violence perpetuated by men
against other men, choosing to focus instead on the genital ridicule from the “opposite sex”
as the most “damaging to male self-esteem”. Yet unlike Dr. Harris, who framed women
vocalizing their sexual dissatisfaction as “probably a benign comment”, Dr. Russo frames
the “demands on them socially by sort of the liberated female” as a “damaging” “burden
that society has placed [on] them” that men seek to “free themselves from”.
When I asked Dr. Russo to elaborate on what he means by a “liberated female”, he
began to stumble over his words: “I I I think it’s just uh a uh modern woman who is probably
also independent, uh also works outside the home” adding that liberated females “demand”
sexual pleasure from their partners. Setting aside the obvious sexism in this remark, Dr.
Russo’s comment points to something even more consequential about male enhancement
discourse. First, cis men’s suffering is rendered a normal response to the “genital ridicule”
men experience from women who want equitable access to sexual pleasure, which is largely
unquestioned by medical practitioners. Second, cis men’s suffering diagnoses feminism—
including cornerstone goals of financial and sexual equity—as the problem, rather than
the limiting, unrealistic, patriarchal gender expectations for men and their bodies. Finally,
physicians in this research treat cis men’s suffering as an ideal justification for enhancing
both men’s penile dimensions, and phallic masculine embodiment through augmentation
procedures. Discourses of suffering therefore point to—if not generate—male enhancement
as the solution to men’s suffering, instead of calling for gender revolution.
In many ways, then, discourses employed in the medical context of male
enhancement serve as a defense against threats to patriarchal power. Patriarchy no doubt
generates benefits for cis men over historically-oppressed others. However, these benefits,
or patriarchal dividends—as well as the violence enacted in the name of patriarchy—are
not distributed equally among men; some men benefit from patriarchy more (Pascoe 2007;
Connell 1995). Thus, male enhancement cannot simply be classified as patriarchal violence
25Notably, some male enhancement practitioners offer discounts to men in the military or veterans.
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directed against cis men’s bodies and subjectivities, nor can it be merely cast as
emancipatory. Rather, patriarchy is productive of particular, masculine subjectivities
through male enhancement; this subjectification serves as a defense against evolving
challenges to patriarchal power, such as feminist movements enacting social change.
Evidenced by the discursive devices employed in the medical context for penis
enlargement, male enhancement is one of the currently accepted answers to the problem of
the legitimacy of patriarchy.
Dr. Russo and Dr. Harris were not alone in their assessment of cis men’s suffering;
Dr. Tabibi agreed that suffering made cis men particularly eligible for male enhancement.
Over the course of more than twenty years, Dr. Tabibi has performed over two thousand
penile and testicular implants that he created and patented with the United States Food and
Drug Administration. Seated in Dr. Tabibi’s assistant’s office, a large poster advertisement
hovered over my shoulder depicting a white woman and man from the neck down in their
bathing suits embracing each other. This image of a happy, heterosexual, white couple stands
in for images of the enhanced penis itself, with a promise of how undergoing the procedure
could shape one’s sexual and romantic life. Their tanned, slender but toned bodies take up
the entire frame of the image, save for a list of surgeries performed by Dr. Tabibi located
at the bottom of the poster.
Gesturing to this list of male enhancement procedures, I ask Dr. Tabibi to describe
under what circumstances he has declined to perform these operations, and rejected a new
patient. He responded:
I tell them “you are not a candidate unless you have a special reason, unless
your girlfriend, or your friend, or your partner, or somebody really hurt you
or hurt your feelings,” [...] because this procedure really really boost their self-
confidence. That is very important. [...] [W]e have a patient [...] his wife was
cheating with one of his friend[s] and later on he find out, [he] said “why?” [she]
said “oh because your penis is so small, so I went [and had sex] with [him]”. And
they got divorced and then with a girlfriend, the same situation happened with
somebody else. This guy has been attacked two times by two different girls just
because of his size, so he’s on the verge of committing suicide. So [I gave him] a
discounted price. [...] definitely this guy has been insulted. [...] [I]t’s in his mind
that “my size is small so I cannot satisfy anybody, going out with any girl”.
Unless [I] do something for him, [he’s] not going to be happy for the rest of his
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life. So you have to do something. These are the group of people who definitely
they need [male enhancement]. [emphasis added]
Dr. Tabibi was equally as emphatic as Dr. Russo that suffering genital ridicule—being
“attacked” and “insulted” by “girls” (adult women)—makes cis men decidedly qualified
to receive male enhancement procedures. We can see from Dr. Tabibi, Dr. Russo, and Dr.
Harris’ comments how cis men’s suffering is normalized, rendered predicable and acceptable,
and a clear indication that the patient is entitled access to genital technologies, rather than
a clear sign that they need mental health support. Hurt feelings, a lifetime of unhappiness,
and suicidal ideation were not indications that Dr. Tabibi’s patient was too unstable for
any kind of procedure on his genitals, and instead needed access to mental health services,
but rather, that he was the best candidate for male enhancement. Dr. Tabibi’s patient even
received a discount on the cost of the procedure because his suffering made him so deserving
of increased access to genital technologies.
The cases I presented above demonstrate that the discourse of suffering operates
very differently within the medical management of trans folks compared to cis male
enhancement patients. Suffering works to denaturalize trans people’s dysphoria as a
“psychological problem” of “their transgender inner selves”, rendering their “quest for
body transformation” illegitimately “unidimensional” and their mental and emotional
states “more unstable” than cis people. Physicians’ logic appears to suggest that internal,
psychological problems cannot be ameliorated by external, medical interventions into the
soma. Doctors seem to imply that even if a trans person undergoes gender confirmation
surgery, they will still suffer from internal problems of instability.
On the other hand, suffering from a body that fails to cite the regulatory norm of
cis masculine dominance is an external problem of “genital ridicule” stemming from “the
liberated female”, cheating girlfriends and wives, or broader “burden[s] that society has
placed [on] them” that are “damaging to male self-esteem”, pushing cis men to be “on
the verge of committing suicide” because they are “not going to be happy for the rest of
[their] life” without access to genital technologies. Getting a male enhancement, according
to practitioners’ logic, will enable cis men to fulfill broader social expectations, including
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those of potential sexual partners. Thus, cis men’s suffering is not only a normal response
according to most physicians, but it is also sufficient cause for somatic transformation of
cis men’s bodies. So even though both trans folks and cis men suffer, it only makes sense
to practitioners to alter the body to ease social suffering in the case of cis men, but not to
ease the so-called “inner”, mental anguish of trans people.
There are rare circumstances under which physicians did not accept cis men’s
suffering as a reasonable justification for granting them access to male enhancement
procedures. In these cases, doctors were concerned about making any kind of medical
intervention out of concern for perpetuating harm against cis men who (might) suffer from
Body Dysmorphic Disorder. I analyze these cases, alongside other invocations of the
discourse of harm, in the next chapter “Harm, Regret, and Dissatisfaction: A Somatechnic
Analysis of Trans and Cis Genital Interventions”.
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Chapter 5
Harm, Regret, and Dissatisfaction:
A Somatechnic Analysis of Trans
and Cis Genital Interventions
Until we know precisely how it operates within and across different contexts, we
cannot escape the tyranny of the natural and the harmful exclusions enacted in
its name.
—T. Garner
Stitching Up the Natural: ‘Manboobs,’ Pregnancy, and the Transgender Body
Continuing to unpack the (de)naturalization techniques that operate through the
medical management of both male enhancement patients as well as trans folks seeking
gender confirmation surgery, in this chapter I critically examine harm as well as regret
versus dissatisfaction as discursive devices that differentially materialize sexed and racialized
bodies, gender identities, and the relation between them. As I demonstrate in my analysis
of physicians’ comments below, these discourses pathologize particular racialized somatic
practices as well as the identities and post-surgical bodies of trans people, marking them
both as unnatural constructions, while normalizing and naturalizing cis men’s bodies and
subjectivities, both prior to and succeeding medical intervention. Understanding through a
comparative somatechnic method (Sullivan 2005a, 2009a, 2009b) how the discourses of harm,
regret, and dissatisfaction work in each medical context renders visible the materialization
of cis men’s bodies and identities.
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Harm
Seated across from Dr. Fraser in his sun-filled office, I conclude our interview by asking him
“if you could share anything with the general public about the work that you do performing
gender confirmation surgeries and male enhancement, what would it be?” Dr. Fraser paused
to think, rocking quietly in his office chair. After a protracted silence, he perches his elbows
on his desk, interlacing his fingers in front of him as if to center himself in preparation for
his answer. I lean in ready to hear the secret he is about to share with me. “Sometimes
making someone whole” he says calmly, “is taking off a part of them.” How do physicians
like Dr. Fraser determine if a procedure will make their patients “whole” or harm them?
Why are some somatic interventions thought to be corrective, restorative, or augmentative,
while others are thought to cause harm? The ways in which differently-sexed and racialized
bodies materialize through conceptions of harm will comprise the focus of my analysis in
this section.
One of the foundational principles of contemporary medical care in Canada and the
United States is ‘above all do no harm’. Despite its widespread usage, the interpretation
and application of the edict to ‘do no harm’ is contested by both physicians and mental
health practitioners, particularly regarding the care of trans patients. As the Standards
of Care (version 7, 2012) make clear under the section “Ethical Questions Regarding Sex
Reassignment Surgery”, some health professionals object to gender confirmation surgeries
as a treatment for trans folks experiencing gender dysphoria. They make these objections on
the basis that genital surgeries (among others) for trans people do not treat “pathological
tissues”, concluding instead that they perpetuate harm against trans bodies by “altering
anatomically normal structures” (55).1 Interpreting the medical principle to ‘do no harm’
in this way results in an uneven application of this edict, since cosmetic procedures like
male enhancement also intervene upon bodies medically-deemed “anatomically normal”,
yet those procedures (mostly) escape accusations of perpetuating harm (see Pentney 2012).
1This section of the SOC (version 7, 2012) also contrasts gender confirmation surgeries with “ordinary”
surgical interventions “made to body features to improve a patient’s self image” (55), suggesting that
gender confirmation surgeries are, mystifyingly, somehow unrelated to the “image” one has of themself,
including their gender.
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Such an uneven interpretation and application of the ethic of care positions the pre-surgical
bodies of trans people as natural, thereby casting the post-surgical trans body as unnatural,
constructed flesh.
Even though I did not explicitly ask physicians how genital interventions could
potentially harm trans or cis patients, practitioners elected to discuss potential harms in
response to other questions I posed about a variety of topics. The doctors who
participated in this research frame trans folks as experiencing harm on the basis of
altering “normal” anatomy with permanent consequences for the naturalness of their
bodies, while under mental and emotional duress from gender dysphoria. And according to
practitioners, gender confirmation surgeries also allegedly create permanent repercussions
for trans peoples’ gender identities, as we saw in the previous chapter, “Authenticity and
Suffering”, from physicians like Dr. Schneider, whose theory of gender acquisition locates
the origin of gender identity within the sexed body.
Practitioners emphasized that trans people are likely to experience harm to the sex
and gender assigned to them at birth, to the exclusion of all other potential harms trans folks
could experience from medical intervention. While both cis and trans patients can experience
harm as a result of post-operative medical complications, for example, practitioners only
discussed negative outcomes in the context of cis men’s medical interventions. Similarly,
both US physicians and Canadian doctors—despite operating under differently-regulated
healthcare systems—discussed how cis men could experience harm as a result of inadequate
or reckless medical care under capitalist systems that prioritize profit accumulation over
human well-being. This is a rare moment of critical resistance that physicians demonstrated.
However, this form of resistance is limited; again, while both cis and trans people can
experience harm from inadequate or reckless medical care, practitioners never included
trans patients in this discussion, only cis men. It is unclear why doctors did not include
trans folks in these conversations; however, by effect, it makes it appear as though the
only harm trans patients can experience from gender confirmation surgery is harm to their
‘natural’ sex and gender.
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By comparison, cis men could experience harm from male enhancement in
multiple ways. In addition to the harms to cis patients identified by practitioners above,
physicians established two other means by which cis men can experience harm from
genital technologies: first, due to “unorthodox” genital procedures, and second, if they
underwent a procedure while suffering from Body Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD). In terms
of cis men receiving “unorthodox”, “unusual”, or “psychologically dangerous” medical
interventions, physicians generally framed racialized genital interventions that challenge
normative conceptions of masculinity and whiteness as causing cis men harm. For
example, through the politics of transgression (Cadwallader and Murray 2007), bead or
nodule insertions into the skin of the penis as well as penile reductions were “weird” and
“unhygienic”, according to male enhancement practitioners.
Most of the doctors in this research also claimed that if a cis man has BDD, he
can experience harm as a result of any cosmetic intervention, including procedures as
minimally-invasive as Priapus Shots for mild girth enhancement. Here we see a rare
overlap between the gatekeeping of trans patients and the gatekeeping of body-dysmorphic
cis men, both of whom medical practitioners frame as having internal, psychological
problems that cannot and should not be ameliorated through physical interventions. From
the case examples below, I illustrate how physicians—in the course of practicing
medicine—mobilize harm as a discursive device that naturalizes whiteness, phallic
masculine embodiment, and cis identification, while pathologizing particular racialized
somatic practices alongside the identities and post-surgical bodies of trans people.
“Swimming Against the Stream of Nature”: Harm to the Cis Body
Many physicians who participated in this research cautioned against opening the gate to
gender confirmation surgeries because they allegedly result in “a total change of identity”
as Dr. Schneider claimed, or because trans patients might be “going through a phase” as
Dr. Fraser surmised in Chapter 4. In each of these statements, it is possible that doctors
were alluding to concerns about perpetuating harm through permanent physical changes
that have implications for both identity and the body. But few practitioners so explicitly
discussed harm in the context of trans healthcare as Dr. Fray, who was unequivocal in his
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concerns about gender confirmation surgery causing harm to trans patients. While Dr. Fray’s
private medical practice is geared towards procedures for cis men, recall that he regularly
worked with trans patients during medical school, so his comments do not stem from a lack
of experience treating trans patients. After describing trans folks as more mentally unstable
than cis people (in Chapter 4 under the section “Suffering as Instability”), Dr. Fray went
on to say:
I think that whether [the medical establishment and insurance companies are]
electing to discriminate against [trans people], or to protect them, or simply to
give them a filtering system of making sure that they’re not doing any harm to
them, which is part of the Hippocratic Oath, or whatever the reasons—good, bad,
or indifferent—there’s the reasons. The reasons are there. [emphasis added]2
Notice how Dr. Fray frames his response: it is unimportant—“good, bad, or indifferent”—
whether gatekeeping access to genital surgeries will “discriminate against [trans people]” or
“protect them” if the intention and result of gatekeeping is the prevention of harm. Yet the
very real harm from such discrimination—or more accurately, the harm from oppression3—
against trans people in cisnormative societies like Canada and the United States is not
given the same ethical consideration compared to the potential harm caused by gender
confirmation surgeries. To be clear, when Dr. Fray invokes the idea of harm as a result of
these surgeries, he is specifically referring to harm against the sex of the ‘natural’ body.
Look you’re swimming against the stream of nature on this one. Because nature
said penis and you’re saying vagina. And so it’s not like we’re enhancing penis,
we’re actually having to go against nature. I actually do understand that, I
think that something that’s non-reversible that could cost a lot of money that
the person is not going to pay for and could also lead to either malpractice or
a wrongful injury [lawsuit] as a result of claiming mental health issues.4 I just
2The Hippocratic Oath, despite popular belief, is not required of modern medical students and does not
explicitly state ‘above all do no harm’. Medical institutions in the United States for example, have adopted
their own versions of medical ethics that suit contemporary medical and cultural values (North 2002).
3Oppression is the systematic marginalization and erasure of a group through power. It negatively shapes
the life chances of groups of people, bringing them in closer proximity to precarity, suffering, and death.
Oppression and discrimination are historically and materially distinct; while discrimination can be hurtful,
it is not historically entrenched nor institutionalized like oppression.
4Dr. Fray’s remarks here about broader institutional bodies—such as insurance companies, public bodies
who cover gender confirmation surgeries, and the medical establishment—may or may not reflect how they
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think [mandatory mental health assessments are] just there to protect all the
parties and it’s still best in [the patient’s] well-being. And if all it does is require
the [trans] recipient to have to prove their intention to approve to prove to prove
uh some mental you know uh stability in their decision look like you [sic] say,
you’re going against nature on that one. [emphasis added]
Here Dr. Fray is raising alarms about harming the ‘nature’ of the sexed body. In addition
to Dr. Fray claiming authority over reading nature’s intentions (“nature said penis”
[emphasis added]), as well as emphatically naturalizing cis embodiment, he also explicitly
pathologizes post-surgical trans embodiment as “swimming against the stream of nature”.
Dr. Fray’s concern for the ‘natural’ sex of the body is heightened by the fact that genital
surgeries on trans folks are largely “non-reversible”, meaning that gender confirmation
surgery would—according to the ethic of body modification espoused by practitioners like
Dr. Fray—permanently mark trans bodies as unnatural constructions.
To quote trans somatechnician Jules Gill-Peterson (2014), who has analyzed logics
like those perpetuated here by Dr. Fray, “[t]he use of technology to modify the body can be
deployed against its authenticity, as a means of devaluing the trans body by measuring only
its resemblance to the presumed natural cisgender body” (406). Despite somatic intervention
into the bodies of cis men, they emerge after male enhancement procedures with the ‘nature’
of their sexed bodies unharmed, because physicians like Dr. Fray construct cis men’s genital
projects as merely “enhancing” or “improving” the genitals they already ‘have’ within a
narrow range of plasticity (i.e. from a penis to a larger penis), rather than a transformation
that “go[es] against nature” of the sex they were assigned at birth.5
Dr. Fray downplays the consequences of delaying trans peoples’ access to
appropriate medical care when he remarks “all it does is require the [trans] recipient to
have to prove their intention” [emphasis added]. From this comment, Dr. Fray
do in fact operate in the world; I am not conducting an institutional analysis here. However, it is important
to stress that the discourses taken up by Dr. Fray and other medical practitioners about institutional bodies
informs how they make sense of, justify, and gatekeep access to genital technologies that would transform
bodies of flesh in their medical practices. For physicians like Dr. Fray, aiming to avoid potential harms
directed at institutional bodies is a justifiable reason for delaying trans peoples’ access to medical care until
they can “prove their intention.” Harm is therefore not the property of naturalization techniques alone.
5For a genealogical analysis of gender and sex plasticity within endocrinology, and how reversibility operates
as a stand-in for plasticity, see Gill-Peterson (2017).
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demonstrates that he either does not understand the impact that gender confirmation
surgery can and often has in the lives of trans people in terms of social and state
recognition, in terms of survival, and in terms of reducing harm (see Spade 2015), or he
subordinates these positive outcomes in an attempt to protect the supposed ‘nature’ of
the sex assigned to bodies at birth. Absent from my interviews with practitioners (except
for one that I detail in the section “Resisting Discourses of Trans Regret”) was any
mention of the harms from forcing trans folks to live through daily violence under a
cisnormative, trans-oppressive society. Pointing to what was not said in my conversations
with physicians is consistent with the analytical method of deconstruction at the centre of
this project, but is complicated by the character of qualitative data given my co-creative
role in guiding the interview discussion, and therefore, my ability to point to those
absences during the conversation. Nonetheless, practitioners’ silence on the harms to trans
people living under social oppression—especially when contrasted with how vocal they
were about the “burden that society has placed [on cis men]”—was nevertheless a
particularly painful absence.
While scholars like Lane (2018) and Garner (2011) have both noted a tension
between the harm health practitioners assume will result from surgery, and the harm
associated with gender dysphoria—with the opening or closing of the gate to access
surgery relying on the significance doctors attribute to each—the male enhancement and
trans healthcare physicians who participated in this research do not report this tension.
Only the harm to the ‘natural’ body and cisgender self as a result of gender confirmation
surgeries was reported by medical practitioners in our interviews. Thus, the discourse of
harm was mobilized against trans people as a naturalizing technique of the sex assigned to
bodies at birth. How the discourse of harm operated in the context of male enhancement
for cis men is the theme I turn to in the next section.
“Unorthodox Procedures” and Harm to Whiteness
When practitioners discuss harm in the context of cis men’s genital enhancement, they
often frame these harms as resultant of “unorthodox”, “unusual”, or “psychologically
dangerous” medical interventions. Procedures that physicians deemed unorthodox include
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bisecting a penis, surgery to have more than one penis, penile augmentations whose size
makes penetration either impossible, or causes the partner unwanted pain (which I discuss
in Chapter 6), the insertion of beads or other nodules under the skin of the shaft of the
penis, as well as penile reduction surgery. In general, doctors refused to talk with me much
about bisecting a penis or surgery to have more than one penis, claiming that they are
“ridiculous” or “isolated requests” that do not reflect their medical practices.6 However,
some physicians briefly spoke about bead or nodule insertion, and many practitioners
discussed penile reduction surgeries with me at length, even though requests for either of
these procedures are relatively rare within the medical practices of the doctors who
participated in this research.
The insertion of beads or nodules underneath the skin of the penile shaft is practiced
in some societies—often in Asian countries—in order to create texture that men allege
increases their sexual partners’ pleasure (Hull and Budiharsana 2001).7 Physicians’ outright
rejection and pathologization of bead and nodule insertion in our interviews demonstrates
how they demarcate acceptable, normalized genital practices of male enhancement and
circumcision,8 from dangerous, ‘unnatural’ genital practices of mutilation. The politics of
somatic acceptability and of bodily transgression are not naturally self-evident, but rather,
always filtered through and materializing from power. In this particular case, whiteness as
a somatechnology (Sullivan 2012, 2007; Pugliese and Stryker 2009) casts bead and nodule
insertion practices as transgressive through processes of racialization.
Physicians will often gesture to other(ed), racialized cultures—most commonly
from Africa—where they say cis men of colour have been stretching and hanging weights
6For example, Dr. Lieberman, a physician practising in the United States, cut our interview short because
he said my questions about unorthodox procedures did not represent his practice in urology, and he was
not going to respond to those questions.
7See Fischer et al. (2010) for a broad overview of the literature dedicated to penile nodule implantation,
which concludes that the majority of these procedures take place in “Asian and Slavic countries”, adding
that they have “occasionally emerged in Western society” (3570). While white people from Canada and the
United States may be inserting beads into the skin of their penises, these practices continue to be racialized.
8Notably, physicians like Dr. Lieberman suggested in our interview that not engaging in genital practices
like circumcision is a reflection of racialized ignorance, neglect, and poverty, and recommended “mass
circumcision there [in China] too just like Africa”. See Gilman (1999) for a historical analysis of the
racialization of the foreskin.
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from their penises for more than a century. They make these gestures as a way to
legitimize the male enhancement procedures they perform in Canada and the United
States. For example, Dr. Allen, made appeals to unnamed African cultures’ genital
practices in order to defend the male enhancement procedures he performs. Dr. Allen is a
US physician who has specialized in gender confirmation surgery for about forty years, but
has also performed suspensory ligament releases and penile girth enhancements with fat
injections for cis men. During our interview, while discussing post-operative care for cis
patients who have undergone his lengthening procedure (who must maintain tension on
the penis with weights and stretching to prevent retraction), he abruptly pivots to discuss
other groups of people who engage in similar penile elongation techniques.
Some islanders in the south seas in Africa lengthen the penis simply by wearing
weights. By wearing weights for varying lengths of time during the day, they
construct the different materials to hold onto the penis and wrap the penis
around and add weights to it, gradually increasing the weight and increasing
the length of the penis. And I have no experience using only that technique of
lengthening the penis, but I’ve seen pictures and it works. [...] I know that’s
done in certain African tribes and I think maybe in the South Pacific Islands
they might do that too. I forget where they they did that, but I know Africa is
one country [sic] where it’s done. In certain tribes. [emphasis added]
By broadly referring to unnamed, racialized tribal cultures in the South Pacific Islands as
well as tribes from a nationally and regionally-undifferentiated Africa, Dr. Allen attempts
to legitimize his male enhancement procedures in the United States by framing them as
existing beyond the contemporary west. The logic is, if other people—particularly tribal
cultures—engage in similar bodily practices as ‘us’—presumably before ‘they’ had exposure
to ‘our’ values, customs, beliefs, or medical technologies—then it is more likely that these
genital practices are not just strange behaviours unique to our culture, but rather, they are
closer to our bodily practices as human beings (at least for those who have penises). In
other words, Dr. Allen mobilizes racialized others as evidence of the universality of penile
augmentation practices.
Like Dr. Allen, Dr. Rosenburg made a similar appeal to racialized groups engaging
in comparable genital practices, stating matter-of-factly:
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I recommend [a vacuum pump]. And I usually prescribe two ten-minute sessions
a day, and within six months your penis will be enormous. Um this is nothing
new. The Ubangis [sic] put plates in their lips, gaugers put dishes in their ears.
[...] There are tribes that you can find dating back again over a hundred years
where they tie stones to their penises. And they get giant long penises and they
actually have regional competitions. How much weight can you drag around with
your penis? Those tribes have done remarkable things with penile lengthening.
[emphasis added]
Through these vague appeals to other(ed), unnamed, racialized cultural practices that
have allegedly existed in Africa before or outside of the use of vacuum pumps, western
medicine, and ‘modernity’, physicians like Dr. Allen and Dr. Rosenburg are attempting to
validate and normalize contemporary male enhancement practices in Canada and the
United States. By associating male enhancement with African tribal cultures—imagined
historically in the west as ‘closer to nature’ (see S. Hall 1990), as “humanity in its most
primitive state” (Bello-Kano 2005, 37)—practitioners constitute penile enlargement as not
unnatural, and therefore, as more socially acceptable. While various cultures throughout
the world have allegedly engaged in penis stretching and elongation—from Africa
(Lemperle and Elist 2015), to the Middle East (Wylie and Eardley 2007), to Indonesia
(Oktavian, Diarsvitri, and Dwisetyani Utomo 2011) to Brazil, Peru, and India (Talalaj
and Talalaj 1994, cited in Wylie and Eardley 2007)—the utterance from white, male
enhancement doctors in the west claiming that penis enlargement is “nothing new” is not
a neutral fact; it is part of a broader discursive regime in which somatic practices from
other cultures are removed from their socio-historical context for the purpose of defending
the current male enhancement industry in contemporary Canada and the United States.
Yet, physicians are quick to pathologize other genital practices common amongst
racialized groups, like bead or nodule insertion under the skin of the shaft of men’s penises,
characterizing these practices as harmful. For example, Dr. Schneider and Dr. Wexler both
discouraged the use of bead insertion in the penis. When I asked Dr. Schneider if he has ever
seen patients who have received procedures that he would characterize as psychologically
dangerous, he stated: “I’ve had [patients who] inserted beads and take really tiny beads like
BB’s. [...] really really weird stuff” [emphasis added]. When I asked Dr. Wexler if there are
people he would not accept as patients, he responded that he accepts almost all patients,
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even those who make “unorthodox requests” because “it may be better to put a little bit of
fat in a phallus than it is to send them to a tattoo parlour where they may or may not have
good hygiene and have them put metal beads up and down the shaft” [emphasis added]. In
other words, expanding the dimensions of a penis through a girth enhancement is a form of
harm reduction, because girth enhancements are normalized and considered safer compared
to practices like bead insertion that Dr. Wexler characterizes as unhygienic, Dr. Schneider
considers “really really weird”, and both construct as harmful.
What the practitioners I interviewed constitute as “weird” is not race-neutral; the
“weird” is fully informed by particular norms, contexts, histories, and discursive regimes
about the body, as well as the situated positions of the doctors who participated in this
research, the vast majority of whom were white. From physicians’ comments, we see how
the privilege of whiteness plays in the politics of transgression. Despite the racialization of
very large penises as Black,9 whiteness as a somatechnology casts length and girth
augmentation as safe, normal, predictable, and acceptable, while marking genital
interventions like bead inserts as “unorthodox” and harmful through normalized, yet
veiled processes of racialization.10 In the next section, I further analyze how medical
practitioners close the gate to “unorthodox” genital procedures, but in this case, they
close the gate based on their conceptions of harm to normative masculinity.
“Unorthodox Procedures” and Harm to Normative Masculinity
Another “unorthodox” genital practice that male enhancement physicians framed as
harmful was penile reduction surgery. According to sociologists and psychologists Lever,
Frederick, and Peplau (2006) who studied women’s and men’s views on penis size, 0.2% or
51 heterosexual men in their sample (N = 25,594) desire a smaller penis (135), whereas
2% or 529 heterosexual women in their sample (N = 26,437) wished their cis men sexual
partners had smaller penises (139). Grov, Parsons, and Bimbi (2010) report that among a
9See the section “The ‘Big Black Dick’” in Chapter 2 and the section “Denaturalizing the ‘Big Black Dick’”
in Chapter 6.
10See Heyes (2009a) insightful article “All cosmetic surgery is ‘ethnic’: Asian eyelids, feminist indignation,
and the politics of whiteness” for a discussion of how all cosmetic procedures are racialized somatic
interventions.
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sample of 1,065 men who have sex with men, 1.4% or about 14 men desire a smaller penis
size (790). While both of these studies drew from non-representative samples, and
therefore, cannot be generalizable, what their findings do reveal is that, while wanting a
smaller penis may be rare, it is not ‘unthinkable’11 despite what practitioners like Dr.
Tabibi may claim.
Dr. Tabibi’s medical practice was built on increasing penile length and girth and
testicular size using implants. The sizes of his implants range from large to extra extra
large, because as he explains, “we don’t call the penis or testicles small”. I asked Dr. Tabibi
how he would respond if a patient requested a procedure to shorten, narrow, or otherwise
reduce his penis size, to which he responded forcefully:
You can’t do that. [...] We cannot do that, because you know I cannot decrease
the size of the penis. You know I cannot decrease the girth of the penis also.
Let’s say the patient has a fat injection [enhancement], when I remove his fat
[through a revision surgery], definitely his penis gets narrow because all this
bulge, bumps, and lumps and everything was removed so his penis gets narrow.
When you cut the suspensory ligament [for enhancement], there’s a chance of
retraction of the penis so the patient[’s penis] gets shorter. All the patients who
had—independent [of me]—suspensory ligament cut, they got shortening of the
penis, okay. But I don’t think anybody in just and the right mind and natural
and healthy thinking [would] think about shortening their penis or narrowing
their penis. Nobody wants to do that okay. It’s it’s it’s against you know the
natural situation of mind. Because everyone wants bigger. [emphasis added]
To be clear, penile reduction surgeries are possible and have been performed successfully
(Martinez et al. 2015). So when physicians like Dr. Tabibi say they “cannot” perform them,
it is not as though male enhancement doctors are unable to reduce a man’s penis size due
to the constraints of medical techniques or technologies, or the material limits of the body,
but rather, physicians are unwilling to perform penile reductions. To further clarify Dr.
Tabibi’s remarks, while the intention of a suspensory ligament release is to elongate the
penis by allowing the ‘inner penis’ to extend outside of the body, there is always a risk of
11It seems as though wanting a smaller penis is regarded as so unthinkable that medical researchers like
Bjekić et al. (2018) did not even design their study in a way that allowed participants to say if they wanted
a smaller penis, assuming that their participants were either satisfied with their penis size or wanted a
larger size (314). Grov et al. (2015) also limited participant responses with regards to penis size satisfaction,
reporting only one option, “wishes penis was larger”, effectively erasing penis size satisfaction and wanting
a smaller penis (229).
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penile shortening as an adverse outcome. Dr. Tabibi claims that all of the men who get
a suspensory ligament release from other practitioners (but not from him) will experience
penile shortening as a negative outcome. According to Dr. Tabibi’s logic, it is acceptable
if a revision surgery that removes the “bulge, bumps, and lumps” of a poorly-executed
enhancement results in a smaller or shorter penis, precisely because it works to reverse the
harm from ‘penile deformity’.
However, beyond these examples of unintentional shortening, Dr. Tabibi claims
it is pathological for a man to willingly desire and pursue a penile reduction. From his
comment, we see how practitioners regard “unorthodox” procedures like a penile reduction
as unnatural, unhealthy, and unthinkable because it “goes against the natural situation of
the mind” since “everyone wants bigger.” Dr. Tabibi continued to make his point about the
impossibility of penile reduction surgeries by using an analogy, this time with a chuckle
punctuating his remarks.
[Shortening or narrowing the penis is] like to say [to a] billionaire “how bout if he
get hundred million dollars from you and threw it in the fire?” [The billionaire
would] say “why why? Why you want to, why why you want to do that when
I can keep the money?” You know? “Do something else, okay? I might lose in
the business transaction, but I don’t want you to put it on the fire”. [emphasis
added]
Unpacking Dr. Tabibi’s analogy, he is claiming that patients take on an acceptable level
of risk of harm when they undergo male enhancement procedures from which they might
lose length or girth as a result of surgical complications (they “might lose in the business
transaction”). Risking harm to your penis through male enhancement for the post-operative
possibility of a large cock is acceptable, according to Dr. Tabibi, but to waste a large penis by
purposefully shortening or narrowing it is comparable to winning the jackpot (a “hundred
million dollars”), and burning it. And in a patriarchal, capitalist society like the United
States (where Dr. Tabibi practices medicine) that values physical, social, sexual, as well as
economic dominance grounded in social inequality, what is more ‘natural’ than coveting a
big dick and millions of dollars?
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Body Dysmorphic Disorder and Harm to Normative Masculinity
The medical management of trans and cis patients seeking genital interventions is not
without some overlapping commonalities; like the gatekeeping of trans patients, doctors
in this research gatekept cis men when they suspected that these patients suffered from
an internal, diagnosable, psychological problem. In fact, the only cases of suffering that
medical practitioners did not regard as a reasonable justification for granting cis men access
to genital technologies, was if they suspected that the patient had a mental disorder such
as schizophrenia, but most commonly Body Dysmorphia.
Dr. Midden was particularly vocal about gatekeeping body-dysmorphic cis men. He
is a physician who has been performing various penile length and girth augmentations, as
well as scrotal enhancement procedures for about twenty years in the United States. When
I asked Dr. Midden why trans folks require letters from mental health practitioners before
receiving access to genital surgeries, but cis patients do not, he made a distinction between
most cis patients and cis people with BDD.
[I]f you want to get your nose done or your eyes done do you need to see a mental
health professional first? I don’t know, I don’t think so. Are there people with
Body Dysmorphic Syndrome? Absolutely. Again is a plastic surgeon better able
to ascertain that than a urologist? Absolutely.
Dr. Midden added that he is best-equipped to filter out patients with BDD because of his
training and experience working in plastic surgery, closing the gate to genital technologies.
Unlike Dr. Midden, most doctors in this research admitted that they did not feel qualified
to diagnose mental health disorders or appropriately counsel psychologically-distressed
patients. Yet out of the twenty doctors who participated in this research, only Dr. Midden
and four other physicians said they have referred patients to mental health professionals.
The fifteen practitioners who do not direct cis male enhancement patients to professional
counselors might delay a procedure, but more commonly, they refer patients they believe
are suffering from BDD to other physicians who may be willing to take them on as
patients.
BDD is catalogued in both the World Health Organization’s International
Classification of Diseases as well as the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic
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and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). As outlined in the DSM-V, the
diagnostic criteria for BDD includes a preoccupation with perceived physical flaws that
others do not see as flaws (such as a small penis),12 repetitive behaviours or thoughts in
response to these perceived flaws, and “clinically significant distress” (237). BDD is set
apart from “normal appearance concerns”, because disordered appearance concerns under
the BDD diagnosis are “excessive”, “repetitive”, “time-consuming”, and “difficult to resist
or control” (241).13
When I asked physicians how they identify who has BDD, most mirrored the
diagnostic criteria for the disorder. For example, Dr. Schneider answered that he suspects
cis men have BDD when their preoccupation with their bodies is excessive and difficult to
control, when “they’re very focused on their penis to the point of a total obsession. They
may transfer all their insecurities to their penis”. For this reason, Dr. Schneider says that
he does not refer cis men to seek counseling because “even if I asked, they won’t go. And
if I asked, then I probably would have refused [to operate on] them anyhow”. Dr. Midden,
on the other hand, diagnoses patients with BDD and refers them to professional mental
health support when their appearance concerns are repetitive, time consuming, and cause
clinically-significant distress.
If they’ve had a number of procedures throughout their body or on their system
because they can’t quite get it right, that’s certainly a way. If they came to be
dissatisfied with other [procedures] they’ve had in the past. If they have a lot of
anger, that’s sort of a clue [they might have BDD].
Like Dr. Midden who relies on his training in plastic surgery to identify BDD, Dr.
Rosenburg says that he has a “coherent narrative” about referring patients to see mental
health professionals because of his experience working with trans patients. He says that a
preoccupation with perceived physical flaws that others do not see as flaws is his first clue
that a patient might have BDD and needs a referral to mental health support.
12Phillips et al. (2010) report that compared to women with BDD, “males are more likely to have genital
preoccupations” (cited in DSM-V, APA 2013a).
13The DSM-V diagnosis of Body Dysmorphic Disorder (APA 2013a) specifies one more diagnostic criteria:
“The appearance preoccupation is not better explained by concerns with body fat or weight in an individual
whose symptoms meet diagnostic criteria for an eating disorder” (236).
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[M]y first line of defense against Body Dysmorphic Disorder is do I see what the
patient sees? If I see what the patient sees, the first level has been achieved and
I move onto the next level, which is do they understand what I’m telling them
and is their expectation realistic?
According to retrospective medical outcome studies, it is in part because BDD patients
have unrealistic expectations that they typically do not find relief from distress after
undergoing cosmetic interventions (see Crerand and Sarwer 2010; Crerand, Franklin, and
Sarwer 2006). However, feminist philosopher Cressida Heyes (2009b) calls attention to
how both advertisements for cosmetic surgery, as well as interactions with cosmetic
surgeons themselves, introduce patients to novel ways of seeing their bodies as abnormal
or marred by imperfections, which may better explain why the distress from BDD is not
improved—and in fact often becomes worse—after consulting with doctors and undergoing
cosmetic procedures. In either case, both mental health professionals and the physicians
who participated in this research agree that bodily transformation through cosmetic
interventions like male enhancement is not appropriate for patients with BDD.
Many of the physicians who participated in my research echoed this justification
for closing the gate to genital technologies on body-dysmorphic cis men, but few were as
explicit as Dr. Rosenburg that performing a male enhancement on a man with BDD would
cause him harm. During my conversation with Dr. Rosenburg, I told him that another
practitioner I had interviewed would rather offer a minor male enhancement procedure to
a patient who might have BDD than reject him, because otherwise he is likely to seek out
illegal or unsafe procedures to enhance his penis.14 When I asked Dr. Rosenburg what his
thoughts were on such a “harm-reduction” approach with patients who could have BDD,
he replied with a frustrated sigh:
The idea of doing something small to save them from something else, I just
don’t see that as an argument. I think that once you have made a diagnosis of
Body Dysmorphic Disorder, you are actually obligated not to do anything.
You’re actually obligated to teach them that anything is wrong, is harmful,
because if you do a little bit, you’re reinforcing an unhealthy behaviour. So I
think that argument is spurious, I don’t like it. [...] [Male enhancement
14I quote Dr. Wexler in the section “‘Unorthodox Procedures’ and Harm to Whiteness” in this chapter.
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practitioners] get paid to do things- we navigate shoals of moral hazard. We
must gird ourselves against the temptation to convince ourselves that we’re
doing something for the patient’s good, but we’re really just rationalizing
because we want to sell a procedure. So you have to be doubly steeled against
that and when you tell me [...] “do something small just to keep them from
doing something big. I’m going to save them from themselves” that just rubs
me the wrong way, because I’m overly sensitive to the marketeering aspect of
what we do. [emphasis added]
Here Dr. Rosenburg claims that any cosmetic procedure on patients with BDD would be
“wrong” and “harmful”. In his response, he uses the language of moral obligation as a
doctor to reject cis men patients with BDD who are seeking male enhancement, framing
this rejection as a way to avoid harm. In fact, Dr. Rosenburg contrasts the rejection of a
potential patient with the “moral hazard” of “selling a procedure”, of “marketeering” at the
expense of a “patient’s good”. Profiting from a procedure, in other words, is subordinated
by the more noble ethic to ‘do no harm’. The harm in this case is located in “reinforcing
an unhealthy behaviour” of BDD patients, namely an excessive preoccupation with his
appearance that causes clinically-significant distress.
In some important ways, gatekeeping cis men with BDD is similar—although
categorically not equal—to gatekeeping trans folks with Gender Dysphoria. Again, the
raison d’etre of gender confirmation surgery is to relieve trans peoples’ suffering, but as I
illustrated in Chapter 4, it is precisely trans people’s suffering that informs doctors
decisions to close the gate to somatic technologies. Similarly, the broadly-recognized
function of cosmetic surgery is to relieve patients’ emotional suffering (Pentney 2012;
K. Davis 2009; Heyes 2009b; Blum 2003), but that suffering—if perceived to be BDD by
physicians—can quickly disqualify a cis man’s access to male enhancement, which doctors
defend as protecting him from harm.
So when confronted with possible cases of BDD, many medical practitioners like
Dr. Rosenburg refer cis men patients to mental health professionals, similar—although by
no means identical—to trans patients who are institutionally required to see psychiatrists or
counselors prior to gaining access to genital technologies. Physicians’ logics are surprisingly
consistent in these cases across their medical practices with trans and cis patients alike;
external modifications to a patient’s genitals are inappropriate interventions for addressing
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internal, diagnosable, psychological problems that doctors view as defying the ‘natural’
body or mind. In the case of trans folks, medical practitioners frame them as defying the
nature of their sexed bodies and assigned gender. And as I demonstrate below, in the case of
cis men, physicians frame them as defying the nature of their gender identities as masculine
men through persistent bodily dissatisfaction.
Even if cis men are initially dissatisfied with their penises, all of the medical
practitioners who participated in this research expected cis men to be satisfied with their
bodies after undergoing male enhancement. Most physicians’ criteria for accepting a new
patient included the likelihood of a patient’s post-operative bodily satisfaction. Heyes
(2009b) postulates that one of the functions of psychological diagnoses like BDD is to
enable cosmetic surgeons to pathologize patients who are dissatisfied with the outcome of
their procedure(s). It is not a coincidence that bodily dissatisfaction—one of the hallmarks
of BDD—is also arguably one of the risks of a cosmetic medical practice that doctors most
want to avoid in order to limit legal repercussions. After reviewing the psychological
literature that is tailored for advising cosmetic surgeons about their practices, Heyes
(2009b) remarks “[a]t the end of reading this literature one is left with the clear
impression that the ideal, psychologically appropriate candidate for cosmetic surgery
expects little of the surgeon” (87).
In my interviews with male enhancement practitioners, in fact, they confirmed that
ideal candidates for their procedures are patients who not only pay their bill on time and in
full, but also have “reasonable expectations” by accepting outcomes deemed satisfactory by
the physician, would be satisfied with a moderate and normative change to their penis size,
are not overly anxious about the size of their penis, and would not file a lawsuit against
their doctor, even if they experience adverse outcomes. “The cosmetic surgery industry
needs us to be distressed about our aesthetically inadequate bodies and works to develop
this distress” concludes Heyes (2009b), “creating surgical subjectivity at the same time
as it tries to control the less manageable, profitable or normative consequences of this
subjectivity” like post-operative dissatisfaction (88).
166
While Heyes (2009b) argues that medical practitioners’ profile of an ideal candidate
for surgery “picks out a distinctively feminine comportment” of deference, adding that
“men are so often described as less likely to be psychologically appropriate candidates for
cosmetic surgery because, among other things, they are ‘too demanding’” (87), the doctors
I interviewed assumed a different perspective, perhaps because they specialize in cosmetic
procedures ‘for men’. Physicians’ expectations that their patients would eventually become
satisfied with their bodies seems to be tethered to doctors’ notions of normative masculinity,
whereby men should not be ‘overly’ concerned with their bodily appearance (Weber 2006;
Haiken 2000). This may help to explain in part why cis men with BDD are uniquely gatekept
by practitioners compared to other cis men. Take for example, Dr. Fray’s comments where
he genders bodily (dis)satisfaction.
[O]ne of the reasons I actually prefer to work with men over women [is] because
women do tend to... just have a lot more issues. Let’s say you were going to
do testosterone replacement in a woman. If she had breast tenderness, or she
got a migraine, or she got a pimple! Or she had a little bit more hair on her
face, or she was losing hair, you would hear about it at one in the morning!
Because she would call and would be freaking out and just get herself worked
into a tizzy. With men, you give them testosterone, the penis works great, you
never hear about it until the penis doesn’t work great, and then they’re back
in wanting another shot. And so in terms of the maintenance requirement, men
are naturally low maintenance, women tend to be, not always, but tend to be
higher maintenance. And if you have a busy practice [...] it’s kind of a turn off
when the majority of the people that you treat are going to be calling you and
you’re going to be counseling them extensively. [...] So I’m much more interested
in men’s health because of that reason. [emphasis added]
From Dr. Fray’s comments, we see how bodily dissatisfaction—especially after a medical
intervention—is gendered by some of the doctors in this research. Dissatisfaction with a
medical procedure, according to physicians like Dr. Fray, is “higher maintenance”. Women,
he claims, are allegedly higher maintenance for allowing symptoms from medical
interventions to get them “worked into a tizzy”—a particularly gendered and disparaging
expression—as if breast tenderness, migraines, acne, unwanted facial hair, and hair loss do
not warrant medical advice. Men, on the other hand, are supposed to be “naturally low
maintenance” and stoic in the face of negative symptoms or adverse outcomes.
Practitioners like Dr. Fray consider it a “turn off” to have to be “counseling [patients]
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extensively” about their dissatisfaction with their medical procedures. So if a cis man has
BDD—characterized by a “repetitive”, “excessive” “preoccupation” with their bodily
appearance, as well as persistent dissatisfaction with the results of cosmetic
procedures—practitioners like Dr. Fray are less inclined to work with them for failing to
live up to normative expectations of stoic masculinity. After a male enhancement, men are
supposed to be satisfied with their bodies and physicians should “never hear about it until
the penis doesn’t work great” anymore, not because men are “freaking out” about how
their penises look post-operatively.
While it may not appear on the surface as though patient cases of BDD are in any
way related to techniques of (de)naturalization, when we consider the comments of
physicians like Dr. Rosenburg and Dr. Fray together, we see how gatekeeping
body-dysmorphic cis men may be important to male enhancement practitioners to filter
out those who would not simply annoy them, but would violate normative, stoic
masculinity through persistent bodily dissatisfaction. Men with BDD are thus imagined
by male enhancement practitioners as excessively concerned about their appearance
beyond what is ‘natural’ for men, reflecting broader patterns within cosmetic medicine
(see Haiken 2000). Cis men who suffer from always being dissatisfied with their bodies
should not receive access to genital technologies, because—according to physicians’
logics—it would cause harm to normative, stoic masculinity as well as jeopardize their
medical practices. As we can see from the case of BDD, the discourses of suffering, harm,
and dissatisfaction (the latter of which I analyze in the next section of this chapter,
“Regret vs. Dissatisfaction”) are intimately entangled in medical discourse, and are
therefore, co-constitutive of patients’ bodies and subjectivities.
While both Body Dysmorphia and Gender Dysphoria are biopolitical
somatechnologies, they do not contribute to the materialization of bodies, subjectivities,
and the relations between them in the same way. One of the chief differences between
them arises in their differential medical management; among the practitioners that I
interviewed, physicians like Dr. Rosenburg assume all trans patients are a homogeneous
group of “psychologically stressed”, “errant” people and are never given the benefit of the
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doubt that they might experience gender euphoria, or be particularly resilient despite
living in a cisnormative, trans-antagonistic society like Canada and the United States.
Instead, medical practitioners describe trans folks as internally disordered and unstable on
the basis of seeking genital interventions that result in “a total change of identity”, to
borrow Dr. Schneider’s words. On the other hand, cis men—by their “anatomy” (see
Chapter 4) and ‘nature’ of stoic masculinity—are unquestionably eligible for male
enhancement. Cis men are only disordered when they persistently seek genital
interventions that never satisfy their expectations, and thus violate normative, stoic
masculinity.
From the comments above, doctors frame the potential harms cis men are exposed
to through male enhancement as harm to normative masculinity and to whiteness, which
are constitutive of the standard subjectivity and ‘ideal’ body against which all others are
compared in the contemporary western social imaginary. The practitioners I interviewed
invoke concerns about harm to phallic masculine embodiment (through BDD and penis
reduction surgery), and harm to whiteness (through “unorthodox”, racialized somatic
interventions). In the case of BDD, body-dysmorphic cis men who are “excessively”
preoccupied with their bodily appearance violate stoic masculinity, which dictates that
men should be disinterested in focusing on their looks, especially after medical
intervention. In the case of unorthodox procedures, they perpetuate harm against one’s
bodily integrity—and not just harm from possible infections from the bead insertion or
unhygienic tattoo parlours—but harm to the social imaginary of the body as white and
male. Physicians who close the gate to male enhancement when they suspect patients have
BDD as well as when patients request “unorthodox” procedures, thus maintain normative
conceptions of cis masculinity and whiteness as natural. In the medical management of
trans patients, on the other hand, the discourse of harm was mobilized against trans
people as “swimming against the stream of nature”, serving as a naturalizing technique of
the sex assigned to bodies at birth.
In the next section, I conclude this chapter—along with my somatechnic comparison
of male enhancement and gender confirmation surgery—by focusing on the final set of
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discourses—regret and dissatisfaction—that I identified from my interviews with physicians
as part of the medical management of both trans and cis patients.
Regret vs. Dissatisfaction
Upon first glance, it makes sense for practitioners to be wary about post-operative regret
amongst their patients, especially if the procedures they perform often result in permanent
changes to the body. After all, most of the physicians in this research explicitly stated
that one of the primary reasons they became doctors was to help their patients, not leave
them feeling regretful about irreversible modifications to their bodies.15 However, compared
to the limited medical management of male enhancement patients, trans folks are subject
to systematic policing of their embodiment projects under the assumption that they will
inevitably regret irreversible transformations. This assumption is not borne out by clinical
research, which shows the incidence of trans people’s regret is incredibly rare. Moreover,
gatekeeping gender confirmation surgeries on the basis that they are irreversible, while
not gatekeeping male enhancement procedures—which are not always reversible, safe, or
efficacious—demonstrates the asymmetrical treatment of these two groups of patients, and
the shaky foundation upon which doctors justify closing the gate to genital technologies for
trans patients, while keeping it open for cis men.
While doctors were apprehensive about trans patients regretting transition, they
only expressed concern about cis men’s potential dissatisfaction after undergoing a genital
procedure. Departing from Garner’s (2011) analysis—which understood regret in the
context of trans chest surgery as a denaturalization technique, and the absence of regret in
gynecomastia surgery for cis men as a naturalization technique—I distinguish between
regret and dissatisfaction as discrete somatechnologies in the materialization of particular
bodies and subjectivities. In the next few vignettes, I make the case that the discursive
device of dissatisfaction—operating within the medical context of male enhancement—is
located in the results of procedures for cis men, whereas regret—operating very differently
15Moreover, as Dr. Fray repeatedly emphasized throughout our interview, avoiding post-operative regret is
good for doctors’ businesses, as litigation can be very costly.
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in the context of gender confirmation surgeries—is located in the ‘core’, bodily identity of
trans people, thereby further casting doubt on the authenticity of trans identification.
In fact, associating regret with permanent changes to the trans body, but not the
cis body, continues to express doubt in the authenticity of trans people’s identities (which
I discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4). This assumption stems from a broader
perspective within medicine: that the site around which authentic gender identity
naturally coheres is the sexed body, which most doctors in this research presumed will
persist even after irreversible genital surgeries, resulting almost predictably in
post-operative regret amongst trans patients. The cisnormative expectation of both the
medical practitioners who participated in this research—as well as the (over)abundance of
investigations examining post-operative regret amongst trans patients (see Zavlin et al.
2018; A. A. Lawrence 2003; Kuiper and Cohen-Kettenis 1998; Landén et al. 1998;
Bodlund and Kullgren 1996; Pfafflin 1993; Blanchard et al. 1989; Lindemalm, Körlin, and
Uddenberg 1986; McCauley and Ehrhardt 1984)—is that because trans folks “really don’t
know what they want” and are just “going through a phase”, to borrow Dr. Fraser’s
words, they will regret their bodily transformations. Out of the twenty participants in this
research, only one practitioner in my sample, Mr. Bennett, resisted against discourses of
trans regret, and I share his comments alongside those of other practitioners in my
analysis below.
In the section that follows, I analyze how post-surgical regret is invoked by
physicians concerned about the irreversibility of gender confirmation surgeries—which
obfuscates both the permanence of many male enhancement procedures and their
complications, as well as the higher incidence of cis patients being dissatisfied with genital
surgeries compared to trans patients—thereby maintaining the conceptual separation
between regret and ‘the natural’ cis body. Such continued skepticism of trans authenticity,
alongside medical practitioners’ unwavering confidence in the stability of cis identification
and embodiment despite somatic intervention, concomitantly work to naturalize one’s sex
assignment at birth.
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“The Changing of a Mind”: Regretting Somatic Transition
Most of the physicians in this research—with a few exceptions—did not explicitly use the
word ‘regret’ when talking about trans folks’ post-operative experiences. Instead, medical
practitioners often emphasized the irreversibility of gender confirmation surgeries, or relied
on euphemisms like trans people “recant[ing] their intent”, to borrow Dr. Fray’s words. This
is not surprising as the entanglement of irreversibility and regret in the context of trans
health care is not unique to my participants, but is reflective of a broader pattern in the
medical management of trans patients (see Ashley 2019c). In his attempt to justify why
cis men have very few barriers to obtaining penile augmentations, while trans folks must
go through mandatory counseling in order to access genital technologies, Dr. Harris framed
gender confirmation surgeries as an irreversible bodily and identity change.
Well the transgender operations are basically irreversible. And you’re going to
remove or add something that may or may not meet their expectations. And
you know they’re going to completely change their sexual perspective with an
operation. It’s a difficult life they’re trying to... acquire you know. I look at
male enhancement much like breast implants. That’s my approach, and if the
[cis] man is reasonable and wants to have [male enhancement] done, there’s
no reason why he can’t have it done as long as he understands the risk and
expectations. [emphasis added]
The differential treatment of trans and cis patients illustrated here by Dr. Harris is
glaring. He constructs cis men as more than capable of being responsible consumer
subjects of genital technologies. Trans patients, on the other hand, are represented by Dr.
Harris as less-than-capable of making reasoned choices, of understanding the risks of
medical procedures, or of managing their expectations for surgical outcomes on the
grounds that gender confirmation surgery makes “irreversible” “change[s to] their sexual
perspective”. The framing of a procedure as “irreversible” is key to many doctor’s claims
about trans people regretting gender confirmation surgery. In the words of Dr. Harris, if
one were to “change their sexual perspective” and it does not “meet their expectations”,
then they cannot reverse the alterations to their genitals. Emphasizing the irreversibility
of trans operations while obfuscating the irreversibility and permanent consequences of
many male enhancement procedures (which I discuss in greater detail in the section
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“Managing Cis Men’s Dissatisfaction with Results”) performs the discursive work of
disconnecting male enhancement from regret.
Dr. Harris’ language of changing one’s “sexual perspective” [emphasis added] may
initially seem ambiguous. After all, many medical practitioners in this research conflated and
confused gender, sexuality, and the sexed body, often misusing these terms interchangeably.
However, in the context of this conversation with Dr. Harris, I interpret his statement about
trans folks changing their “sexual perspective” to mean that trans people are changing
their gender identities and sexed bodies, not necessarily their sexuality, erotic practices, or
sexual relationships. In other words, the context of our conversation does not seem to lend
itself to interpreting this statement as a caution against sacrificing identity coherence as
cisgender, in exchange for having different erotic practices after gender confirmation surgery
has transformed one’s genitals. With that said, male enhancement physicians did discuss in
our interviews how they gatekeep access to technologies of the sexed body on the basis of
patient sexuality, erotic practices, and relationship structures, but this analysis falls largely
outside of the focused purview of this dissertation.16
Instead, Dr. Harris’ use of the language “change their sexual perspective with an
operation” seems to yoke gender identity (one’s “sexual perspective”) to anatomy
(through “an operation”). Tethering gender identity to the material body implies—as
other practitioners like Dr. Schneider established in previous quotations about
authenticity17—that physical transformation through gender confirmation surgery
necessarily results in a permanent change to one’s ‘core’ sense of self as a gendered
subject. Regret, therefore, is not located merely in the results of gender confirmation
surgeries failing to “meet their expectations”; the seat of regret in this context rests in the
permanent changes made to trans people’s ‘core identities’ as gendered subjects through
“irreversible” modifications to the ‘natural’ sex of the body.
16In Chapter 6, I discuss how for Dr. Tabibi, monogamous marriage unlocks the gate to genital technologies.
Other practitioners medicalize sexual inactivity, pathologize solosexuality as well as polyamory, and render
partnered sex compulsory. Even though this data on sexuality are not central to the arguments of this
dissertation, they make rich stories worth telling in other publications.
17See the section “‘Weed Out the Real Ones’: Skepticism of Trans Authenticity” in Chapter 4.
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Dr. Fray mirrors Dr. Harris’ language in our interview, arguing that gender
confirmation surgeries are not reversible, and reasoning that if a trans patient changes
their mind after receiving surgery, the consequences are much more damaging and grave
than the consequences of male enhancement procedures.
When you compare [male enhancement] with the potential of changing a gender,
where you’re creating a non-reversible surgical treatment, where the changing of
a mind could result in a potential lawsuit or litigation against the perpetrator
or the surgeon, and the person could say “well you should have known that I
was mentally unstable” or “I was going through a lot of stress”, I think that
you’re just dealing with a more egregious treatment. [emphasis added]
From doctors’ comments, we receive a glimpse as to how the notion of regret dominates
medical discourse in the practice of trans healthcare. Physicians’ insistence that gender
confirmation surgeries risk post-operative regret from trans patients because they are “non-
reversible” with potentially “egregious” outcomes is striking, because—while some very
minimally-invasive male enhancement procedures are temporary and/or reversible (such
as platelet rich plasma injections or Scrotox)—many of the penile augmentations these
and other doctors perform are not reliably reversible and regularly result in permanent
complications.
Girth augmentations with polymethyl methacrylate (PMMA) injections, for
example—which essentially consist of inserting several rounds of an acrylic substance
around the corpus cavernosum and corpus spongiosum, the erectile tissue of the
penis—are not reversible without aggressively removing an extensive section of penile skin
(Casavantes, Lemperle, and Morales 2016). One follow-up investigation by Casavantes,
Lemperle, and Morales (2016) reported that half of patients who received PMMA
injections developed irregularities in the form of unwanted indentations, ridges, and
nodules on the penis. Other studies on the use of PMMA throughout the body report
similar negative outcomes (Park et al. 2012; Salles et al. 2008). And despite positive
reflections from Casavantes, Lemperle, and Morales in their study on the use of PMMA in
the penis, serious questions remain about patient satisfaction with the augmentation
results due to a low respondent rate to the doctors’ follow-up with patients (28%), and
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low patient turn out to receive the second and final PMMA injection in the study (33%)
(Alter 2016).
Only one practitioner from my interviews, Dr. Wexler, has reported performing
PMMA injections. Soon after providing this enhancement to patients, he stopped offering
the procedure in his medical practice due to the unknown, long-term consequences for cis
men’s bodies. In fact, doctors do not know what will happen to men’s penises with PMMA
in the future (Alter 2016), especially beyond 18 months (Kim et al. 2015).18 Despite the
uncertainty surrounding PMMA’s potential impact on men’s health, at the time of this
writing, there are other doctors—especially in the United States—who continue to perform
PMMA injections for permanent girth augmentation.
In addition to the irreversibility of PMMA injections, cutting the suspensory
ligament is not reversible either. Seven of the physicians I interviewed for this project had
previously performed, or continue to perform this suspensory ligament release to lengthen
cis men’s penises. As I described earlier in this manuscript, a suspensory ligament release
severs the ligament that keeps the penis tucked up under the pubic arch and into the
body. The ‘inner’ penis tucked into the body can be longer in some cis men than others.
Releasing this ligament aims to allow the ‘inner’ part of the penis to extend outward from
the body and—according to some physicians—can result in up to two inches gained in
length. However, if post-operative care is mismanaged, physicians tell me that it is
common for the ligament to reattach causing retraction and loss of not just the length
that was gained from the procedure, but original length of the penis.
In addition to being irreversible, cutting the suspensory ligament has a history of
producing a whole set of complications. To varying degrees, these complications can be
ameliorated with additional revision surgeries, but there is no guarantee the complications
will resolve. Synthesizing various medical studies, feminist historian Elizabeth Haiken’s
18For example, Kim et al. (2015) state “long-term follow-up of injections of these materials has not been
reported to date. Long-term follow-up is especially important for permanent fillers, since fatal adverse
effects can occur, as with silicone” (207). The study by Kim and colleagues monitored patients up until
18 months post-operatively.
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(2000) germinal article on male enhancement summarized some of the complications from
lengthening procedures, including:
“[P]enile deflection” (a penis that heads off in the wrong direction), significant
scarring, a “hair-bearing penile hump” (because hair-bearing skin from the pubic
region is advanced to cover the released “root” of the penis), formation of “dog-
ears” (hanging flaps of hair-bearing skin bracketing the penis), “scrotalization”
(the flaccid penis is surrounded by and partially or completely disappears into
the scrotum), shortening, and decreased sexual function. (401)
While lengthening procedures and PMMA injections are not reversible—and often result
in both physical and emotional pain—fat injections and tissue grafts can be reversible, in
theory, but they too have a history of resulting in adverse outcomes. Six of the practitioners
I interviewed previously performed or continue to perform penile girth augmentations with
fat injections or grafts, procedures that have historically resulted in a
“poor cosmetic appearance” at best, and at worst, painful nodules of fat that
required surgical removal; chronic inflammation; spontaneous rupture;
irregular resorption of fat (producing, in one case, “a bizarre mushroom shaped
penis”); necrosis (literally, “death”) of grafted or injected fat (with consequent
risk of infection, bacterial contamination, and gangrene); and decreased sexual
function. (Haiken 2000, 401)
The first patient to have died as a result of a penile girth augmentation using fat injections
passed away in 2017; the fat traveled from the veins in his penis to the blood vessels in his
lungs causing a fat embolism (Zilg and Råsten-Almqvist 2017). While this is certainly a
rare outlier case, it nevertheless speaks to the potential risks and irreversible harms of fat
injections for penile girth enhancement.
Soon after Dr. Harold Reed imported Dao-chou Long’s (1990) suspensory
ligament release technique from China in 1991, and Dr. Ricardo Samitier Jr. began
performing autologous fat injections a few years later (Haiken 2000), the American
Urological Association (AUA) announced in a policy statement in 1994 not to support
urologists who perform the division of the suspensory ligament for increasing penile length
in adults, nor the subcutaneous fat injections for increasing penile girth, because neither
have “been shown to be safe or efficacious” (AUA 2018). Since the AUA is one of the most
influential scientific and regulatory bodies of urology, this policy has broader implications
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for urologists who perform male enhancement; without the support of the AUA, urologists
can lose board certification in urology, and medical malpractice insurance companies can
nullify physicians’ liability coverage. Several surgeons have lost their medical licenses as a
result of adverse outcomes and surgical complications from penile augmentations after
performing botched procedures (Haiken 2000). Some physicians faced litigation, such as
urologist Melvyn Rosenstein who was confronted with upwards of fifty lawsuits from
patients, one of whom claimed to suffer from “disfigurement, shortening and loss of use of
his penis” (cited in Bannon 1996). Due to the death of one of his patients, Dr. Samitier
was sentenced to prison for manslaughter (Bannon 1996).
The risks and complications listed above are the reasons why Dr. Tabibi no longer
offers the procedure to cut the suspensory ligament,19 and why Dr. Schneider and Dr. Allen
stopped performing most male enhancement procedures altogether. However, many other
doctors in my sample who perform the Man Shot with autologous fat transfer, as well as
most physicians who perform the suspensory ligament release, spoke in defense of their
procedures citing advancements in medical technologies and significant improvements made
to the process. For example, Dr. Fray spoke about the improvements in using much smaller,
micronized fat enriched with platelet rich plasma to reduce the likelihood of “dead necrotic
fat, lumpiness, oil cysts”, and other negative outcomes. Dr. Perry was so confident in the
Man Shot procedure, he performed it on himself. Dr. Midden, Dr. Harris, Dr. Fraser, and
Dr. Russo spoke positively of their results performing suspensory ligament release. However,
the AUA maintains as recently as October 2018 that as a policy they do not support
either of these procedures (AUA 2018). The AUA has reaffirmed their policy statement on
subcutaneous fat injection and division of the suspensory ligament every one to five years,
meaning that they may reaffirm or reevaluate this statement within the next three years.
Practitioners’ anxieties about the permanence of gender confirmation surgery and
the potential for trans patients to regret these interventions—compared to physicians’
relatively limited concerns about the irreversibility of male enhancement procedures and
19Dr. Tabibi still performs implant lengthening and girth procedures that, according to multiple members
of Enhancement Forum, have resulted in permanent complications.
177
their complications—erase the very real and “egregious” outcomes from somatic
interventions as unreliable as penile augmentation. Diminishing the likelihood and severity
of adverse outcomes from male enhancement also conceals the processes that
(re)naturalize post-surgical cis bodies and subjectivities, so that a cis man regretting a
poor outcome from penile augmentation is explained away as ‘worth the risk’ for the
possibility of having a bigger penis.20
Resisting Discourses of Trans Regret
Occasionally, the male enhancement practitioners I interviewed resisted dominant
discourses. The only practitioner to resist discourses of trans regret, as well as the
pathologization of trans folks’ bodies and subjectivities, was Charles Bennett. Mr. Bennett
is a clinical cosmetic specialist with seven years of experience treating both cis men and
trans patients in the United States under the medical guidance of a physician.21 Mr.
Bennett specializes in administering the Priapus Shot for mild girth augmentation and has
performed this procedure on more than one hundred patients over the last seven years.
Within the last year, he also started offering Scrotox injections to smooth out the rugae,
or the wrinkling of the skin of the scrotum, having performed this procedure on less than
twenty cis men. While I did not specifically ask about practitioners’ sexualities, erotic
practices, or relationship structures in interviews, Mr. Bennett explicitly volunteered the
information that he is a gay man. He was also the only participant who was not a medical
doctor.22 It is not clear if Mr. Bennett’s position in relationship to medical institutions,
20Dr. Tabibi’s analogy presented earlier in this chapter (under the section “‘Unorthodox Procedures’ and
Harm to Normative Masculinity”) speaks to this idea that the risks of male enhancement are ‘worth it’.
His analogy essentially communicated that one “might lose in the business transaction” by experiencing
negative outcomes from male enhancement, but getting an augmentation is still worth the risk for the
possibility of having a larger penis. Members of Enhancement Forum echoed Dr. Tabibi’s sentiment. At
the time of my observations of the forum, PMMA was attracting a lot of attention. Forum members
frequently claimed that they would sacrifice their penis for the chance of enlarging it with PMMA even if
medical professionals determine in the future that the material used in the enhancement causes irreparable
damage, because it would be worth the risk for the handful of years of having an enhanced penis.
21Different states in the US have different regulations as to who can perform medical procedures and under
what supervision. In Mr. Bennett’s state, it was legal to perform the Priapus Shot on a patient without a
medical license.
22All other participants had a medical license at the time of the interview. Only a few physicians in this
research abstained from mentioning anything readily recognizable as pertaining to their sexuality. Most
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his lack of immersion in certain forms of medical discourse, or his sexuality as a gay man
are individually or collectively responsible for informing his perceptions of trans people,
but he seemed to suggest throughout our interview that they did. Mr. Bennett did not
have any more trans patients than the other participants who specialize in gender
confirmation surgeries, but he certainly worked with more trans patients than those
practitioners who only specialize in male enhancement.
When I mentioned to Mr. Bennett that the physicians I had already interviewed
were concerned about the irreversibility of gender confirmation surgeries and the possibility
of trans patients regretting transition, he was initially very confused, as this did not reflect
his experiences working with trans people. As a fast-paced speaker accented by a southern
drawl and vocal fry, 23 Mr. Bennett responded:
I treat almost every transgendered [sic] person in [the city]. I mean every
single transgendered [sic] person in [the city] knows who I am. All the
therapists recommend me, all the drag queens at all the drag bars scream my
name out whenever I go into a bar. They all know who I am. I treat a lot of
transgendered [sic] patients. Male-to-female, female-to-male and I’ve never had
one person tell me that they had any regrets. [...] You could have had a
practitioner who was a very conservative republican that you asked that
question to that thinks that we’re all fucked up in the head, and in their mind
everyone who [had gender confirmation surgery] made a mistake and they
should have gone to transformation camp or whatever those straight camps are
[that] they used to send kids to to make them straight. I mean I have never
ever had someone tell me that they regretted it. Never. [emphasis added]24
practitioners mentioned they were married to women; of course this does not necessarily mean they identify
as heterosexual or that they do not engage in sexual activities with other people.
23Vocal fry refers to “the lowest register (tone) of your voice characterized by its deep, creaky, breathy
sound” (Akst and Pietsch n.d.), and is often attributed to women’s and gay men’s speech patterns.
24Mr. Bennett’s moment of resistance is significant, although limited. While conservative legislation put
forward by republican politicians has aimed to erase, pathologize, criminalize, and dehumanize trans
identity, experience, and existence, trans oppression is not unique to the right of the political spectrum.
‘Trans-positive’ liberals—including mental health professionals—have also been leading proponents of
gatekeeping trans access to appropriate medical care out of concern that trans folks might regret gender
confirmation surgeries (Whitehead et al. 2012). In both cases—through trans erasure often purported by
conservatives and conversion therapists, as well as processes of self-actualization most often supported by
liberals through the humanist politics of tolerance (Gressgård 2010)—concerns about regret operate to
naturalize cis bodies and identities.
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Out of all my interviews with practitioners, this moment of critical resistance to dominant
discourses is rare. While Mr. Bennett’s experiences are anecdotal, they are supported by
scientific inquiry. Clinical research demonstrates it is extremely rare for trans patients to
regret gender confirmation surgery—with the incidence calculated at about 1% (N = 232)
(A. A. Lawrence 2003) to 1.5% (N = 40) (Zavlin et al. 2018) depending on the study. By
comparison, cis patients are up to twenty-three times more likely to regret genital surgery.25
Which begs the question why trans patients are gatekept out of concern about regret, yet
the barriers for cis patients are comparatively low.
I must underscore that presenting these statistics as a challenge to dominant
discourses is a limited form of resistance. Despite providing these statistics as a
counter-argument, the discursive work accomplished by the notion of regret in the
materialization of trans bodies remains mostly unaffected. As A. A. Lawrence (2003)
remarked in a study about regret from “male-to-female” (MtF) trans people after
‘sex-reassignment surgery’ (SRS),
Superficially, the results of MtF SRS appear to be so uniformly good that looking
for factors predictive of satisfaction or regret might seem a pointless exercise.
However, because existing beliefs concerning putative predictors of satisfaction
or regret continue to affect the lives of candidates for MtF SRS and continue to
influence the Standards of Care, such an investigation is warranted. (309)
In other words, conducting research to measure predictors of trans people’s post-operative
regret is not warranted on the basis that trans folks do in fact regret their surgeries in any
way that should meaningfully impact their care as a class of people—they do not. But rather,
that this research on regret is only meaningful insofar as people expect it to be meaningful,
and those expectations impact the lives of trans folks through the institutions responsible
for managing their care. The Thomas theorem (Thomas and Thomas 1928) captures this
dynamic well: things that are defined as real—that trans people’s post-operative regret is a
25Cis patients regret genital surgeries such as orchiectomy—or removal of one or both testicles—at an
incidence of 23% (N = 201) (Clark, Wray, and Ashton 2001) and colpocleisis—or closure of the vagina—at
10.7% (N = 84) (Ubachs, Van Sante, and Schellekens 1974) or 9.3% (N = 32) (Wheeler et al. 2005)
depending on the study. These articles did not distinguish between dissatisfaction and regret in the
language they used as I have; however, the meanings and implications behind such a distinction—that
the unhappiness of trans folks is rooted in their identities whereas the unhappiness of cis people is rooted
in the results of their procedures—were consistent between their usage and how I employ them here.
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meaningful concern—are real in their consequences—such that regret continues to exercise
discursive power in the lives of trans folks. The discursive work accomplished by the notion
of regret is the persistent denaturalization of trans bodies and identities at the level of
institutional health management as well as the everyday lives of trans people.
Bioethicist trans activist Florence Ashley (2020) does not use the language of regret
or dissatisfaction, but captures much of my argument about the different treatment of trans
and cis embodiment.
It is a sad reality that in a lot of ways, trans bodies can disappoint us. Yet if I say
that, I know cis people will jump to forget just how disappointing cis bodies are.
The prime difference is that cis bodies get to be disappointing. Society lets them
be disappointing. When bodies that flow from transition-related interventions
disappoint us, it’s taken as evidence against those bodies (and interventions).
Yet no one takes disappointment with cis bodies as evidence against cis bodies.
(personal communication)26
Ashley illuminates how trans bodies that disappoint are leveraged against transition-related
procedures, trans people, and their sense of self as gendered subjects, whereas cis bodies that
disappoint do not cast doubt on the cis body or subjectivity. Across all of the cases in which
practitioners in this research invoked regret in the context of trans healthcare, it marked
the sex assigned at birth of the pre-surgical trans body as natural, constituting the post-
surgical trans body as an unnatural construction. As the epigraph quoting Garner (2011) at
the beginning of this chapter suggests, this denaturalization process only lends legitimacy
to the cisnormative violence enacted against trans people in service of ‘the natural’.
Managing Cis Men’s Dissatisfaction with Results
Due to the way in which cis men’s bodies and identities are naturalized both before and
after male enhancement, regret does not take on much salience in this particular medical
context. As Garner (2011) observed in the case of gynecomastia surgery on cis men’s chests,
“It is not simply that it is taken for granted that there is no regret associated with the
post-surgical [cis] body”, they write. “[I]t is rather that posing the question of regret makes
no sense in this context due to the distance maintained between the natural and the notion
26Social media post on Facebook, October 4, 2020.
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of regret” (138). The absence of regret in the medical context of male enhancement is one
of the ways through which cis bodies and identities are (re)naturalized. In this section
of analysis, I demonstrate how regret is reserved almost exclusively for describing trans
patients’ sense of self as a gendered subject and their feelings about medical procedures
post-operatively, while a different discursive device of patient dissatisfaction is used in the
context of male enhancement to describe cis men’s disappointment in the results of somatic
intervention. The difference between these discursive devices is that regret casts doubt on
trans authenticity, working to naturalize one’s sex assignment at birth, while cis men’s
dissatisfaction—excluding rare cases of Body Dysmorphia—does not disrupt the nature of
cis embodiment.
This claim may appear to contradict my earlier arguments in this chapter about
cis men’s persistent bodily dissatisfaction in the case of Body Dysmorphic Disorder and
harm to normative masculinity. The primary difference between the two is the extent to
which male enhancement practitioners pathologize dissatisfaction or not. While framing cis
men as dissatisfied instead of experiencing regret from somatic transformation operates to
naturalize the cis body, persistent dissatisfaction functions through the medical management
of BDD as harm to normative masculinity. BDD denaturalizes the gendered behaviour of
cis men who are persistently disappointed in having what they perceive to be a small penis,
whereas the case of dissatisfaction with male enhancement results segregates cis men’s
post-operative bodies from the unnatural—rendering ‘dissatisfaction’ an agile and durable
discourse in the materialization of sexed bodies and gender subjectivities.
While Dr. Allen was discussing the autologous fat injection and suspensory
ligament release operations that he formerly performed before abandoning both
procedures, he recalled how both he and his patients were “unhappy” with the
“unsatisfactory”, “poor results” of his now discontinued procedures.
[Y]ou’ll never know what the final result will be. Not only that, you never know
exactly how much [girth] is going to stay, and you could easily lose half of
[the fat]. But in addition to that, the fat that does remain that does become
vascularized can remain as lumps, lumpy masses. Which can be uncomfortable
and unsightly. And uncomfortable to the point where the patient is unhappy
with that, with either the appearance or the discomfort of it, and wants to have
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the lumps removed. So we frequently had to go back and do surgical excision of
those fatty lumps. Um... because this was a common problem, and because some
significant percentage of patients lost length of the penis from the lengthening
part of the procedure, I stopped doing the procedure[s]. Cause I wasn’t happy
with the results. It seemed to me that it was a very high percentage of cases—
either the patients were unhappy because they lost the length that we created
originally, or had problems with absorption of fat and remaining uncomfortable
lumps of fat under their skin—that I had to address and re-operate on the
patient. That to me it’s just the rate of those poor results and complications
were unsatisfactory, and so I decided at one point to stop doing them. [emphasis
added]
From Dr. Allen’s account, he stopped performing the suspensory ligament release for length
enhancements as well as girth augmentations with fat injections—not because cis patients
“recanted their intent” as Dr. Fray has described trans folks, and not because the poor
results of the procedure did not meet the patients’ expectations of their newly changed
“sexual perspective” as Dr. Harris claimed about trans patients—but because Dr. Allen’s
cis patients were “unhappy” with the “unsatisfactory” “poor results”. That Dr. Allen agrees
with his patients’ dissatisfaction with the results renders it an acceptable response to adverse
outcomes, rather than a case of BDD and harm to normative masculinity. In this vignette,
Dr. Allen’s attention to “lost length”, “unsightly” “fatty lumps”, and the “appearance” and
“discomfort” of the penis directs our focus onto patient dissatisfaction with the procedure’s
results, rather than regret located in a ‘core’, bodily identity change as we see with the
medical management of trans patients.
Other practitioners, such as Dr. Tabibi, also discussed cis men’s dissatisfaction
with the results of a procedure—not due to regret of a ‘core’ identity change, nor due to
“complications” or “poor results” as we saw with Dr. Allen—but rather, due to unrealistic
expectations for what male enhancement procedures could realistically accomplish in cis
men’s lives. In the next quote, Dr. Tabibi recounts a patient case he identified as a possible
instance of Body Dysmorphia where he refused to perform a male enhancement surgery in
order to prevent patient dissatisfaction with the results of the procedure.
I refused to do the surgery. I told him “I’m not going to do the surgery”. Because
I know this guy, I know he’s never satisfied with anything. He has a larger size
penis. I know that he has- and he is not satisfied. I’m sure when he gets [a] 10
[inch penis] he’s also not satisfied. So no matter what I do- because most of these
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people they have some kind of wrong conception of the procedure. They think
the larger they go from 8 to 10 [inches] he thinks he can go and pick up ten
girls at the bar. So that’s the problem they have. And I don’t want to be part
of that wrong conception. [...] At some point they get disappointed. The guy
gets disappointed because then he goes and says “Oh I can do this and that”
and nobody wants to pick him up because his personality, position, financial
situation, attitude does not change. [emphasis added]
Take note of how Dr. Tabibi limits the transformative power of male enhancement. Unlike
gender confirmation surgeries—which physicians like Dr. Schneider frame as necessarily
causing a “total change in identity”—male enhancement does not impact one’s
“personality, position, financial situation, [or] attitude”; that would be a “wrong
conception of the procedure”. Cis men’s expectations that male enhancement will have a
broader impact on their sense of self in relation to others (like potential sexual partners)
will only result in patients becoming “disappointed”, according to physicians like Dr.
Tabibi. Limiting the transformative power of penile augmentation is one of the devices
through which male enhancement is conceptually separated from regret, and any
unhappiness that may stem from these physical interventions is instead located in the
procedures’ results not satisfying patients’ expectations, whether those patients can be
diagnosed with BDD or not.
Practitioners’ concern about post-operative results for cis men, rather than concern
about their sense of self as men, was common throughout all my interviews with physicians.
Dr. Fray adopted a similar approach as Dr. Tabibi to screen out prospective patients with
unrealistic expectations. When I asked how he decides who is an ideal candidate for male
enhancement compared to those he would not accept as a patient, Dr. Fray replied that he
tries to “weed out” people that will only be “let down” and “dissatisfied” by the procedure’s
“results”.
I try to have [patients] envision what the most optimal results could be [...]. It
gives me an idea about whether or not they have healthy realistic expectations,
or if I’m dealing with someone who maybe does not have realistic expectations
and is likely to be let down by any procedure result. In those cases, I think as
a physician if you do come across people like that you just kindly say “I just
don’t- I think there’s probably other physicians out there who probably would
be a better match for you. I just don’t know if I’m going to be able to really
achieve the kinds of results that you want”. [...] But you have to put out possible
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scenarios of either negative outcomes, adverse outcomes, what the potentials
are, and keep it real. And if somebody only has rosy glasses we know what
happens, it’s just a big let down. And I don’t want a dissatisfied patient. I would
rather under-promise and over-deliver and also have people have appropriate
expectations about what I’m doing. [...] Part of it is that you want people to be
satisfied and you don’t want somebody having unrealistic expectations where
even in the best case scenario, you would be failing. So I think... 95 percent of
the people out there are just fine. Five percent of the people are more likely to
either want to sue you, or would write horrible reviews about you, or just would
create a huge fuss, those are the ones you want to weed out before you treat
them. [emphasis added]
Like Dr. Allen and Dr. Tabibi, Dr. Fray focuses on “negative” and “adverse outcomes”
as well as “realistic expectations” for the “procedure results”. Nowhere does he mention
that his procedure could result in irreversible changes to a cis man’s penis, let alone how
this transformation would result in a permanent change in a cis man’s identity. Physicians’
concerns about cis patient dissatisfaction with a procedure’s results are compounded by
anxieties that cis men might sue their doctors, or “write horrible reviews” that damage
their reputations, or otherwise “create a huge fuss”, not because their cis men patients
would regret an irreversible and “total change of identity”, to borrow Dr. Schneider’s words.
Comparing multiple cases like these, we see how trans folks are institutionally required
to seek counseling in great part to avoid regret, whereas male enhancement practitioners
simply mitigate cis men’s dissatisfaction and disappointment with the results of penile
augmentation. By claiming that cis patients may become dissatisfied, but trans folks will
regret their procedures, practitioners naturalize the sex assigned at birth of pre-surgical
trans bodies, thus casting post-surgical trans bodies as artificial constructions.
The fine line between dissatisfaction and regret is not politically neutral, and not
without real material consequences in the formation of bodies and identities. Some may
suggest that both trans and cis people—albeit for separate reasons—are denied access to
surgery, so the effect on the incarnation of sexed bodies is in some ways equitable. But the
key injustice is that cis men’s expectations can be and are successfully managed by male
enhancement practitioners—either their original doctors, or subsequent physicians like those
who Dr. Fray claims “would be a better match” for the patient. But doctors believe that
‘core’ identities like gender and sex are naturally rooted in the body and immutable—and
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therefore, not manageable—so gatekeepers prevent trans folks from undergoing surgeries to
prevent post-operative regret.
In the very rare cases that doctors expressed concern about their cis patients
potentially regretting a penile augmentation because they have not carefully considered
the ramifications of the procedure, doctors’ responses are much less cautious, and
certainly less pathologizing than how they talk about trans patients seeking gender
confirmation surgeries. For example, Dr. Midden explains that he has recently changed the
policies of his medical practice so that his cis men patients are less likely to undergo male
enhancement on a whim.
[Male enhancement] surgeries [are] performed anywhere from a month to a day
because some of them come in from out of town. Have interviews one day and
surgeries the next. Although I’ve made that much less frequent than it used to
be, because I really don’t want to do this as an impulse buy on the part of the
patient. So generally it’s a two to four week process from the time we talk to
them, to the time they have surgery. [emphasis added]
Instead of granting cis men access to genital surgery the day after their initial intake
interview, Dr. Midden has started to delay the process to two to four weeks in order to
mitigate the likelihood of his cis patients undergoing the procedure on an “impulse”
without carefully considering their options, and therefore, potentially experiencing regret
after the surgery. Compare this to the majority of trans patients who—following the
Standards of Care (version 7, 2012) that outline the best practices in the treatment of
Gender Dysphoria—have to go through the ‘real life test’ living in their affirmed gender,
sometimes waiting years to receive letters of support from mental health professionals
while paying them large sums of money in order to gain access to gender confirmation
surgeries.
Some may argue that it is precisely because trans patients have to submit to such
a strict gatekeeping process that clinical research reports such a low incidence of trans
regret, that without medical gatekeeping, more trans people would deeply regret
undergoing gender confirmation surgeries. My research cannot speak to that. What my
and Haiken’s (2000) research on male enhancement does show, is that there are no
standards of care implemented across physicians’ medical practices, no formal guidelines,
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and no institutionalized requirements for cis men to see mental health professionals before
getting genital surgery. Cis men are rarely and inconsistently referred to mental health
supports by the physicians who participated in this research. Moreover, there is evidence
from my participants’ testimonials that their cis men patients do have gender identity and
mental health struggles, and they do second guess their genital procedures afterwards.
Despite this, cis men are currently granted access to genital technologies with limited
gatekeeping to a great degree because their bodies and identities are rendered natural.
And because we culturally naturalize the sex assigned to bodies at birth, appropriate
healthcare for trans folks is often delayed or denied, which does cause real material harms
in trans peoples’ lives (see Travers 2018; Seelman et al. 2017; Brown 2010).
The only other time a physician in this study, Dr. Schneider, even hinted in our
interview that his cis men patients might regret an operation, it was not about male
enhancement; he expressed concern about cis men regretting a procedure that—as I
demonstrated previously (in the section “‘Unorthodox Procedures’ and Harm to
Normative Masculinity”)—all doctors who participated in this research were quick to
pathologize: penile reduction surgery. Although Dr. Schneider had relocated to a lounge at
the airport, he said he could not speak very loudly “because of what we’re talking about”
in such a public place. When I asked him “Have you ever received a request from a patient
to make his penis smaller?” Dr. Schneider responded in a hushed and hoarse voice:
I get ‘em on the internet and I tend to ignore them. [...] I would say probably
they’re nuts. Okay, probably. I can make it smaller, but I’m not going to unle-
I’m not- I don’t want to go through the whole psychological aspect of dealing
with it. [...] I would tend to think that these guys, it could be a situational thing
with their partner. In which case I’m not going to do it. Their partner should
get taken care of. And if it’s not a situational thing [with] the partner, like I
told you at the start, a lot of these guys are wacky. [emphasis added]
For Dr. Schneider, interest in getting a penile reduction either indicated that cis men were
mentally unstable, or they were making a decision to get a permanent procedure based on
situational—in other words, temporary—reasons, suggesting that these patients would
likely regret their decision to get a penile reduction surgery after those reasons no longer
hold importance in their lives. It is not a mistake that Dr. Schneider assumed that a
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penile reduction surgery would be done for “situational” reasons, as this reflects a broader
assumption shared by the practitioners in this research: that no man would ever in his
“right mind” want his penis to be smaller, and “everyone wants bigger”, to borrow Dr.
Tabibi’s words. So from Dr. Schneider’s account, he essentially stated that if desire for a
penile reduction is not situational—and therefore, not subject to concern about
regret—then it is a sign the men are “wacky” or “nuts”.
Technologies of the Natural
The purpose of this and the preceding chapter is not to suggest that the patient
experiences, medical practices, surgical risks, institutional structures, or historical
contexts of male enhancement and gender confirmation surgeries are the same, and
therefore, should be subject to identical practices and codified regulations. To be clear, I
am not recommending explicitly or by implication that cis men undergo mandatory
counseling—identical to the process trans folks currently undergo or otherwise—before
gaining access to genital technologies. Nor am I, as a cis researcher, dictating whether or
not trans patients must undergo required counseling to access gender confirmation
surgeries as currently outlined by the Standards of Care (version 7, 2012). Trans activists
and advocates have been doing this work for a long time to make their own
recommendations about how the medical management of trans patients should change and
what other practices should emerge (see Ashley 2019a, 2019c; Ashley and Ells 2018; Heyes
and Latham 2018; Winters 2018; Latham 2017; Cavanaugh, Hopwood, and Lambert 2016;
Bourns 2015; Lev 2013; Hale 2007).
Rather, the purpose of this and the previous chapter, “Authenticity and Suffering”,
is to bring into relation the norms, histories, and discursive regimes attendant to each of
these overlapping medical contexts in order to demonstrate that medical discourse does
not merely describe the reality of bodies; it further brings those bodies into being. Medical
discourses are a technology of the natural through which particularly-sexed and racialized
bodies and subjectivities are constituted. Unpacking and juxtaposing discourses that arise
in each of these medical contexts enables us to see the seams and sutures—the ways in
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which cis men’s bodies and identities materialize through medical discourse—rendering
visible their incarnation through somatechnologies of (de)naturalization like authenticity,
suffering, harm, and dissatisfaction versus regret. Equipped with this knowledge, we can
attempt to disrupt the violence enacted against trans people and historically-oppressed
others in service of cis masculinity, whiteness, and ‘the natural’.
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Chapter 6
“Too Big Doesn’t Mean
Anything”: ‘Monster Cocks’, the
‘Reproductive Body’, and the
Racialization of Genitals
...biology is politics by other means.
—Anne Fausto-Sterling
Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality
The somatechnic analysis that I conducted in the preceding chapters comparing
male enhancement and gender confirmation surgery is distinct from the style of analysis
that I present here. Instead of bringing particular somatic transformations in relation to
each other to emphasize how, despite their similarities, they are discursively framed in
contrasting ways, this chapter brings multiple bodies in relation to each other using the
figure of the ‘monster cock’. In the section below, I offer a more detailed explanation of
this term as it appears in the language of Enhancement Forum members, but briefly, a
monster cock refers to a penis whose size—often after an enhancement—hinders a person
from being able to penetrate a circlusive sexual partner, or causes the partner pain. My
examination in this chapter of how the discourse of the monster cock operates in relation
to the ‘female reproductive body’, the ‘Asian female body’, and the ‘Black male body’
is not a somatechnic analysis in the sense of comparing two or more forms of somatic
transformation. However, I bring the insights of the theoretical tradition of somatechnics
with me into the analysis of this chapter—for example, the inextricability of technology and
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the body, the materialization of the body through discourse, and the relational comparative
analysis between bodies and somatic practices—to demonstrate the underlying assumptions,
justifications, and prohibitions for particular forms of bodily being.
Two of the questions that I posed to physicians generated the majority of the quotes
that I analyze in this chapter. First, I asked what male enhancement practitioners generally
think about the monster cock. Second, I asked if there is anything as a medical doctor
that they could do to help a cis man who wants to have penetrative sex, but currently
cannot without causing pain to his sexual partner. In practitioners’ responses, they referred
to cis men’s sexual partners exclusively as cis women, despite my use of gender-neutral
language.1 I pushed back against physicians’ heteronormative assumptions in my interviews
by consistently asking how their claims about the body and sexuality relate to their gay
patients, with little effect.
I imagine that had I developed different interview tools to challenge physicians to
consider even further how monster cocks might be painful during anal or oral
penetration—with partners of any gender or sexed body—that framing would have
generated rich responses and a valuable contrast in the data. In particular, I anticipate
that this contrast would help to demonstrate the parameters of practitioners’
understanding of monster cocks, sexed and racialized bodies, sexual practices, and ‘the
natural’. I doubt physicians, for example, would naturalize one’s anal or oral capacity to
“accommodate” a monster cock, as neither fit as neatly with existing discourses that
naturalize reproductive sex, heterosexuality, or racialize the sexed body. Nevertheless, the
analysis of this chapter is limited to and by physicians’ talk about male enhancement
patients who doctors believe engage in vaginally-penetrative sex with cis women.
Below I share a portion of my exchange with Dr. Rosenburg because it accomplishes
two tasks. First, it serves as an example of how I challenged physicians’ assumptions of
heterosexuality, and second, it is a primer for understanding doctors’ reaction to the monster
1When defining and explaining monster cocks to practitioners, I carefully and purposefully described them
as causing pain to “sexual partners”, rather than using gendered language like ‘husbands’ or ‘girlfriends’.
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cock as interfering with the “purpose” of the male body. When I asked Dr. Rosenburg what
his thoughts were about the average size penis, he responded
Dr. Rosenburg: My criteria for discussing lengthening of a penis with anyone is
if they’re less than 4 inches erect because that makes intercourse difficult due to
the size of our pelves and the way that we thrust. So anybody who is more than
four inches erect is normal and beyond that it’s a broad spectrum, I don’t quote
anybody a number beyond that. I tell them if you’re more than four inches erect
you are a-ok.
Jennifer: Okay and so if their penis is less than four inches erect would you say
that you’re more inclined to perform the surgery on them?
Dr. Rosenburg: Yes because then they actually carry a diagnosis of microphallus
and again it’s a functional problem, it’s hard to impregnate a woman if you are
three inches when you’re erect. The uh the penetration is not adequate. [...] I
think the purpose of a penis is to function [...] obviously it has to have erectile
potential and if they’re interested in procreating it has to have ejactile potential.
[...]
Jennifer: You mentioned that part of the function or purpose [of the penis] is
procreation, and you talked about [for] men who have a[n erect] penis smaller
than three inches it can be really difficult to perform in terms of penetrating a
vagina [...] What is the function of your gay patients’ penises?
Dr. Rosenburg: Um really to me it looks about the same as a heterosexual
conversation. [...] I try to look at it from an individual’s perspective. What are
your needs? [...] Um everybody has a very different need and desire, and we have
that for the way we comb our hair, and we have that for our genitalia if we’re
trapped in the wrong body, or we’re trapped in an adequate body. So I don’t
really speak to a gay, queer, lesbian, trans person any differently than I would
speak to anybody else.
I attempted to restate my question a second time, but rather than responding to my question
about the ‘purpose’ of gay men’s penises, Dr. Rosenburg replied that his gay patients were
more interested in scrotal lifts than penile lengthening, thus bypassing the importance of
length to gay men’s ability to “thrust”. Dr. Rosenburg’s response above demonstrates an
evasion and resistance against questions about gay patients that I commonly faced from
physicians during interviews, despite gay men accounting for a sizable proportion of most
practitioners’ patients in their medical practices.
But Dr. Rosenburg’s quote is also analytically compelling for considering how
physicians think about the purpose of the penis and the ‘male’ body in terms of
(particularly heterosexual) penetrative practices and reproduction. Comments like Dr.
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Rosenburg’s response above were not characteristic of the majority of my interviews, but
they were not unique either. A quarter of the practitioners in my sample identified a cis
man’s inability to penetrate a cis woman and/or their infertility related to penile length as
a failure of the (function of the) male body. As my analysis within this chapter
demonstrates, one of the ways in which the male body is reasserted as male is through
penetrative heterosexual practices and the naturalization of the ‘female reproductive
body’.
When discussing monster cocks with me, physicians naturalized the ‘female
reproductive body’, claiming that cis women’s bodies are capable of “taking” any size
penis due to the alleged biological “design” and “natural” capacity of “the vagina [to]
adjust and accommodate the head of the baby”. Practitioners often deflected criticism
that a man’s penis could ever be “too big” or could cause someone genital pain—much
less unwanted genital pain2—by medicalizing and denaturalizing cis women’s inability to
“accommodate” any size penis through vaginal penetration, for example, due to
dyspareunia—a medical diagnosis of “persistent or recurrent genital pain that occurs just
before, during or after intercourse” (Mayo Clinic 2018). Framing these women’s bodies as
having “anatomical issues”, “postmenopausal dryness”, “scar tissue” or otherwise needing
“to be examined by the gynecologist”, constructs cis women’s bodies as ‘unnatural’ for
failing to “fit”—much less sexually enjoy—a ‘monster cock’, given the allegedly “natural”
capacity of the vagina to stretch, seemingly with few limitations.
Several practitioners attempted to reconcile how cis women could possibly
experience unwanted vaginal pain from monster cock penetration. One doctor suggested
that genital pain could be a result of a different body build between, for example, a
“petite female dating a basketball player”. Other doctors racialized the mismatch between
genitals. For example, one doctor conceded that a penis could be “too big” when there is a
size mismatch between differently-racialized genitals. Invoking the racializing discourse of
2I want to draw readers’ attention to how most physicians did not even address that this pain could be
unwanted, choosing to argue instead that cis women cannot, by biological “design”, experience pain in
general from vaginal penetration. As a result, my language in this analysis oscillates between merely
emphasizing that this pain is possible, and stressing that this pain is often unwanted.
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the ‘tight Asian pussy’, this doctor naturalized an Asian cis woman’s inability to “take” a
monster cock because her genitals are “small by nature”. Similarly, another doctor
acknowledged that, in particular cases, a penis might be too large for (pain-free) vaginal
penetration by invoking the racializing discourse of the ‘big Black dick’ and the genital
swelling caused by sickle cell anemia (which is a disease commonly racialized as Black). He
claimed that Black cis men are the only people whose penises could be as large as a
monster cock to cause cis women unwanted pain from penetration.
My aim in this chapter then is to map out both the erasure and selective
invocation of the monster cock within the medical context of male enhancement. I build
the case that for cis men on Enhancement Forum, acquiring a monster cock through
penile augmentation helps them accomplish phallic masculine embodiment—as a social,
relational, and somatechnological process—in relation to other male bodies, and through
sexual dominance over female bodies. This is in part because heterosexual dominance is
central to contemporary conceptualizations of masculinity (Pascoe 2007). However, given
that monster cocks—by definition—impede penetration due to their size relative to the
sexed bodies of circlusive sexual partners, monster cock dominance competes with
physicians’ understandings of the “purpose” of the male body. This chapter illustrates how
doctors’ discourses of reproduction and ‘successful’ heterosexual penetrative practices are
technologies of the natural that work to reaffirm the body as naturally male.
Physicians’ discourses work to frame the ‘female reproductive body’ as naturally
capable of “accommodating” any size penis, thereby confirming patients’ bodies as male
through heterosexual penetration. Dyspareunia functions within male enhancement
discourse as a ‘failure’ of the female reproductive body for undermining heterosexual
penetration, and therefore, it places the ‘problem’ of pain on the female body in order to
shore up the boundaries of male bodies. Given that physicians construct Asian cis
women’s bodies as uniquely vulnerable to experiencing pain from penetration, and frame
Black cis men’s sexed bodies as uniquely capable of causing cis women pain through
vaginal penetration, the ‘big Black dick’ and the ‘tight Asian pussy’ function discursively
to normalize the sexed bodies of white people. To set the stage for this analysis, I begin by
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providing an exegesis for the term ‘monster cock’, situated within the language of
Enhancement Forum members.
Monster Cocks
Figure 6.1: Micha Stunz pictured at Folsom Street Fair in Berlin displaying his silicone-
enhanced penis (Reprinted with permission from VICE Media; modifications to blur the
image background are mine).
The term ‘monster cock’ is language often used by members of penis augmentation
websites like Enhancement Forum. A monster cock is a penis whose size—in many cases
after male enhancement—impedes a person from being able to penetrate a circlusive sexual
partner or causes the partner pain. Offering a contemporary example of a monster cock is
Micha Stunz, a cis German man pictured above at a gay leather and fetish street fair in
Berlin (see Figure 6.1). In the mini cockumentary3 This Is What Life Is Like with a Gigantic
Penis: Monster Meat, Vice Media (2015) interviews Micha about his enhanced penis. After
Micha augmented his penis with several rounds of silicone injections, he reports that it now
3Cockumentaries are documentaries about cocks, most notably their size. Recent cockumentaries have titles
such as My Penis and I (2005), My Penis and Everyone Else’s (2007), and Unhung Hero: Does Size
Matter? (2013). My use of the term ‘cockumentary’ should not be confused with the 2011 documentary
about cock-fighting roosters called The Cockumentary.
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weighs up to nine-and-a-half pounds (or about four-and-one-third kilograms); his penile
dimensions are about nine inches in length and three-and-a-half inches in diameter (or
about twenty-three by nine centimeters). However, these penile measurements are not what
necessarily determines his monster cock status; a penis can be much smaller than Micha’s
and still be a monster cock in accordance with the definition employed by Enhancement
Forum members, among others. In the course of his Vice Media interview, Micha did not
claim to have a monster cock; however, he also did not refute such a label. That Micha
reports it is impossible for him to penetrate his sexual partner(s) with his penis because of
its large size is—according to many members of Enhancement Forum—the hallmark of a
monster cock.
By Enhancement Forum members’ definition, the status of a penis as a monster cock
is necessarily relational to the bodies that interact with that penis.4 Monster cock status
as it is defined online and in this dissertation is not a fixed characteristic nor universal
‘truth’ about the body determined by a specific penis size, but rather, a changing social
and relational status of the body. For example, in an Enhancement Forum thread asking
fellow members interested in male enhancement “How big should we go?”, one member
writing about his desire for his penis to be a monster cock defined it in relation to sexual
partners.
Why do I WANT to have unsuccessful sex??? What I mean here is... I have yet
to find a girl that [penetrative] sex simply wont work with because of my girth...
why in the hell is the thought of that potentially happening a turn-on for me?
[emphasis added]
This quote foregrounds the social and relational character of monster cocks. For example,
“unsuccessful sex” refers to the inability of this cis man to penetrate a “girl” (adult woman?)
4Given the social, relational, and interactional character of monster cocks, their incidence is difficult to
determine; however, we can infer from cis women’s reported experiences of pain from vaginal penetration
(see Herbenick et al. 2015; Elmerstig, Wijma, and Swahnberg 2013) that monster cocks exist, as well as cis
men’s qualitative accounts of causing their circlusive sexual partners pain. The online forum Large Penis
Support Group—while regarded by some of the site’s more than 660 thousand members as an ironic name—
is treated by other forum members as an actual place to find community support. Forum members offer
each other advice about where to find condoms that fit, how to conceal their genital bulge with clothing,
and how to have penetrative sex without hurting their sexual partners. While I referenced the Large Penis
Support Group in my interviews, it was not part of my online observations of male enhancement forums.
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because—in relation to her vagina, anus, or mouth—his penile girth would be too large for
‘successful’ penetration. Like the quote above, most Enhancement Forum members spoke
about monster cocks in terms of their impacts on cis women’s bodies, with one forum
member saying “Heck, some men enjoy seeing a woman struggle to accommodate a [monster
cock] size, which in effect can be a complaint by the woman, but not necessarily a complaint
by the man” [emphasis added]. Monster cocks are therefore not measured by their absolute
dimensions or weight, but by how circlusive sexual partners—in this case cis women—
physically experience often unwanted pain during penetration.5 When I use the phrase
‘unwanted pain’ I am distinguishing it from consensual pain play in order to signal that
monster cock penetration can be sexually violent. Sexual violence refers to unwanted, and
therefore, non-consensual sexual conduct, either completed or attempted.6
Cis men interested in getting an enhanced monster cock, however, do not merely
define them in relation to and through dominance over cis women’s bodies through vaginal
penetration; they also define monster cocks in relation to the penis sizes of other men. For
example, one Enhancement Forum member posted the following in response to the prompt
“How big should we go?”:
The bottom line is I don’t trust women at all, and until I was so big that I
[my penis] could literally not fit inside her, I would assume she’s had [sexual
partners with] bigger [penises] and that she loved it way more than me and she’s
just lying to protect my feelings. Well, the problem with that is that I’m not
going to think I’m big until I don’t fit, and if I don’t fit then what’s the point[?]
[emphasis added]
In these “women-as-objects stories” (Curry 1991, 128), women serve as a conduit through
which cis men gauge their penis size and phallic masculine embodiment compared to other
men. Another forum member explained it succinctly when he stated that he wanted a
5Because ‘circlusion’ implies active participation, I do not refer to potential acts of sexual violence against
cis women as ‘vaginal circlusion’; that could be interpreted as if women are actively partaking in—and thus
somehow consenting to—the violence directed against them. Throughout this manuscript, I use the phrase
‘vaginal penetration’ rather than ‘vaginal circlusion’ when I am referring to possible acts of sexual violence.
6I use the term ‘sexual violence’ instead of ‘rape’ due to the social and historical limitations of this term. As
one example of many, rape was originally regarded in Canada as a property crime for ‘stealing’ the ‘sexual
purity’ of a man’s daughter or wife (Keough and Campbell 2014). Because of this history and narrow,
particularly legal definition of the term ‘rape’, I largely avoid using it in this manuscript.
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monster cock because “I want to know I am [my penis is] bigger than the next dude. I want
to be the one she measures everyone else against” [emphasis added].
So as we consider monster cocks throughout this chapter, it is important to
remember that—at least in practice—cis men often define monster cocks in comparison to
the penises of other cis men, as well as in relation to circlusive sexual partners’
bodies—particularly how monster cocks can cause cis women unwanted pain—as a
testament to a cis man’s phallic masculine embodiment. In other words, monster cocks
often serve cis men to feel dominant over cis women and their bodies, as well as physically
and sexually superior over other cis men.7
After I shared forum members’ definition of the term ‘monster cock’ with
practitioners—including how in practice cis men often describe them relationally—I asked
physicians for their professional opinion of monster cocks. I thought perhaps the doctors
who participated in this research would discuss the logics they would use to grant or deny
requests made by cis men seeking a monster cock enhancement—offering different
justifications for opening or closing the gate to these augmentations—which at times
physicians did provide. I also expected practitioners to discuss the importance of limiting
the length and girth dimensions of penile augmentations because of their investments in
enabling their patients to engage in penetrative sex, which doctors did discuss, but often
indirectly. I originally devised this question to see if physicians would consider offering cis
men penile reductions in order to enable penetrative sex, but as I demonstrated in
Chapter 5, every doctor denounced reducing a man’s penis size.
Finally, I imagined that some practitioners might regard monster cocks as
‘unnatural’, and therefore, not part of their medical practices since the majority of my
participants insisted that they aim to achieve a “natural-looking aesthetic” through male
enhancement. However, with the exception of one case shared by Dr. Rosenburg that I
detail below (in the section “Denaturalizing the ‘Big Black Dick’”), none of the doctors in
7To be clear, the (hetero)sexual practices normalized by our culture may require a transformation, not
necessarily the dimensions of our bodies, ‘enhanced’ or not. Micha affirmed in his interview with Vice
Media (2015) that there are more ways to have sex than using one’s penis to penetrate a partner: “if you’re
prepared to take other paths, and to try out new ideas, then you might even have a new field [of sexual
practices] you can discover”.
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this research explicitly referred to monster cocks as ‘unnatural’. What I did not anticipate
was for physicians to declare that monster cocks—penises so large that penetration is
either impossible or causes circlusive sexual partners pain—simply do not exist.
The ‘Reproductive Body’ and Heterosexuality
“Nobody’s penis is bigger than a baby’s head”: Naturalizing the
‘Reproductive Body’
The doctors in this research accomplished such an erasure of monster cocks by
consistently (re)framing the discussion to focus so acutely on the ‘nature’ of cis men’s
sexual partners. All of the physicians in this research denied the existence of monster
cocks—at least initially—because they defy the ‘reproductive body’. In the subsequent
quotes that I share, observe how techniques that naturalize vaginally-penetrative
heterosex and sexual reproduction enable doctors to deny the importance of—much less
the existence of—monster cocks and their ability to cause cis women unwanted pain as
circlusive sexual partners. Like the gendered stories told by medical science about the
‘active’ sperm and ‘passive’ ovum during human reproduction (see Campo-Engelstein and
Johnson 2014; Martin 1991), notice how physicians project gender and heteronormativity
onto biology through the naturalization of the ‘reproductive body’.
When I asked Dr. Rosenburg if there is anything he could do as a physician to help
a cis man who wanted to have penetrative sex—but currently could not because penetration
hurt his partner—I thought we might discuss the possibility of offering this man a penile
reduction. Instead, Dr. Rosenburg communicated that monster cocks do not exist by the
definition I gave him because of cis women’s ‘natural’ reproductive capacities to birth babies.
Instead of acknowledging that cis women can experience pain—much less unwanted pain—
from vaginal penetration with a monster cock, Dr. Rosenburg suggested that his male
enhancement patients and their sexual partners can eventually “fit together” if they simply
practice
patience [during sex]. [...] And patience during the relationship. We’re all born of
women and nobody’s penis is bigger than a baby’s head. So virtually any female
could, with enough stretching, take virtually any erect penis. If the couple is in a
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loving, caring relationship and has patience, you can fit together. So I think you
start with patience. [emphasis added]
Dr. Rosenburg insists that monster cocks are not real and neither is the pain cis women
can experience from vaginal penetration because cis women’s bodies naturally stretch to
accommodate a baby’s head, so eventually one can make any penis that is smaller than a
baby’s head “fit”. The expectation that women and men will no doubt fit together through
circlusive/penetrative sex is grounded in heteronormative and binarist assumptions about
their respective ‘natures’, particularly cis women’s alleged ‘reproductive nature’. Rather
than suggesting that his patients engage in alternative sexual practices that do not center
penetration—especially after undergoing a male enhancement procedure—notice how Dr.
Rosenburg speaks about heterosexual penetration as if it is compulsory (see Rich 1980,
2004), that heterosexual couples just need to have “patience” and do “enough stretching”
of cis women’s vaginal introitus or opening in order to make the couple(’s genitals) “fit
together”. The discourse of reproduction, in tandem with references to heterosexual love
and care, work to rescue the male body in interaction with the female body from the threat
of penetrative failure.
Dr. Rosenburg was not alone in his disbelief in the existence of monster cocks
and his erasure of cis women’s unwanted pain. In addition to mirroring Dr. Rosenburg’s
statements about cis women’s ‘nature’, physicians like Dr. Fray also erased the existence
of monster cocks by suggesting that if they did exist, they would interfere with the ability
to “procreate”. Struggling to finish his sentences, Dr. Fray cast suspicion on the existence
of monster cocks—again defined as penises whose size renders penetration impossible or
causes circlusive sexual partners unwanted pain.
I think it is impossible for someone[’s penis] to be too large for all potential
partners because when you consider the fact that a woman having birth is passing
shoulders of a ten-pound baby through her, there’s nobody [with a penis] that big.
So I just don’t- I don’t believe that. [...] the vagina was naturally designed- with
appropriate silicone lubrication- I still think that there is um... Well let’s put
it this way, if you were dating somebody and you got in the sack and realized
that “I can’t take this guy’s penis”, the ability to procreate possibly just went
out the window, unless there [was] gonna be some artificial insemination. I just
can’t imagine that something like this would be the case because I I I just don’t
believe it. I don’t believe it. [emphasis added]
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Some may argue that a close examination of Dr. Fray’s comments would indicate that
he responded as though monster cocks are defined as so large that penetration would be
impossible for “all potential partners” [emphasis added]. However, as Dr. Fray articulates
his argument, it becomes clear that he is not concerned about the probability of at least
one woman existing who could be a “potential partner” to a man with a monster cock
by physically accommodating his large penis size. Instead, he demonstrates his assumption
that cis women generally have a biological capacity to birth babies, so therefore, cis women
generally should be able to physically “take” any size penis because “there’s nobody [with a
penis] that big” as the body of a “ten-pound baby” (equivalent to four-and-a-half kilograms).
According to Dr. Fray’s logic, cis women should be able to vaginally “take” a penis the size
of Micha’s silicone-enhanced monster cock that I pictured at the beginning of this chapter
(see Figure 6.1), because it weighs less than a ten-pound newborn.8
Dr. Fray’s disbelief in the existence of a penis so large that vaginal penetration is
painful or impossible simultaneously relies on the naturalization of human reproduction and
heterosexuality. He reasons that because “the vagina was naturally designed” for penetration
by a penis, as well as for “passing shoulders of a ten-pound baby”, it is “impossible for
someone[’s penis] to be too large” for vaginal penetration. The threat of penetrative failure
is neutralized by grounding the nature of the male body in interaction with the ‘female
reproductive body’. Yet notice the slippage in Dr. Fray’s argument when he begins to say
that—in addition to the ‘natural design’ of the vagina—“appropriate silicone lubrication”
can also help facilitate vaginal penetration. In other words, Dr. Fray’s comment about
silicone lubrication begins to concede that not all cis women can, by the ‘natural design’ of
their bodies alone, “take” any size penis.9
Dr. Fray reasserts that if monster cocks as I defined them in our interview were
real, if cis women could not vaginally “take” any size penis, then ‘natural’ modes of
8In Canada and the United States, the average birth weight of a newborn infant is about seven-and-a-half
pounds (or three-and-a-half kilograms). A ten-pound (or four-and-a-half kilogram) infant is at the upper
limit of ‘normal’ birth weight (Government of Alberta 2019).
9As a somatechnician, I understand silicone lubrication—not as a substance ‘unnatural’ to sex—but as
beginning to break down the false dichotomy of the ‘natural’ and the ‘artificial’ in human sexual relations.
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reproduction (as opposed to “artificial”, technologically-assisted insemination) would be
impossible. It seems that Dr. Fray imagines the body to be naturally reproductive, that
procreation is a particularly natural process of binary bodies and heterosex, concluding
therefore, that a penis could never be too large to hinder vaginal penetration because that
would mean a loss of fertility without the assistance of artificial insemination. Of course,
not all bodies are reproductive, including those that are socially and medically sexed as
“female” under the binary. If we understand sexual reproduction and pregnancy—not as
‘natural’ processes made possible by the ‘complementary’ and ‘dimorphic’ ‘natures’ of
sexed bodies—but rather, as somatechnologies, we come to see that all reproduction is not
quite ‘natural’ (see Garner 2011).
Practitioners like Dr. Rosenburg and Dr. Fray—physicians with years of medical
training, official accreditation, and expertise as practicing doctors in the field of sexual
health—were comparing vaginal penetration to giving birth, thereby erasing the pain of
childbirth. A penis does not have to be larger than a newborn human being for it to cause
a circlusive sexual partner pain. Veritably, most people who engage in circlusive vaginal sex
do not want it to feel like childbirth. Giving birth is still incredibly painful despite several
months of changes in the body, multiple hours of contractions, and a flood of hormones
that prepare the body to give birth that “stretching” during vaginal circlusion cannot quite
mimic. The body has limits; it is common for the perineum—the flesh between the vaginal
opening and anus—to tear during childbirth or require an episiotomy.10 Sometimes a C-
section is required for the health of the gestational parent because they are unable to pass the
baby through their vaginal or genital canal,11 all of which is fairly common knowledge within
10The National Health Services (2017) of the UK describes an episiotomy as “a cut in the area between the
vagina and anus (the perineum) during childbirth [....] [that] makes the opening of the vagina a bit wider,
allowing the baby to come through it more easily. [...] In some births, an episiotomy can help to prevent a
severe tear or speed up delivery if the baby needs to be born quickly”. The rate of episiotomy in Canada
as of 2007 was 17% of births, and in the US as of 2012 was 11.6% of deliveries (Clesse et al. 2018).
11I include the term ‘genital canal’ alongside ‘vaginal canal’ out of respect for and acknowledgement of
pregnant trans folks who do not use the term ‘vagina’ to refer to their bodies. The term ‘vagina’ is further
exclusionary since its Latin translation means “scabbard” or “sheath”, defining the vagina by and in
relation to the penis (Merriam-Webster, s.v. “vagina (n.),” accessed September 18, 2019).
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and outside of medicine.12 Comparing vaginal penetration to birthing a baby subordinates
the comfort, health, and safety—much less the pleasure—of the majority of cis women,
thereby reducing them to sexual objects.
In the section that follows, I outline one of the ways in which physicians attempted
to make sense of how cis women could possibly experience genital pain from penetration. The
vignettes below demonstrate how male enhancement practitioners render cis women’s bodies
as ill, aging, or otherwise responsible for unwanted vaginal pain. I argue that dyspareunia
functions discursively as a ‘failure’ of the female body for disrupting heterosexual penetrative
practices; physicians’ invocation of dyspareunia works to confirm the boundaries of cis men’s
bodies as male by medicalizing and denaturalizing the female body.
“It May be a Female Problem”: Denaturalizing Cis Women’s Genitals
In 1593 a German surgeon, Guilhelius Fabricius Hildanus, encountered a woman who
experienced infertility and declining health. Chief among her problems was “recurrent
genital pain associated with sexual activity, experienced during and after inter-course”
(Kompanje 2006, 604), which in present-day allopathic medicine in Canada and the
United States is commonly diagnosed as dyspareunia. Hildanus advised her to abstain
from any form of vaginal penetration while she treated the ulcers on her vagina with
ointments. Instead of treating his patient as if she were the source of her unwanted pain,
Hildanus redirected his medical attention onto her husband. Hildanus determined that the
cause of his patient’s vaginal pain was “the exceptional length of her husband’s penis in
the fervent embrace” (cited in Kompanje 2006, 604). As a curative, Hildanus invented a
device he termed a “masculine shield” that was fashioned out of cork and placed on the
man’s pelvis in order to “prevent the deep penetration of the penis” (cited in Kompanje
2006, 604). According to records containing Hildanus’ medical observations, his invention
worked: “This shield he put on, making the art well: even she felt no pain, and she even
fancied it” (cited in Kompanje 2006, 604). In assessing Hildanus’ treatment plan,
12From 2005 to 2014, doctors medically recommended about fifty percent of all cesarean deliveries in the US
because it was not favourable for the health of the fetus and/or pregnant person to give birth through the
vaginal or genital canal (Hehir et al. 2018). The remaining fifty percent were elective cesarean births.
203
contemporary medical ethicist Erwin J. O. Kompanje (2006) expresses surprise that
Hildanus “gave the male partner a device as part of the treatment, rather than treating
the woman as a sole source of the problem”, which he called a “common error” even in
present-day medical practices (605).
The male enhancement practitioners who participated in this research almost
exclusively assign responsibility to cis women (to the exception of blaming racialized cis
men)13 for the unwanted pain they experience from vaginal penetration. Dr. Tabibi’s
remarks, for example, direct the “problem” of pain onto cis women’s bodies. Repeating
much of the language of Dr. Fray and Dr. Rosenburg’s responses in the previous section,
Dr. Tabibi rejects the existence of monster cocks altogether, particularly by denying the
possibility that women could experience unwanted pain from vaginal penetration. Rocking
back and forth in his plush leather office chair causing it to creak each time he reclined,
Dr. Tabibi commented on the alleged nature of cis women’s bodies, medicalizing those
who fail to vaginally “accommodate” a penis.
Too big doesn’t mean anything. Too big for women is—unless they have some
kind of medical or sexual problem—uh is unusual- not natural because remember
that the vagina can adjust and accommodate the head of the baby. There’s no
penis the size of the head of the baby. Cause I haven’t seen that one. What’s the
head of the baby? Seven inches? Eight inches [in diameter]? [...] So the largest
penis is not even close to that. So it’s not comparable. So the vagina has this
capacity of expansion. And actually the body, the skin is expandable, that’s the
reason why I put the [penile] implant under the skin, [the implant] expands [the
skin]. So our body has this capacity naturally, it expand[s]. So I don’t think big
is something- unless somebody had a previous surgery [on] her vagina and the
scar tissue [causes] narrowing or something, so of course that one’s painful. Or
some women have dyspareunia when they get older and their hormone balance
changes so they have that issue. So those are the things that are exceptions to
this rule. But usually I don’t think any woman asks her husband or her boyfriend
to make him [his penis] smaller. [emphasis added]
13The only other ways in which physicians from my sample imagined that cis women could experience
vaginal pain was from brutal sexual violence with inanimate objects, “gang rape”—which the doctor
claimed is enacted exclusively by men from racialized countries—or from being penetrated by a cis Black
man afflicted with genital swelling who has a monster cock as an effect of his ‘race’. I discuss the latter
case in this chapter.
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From Dr. Tabibi’s framing of the issue, we are led to believe that the skin’s “capacity
of expansion” is so natural to the human body, that if the vagina cannot “adjust and
accommodate” a monster-sized penis like it can “the head of the baby”, then that person
must “have some kind of medical or sexual problem” that is “not natural”. While “a previous
surgery on her vagina”, “scar tissue”, “narrowing” of the genital canal, “dyspareunia”, or a
change in one’s “hormone balance” may contribute to many cis women’s pain during vaginal
penetration, those “exceptions to this rule” of ‘natural’ vaginal expansion do not vindicate
monster cocks as incapable of causing cis women unwanted pain. It is not as though the
skin’s capacity for expansion does not have limits, and that pushing past those limits cannot
result in pain.14
Physicians disregarding the possibility that a cis man’s penis could cause cis
women unwanted vaginal pain—while at the same time pointing to other hypothetical,
medicalized causes of that pain—is a deflection technique that rescues the maleness of cis
men’s bodies—accomplished through penetrative heterosexual practices—from critique.
By using the language of ‘technique’ here I am not arguing that Dr. Tabibi and
practitioners like him knowingly deflected criticism, nor am I necessarily claiming that
physicians are wholly unaware that they transfer the “medical or sexual problem” onto cis
women’s bodies. Intentions are not necessarily important in the operation of discourse or
when analyzing the consequences of those discourses.15 This derailment tactic—whether
physicians use it intentionally or not—also helps practitioners evade answering warranted
questions about the ramifications of the male enhancement procedures they perform,
particularly the ramifications experienced by circlusive sexual partners.
Dr. Tabibi was not alone in rendering cis women responsible for the unwanted pain
they can experience from monster cock penetration. Several other physicians, including Dr.
14Consider how stretch marks—tears in the dermis caused by rapid growth of fat and/or muscle, from
pregnancy, or childhood growth spurts—are a testament to the limits of the skin’s capacity to expand.
15In The History of Sexuality, Foucault (1990) explains “Power relations are both intentional and
nonsubjective [...] there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives. But this
does not mean that it results from the choice or decision of an individual subject” (95). In their analysis
of Foucault’s work, Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) suggest that even though “[w]ill and calculation were
involved”, the consequences of power’s operation “escaped the actors’ intentions” (187).
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Schneider, made similar deflections. I asked Dr. Schneider if there is anything that he could
do as a physician to help cis men who cannot have penetrative sex because their penis size
hurts their sexual partners. Dr. Schneider responded matter-of-factly:
No, no... Except treat the woman. [...] Well it may be a female problem, post-
menopausal dryness, some anatomical issues in the females and those need to
be addressed. [...] If it’s a dryness issue, the woman may need to be on estrogens
or some of these new lasers that are out where they can laser the vagina down
and increase the health of the vaginal lining and increase natural lubrication. If
there’s an issue with the [female] partner, the next step is usually for the partner
to be examined by the gynecologist. [emphasis added]
Dr. Schneider’s comments denaturalize cis women’s bodies at the expense of their comfort
and physical safety. Instead of acknowledging that it is possible for a penis to be “too big” for
(pain-free) vaginal penetration—much less pleasurable sex—Dr. Schneider deflected critique
away from monster cocks by medicalizing cis women’s bodies as having a “female problem”
that needs to be “examined by a gynecologist”.
Adding to the potential causes for vaginal pain that Dr. Tabibi surmised above,
Dr. Schneider suggested to “laser the vagina down” to address assumed “anatomical issues”
that may cause pain during vaginal penetration. Monster cocks, on the other hand, do not
pose an “anatomical issue” because they do not exist according to practitioners like Dr.
Schneider. He also recommended to “treat the woman” for “post-menopausal dryness” by
prescribing estrogen—a hormone molecule deeply coded by binarist science of the sexed
body as ‘female’ (Fausto-Sterling 2000; Oudshoorn 1994)—thereby reaffirming the need to
bring ‘female’ bodies back into alignment with ‘nature’ to enable heterosexual sex. Dr.
Schneider’s treatment recommendations aim to “increase the health of the vaginal lining”
as well as “increase natural lubrication” [emphasis added], meaning that pain from vaginal
penetration indicates to Dr. Schneider that the vagina is not as ‘healthy’ nor responding to
vaginal penetration as it ‘naturally’ should, rather than demonstrating, for example, that a
couple’s chosen sexual practices may need to adapt and diversify, especially after a penile
augmentation.
Practitioners’ repeated medicalization of cis women’s bodies, denaturalization of
cis women’s unwanted pain, alongside their insistent denial that cis men’s penises could
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ever be too large for pain-free, vaginal penetration demonstrates physicians’ perpetuation
of—if not investment in—medical sexism, compulsory heterosexuality, and the maleing of
cis men’s bodies through penetrative heterosexual practices. Feminists who study the
medicalization of sexuality (Cacchioni 2007; Tiefer 2004) persuasively illustrate that
diagnosing cis women as having a sexual problem—especially if they do not enjoy vaginal
penetration—is often motivated by a heteronormative, phallocentric, and unrealistic
sexual ideal. Pharmaceutical companies and cosmetic surgeons are also capitalizing on this
narrowly-defined sexual ideal in the hopes of expanding their patient base by medicalizing
cis women’s bodies and sexualities. For example, in the case of ‘female sexual
dysfunction’—often characterized by a lack of sexual response, desire, or orgasm from
vaginal penetration—the pharmaceutical and surgical ‘cures’ preexisted and are what
drove the creation of a medical diagnosis (Canner 2009; Tiefer 2004). The production of
commodity ‘solutions’ is what led to the manufacturing of a physical ‘problem’.
However, to be clear, the transformation of cis women’s bodies through genital
technologies as a means to accommodate monster cocks does not necessarily render cis
women as passive objects of heteronormativity and phallocentrism. Contrary to much
feminist scholarship—which frames the surgical creation of “designer vaginas” as the
surrendering of one’s identity and body to the mandates of the male gaze (see Braun 2010,
2009, 2005; Green 2005)—a somatechnic lens teaches us that the liberatory / oppressive
dichotomy assigned to somatic practices “negates the political potential” of these
procedures—not in terms of what the subject intends bodily transformation to
signify—but in terms of the possible intercorporeal meanings created in relation to others
(Sullivan 2006, 556). Somatic interventions generally regarded as ‘conformist’ or
‘normative’ carry more meanings than what is strictly intended. Just as somatic practices
that are intended to be transgressive and radical can carry multiple, often contradictory
meanings, practices constructed as normative are also multiple in their effects, and those
who engage in practices like “laser[ing] the vagina down” or taking hormones should not
be foreclosed as ‘cultural dupes’.
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Physicians who participated in this research such as Doctors Rosenburg, Fray,
Tabibi, and Schneider largely did not respond to my questions about monster cocks as I
originally expected. Meaning, to the exception of one case that I share below, they did not
place limits on the penile dimensions that result from their enhancement procedures as a
means to preserve the possibility that their patients can penetrate a partner. Instead, they
defend phallocentric sex by denying the possibility that vaginal penetration can become
painful; regardless of a cis man’s penis size, he cannot—by the “function” of the male
body and the reproductive ‘nature’ of cis women’s bodies—cause them unwanted pain
through vaginal penetration. Shoring up the boundaries of the male body, practitioners
suggest that one of the very few ways in which cis women can experience pain from
vaginal penetration is if she has a medicalized problem as a result of illness or aging. Male
enhancement practitioners direct the “problem” of pain from monster cock penetration
onto cis women’s bodies, whereby dyspareunia functions as a ‘failure’ of the female body
for disrupting heterosexual penetration. Cis women are assigned responsibility for the
unwanted pain they experience from monster cock penetration, and are largely rendered
acceptable casualties of sexual violence.
Contrary to his comments above, Dr. Tabibi did attempt to understand—beyond
medicalizing cis women’s sexed bodies—how the monster cock could cause circlusive sexual
partners unwanted pain. While the majority of the practitioners who participated in this
research “don’t believe” that a cis man’s penis could ever be “too big” so as to cause a cis
woman pain through vaginal penetration, Dr. Tabibi reluctantly believed some women and
their reports of unwanted pain when he suspected that there was a biologically-determined
size mismatch between racialized genitals. Despite the singularity of his response, I share
Dr. Tabibi’s comments as they provide a valuable contrast in the data for how practitioners
make sense of cis women’s unwanted pain. Moreover, racializing Asian cis women’s vaginas
as “small by nature” works to render the monster cock a result of racialized difference in
genital size. According to physicians’ typology of racialized genitals, which I present later
in this chapter, this discursive move naturalizes and normalizes the particularly white male
body.
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“I’m small by nature”: Naturalizing the ‘Tight Asian Pussy’
During our two-and-a-half-hour interview, Dr. Tabibi was called away by his staff on several
occasions for patient consultations. While Dr. Tabibi was on a conference call with a patient
complaining of pain, I stayed in his office passively listening to top 40 soundtracks playing
down the hall at his receptionists’ desk. Glancing around Dr. Tabibi’s office, I observed his
ornate wooden desk and filing cabinets strewn with printed medical journal articles and
copies of his patents from the FDA. In addition to housing medical texts, his shelves served
as temporary storage for tubes of cream, Tubigrip bandages, and boxes of antibiotics placed
haphazardly among decorations, family photos, and awards. On the shelf nearest me is a
four-by-five postcard with a photo of Laura and George W. Bush. The former First Lady
and US President are pictured posing in a field of grass with blurred figures of deciduous
trees in the background on their 1,600 acre Prairie Chapel Ranch home in Texas.16 Wearing
button-up shirts with a matching hue of cornflower-blue, the pair are smiling at the camera
embracing each other. This postcard—ostensibly depicting marital bliss—is propped up
against leather-bound religious texts, supported at the base by a model replica of a white,
opaque, testicular implant.
During my interview with Dr. Tabibi, I learned that the Bush family postcard was
an illustrative anecdote from my research in the field, reflective of some of Dr. Tabibi’s
political views that carried over into his medical practice. Legislation from the second Bush
administration—such as “The Healthy Marriage Initiative”—sought to promote marriage
in ways that privileged heterosexual, particularly monogamous couples (Whitehead 2012)
as the foundation of US society at the expense of other family structures (Heath 2013,
2009)—a platform that I learned was congruent with Dr. Tabibi’s investment in heterosexual
monogamy in his medical practice. Without prevarication, Dr. Tabibi made clear during our




interview that he prioritized heterosexual patients in long-term, committed, monogamous
relationships when granting cis men access to male enhancement technologies.17
The purpose of male enhancement procedures, as Dr. Tabibi describes them, is to
help couples “enjoy better, so together they can work with each other.” The best candidate
for male enhancement, according to Dr. Tabibi, is a man who is married or has a long-term
girlfriend on the track to marriage, is sexually and romantically monogamous, and is not
looking to “pick up people” on the “market”. Prioritizing monogamous men, Dr. Tabibi
wants his male enhancement patients to have a woman partner who can “use” his enhanced
penis. In Dr. Tabibi’s medical practice, heterosexual monogamy unlocks the gate to genital
technologies.
In very rare cases, however, heterosexual monogamy also justifies the removal of
Dr. Tabibi’s penile implants. Despite declaring elsewhere in our interview that “Too big
doesn’t mean anything”, Dr. Tabibi did share patient cases where “too big” meant a lot
to his patients’ partners. Despite insisting elsewhere in our interview that “I don’t think
any woman asks her husband or her boyfriend to make [his penis] smaller”, the long-term
girlfriends looking to marry some of Dr. Tabibi’s male enhancement patients have asked him
to reverse their partners’ penile augmentations so as to return their penises to a smaller
size. In some cases, Dr. Tabibi has acquiesced and reduced the size of or removed patients’
penile implants. Recounting a patient case while discussing monster cocks in our interview,
Dr. Tabibi shared the following experience about a patient and his partner.
[T]he physician should be smart enough you know to adjust [the implant size]
based on the patient’s skin, patient’s desire, and sometimes partner. I removed
some of the implants after patients got married because they got married to
the Chinese girl and she was very small. So I have to change or decrease the
size. So I went from extra large to large. [...] Which she said “I cannot have
it, I cannot enjoy sexual activity with my boyfriend. If I were to get married to
him, [his penis] is too big”. So they decided, with a lot of sorrow and crying and
everything to remove it. And I did. [...] The user of this product, she has the
17Dr. Tabibi’s preference to perform male enhancement procedures on married men is reflective of broader
patterns within cosmetic medicine. For example, Gorney and Martello (1999) developed the SIMON
criteria, an acronym that refers to Single, Immature, Male, Over-expectant, and Narcissistic. The authors
of this criteria encourage practitioners to avoid performing cosmetic surgery on patients with these
characteristics.
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right also at some point to [decide his penis size]. So we have to be very very
careful, very very careful. My position in this situation is very tough. Because
the guy says “make it as big as possible” and she says “no please be careful,
I cannot adjust [to] that [implant] because I’m small by nature”. I have to go
between [his] and [her desires]. I have to be very careful to manage this situation.
[emphasis added]
Alongside framing gender as relational opposites in the quote above, Dr. Tabibi also
perpetuates a heteronormative project that requires ‘female’ and ‘male’ bodies to fit
together through vaginally-penetrative sex and monogamous relationships. For example,
Dr. Tabibi says his patient’s girlfriend “cannot enjoy sexual activity with [her] boyfriend.
If [she] were to get married to him, [his penis] is too big”, suggesting that his penis is too
big for their sexual relationship—and by implication their future marriage—to survive.
Dr. Tabibi expresses that it is important for him to consider “[t]he user of this product”,
meaning his patients’ wife or long-term girlfriend who he says “has the right” to decide
what size penis her sexual partner can have. The permanence of physical
incompatibility—meaning a mismatch in genital size—between married or long-term,
monogamous, heterosexual couples convinces Dr. Tabibi to remove a patient’s implant
that the impermanence of a casual girlfriend may not.
While it may seem as though Dr. Tabibi is supporting a woman in the case cited
above by deciding “to change or decrease the size” of her partner’s penile implant with the
hope that she can “enjoy sexual activity with [her] boyfriend”, Dr. Tabibi suggests he is
reversing his implant in order to support their path to marriage by helping them overcome a
mismatch in genital sizes that he believes is biologically-determined by race. Dr. Tabibi only
believes that a penis can be “too big” when he estimates there is a size mismatch between
differently-racialized genitals. At another point in my interview with Dr. Tabibi (see the
section “The ‘Genetics of Race’ and the Racialization of Black Men’s Genitals” below), he
exclusively spoke about Black men with enhancements as capable of having monster cocks
that could be “too big” for penetration. In this quote, however, he constructs the vagina
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of one patient’s partner as “small by nature” on the basis of her being a “Chinese girl”
(woman).18
Discourses that naturalized cis Asian women’s vaginas as small were also common
in online support sites like Enhancement Forum.19 For example, cis men interested in penis
augmentation regularly advised each other to seek out cis Asian women as sexual partners.
The cheapest, easiest and quickest way to feel you have a larger penis is to go
out with a woman with a small pussy or young women who have no children.
Asians have small vaginas by design. Try it, you will never go back. [emphasis
added]
As I have identified throughout this manuscript, cis women’s bodies are often used by
cis men as a conduit through which they gauge their masculinity and accomplish phallic
masculine embodiment. Cis men interested in male enhancement often conceptualize their
own sense of masculinity and of having a large penis in relationship to bodies they perceive
to be smaller or softer.
These cases demonstrate how cis women’s bodies are understood through a racial
hierarchy, in this case marked by ‘yellow fever’. Feminist philosopher Robin Zheng (2016)
describes ‘yellow fever’ as a “racial fetish” or an objectifying and otherizing sexual preference
for Asian people, commonly women (401). The term centers the racism of the concept ‘yellow
peril’, but emphasizes how that racism is sexually objectifying. ‘Yellow fever’ is partially
an effect of the racializing stereotype perpetuated by Dr. Tabibi that the morphology of
genitals is ‘naturally’ determined by race. Drawing on the concept of ‘yellow fever’ helps us
to understand that the stereotype of cis Asian women’s “small vaginas” offers cis men who
are anxious about their penis size the “cheapest, easiest and quickest way” to calm their
anxieties and make them feel like masculine men.
Racialized stereotypes of Asian women as small, subservient, and sexually exotic
are not new; they are socially and historically-rooted in institutionalized racism. Early
18After male enhancement physicians told me that penis size is determined by race, I asked them if the
vagina also varies in size by race; however, unlike Dr. Tabibi, most practitioners declined to comment on
the vagina generally, saying that it was outside of their expertise.
19At the time of my virtual observations, upwards of one hundred posts eroticized Asian women as small,
hyper-feminine, or having “tight pussies”.
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nineteenth century immigration law in the United States, for example, prevented
independent Asian women from immigrating, thereby foreclosing many of the labour
opportunities of those who were allowed to enter the country. As a result, Asian women
immigrants commonly laboured as indentured servants or in sex work (Jiwani 2005; Võ
and Sciachitano 2000), contributing to the stereotype that Asian women are passive and
sexually available. In the twentieth century, when US soldiers invaded several Asian
countries such as the Philippines, Japan, and Vietnam, they sexually exploited local
women as the “spoils of war” (Patel 2008, 119). Under the conditions of war and the
threat of sexual violence, the women who were compliant (but still not consenting) were
read by US soldiers as submissive and child-like (Patel 2008). The exotification of the
‘Asian pussy’ as object, as commodity, as available particularly to white men thus has
roots in structural, anti-immigrant racism and imperialist sexual violence. Stereotypical
portrayals of cis Asian women being hypersexual, exotic, and docile are made flesh in the
figure of the ‘tight Asian pussy’.
The concept of Orientalism (Said 1978) is particularly germane to thinking about
cases of ‘yellow fever’ and the racialization of the ‘Asian pussy’. Orientalism is a form of
cultural imperialism that constructs the Oriental Other—who is particularly
feminized—as essentially exotic, erotic, and sexually available. The racialized
representations of the ‘Asian body’ perpetuated by both forum members and physicians
like Dr. Tabibi—particularly the naturalization of Asian people’s vaginas being small “by
design” or “by nature”, respectively—are, according to Orientalism, a means to dominate
and control othered, racialized populations. The ‘tight Asian pussy’, much like the
discourse of the ‘big Black dick’ that I discuss in the next section, functions discursively
within male enhancement practice to render the monster cock a result of racialized
difference in genital size. Working together, these discourses normalize and naturalize the
particularly white male body.
Dr. Tabibi’s comments also work to address the dilemma created by the monster
cock, namely, the tension between successful heterosexual penetrative practices that confirm
the body as male, and phallic masculine embodiment that confirms a man’s masculinity.
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He elects to prioritize the male body’s “purpose” within heterosexual monogamy. In other
words, Dr. Tabibi shores up the male body of his patient by prioritizing its “function”
(to borrow Dr. Rosenburg’s term) of successful heterosexual penetrative practices instead
of reaffirming phallic masculine embodiment by maintaining the size of the monster cock.
Notably, Dr. Tabibi was the only physician in my sample to do this; the majority of doctors
in my sample prioritized maintaining the size of a cis man’s enhanced penis.
In the next section, I analyze practitioners’ discourses that identify the ‘genetics
of race’ as the determinant of penis size in order to contextualize the other way in which
male enhancement practitioners attempted to make sense of cis women’s unwanted vaginal
pain from penetration; namely, by essentializing the bodies of cis Black men with sickle
cell anemia (an often racialized disease) for having ‘unnaturally’ large penises as an effect
of their ‘race’. In the following sections, I foreground how physicians’ conceptualization of
race as a biological reality—rather than a social product—inform their understandings of
who could be physically equipped with a monster cock, and therefore, who could even be
capable of causing cis women vaginal pain through penetration.
The ‘Genetics of Race’ and the Racialization of Black Men’s
Genitals
In the case that dyspareunia and the ‘tight Asian pussy’ do not sufficiently explain cis
women’s pain from vaginal penetration—meaning, when rendering cis women responsible
for vaginal pain does not effectively defend the contours of cis masculinity and male
bodies—physicians discursively gesture to racialized male genitals. As I demonstrated in
the previous section, ‘female’ genitals racialized as Asian are constructed as “small by
nature”; in this section, I show how ‘male’ genitals racialized as Black are framed as
unnaturally ‘excessive’, as the only possible monster cocks that are responsible for cis
women’s pain from penetration. These discourses of the ‘big Black dick’ and the ‘tight
Asian pussy’ function to normalize and naturalize particularly the white male body,
defending its contours as incapable of causing cis women pain.
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Before I share the practitioner’s remarks that (de)naturalized racialized genitals,
however, it is important to first set the stage for how these comments fit into the overarching
discourses on race and penis size mobilized by the male enhancement practitioners with
whom I spoke for this project. A few physicians in my sample challenged the common
perception that penis size is related to—if not determined by—race. For example, Dr. Harris
disrupted racializing discourses when he remarked “I’ve seen as many white men with long
penises as I’ve seen Black men. I don’t think there’s a racial difference frankly.” Offering
alternative explanations for different size penises that seem to move beyond race, Dr. Allen
and Dr. Fraser proposed that penis size is related to height and overall “body habitus” or
build.20
Dr. Fraser acknowledged that a size mismatch between the genitals of his male
enhancement patients and their sexual partners might cause pain through penetration. I
asked Dr. Fraser if there is anything he could do to help cis men who would like to have
penetrative sex with their partners, but currently cannot because the monster cock size of
their penises causes their sexual partners pain, to which he responded cautiously, pausing
between sentences:
I can’t think of what would help other than using toys on the partner to
perhaps loosen the sphincter or the vaginal introitus... That would be my only
recommendation... But also sometimes you may have size mismatch just
because of the body habitus of one person to the other. So say that you have a
petite female dating a basketball player. So there’s only so much she’s going to
be able to handle. [emphasis added]
Like Dr. Schneider and Dr. Tabibi, who claimed that vaginal pain from penetration was
a “female problem”, Dr. Fraser also began his answer by rendering cis women’s bodies
responsible for the unwanted pain they can experience from monster cock penetration.
Cis women’s vaginal introitus may be ‘tight’, according to Dr Fraser’s framing. His only
20Doctors Harris, Allen, and Fraser were not able to reference any scientific evidence in support of their
claims accounting for differences in penis size. The anecdotal confirmations they provided from their
medical practices are not representative of the general population; they are selective of the men who are
not only concerned about their penis size, but are also interested in, and can afford out-of-pocket expenses
for medical appointments and elective interventions. In other words, anecdotal evidence of the variance in
penis sizes from physicians’ medical practices offers a narrow snapshot of the population, and therefore,
cannot be representative.
215
suggestion to help a cis man who is causing his partner unwanted vaginal pain is for him
to use toys “on the partner to perhaps loosen the sphincter”. Notably, Dr. Fraser did not
recommend alternative sexual practices that do not center penetration.
By the end of his response, however, Dr. Fraser reluctantly admits that
“sometimes you may have size mismatch just because of the body habitus of one person to
the other”. Unlike Dr. Tabibi and Dr. Rosenburg who racialize this mismatch in genital
size, Dr. Fraser communicated that significant differences in height between a “petite
female” and her “basketball player”-sized partner can account for a “size mismatch” in
genitals. Acknowledging the limits of the vagina’s “capacity for expansion” (to borrow Dr.
Tabibi’s words), Dr. Fraser finally concedes at the end of his comment that “there’s only
so much she’s going to be able to handle”, a point that every other practitioner in this
research did not confirm.
Dr. Allen’s explanation appears to move beyond race, at least initially. To
complicate his response, however, he suggested that while penis size is related to a
person’s height, he claimed that one’s height is determined by their race. In response to
my question “in your professional opinion, is there anything that accounts for differences
in penis size?” Dr. Allen said:
Well supposedly the African Americans- or just Africans have a larger penis. I
think some ethnic groups have larger or smaller penises, Africans [are] maybe
in general taller than white Caucasians. Asians have smaller penises, but most
Asians are smaller men, they’re smaller people, and so they would have smaller
penises too. [...] but I’m not sure about what medical statistics [say]. [emphasis
added]
While Dr. Allen cites height as a determinant of penis size, he racializes height as determined
by race categories (or what he terms “ethnic groups”),21 whereby “Africans [are] maybe in
general taller than white Caucasians” and “most Asians are smaller men, they’re smaller
21Practitioners regularly conflated terminology during our interviews—not just about gender, sex, and
sexuality as I demonstrate in Chapter 5—but also language about race and ethnicity. The terms ‘African’,
‘Asian’, and ‘white Caucasian’ do not refer to ethnicities, but rather, racial classifications tethered to
regionally undifferentiated geographies that include heterogeneous groups of people. My suspicion is that,
because conversations about race in Canada and the US are particularly contentious, using the language
of ‘ethnicity’ functions to defuse tension and shelter white fragility (DiAngelo 2018).
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people”, thereby reaffirming by the transitive property that genital size is related to—
if not determined by—race. In many ways, the medical field of male enhancement coheres
around this notion of the ‘average’ penis size as a reference to help determine which patients
are deserving candidates of penis augmentation, and what are realistic, post-enhancement
goals in terms of penile dimensions. Thus, male enhancement specifically materializes a set
of social relations that Foucault (1999) described as “a type of power [...] that can only
function thanks to the formation of a knowledge that is both its effect and also a condition
of its exercise” (52).
Similar to Dr. Allen—and as a result of racializing penis size—the majority of the
male enhancement practitioners who participated in this research invoked the stereotype
of the “big Black dick” (Lemons 1997, 38; see also Poulson-Bryant 2006) as if it were a
material, biological reality of Black cis men’s bodies. For example, in the next vignette, Dr.
Martin estimates the ‘average’ penis sizes according to different race categories, claiming
that men from “African countries” have the largest median penile length.
There have been a lot of studies and ninety percent of the population fall
between five inches and seven inches [in penile length]. [...] [Penis size] varies
from ethnicity to ethnicity [...] I think in North America those [five to seven
inches] are pretty much I guess what would be considered average versus
Africa versus Asia. [...] And then for different cultures [their penis size] was
bigger or smaller or whatever. I think like South Korea and North Korea was
on the smaller side, maybe about four-and-change [inches] as their median
[penile length] and I think there was some African countries where the median
[penile length] was about seven, seven-and-a-half or so [inches]. But I think in
North America it was pretty much around five-and-a-half [inches in penile
length]. [emphasis added]
Like other male enhancement practitioners who I quote below, Dr. Martin seems to
confuse race (or “ethnicity”) with geography—specifically conflating whiteness with
“North America”—when he describes the average penis length of cis men in North
America “versus Africa versus Asia”. Rather than a mere accident, it is an effect of
whiteness that people exclude Mexico—a country that has a large population of people
who are not white—from North America. Moreover, conflating “North America” with
whiteness erases the growing communities of people of colour in Canada and the United
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States,22 as well as the existence of Indigenous Peoples on this land for thousands of years
before white settler colonists violently claimed it as their/our own.
At any rate, other doctors’ assessments of the ‘average’ race-based penile length
differed numerically from Dr. Martin’s estimations; however, the racial hierarchy remains
intact. Dr. Tabibi approximated that the lowest value within the range of penis sizes starts
with Asian men having three-and-a-half inches in penile length, which he characterized as
“below average”. The highest value Dr. Tabibi calculated within the range of penis sizes
according to race categories is among Black men having “at least four-and-a-half” inches in
penile length. White men’s penile average was located somewhere in the middle of those two
figures. Notably, the penis sizes of other groups were largely absent from physicians’ talk
mapping out penis size according to race categories. The estimated penile measurements
practitioners cited in our interviews are mostly anecdotal from their medical practices, not
from peer-reviewed studies.23
More importantly, physicians’ talk about median race-based penile length carries
with it the assumption that there is more inter-group variability between ‘races’ than intra-
group variability in terms of penis size. In other words, male enhancement practitioners like
Doctors Allen, Martin, Tabibi—and as I share below, Dr. Rosenburg too—assumed there is
more variability in penis length between race categories (i.e. Asian, Black, white, etc.) than
within them. In concert with physicians’ racialized hierarchy of penis sizes that I described
above, most of the doctors who participated in this project—including Dr. Rosenburg—
insisted that penis size was determined by the ‘genetics of race’, which as I demonstrate
22See Franklin (2014) for evidence of the changing demographics in the United States. See Statistics Canada
(2017) for the growing number and proportion of the visible minority population in Canada from 1981
projected until 2036.
23Four of the twenty practitioners from my sample did not provide estimates for the race demographics
of their patients. Out of the sixteen who did provide race demographics, most physicians’ practices have
10-40% Black or African American patients; Latinx or Hispanic men typically make up 10-30% of doctors’
patient base; and Asian men typically number between 5% and 25% of physicians’ patients. White men—
or what most practitioners referred to as “Caucasian” men—typically formed the largest group, making
up 50% or more of patients in a doctor’s medical practice. However, in rare cases white patients were
not the single largest group; in Dr. Russo’s practice, for example, about 40% of patients are African
American, 40% are “Caucasian” (of which 10% are Latinx), and 20% are Asian. Notably, Mr. Bennett
could not recall having Black or Asian patients. Only Dr. Midden disambiguated broader racial categories
to identify patients according to countries of familial origin.
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in Chapter 2, is unsubstantiated by current medical science—and may not be possible to
substantiate—despite the persistent social energy dedicated to ‘finding’ racialized difference
in genital dimensions.
When Dr. Rosenburg talks about race in the context of our interview, he oscillates
between treating race as a proxy to mean, as he formally defined it, “restricted gene
pools”, but in the context of our conversation, he also treats race as a meaningful label for
understanding ‘natural’ differences between social groups of human beings. For example,
when I asked Dr. Rosenburg, “is there anything that accounts for different penis sizes in
men?” he answered that size is resultant from “genetic triggers” and “racial traits”. “Well
different gene pools have different size penises” Dr. Rosenburg asserted. “I I I I in no way
mean to be racist or insult any ethnic group, but Asian men have smaller penises than
western men.” In this comment, Dr. Rosenburg spoke about race as “gene pools”, but then
also treated “Asian men” as a homogeneous group of people (despite having heterogeneous
“gene pools”), whose categorization is meaningful in order to understand them as separate
and different—especially in terms of penis size—from other ‘races’.
When I asked Dr. Rosenburg to clarify what he meant by “western” in his comment,
he explained “if I had ever been born in China, I’d still have a bigger penis than most
Chinese men. I mean not me personally, but somebody with my genetic background. I think
it is racial.” Like Dr. Martin—who conflates whiteness with “North America”—when Dr.
Rosenburg refers to “western” men like him, it is clear that he is referring to them as white,
not in terms of “western” genes, but by flattening whiteness with culture and geography.
Like Dr. Martin, perhaps Dr. Rosenburg conflates the two because he imagines the west as
white, as belonging to white people. Nevertheless, Dr. Rosenburg formally defines race in
terms of gene pools, but employs race according to socially-produced categories of difference
such as “Asian” or “North American”. Later in our interview, Dr. Rosenburg recognized
that “People that intermarry, okay all bets are off”24 in terms of predicting the penis size
24Instead of framing racist oppression as a consequence of inequality making some differences matter
politically by allocating benefits to whiteness, Dr. Rosenburg’s complete quote conceptualizes racist
oppression as an inevitable outcome of diversity and difference: “People that intermarry, okay all bets
are off. That’s what we should all do, we should all be forced to marry somebody of a different gene pool.
Think of the world peace that would result.” Here I am reminded of Ta-Nehisi Coates’s (2015) words:
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of their children, meaning that when “gene pools” are not “restricted”, “racial traits” are
not clearly defined. Yet despite recognizing that race categories are not mutually exclusive,
Dr. Rosenburg applies race categories as if they are. Dr. Rosenburg’s conceptualization and
deployment of race imposes rigid classifications upon a continuum of physical traits that
cannot be neatly organized into discrete categories.
Dr. Rosenburg’s conflicting usage of the term ‘race’ was apparent throughout his
other statements during our interview, which I share here to help contextualize his
remarks that denaturalize the penises of Black cis men. For example, below Dr. Rosenburg
oscillates back and forth between commenting on the genetics of observable traits (like
body fat distribution within a restricted gene pool), and social categories of ‘race’ (such as
“Hottentots”) as if these groupings are biologically meaningful and scientifically accurate,
rather than categories that are socially-produced through white supremacy and
colonialism. When I asked Dr. Rosenburg to explain what he means by ‘race’ after he
clarified his usage of the term ‘western’, he replied with such conviction in the genetics of
race categories that he laughed at the absurdity of anyone claiming otherwise.
In fact there are genetic groups, the Hottentots have gigantic steatopygia, rumpty
dumpty, they have these huge butts that you could put a glass on top of. And
those are a genetic trigger, it’s a racial trait. Can’t call me racist for knowing
that lumpty dumpty or steatopygia is a biological phenomenon restricted to a
certain race of people, it just is. [emphasis added]
Dr. Rosenburg’s assertions about the biology of race cannot be dissociated from the
scientific racism and histories of colonialism that inform his understanding of racialized
bodies. Overlapping referentially with the fat-oppressive language in Dr. Rosenburg’s
quote above is the racist, colonialist language of the Dutch word “Hottentots”—meaning
“stutterers” (Hughes 2006)—which was historically forced upon the Khoikhoi Indigenous
group of South Africa by Dutch colonists (Gilman 1999).
“‘race’ itself is just a restatement and retrenchment of the problem. You see this from time to time when
some dullard—usually believing himself white—proposes that the way forward is a grand orgy of black and
white, ending only when we are all beige and thus the same ‘race.’ But a great number of ‘black’ people
already are beige. And the history of civilization is littered with dead ‘races’ (Frankish, Italian, German,
Irish) later abandoned because they no longer serve their purpose—the organization of people beneath,
and beyond, the umbrella of rights” (115).
220
The image of the “Hottentot” was introduced to the British public through
ethnological show business—the exhibition of people of colour to ‘educate’ and scintillate
white audiences for a profit. In one of these exhibitions from 1810, a British man and a
Dutch colonist of South Africa caged and abused a San woman named Saartjie Baartman
while displaying her body to white audiences in London. They gave her the stage name
“Hottentot Venus” as a joke to highlight the incompatibility of European ideals of beauty
with Black bodies (Lindfors 1996). Historiographer of African literature Bernth Lindfors
(1996) explains the contemporary purchase of the term ‘Hottentots’.
Because [Saartjie Baartman] was displayed, treated, and conceptualized as
little better than an animal, the Hottentot Venus remains even today a potent
symbol of Africa’s supposed degraded backwardness. Cuvier [a French
naturalist] compared her to a monkey or an orangutan, scientifically
dehumanizing her and her kind. It was this sort of biological slur that
reinforced European beliefs that Africans were closer to the lower order of
brutes than to human beings. (210-211) [emphasis added]
What Lindfors demonstrates is that the nomenclature ‘Hottentot’ continues to elicit racist,
dehumanizing understandings of Black bodies that positions white bodies as normative,
and white people as superior knowers of the ‘natural’ world through white supremacist,
western ‘science’. Indeed, sexological and anatomical literature written by white scholars
describes the dissected pelvises and—as Dr. Rosenburg calls them—the “huge butts” of the
Hottentots as “sufficiently well marked to distinguish [them] [...] from those of any of the
ordinary varieties of the human species” (cited in Snorton 2017, 23). Shortly after Saartjie
Baartman died, her genitals were cast in wax molds and her body in plaster; up until 1982,
these molds were displayed to the public as a means of distinguishing the genitals and bodies
of Black people from those of white bodies as the norm (Lindfors 1996).
In addition to Dr. Rosenburg’s use of the Dutch name ‘Hottentots’ and the
histories of racist, colonialist violence that it carries, he also employed the medical term
“steatopygia”,25 defined as “an excessive development of fat on the buttocks that occurs
chiefly among women of some African peoples especially the Khoisan” [emphasis added].
25Merriam-Webster, s.v. “steatopygia (n.),” accessed September 18, 2019, http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/steatopygia.
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This term already contains within it the racist, sexist, and fat-oppressive assumption that
the bodies of Black women are in excess of the normative body, defined in the western
imaginary as white, male, and thin. As historian Sander Gilman (1999) noted, “beginning
with the expansion of European colonial exploration, describing the form and size of the
buttocks became a means of describing and classifying the races. The more prominent, the
more primitive” (212). Dr. Rosenburg’s preoccupation with the size of the “butts” of this
group—much like fixating on the size of Black men’s penises—thus reinforces a colonialist
history of scientific racism. Dr. Rosenburg’s understanding of race categories—particularly
Black men’s bodies as having ‘unnaturally’ large penises—extends from the knowledge
claims of scientific racism and colonialist science.26
That Black men supposedly have the largest median penis size compared to the
median penile length of other ‘races’ meant to some male enhancement practitioners that the
only monster cocks that could possibly exist would be those of Black men. For example, while
discussing monster cocks in our interview, Dr. Tabibi implied that those who have undergone
male enhancement procedures—“especially” Black patients with penile augmentations—
could have a monster-sized cock.
[W]ith some of the sizes that we put, definitely the penis is very large. I’ve seen
that also. Especially when we have a few Black patients that originally were large
and they would like to get larger. So [one Black patients’ penis was originally]
five [inches], we change it to seven-and-a-half [inches] in girth. You know the
girth [is] so big that that’s unusual. [emphasis added]
26While explicitly racist claims were not characteristic of all my interviews with physicians (Dr. Fraser was
a notable exception), the majority of my participants did perpetuate racist stereotypes, white supremacist
ideologies, and/or phrenological ideas presented as objective science. For example, Dr. Wexler uses what
he calls a “human assessment technology” as part of his patient evaluation process to develop a tailored
treatment plan for each patient. This technology is “not a normal psychometric exam that identifies who
you are,” explained Dr. Wexler. “This one identifies what you are, and by going back to the basis of
what you are and being true to your nature as you go through life, you have less stress. [...] a person’s
physical presentation is a direct relationship to what they are. So [this assessment has] questions like
“are your features angular or rounded?” [...] “are your eyes this colour?”, “did you have uh premature
receding hairline?” “are you heavier around the middle, are you athletic?” [emphasis added]. Measuring
one’s physical traits—including facial features, eye colour, fat and muscle distribution—as a means to
predict one’s abilities, personalities, and “what they are” is awfully reminiscent of phrenology: a debunked
field of study that measured the physical dimensions of the skull to construct the mental abilities of
different ‘races’, and justify structural racism (see Stein 2015; Fausto-Sterling 2000).
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Like Dr. Schneider, who marked bead inserts into men’s penises as “really really weird” (see
Chapter 5), Dr. Tabibi’s characterization of Black men’s augmented penises as “unusual”
in size is not race-neutral. What doctors in Canada and the United States deem “weird”
and “unusual” is instructed by the norms, contexts, histories, and discursive regimes about
the body within contemporary allopathic medicine in the west. However, it would be an
interpretive leap to argue that Dr. Tabibi’s ambiguous characterization denaturalized Black
men’s penises; he did not invoke discourses that unequivocally refer to the nature of the
sexed body, biology, medicalization, or pathologization, etc.
Dr. Rosenburg was the only male enhancement practitioner from my sample who
explicitly denaturalized Black men’s genitals. I conclude this chapter by examining his
remarks in the following section. Despite the singular character of Dr. Rosenburg’s
statements, I share them below because—in terms of discursive strategies structured
through whiteness—his remarks overlap considerably with other practitioners’ arguments
about Black men’s genitals and with other physicians’ claims about racialized men’s
sexual behaviours.
Denaturalizing the ‘Big Black Dick’
After a short intermission in my conversation with Dr. Rosenburg—who after arriving
home from his commute had dinner with his wife—he returned to our interview to
continue discussing monster cocks, particularly the penises of men racialized as Black.
While attempting to make sense of how cis women could possibly experience unwanted
pain from monster cock penetration, Dr. Rosenburg suggested that the only men who
truly have monster cocks are Black men who have an illness that is highly racialized,
framing their bodies in contrast with the natural. When I asked Dr. Rosenburg if he has
seen any monster cocks in his medical practice, he explained:
I haven’t seen any naturally- the only freakishly large [penises of] men I have
seen who are so large that penetration is impossible are [the penises of] Black
men with sickle cell anemia who have reoccurring bouts of priapism who become
horribly disfigured and distended. [emphasis added]
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Based on the context of the conversation, it seems as though Dr. Rosenburg begins to say
that he has not seen any “naturally” large penises like monster cocks. Before finishing his
sentence, however, he abruptly redirects his remark seeming to suggest that, in contrast
with the natural, “the only freakishly large [penises of] men [that he has] seen who are so
large that penetration is impossible are [the penises of] Black men with sickle cell anemia”
[emphasis added]. By marshaling the spectre of the ‘freak’ in this comment—which has
historically been racialized (see Bogdan 1996; Cook Jr. 1996; Lindfors 1996) as well as
constructed as a corruption or failure of nature (see Garland-Thomson 1996)—Dr.
Rosenburg underscores his framing of Black, ill, monster cocks as unnatural. Dr.
Rosenburg’s techniques of denaturalization are equally apparent when he describes the
effects of priapism—the persistent and painful erections caused by sickle cell anemia—as
making Black cis men’s penises “horribly disfigured and distended”, lacking the “natural
contours” of the penis that he otherwise described in our interview.
Based on his remarks above, Dr. Rosenburg is able to characterize the penises of
ill, Black, cis men as “freakishly large” due to two co-occurring constructions of race.
First, Dr. Rosenburg’s (problematic) conceptualization of race as a biological reality
structures the manner with which he understands Black bodies generally—and Black
men’s penises specifically—through whiteness as the norm. Like other physicians in this
project, Dr. Rosenburg relies on and perpetuates the scientifically unsubstantiated
assertion that on average Black cis men have larger penises compared to other groups
divided by race. While some may view Dr. Rosenburg’s claim as positive or as a
compliment to Black men—especially given the way Canadian and US cultures value large
penises—to borrow from critical race scholar Yasmin Jiwani (2006), even “‘[p]ositive’
representations, like their negative counterparts, still serve the function of reinforcing the
superiority of whites by re-inscribing the inferiority of peoples of colour” (273). In this
case, the reinscription of inferiority onto Black men’s genitals is inferentially linked to
primitivism, which imagines Black bodies as ‘closer to nature’ (see Bello-Kano 2005;
Gilman 1999; S. Hall 1990).
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The ‘big Black dick’ invoked by Dr. Rosenburg and other male enhancement
practitioners is rendered non-normative by centering whiteness as the invisible norm (see
Lehman 2006). Like a racist Goldilocks parable, Black men are allegedly hypersexual and
have exceptionally large penises, Asian men according to this formulation are effeminate
and—as Dr. Rosenburg claimed himself—have small penises, whereas white men’s
sexuality and penis size are supposedly ‘just right’. By centering whiteness as the invisible
norm, not only are Asian men subordinated and rendered less-than-men, the racist
stereotype of the ‘big Black dick’ reduces Black men to their bodies—a technique whose
legacies trace back to pro-slavery ethnology in the United States27—while also reinforcing
the dangerous stereotype that Black men are sexually insatiable, violent (hooks 2004), and
perverse (Stein 2015).
According to gender and race scholar Melissa Stein (2015), the contemporary
construction of the Black “sexual menace” (218) is rooted in racialized gender, constructed
in late nineteenth century sexology as a codified sexual disorder ‘furor sexualis’, which
white scientists of race manufactured as a lack of self control alongside “abnormal
passions” (223) that were innate to the biology of Black men. As Stein (2015) points out,
‘furor sexualis’ constructed Black men as “simultaneously too much man and not man
enough. That is, they embodied brute masculinity without the manly restraint and
rationality of civilization” (223).
At the heart of Dr. Rosenburg’s claims, intended or not, is the figure of the
sexually-threatening Black man. This figure relied on the biologization of Black men as
naturally sexually violent, grounded particularly in the sexed body. At the time, the
foreskin of the penis and its “secretions”, for example, were constructed as “stimulating”
for any man, but for Black men allegedly created an “over-exuberant and impatient
virility” that—according to white scientists of race—was compounded by the large size of
Black men’s penises (cited in Stein 2015, 228). By locating the ‘propensity to rape’ in the
genitals of Black cis men, white scientists of race generated the “distinctly genital [...]
27For example, “[e]thnological proslavery arguments generally presented [...] that the very bodies of African
Americans were designed for labor whereas the bodies of (male) Caucasians were more suited for intellectual
pursuits” (Stein 2015, 73-74).
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solution” of castration (Stein 2015, 218), justifying various genital procedures on Black cis
men—including circumcision, removal of the testicles, and mutilation of the penis28—as a
means of protecting white women who were framed as vulnerable to Black men’s allegedly
uncontrollable and “abnormal” sexuality (223). White scientists of race reasoned that
genital surgery on Black men “could curtail sexual aggression among the most savage”,
and dovetailing with the rise of eugenics in the United States at the end of the nineteenth
century, white scientists of race celebrated that genital surgery would also render Black
men sterile (cited in Stein 2015, 219).
Throughout history, then, the construction of Black cis men and boys’ genitals as
‘overly-endowed’—or “freakishly large” as Dr. Rosenburg claimed—has contributed to the
white perception of Black cis men’s sexualities as ‘abnormal’; both Black cis men’s genitals
and sexualities were framed as responsible for sexual violence, and have operated as a
justification to mutilate, sterilize, and lynch Black cis men and boys as a result of centering
whiteness as both ‘civilized’ and the norm. To quote Scott Poulson-Bryant (2006) “once
upon a time we were hung from trees for being, well, hung” (7). The racialization of sexual
violence and the threat these racist stereotypes pose to boys and men of colour are not relics
from the not-so-distant past. The figure of the ‘Black rapist’ continues to be mobilized by
white people in contemporary Canada and the United States, including by white feminists.29
We continue to see the threat of violence play out in contemporary racist encounters; white
women and girls weaponize their white femininity, claiming vulnerability to the alleged
sexual aggression of boys and men of colour, especially Black boys and men (Dodd 2016).
The stereotype of the ‘big Black dick’ invoked by Dr. Rosenburg and other practitioners
28At the turn of the century, white scientists of race intended for castration to become an alternative to
lynching; however, castration was already a concomitant practice of the lynching spectacle. According to
Stein (2015), the act of “unsexing” (243) Black cis men during lynchings served as an initiation of white
boys into white supremacy whereby a “young white boy became a man by literally taking the manhood
of an African American” (238). Among other objects that served as mementos, white participants in the
lynchings of Black cis men and boys collected their severed genitals as postmortem souvenirs. Whether
castration was a understood at the time as a ‘progressive’ suggestion made by medical scientists seeking
authorial control over what the US should do to resolve the growing ‘race problem’, or an act carried
out by a lynch mob, the specter of castration in both scenarios functioned as a means of controlling and
subjugating Black people.
29For just one example of many, see Susan Brownmiller’s (1993) Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape.
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continues from its historical legacies to justify anti-Black racism, creating the conditions
that place Black boys and men in direct danger of police surveillance and state-sanctioned
violence, incarceration, and death (see Stein 2015; Jiwani 2011; Patton and Snyder-Yuly
2007; hooks 2004; A. Davis 1983).
The second way in which Dr. Rosenburg racializes and denaturalizes the penises of
Black cis men is by mobilizing sickle cell anemia as a racialized disease. A blood condition
characterized by the crescent shape of one’s red blood cells, sickle cell disease30 developed
as a way for the human body to resist the malaria parasite. As a result, sickle cell disease
affects people in regions with high rates of malaria (CDC 2018b), and is common among
those whose ancestors came from Central and South America, the Caribbean, Mediterranean
countries, sub-Saharan Africa, Saudi Arabia, and India (CDC 2019). The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) report that in the United States, for example, sickle cell
disease occurs most often in Black populations with about “1 in every 365 Black or African-
American births”,31 and to a lesser extent in “Hispanic-American” populations, occurring
“among about 1 out of every 16,300 Hispanic-American births” (CDC 2019).
Sickle cell disease, in both popular imagination and medical expertise, is often
constructed as a ‘Black disease’ (Bediako and Moffitt 2011). Contrary to this belief,
however, sickle cell anemia is not a race-specific disease, much less a ‘Black disease’; the
association between sickle cell anemia and Black people is actually representative of
geographical location and (ancestral) exposure to malaria (see Bediako and Moffitt 2011),
not ‘race’ as a biological reality. Anyone, including white people, can have sickle cell
anemia and its associated symptoms, such as the swelling and distension of one’s penis
from priapism.32 Yet Dr. Rosenburg did not claim that anyone with priapism would be
30‘Sickle cell disease’ is an umbrella term for various manifestations of the disease. The term ‘sickle cell
anemia’ refers to “the most common and most severe type of sickle cell disease” (NIH 2019).
31The CDC (2019) also reports that about “1 in 13 Black or African-American babies is born with sickle
cell trait (SCT)”, meaning they have inherited one sickle cell gene rather than the two copies that result
in severe symptoms.
32However, places that have high populations of white people (such as Canada, the United States, Europe,
Russia, and Australia) have also had the resources and political support to eliminate (see CDC 2018a; WHO
2016a) or considerably reduce the incidence of malaria in their territories (see Government of Canada 2016;
NSW Government Health 2016; WHO 2016b). With the significant reduction or elimination of malaria in
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unable to penetrate a partner (by definition of the term monster cock); he specifically
identified cis Black men with priapism as having “freakishly large” monster cocks in
contrast with the natural. Invoking this highly racialized disease, therefore, further enables
Dr. Rosenburg to essentialize cis Black men at the level of ‘race’ as the only people with
monster cocks capable of causing cis women unwanted pain through penetration.
Denaturalizing cis Black men’s penises on the basis of ‘race’ (in terms of genetics
and disease) places Black men and boys in danger, largely leaves unaddressed cis women’s
unwanted pain from monster cock penetration, and conceals other men’s sexual violence.
After all, the racialized framing of monster cocks in Dr. Rosenburg’s comments renders
invisible the sexual violence enacted by white men particularly, as well as non-Black men
of colour who—according to this formulation—do not have a racialized disease, nor the
necessary race-based genetics—and therefore, genital size—to even possess a monster cock
that would ostensibly enable them to enact this kind of violence against circlusive sexual
partners.
Like the ‘tight Asian pussy’, the ‘big Black dick’ functions discursively to
normalize the sexed bodies of particularly white cis men. If the “purpose” or “function” of
the penis is heterosexual penetration and reproduction, as some physicians suggest, and
failure to successfully engage in heterosexual penetrative practices threatens the maleness
of the body, then framing the Black male body as uniquely incapable of vaginal
penetration without causing cis women unwanted pain discursively constitutes the Black
male body as essentially, biologically different at the level of sex. This only reinforces the
histories of scientific racism that framed Black bodies as failing to embody sex according
to white standards (Snorton 2017; Stein 2015; Gill-Peterson 2014; Magubane 2014). On
the other hand, if phallic masculine embodiment—as a practice of dominance over
others—is accomplished through the monster cock, and Black cis men are framed within
medical discourse as the only people capable of having a monster cock at the level of
genetics and a racialized disease, then Black men’s subjectivities are reinscribed as
these regions, therefore, sickle cell anemia does not develop in their populations, which helps explain why
relatively so few white people have developed the condition.
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“embod[ying] brute masculinity without the manly restraint of rationality and
civilization” (Stein 2015, 223).
Naturalizing the White Male Body
Between Enhancement Forum members’ discourses about the monster cock, and male
enhancement practitioners’ discourses about the “purpose” of the male body, the figure of
the monster cock produces a tension between phallic masculine embodiment practices that
shore up cis men’s masculine dominance on the one hand, and successful heterosexual and
reproductive practices that confirm the body as male on the other. Within this chapter, I
presented how physicians attempt to reconcile this tension. Through this analysis, I
demonstrate that together the ‘reproductive body’, dyspareunia, the ‘tight Asian pussy’,
and the ‘big Black dick’ function discursively as technologies of the (un)natural that
reassert cis masculinity and the sex of particularly white male bodies as natural through
their relation to female and racially-marked bodies. By juxtaposing different bodies in
relation to the monster cock I was able to locate the seams and sutures for how cis men’s
bodies are constructed as natural through heterosexuality, reproduction, medicalization,
and race.
Practitioners invoked the ‘female reproductive body’ by naturalizing cis women’s
“capacity of expansion” to vaginally “accommodate” any size penis to shore up cis men’s
bodies as male through heterosexual penetrative practices, thereby denying the existence
of a monster cock that causes cis women vaginal pain. The threat of penetrative failure
posed by the monster cock is neutralized by grounding the nature of the male body in
its penetrative and reproductive “function” in relation to the ‘female reproductive body’.
In physicians’ limited attempts to acknowledge and explain cis women’s unwanted pain
from penetration, they cited dyspareunia, the ‘tight Asian pussy’, and the ‘big Black dick’.
Redirecting the “problem” of pain from monster cock penetration on to cis women’s bodies,
physicians invoke dyspareunia, which functions discursively as a ‘failure’ of the ‘female
reproductive body’ for undermining heterosexual ‘success’. Thus framing cis women’s sexed
229
bodies as ill, aging, and otherwise responsible for vaginal pain from penetration shores up
the naturalness of the male body.
Racializing Asian cis women’s vaginas as “small by nature”, and racializing Black
cis men’s penises as “freakishly large” both work to render the monster cock a result of
racialized difference in genital size while naturalizing and normalizing particularly white
men’s bodies. Both reinforce histories of racism that framed Asian cis women as passive,
hypersexual, and exotic; and Black bodies as aggressive, hypersexual, and perverse for failing
to embody sex according to white standards. (De)naturalization techniques have historically
been effective means for justifying the status quo and for absolving ourselves of changing
oppressive social arrangements. We can begin to transform oppressive social arrangements





The bodies of particularly white cis men are regularly centered in everyday life, but often
in ways that go un(re)marked. That there has been an abundance of feminist and
sociological research about medical interventions into the genitals of peoples who have
historically faced oppression, but there is such limited research about cis men’s genital
practices is in many ways reflective of the absent presence of the male body accomplished
through masculine disembodiment. This disembodiment is interlocking with the unmarked
categories of whiteness and cisness. By refocusing on male enhancement, this research
works to locate the seams and sutures that stitch the particularly white male body
together before and after genital transformation.
Given that minimal social science research has been conducted on male
enhancement generally, and that the extant somatechnic research comparing genital
transformations has largely focused on medical interventions into historically-oppressed
peoples bodies and not ‘male’ bodies, this investigation is unique in mapping out both the
incarnation of the male body through medical discourse, and its differential
materialization compared to other bodily becoming. Moreover, the existing bodies of
scholarship that investigate historically-oppressed peoples’ genital practices tend to
approach body ‘modification’ to evaluate the liberatory potential or oppressive pitfalls of
somatic transformation while also often maintaining a false dichotomy between nature and
technology. Departing from that scholarship, in this manuscript I examine cosmetic genital
procedures for cis men—not to ask if these body projects are good or bad, or if they
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produce ‘artificial’ bodies, or what these body projects necessarily mean—but to ask what
male enhancement does in the incarnation of bodies.
In many ways, this project about cis men has always, necessarily also been about
those who are othered. I demonstrate through this research how medical discourse renders
the particularly white male body as natural and normal, while (de)naturalizing the bodies
and/or identities of trans folks, cis women, and people of color in ways that work to
justify inequitable social arrangements. This dissertation focused on some of these
inequities, including gatekeeping trans folks’ access to appropriate medical care and
denaturalizing their post-operative bodies, lending legitimacy to the violence enacted
against them; erasing cis women’s pain from sexual violence, if not rendering their bodies
responsible for this pain through processes of racialization and medicalization; and
racializing the sexed bodies of Asian cis women and Black cis men in ways that contribute
to their construction as sexually docile or threatening, respectively, further entrenching
how they are socially made vulnerable to racist violence. As such, this project joins others
in deconstructing ‘the natural’ as a site through which power operates, and through which
so many justifications for inequity in Canada and the United States are fortified.
By comparing male enhancement with gender confirming genital procedures, I
traced the operation of various technologies of the natural within male enhancement that
suture cis men’s bodies together as naturally male. Male enhancement practitioners’
theory of gender acquisition posits that the male body is the site from which masculinity
naturally emanates, making cis men unquestionably eligible according to physicians to
receive male enhancement. Their authenticity as ‘real men’ was largely unquestioned, even
when their bodies failed to cite the regulatory norms of sex. This work demonstrates how
medical discourse constructs genital surgeries elected by cis men as an acceptable somatic
intervention for self improvement of their ‘natural male bodies’, and a reasonable and
predictable option to address suffering from social burdens like genital ridicule
(particularly by the ‘opposite sex’). For many male enhancement physicians, cis men’s
suffering served not as an indication that they needed access to mental health supports,
but that they were ideal candidates for male enhancement.
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Cis men’s suffering becomes a potential problem, according to practitioners, when
it is characterized as persistent dissatisfaction with their bodies, signaling a potential case
of Body Dysmorphia. In this case, most physicians agreed that any medical intervention
would cause harm to cis men’s identities as masculine. Other potential harms include penile
reduction surgeries or racialized interventions into the body which indicated to practitioners
that cis men were “really really weird” if not unstable, causing harm to whiteness and cis
masculinity. Compared to physicians’ concern about trans people regretting irreversible
surgical interventions, practitioners framed male enhancement as unlikely to cause cis men
regret, even if they may feel somewhat dissatisfied with the end results; the seat of regret
therefore rests in a permanent change to what physicians see as a ‘core’ identity of gendered
subjects, not a ‘minor’ change to their embodiment.
Gender confirmation surgery, on the other hand, is constructed by medical discourse
as a procedure that needs to be highly gatekept in case patients are “just going through
a phase” and are not actually trans, and as a somatic transformation that will not change
trans people’s inner problem of suffering from psychological instability. Doctors construct
transition surgeries as harmful and irreversible procedures to the nature of the sex trans
people were assigned at birth, concluding that trans people’s regret over somatic intervention
is inevitable because the nature of their sexed body will persist even after surgical transition.
Practitioners naturalize the sex both cis men and trans folks were assigned at birth, so only
cis men’s body projects are constructed as leaving their sexed bodies intact, thus casting
post-surgical trans bodies as artificial constructions.
Closing the gate to gender confirmation surgeries on the basis that they are
irreversible, while largely not gatekeeping male enhancement procedures—which are not
always reversible, safe, or efficacious—demonstrates the asymmetrical treatment of these
two groups of patients. Moreover, this differential gatekeeping reveals the dubious
foundation upon which doctors justify closing the gate to genital technologies for trans
patients, while keeping it open for cis men. Comparing multiple cases like these, we see
how trans folks are institutionally required to seek counseling in great part to avoid regret,
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whereas male enhancement practitioners simply mitigate cis men’s dissatisfaction and
disappointment with the results of penile augmentation.
Garner’s investigation (comparing gynecomastia with trans chest surgeries) and my
own shared considerable overlap in terms of the theoretical perspectives that oriented our
research, and our objects of analysis. Both of our projects were grounded in similar bodies:
of scholarship, of trans people, and of cis women and men. Both of our investigations used
a somatechnic method, and both produced similar conclusions. However, our respective
projects drew from different sets of medical experts, employed distinct methods (textual
analysis versus interviews), and analyzed separate locations of the body (chests versus
genitals) that carry with them discrete processes of pathologization (of chest tissue versus
body dysmorphia). The procedures involved (on cis men’s bodies) are also constructed
in contrasting ways: as correcting a medical pathology (gynecomastia) versus an elective
cosmetic procedure (male enhancement).
That the conclusions I drew from my comparative analysis largely corroborate the
arguments Garner produced—despite these dissimilarities—indicates the embeddedness of
doctors within medical discourse, and the consistency with which medical discourse enables
and constrains the differential materialization of trans and cis bodies and subjectivities
across distinct medical fields and within medical practice, not just codified texts. Because
not all of the discourses physicians invoked in our interviews exist in texts, and therefore,
“may leave only a thin and ambiguous historical residue” for textual analysis (Whitehead
2012, 21), this investigation makes a valuable contribution to mapping out their operation,
including how doctors employ and disrupt these discourses in their everyday practices.
Sharing practitioners’ dominant discourses alongside disruptions to these discourses—such
as Mr. Bennett’s unequivocal statement that his trans patients have never regretted somatic
transformation—offered a means of ‘talking back’ within medical discourse.
The ways in which Garner’s and my conclusions depart from one another are also
meaningful. That physicians—including those who work(ed) with trans people—do not
report a tension between weighing the potential harms related to gender dysphoria with the
potential harms from transition surgeries—only considering the latter—is a consequential
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finding in the materialization of bodies at the level of medical practice that was not captured
in codified texts. Moreover, that most practitioners recognize that they are not trained nor
qualified to evaluate patients’ suffering—much less the harms that are associated with that
suffering—yet in practice they largely accept cis men’s suffering and reject trans people’s
suffering undermines doctors’ claims that trans people have unstable psychological problems
that cis men do not. While the gatekeeping around male enhancement may be problematic
for a number of reasons, it reveals that there are other possibilities for how trans people’s
access to surgery could be managed—not as pathology, but as aesthetic surgery—thus
cracking open a fissure in medical discourse.
Both of our analyses demonstrate that physicians pathologize trans people largely
due to practitioners’ theories of gender acquisition—that gender is the effect of sex, rather
than its cause—which lies at the heart of their doubt in trans authenticity and their
concern about trans regret. Unlike the majority of gynecomastia patients in Garner’s
analysis, however, since male enhancement patients can also be pathologized with Body
Dysmorphic Disorder—albeit in different ways and to different degrees than trans patients
with Gender Dysphoria—this project also contributes to the literature by identifying a
rare overlap between the pathologization of trans and cis patients. While large bodies of
scholarship have investigated these two sites separately, bringing them in relation to each
other through a somatechnic method renders visible the boundaries and logics of doctors’
medical practices. Physicians were surprisingly consistent in their logics that internal,
diagnosable, psychological problems cannot be ameliorated through physical interventions.
In the case of trans patients, closing the gate to somatic transformation maintains the sex
they were assigned at birth as natural, and in the case of cis male enhancement patients,
closing the gate maintains normative conceptions of masculinity.
By examining physicians’ assessments of patient suffering, this project also maps
out the differential attribution of social burdens versus psychological problems to different
bodies and subjectivities, reflecting the discursive battlefield in the medical management of
trans and cis patients. In Garner’s (2011) analysis of gynecomastia, they found that cis men
conceptualized their conditions as having “robbed” them of their ‘natural’ bodies, signaling
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“a deep sense of injustice at what has been taken away, so that gynecomastia surgery [...is...]
imagined as giving back what is rightfully theirs [...] not a construction” (281). Similarly in
my own investigation, cis men and physicians imagined male enhancement not as a somatic
transition and not as construction, but as a remedy to their aggrieved entitlement to sexual
access—particularly to women’s bodies—that they were otherwise denied due to what they
imagine to be a result of their penis size, rather than, for example, their disinterest in giving
reciprocal sexual pleasure.
While I was unfortunately not the investigator to conduct interviews with cis
men, future research of cis men’s framing of suffering as though they are victims of an
unfair sexual economy merits deeper examination. That practitioners’ explanations for
their patients’ interest in male enhancement diagnose feminism as the problem for cis
men’s suffering—rather than the limiting, patriarchal gender expectations for men’s
bodies under capitalism—closely mirrors incel discourse (Srinivasan 2018), and
demonstrates how male enhancement is one of the currently accepted answers to the
problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy (Connell 1995). Men and masculinities scholars
researching the looksmaxing practices of extremist networks like incels may find significant
overlap with cis men enhancing their genitals (Cook 2018, see). Because of the potential
risks researchers face in terms of harassment, doxxing, and (sexual) violence associated
with conducting this kind of investigation, I join others (Schneider 2020; Huang 2016) in
calling on universities and institutional review boards to support scholars who take up this
research so they have institutional assistance to navigate potential vulnerabilities to cis
men’s—and potentially incel—violence.
By tracing physicians’ erasure and selective invocation of the monster cock and the
sexual violence perpetuated through monster cock penetration, I analyzed how physicians
attempt to resolve a tension between sexual practices that male the body, and dominance
practices—what I call phallic masculine embodiment—that accomplish masculinity. Reading
the monster cock in relation to discourses of the ‘female reproductive body’, dyspareunia,
the ‘tight Asian pussy’, and the ‘big Black dick’, I trace how male enhancement discourse
works to shore up the contours of whiteness, cis masculinity, and the male body through
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their relation to and dominance over female and racially-marked bodies. Only by analyzing
the monster cock relationally was I able to identify the seams and sutures of the natural
male body, and to understand the assumptions and prohibitions for monster cock bodily
being.
As one of the few somatechnic investigations into the male body (see Garner 2011;
Fox and Thomson 2009a, 2009b for a few exceptions), this research helps bridge men and
masculinities scholarship and somatechincs. Men and masculinities studies would benefit
from using a somatechnic method and theoretical approach to understand the social
materialization of the male body. While men and masculinities studies often relies on
non-male masculinity scholarship to disentangle masculinity from the male form, and
maps out the incarnation of the male body by identifying moments when the body fails to
cite the regulatory norm of sex—often by examining processes of medicalization—the
comparative analysis enabled through a somatechnic orientation would strengthen men
and masculinities scholarship by not having to rely on bodily failure as a necessary
analytical entry point. Somatechnics can specifically aid men and masculinities studies by
identifying the assumptions and justifications for particular forms of male embodiment
when juxtaposed with other forms of bodily being.
This research also makes a novel contribution to the literature by analyzing male
enhancement discourse from cis men’s online support sites like Enhancement Forum. While
previous research has examined cis men’s talk about their penises as ‘short’ in online forums
(Del Rosso 2011), there is no equivalent nor similar analysis of cis men’s talk about their
practices to augment their genitals. My analysis of Enhancement Forum discourse was
mostly limited to a pilot study to center existing discourses about male enhancement in my
interviews with physicians, and as supportive evidence in my analysis of the monster cock.
Future research on male enhancement would benefit from a more in-depth analysis of cis
men’s online talk, including about do-it-yourself genital practices.
This manuscript contains some undertheorized elements that warrant further
research. For example, while Dr. Tabibi racialized cis Asian women’s genitals as “small by
nature”, most male enhancement physicians in my sample did not respond to questions
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about the racialization of cis women’s bodies, claiming that the vagina was outside of their
area of expertise. As a result, the data I co-generated with practitioners was insufficient to
support a line of argumentation that the monster cock—as a representation of a racialized
mismatch between genitals—signaled practitioners’ investment in anti-miscegenation.
However, this could prove an important line of inquiry for future research on male
enhancement. Another undertheorized element in this present research that would benefit
from further investigation is gay men’s participation in male enhancement practices. A
comparative examination of how medical discourse constitutes their bodies would enrich
this analysis. Finally, as Karioris and Allan (2017) point out, the testicles are often
forgotten when considering the construction of masculinity and the male body. While
scrotal enhancements were technically included under the purview of this research, they
were sidelined both in my conversations with male enhancement practitioners, and in this
present analysis, and merit a closer examination.
I cannot predict how this dissertation and its descriptions, analysis, and conclusions
will be taken up by others. It is certainly possible that practitioners may change some of
their practices by referring cis men patients to mental health supports, screening them for
sexual violence, or tracking the incidence of regret after male enhancement. Given that this
is one of the few examinations of male enhancement from a social science perspective, it is
also possible that this research may contribute to how cis men fashion their narratives to
gain access to augmentation surgeries. After all, trans folks are not unique in tailoring their
statements to access medical knowledge and somatic transformation.
I have written this dissertation largely as a response to the ways in which the
‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ operate within medical discourse, with the understanding that
(de)naturalization techniques are not benign descriptions of reality, but bring into being
particular formations of sexed and racialized bodies and relations between them. I
acknowledge, as poststructuralist feminists insist, that this project on male enhancement
further brings bodies into being in unpredictable ways. To borrow Nikki Sullivan’s (2009)
words,
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I recognize that my contribution is no less an effect of the operations of power
particular to a given time and place—the somatechnologies, if you like—than the
work with which I engage. In other words, I acknowledge that the critical practice
I perform itself contributes to the formation and transformation of bodies (of
flesh, knowledge, politic) in heterogenerative and unpredictable ways. As such,
the intervention I make should not be understood in terms of a definitive answer
to a set of identifiable universalizable problems but as a necessarily delimited
offering that is open to ongoing (re)evaluation and modification. (314)
My contribution to the materialization of sexed and racialized bodies is also necessarily
delimited. That I am an outsider to the populations largely represented in this investigation
only confirms that my claims in this manuscript should be read as partial, a reflection of
my whiteness and social location as a cis woman, and held as cispicious1 until corroborated
by others.
What I hope, however, is that this research begins to locate the seams, cracks,
fissures, and ruptures in discourse. After all, Foucault suggests that the revolutionary
potential of discourse analysis is not in attempting to move beyond or outside of discourse,
but in identifying the alternative possibilities contemporary to current arrangements. The
significance of discourse analysis is its potential to open up new geographies of thought,
action, resistance, embodiment, and subjectivity. By studying male enhancement for its
discontinuities, I hope that the contents of this manuscript open up space for different
forms of bodily being and subjectivity. My aim was to trouble the binary between the
‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ body in an effort to show how no bodily being is (un)natural,
and to therefore, not only disrupt the justifications that naturalize inequity by grounding
them in our bodies, but to make an intervention into how bodies might come to matter
differently.
1‘Cispicious’ is a portmanteau of ‘suspicious’ and ‘cisgender’.
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Thank you for joining me for this interview. How much time do we have set aside today?
As I described in the consent form, I am studying how medical practitioners make decisions
in consultation with their patients about elective male genital procedures. The questions
in this interview will focus on your experiences performing [procedures] . Do you perform
any other procedures that might qualify for this study?
Have you had a chance to review the consent form? Do you have any questions? Do you
consent to participating in this interview?
Some of these questions may sound really basic or have obvious answers, but I’ve received
a lot of different and surprising responses from practitioners, so I’m interested in hearing
what you think. I’ll start the audio recorder now.
Warm-Up Questions
1. To start, can you briefly tell me how you became interested in [male enhancement] ?
• How many years have you been performing [procedures] ?
• Over the years, about how many patients have you performed these procedures on?
• Without disclosing sensitive information, can you tell me about the demographics of
the patients who come to see you? (Race, sexuality, socioeconomic status)
2. Who is an ideal candidate for these procedures? How do you decide if someone is ready
for them?
• What do realistic expectations for your procedures look like? What are unrealistic
expectations?
• Do you refer to any professional guidelines or publications when deciding whether to
take on a patient for these procedures?
270
• What kinds of things can someone say or do that tell you it is not a good idea to take
them on as patients / to perform a procedure on a patient?
• Do patients have any common experiences related to their decision to get these
procedures? If someone has these experiences, does that help inform your decision
to accept them as a patient?
• Do you consult with a patient about the impact the procedure will have on their sex
lives / partners / future partners? Do you ever consult with patients’ partners?
• You mentioned earlier that you perform these procedures on gay men as well. Can
you also tell me about your work with them?
• How would you react to a patient who wants this procedure in part so that they can
get a sexual partner? Or many sexual partners?
• Have you ever reversed a procedure that you (or another doctor) performed? Can you
tell me about those cases?
3. What is your professional opinion about research looking for the “average penis size”?
• If they use these figures in their practice: What is the average penis size? Where do
these figures come from?
• What accounts for different penis size in men? Do these numbers vary across different
groups of people? Why is that the case?
• Is there a relationship between body fat and penis size?
• Have you ever seen a patient who had a very large penis and wanted to augment their
penis with your procedures? Can you tell me more about this?
• Is it possible that any of your patients seeking a genital augmentation are intersex?
4. Can you think of a patient who did not fit the general description of who you typically
see? Can you tell me more about this experience?
• Have you ever decided to not perform an elective genital procedure on a prospective
patient? Can you tell me about this?
• Have you ever received unusual requests from patients?
• Are there patient requests that you would consider not anymore physically risky than
the procedures you normally perform, but are otherwise dangerous?
• Have you ever received requests from a patient to make his genitals smaller? Softer
or harder? Ribbed or textured? Curved? Differently proportioned? If requested by a
patient, would you perform any of these procedures?
• What does a natural-looking penis look like?
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• One doctor I spoke with has adopted a ‘harm reduction’ approach to patients who
request ‘unusual’ genital procedures by giving them a mild enhancement. What are
your thoughts on that?
• Have you ever seen a patient who had body dysmorphia? How can you tell if someone
has body dysmorphia?
5. The next few questions are inspired by some of the male enhancement forums I’ve seen
online and may seem a bit out of the ordinary. Feel free to take your time with them.
• A common question in these forums is “how big is big enough?” In terms of penis size
for your patients, how big is big enough?
• Some men on these forums talk about wanting, and sometimes receiving procedures
for what they call a “monster cock”—a penis so big that penetrative sex with their
partners is impossible or really painful. What are your thoughts on that?
• There is a forum for men who want to have penetrative sex, but cannot without hurting
their partners because their penises are very large. Is there anything you could do as
a doctor to help them?
• Some men online compare male enhancement procedures to genital mutilation. What
are your thoughts on that?
6. Have you ever asked a patient to seek professional counseling (before undergoing a
procedure)? Do you require patients to see a professional counselor?
• Why do you suppose that transgender people require counseling and a professional
letter written on their behalf to receive elective genital procedures and your cisgender
patients do not?
Cool-Down Questions
7. What do you think is the ideal role of medicine in terms of male enhancement?
• What is the most fulfilling aspect of your job?
• If you could share something about the work that you do with the general public,
what would you like them to know?
• Is there anything else that you would like to share with me?




Hello [participant’s name] ,
My name is Jennifer Thomas; I am a PhD student working with Dr. Travers in the
Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Simon Fraser University in Burnaby, BC
Canada. Starting in October 2014 I am conducting interviews via Skype with medical
practitioners who perform elective male genital procedures. I would like to invite you to
participate in my dissertation research exploring how medical practitioners make decisions
in consultation with their patients about elective genital procedures.
You are eligible to participate in this study if you perform elective procedures on male
genitalia, including, but not limited to penile length and girth enhancement, penile or
testicular implants, and adult circumcision. By participating, you will have the opportunity
to share your expertise and perspectives on elective male genital procedures. Most interviews
last about one hour.
Participating in this study does not pose many risks. I will keep your responses confidential
and your name, contact information and other identifying information private to the greatest
extent permitted by the law. I will not ask you to share information that would identify your
patients during our conversation. If you share identifying information, I will not include it
in my study. Please see attached for a sample of the consent form.
Please let me know if you have any questions. I look forward to hearing from you.
Jennifer Thomas
PhD Candidate, Sociology
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Simon Fraser University
8888 University Drive,
Burnaby, B.C. Canada V5A 1S6
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1. Study Title
An Ethnography of Male Genital Enhancement
2. Study Personnel
Principal Investigator Faculty Advisor Department Chair
Jennifer Thomas Dr. Travers Dr. Dany Lacombe
The Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Simon Fraser University
3. Study Invitation and Purpose
You are invited to participate in a study on how medical practitioners and men seeking 
male genital enhancement make decisions about surgical and do-it-yourself genital 
enhancement procedures. The results of this study will be used to inform our 
understanding of male genital enhancement. You will only be asked to engage in one 
interview which typically lasts for about one to two hours. The study will take place 
throughout Canada and the United States from August 2013 through August 2018. This 
research is being conducted for my PhD dissertation in Sociology at Simon Fraser 
University in Burnaby, BC Canada.
4. Participant Characteristics and Exclusionary Criteria 
You are eligible to participate in this study if you are a medical surgeon or medical staff 
person who performs or assists elective male genital surgeries, including, but not limited 
to penile length and girth enhancement, penile or testicular implants, adult circumcision, 
foreskin restoration, scrotal shaping, or penoscrotal webbing excision. You must be 19 




5. Voluntary Nature of Participation
During the interview, I will record our conversation with a digital audio recorder and by 
taking written notes. You may decline to have your voice recorded and notes taken 
during the interview. If you decide to participate, you may decline to answer any 
question or withdraw at any time without negative consequences. If you withdraw early, 
I will not delete or shred any data already gathered unless specifically requested by you.
6. Anticipated Benefits to Participants 
There are no direct benefits or monetary reimbursement for participating in this research.
By participating, you will have the opportunity to share your expertise and perspectives 
on elective male genital surgery.
7. Anticipated Risks to Participants
Potential risks in this study are very limited and will not exceed risks you would 
otherwise experience in your everyday life. If at any time during the interview you feel 
uncomfortable, at your request, I will stop the digital audio recorder, set aside my notes 
and ask if you would like to continue. You may stop the interview at any time without 
negative impact to your relationship with me or with Simon Fraser University.
8. Promise of Privacy 
I will keep your responses confidential and your name, contact information, and other 
identifying information private to the greatest extent permitted by the law. The records 
of this study will be kept private. No information that would identify you or your 
patients personally will be solicited during the interview. If you share information that 
will make it possible to identify you or your patients, I will not include this information 
in any of the transcriptions, written reports, or oral presentations. Descriptive details of 
the interview and our interaction may be recorded. In order to protect your privacy, I will
transport the audio file, my notes and this consent form in a secure lock-box. All 
research materials will remain at the private residence of the principal investigator. 
Notes and audio files will not be connected with your name, but with a code only known
by the principal investigator. I will keep the data in a secure location for up to 15 years. I
have taken great precautions to protect your privacy and keep your information 
confidential.
9. Organizational Permission
Permission to conduct this study at your organization may or may not have been 
obtained. Please ask the primary investigator for the updated status on organizational 
permission. The risk of your participation without the organization's consent is very 
minimal. I will keep your participation in this research confidential, which means I will 
not inform anyone, including anyone from your organization, that you have participated 
in this research.
275
10. Contacts and Questions
Please contact the principal investigator, Jennifer Thomas if you have questions about 
the research or if you are interested in obtaining the final research results. Complete 
contact information for the research team is noted on the first page of this form.
If you have any concerns about your rights as a research participant and/or your 
experiences while participating in this study, you may contact Dr. Jeffrey Toward, 
Director, Office of Research Ethics.
10. Statement of Consent
I have read and understand the above. All my questions have been answered. I am 19 
years of age or older. I agree to participate in this study. I have requested a copy of this 
form.
Participant’s Printed Name Signature                                                Date
Investigator’s Printed Name                          Signature                                                Date
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